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Second Series

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru



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“ So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the ‘third world’ as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote....the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.”

Indira Gandhi

**Selected
works of
Jawaharlal
Nehru**



BROADCASTING, NEW DELHI, 21 JULY 1952

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Second Series

Volume Nineteen

(16 July 1952–18 October 1952)

A Project of the
Jawaharlal Nehru
Memorial Fund

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PUBLISHED BY

Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund
Teen Murti House, New Delhi 110 011

ISBN 0 19 564193 0

DISTRIBUTED BY


Oxford University Press
YMCA Library Building, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi 110 001
Bombay Calcutta Madras
Oxford New York Toronto
Melbourne Tokyo Hong Kong

PHOTOTYPESET AND PRINTED BY

Rekha Printers Private Limited
A-102/1, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase II
New Delhi 110 020

General Editor

S. Gopal



FOREWORD

Jawaharlal Nehru is one of the key figures of the twentieth century. He symbolised some of the major forces which have transformed our age.

When Jawaharlal Nehru was young, history was still the privilege of the West; the rest of the world lay in deliberate darkness. The impression given was that the vast continents of Asia and Africa existed merely to sustain their masters in Europe and North America. Jawaharlal Nehru's own education in Britain could be interpreted, in a sense, as an attempt to secure for him a place within the pale. His letters of the time are evidence of his sensitivity, his interest in science and international affairs as well as of his pride in India and Asia. But his personality was veiled by his shyness and a facade of nonchalance, and perhaps outwardly there was not much to distinguish him from the ordinary run of men. Gradually there emerged the warm and universal being who became intensely involved with the problems of the poor and the oppressed in all lands. In doing so, Jawaharlal Nehru gave articulation and leadership to millions of people in his own country and in Asia and Africa.

That imperialism was a curse which should be lifted from the brows of men, that poverty was incompatible with civilisation, that nationalism should be poised on a sense of international community and that it was not sufficient to brood on these things when action was urgent and compelling—these were the principles which inspired and gave vitality to Jawaharlal Nehru's activities in the years of India's struggle for freedom and made him not only an intense nationalist but one of the leaders of humanism.

No particular ideological doctrine could claim Jawaharlal Nehru for its own. Long days in jail were spent in reading widely. He drew much from the thought of the East and West and from the philosophies of the past and the present. Never religious in the formal sense, yet he had a deep love for the culture and tradition of his own land. Never a rigid Marxist, yet he was deeply influenced by that theory and was particularly impressed by what he saw in the Soviet Union on his first visit in 1927. However, he realised that the world was too complex, and man had too many facets, to be encompassed by any single or total explanation. He himself was a socialist with an abhorrence of regimentation and a democrat who was anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with the necessity of mitigating economic and social wretchedness. His struggles, both within himself and with the outside world, to adjust such seeming contradictions are what make his life and work significant and fascinating.

As a leader of free India, Jawaharlal Nehru recognised that his country could neither stay out of the world nor divest itself of its own interest in world affairs. But to the extent that it was possible, Jawaharlal Nehru sought to speak objectively

and to be a voice of sanity in the shrill phases of the 'cold war'. Whether his influence helped on certain occasions to maintain peace is for the future historian to assess. What we do know is that for a long stretch of time he commanded an international audience reaching far beyond governments, that he spoke for ordinary, sensitive, thinking men and women around the globe and that his was a constituency which extended far beyond India.

So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. There is, as is to be expected in the speeches and writings of a man so engrossed in affairs and gifted with expression, much that is ephemeral; this will be omitted. The official letters and memoranda will also not find place here. But it is planned to include everything else and the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.

Indira Gandhi

New Delhi
18 January 1972

Chairman
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund

During the period 16 July to 18 October 1952 covered by this volume, Jawaharlal Nehru bestowed substantial attention on the question of Kashmir's relationship with India in the context of the decision of the State's Constituent Assembly to finalize its Constitution. Making a statement in the House of the People on 24 July, Nehru clarified that "the accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State was complete in law and in fact Jammu and Kashmir State is a constituent unit like any other." He added that according to the agreement arrived at following talks with Shaikh Abdullah and other leaders from Kashmir, a number of important parts of India's Constitution would be applied to Kashmir State though that State would be on a somewhat separate footing from the other States due to reference to the UN of the question and some other factors. The State would also have an elected head to be called Sadr-i-Riyasat.

Another development relating to the Kashmir question was the inconclusive ending of the third and final round of talks with the representatives of India and Pakistan in Geneva held by Dr Frank Graham. No agreement was reached as both sides differed on the quantum and character of the forces to be left in Kashmir before a plebiscite was held. India insisted that she would accept appointment of a plebiscite administrator only when she was satisfied that demilitarization as desired by her had been effectively brought about. While increased infiltration from the other side of the ceasefire line for sabotage and espionage activities came to be noticed, there was also marked stepping up of anti-Indian propaganda and war cries in Pakistan. To Nehru, Pakistan's foreign policy appeared to be based on the Kashmir question only.

The finalization and approval of the draft five year plan in this period was another landmark development. While satisfied that the draft plan had been discussed at various levels in a truly democratic manner, Nehru was however anxious that the common people including school students should be made fully aware of the salient features of the plan and their active participation and understanding sought so that they knew and appreciated how it was going to affect them.

While the public sector had a key role to play, Nehru felt it necessary to emphasize that "the State ownership would only be put into effect if it did not disrupt production or upset the existing economic structures." There also could be "no such thing as proceeding forthwith with the socialist ideal. If you accept it hundred per cent today, even then we are limited by our resources." The pace of development had therefore necessarily to be gradual. Nehru realized that work on projects like Bhakra Nangal having been taken up much before the start of the planning process, huge sums of money had to be earmarked for

their execution which prevented their undertaking many smaller works involving less expenditure but capable of yielding quicker results.

On 2 October, Nehru inaugurated the scheme of community development projects. To him the scheme held out the hope of bringing about great transformation in rural India. He thought the lives of the people would undergo immediate change for the better as these projects would mobilize people at various levels to become involved in constructive work on a voluntary basis. The start of the Bharat Sevak Samaj, a non-official and non-political voluntary organization, was yet another effort to encourage people from all walks of life to contribute their mite towards improving their environment and neighbourhood.

The welfare of tribals, preservation of their rich cultural traditions, the acute conditions of distress in famine-affected areas in parts of South India and in the north-eastern region, partial relaxation of controls due to easing of food situation, the continuation of the Preventive Detention Act, the system of education in the country, support and sympathy for the growing nationalist upsurge in foreign possessions in the country, the continuance of the archaic and anomalous system of Rajpramukhs as heads of states for life, and the Rulers' privy purses, etc. especially in the light of the decisions in regard to Kashmir, the refixation of boundaries between West Bengal and Bihar, and Punjab and Himachal Pradesh, the Cauvery waters dispute, the mulki-non-mulki agitation in Hyderabad and the communal tension in some places as a result of the inflammatory writings in the language newspapers were some other subjects that engaged Nehru's attention.

In the sphere of foreign affairs, assumption of direct rule by the King in Nepal due to the failure of the first elected democratic government was welcomed as the King enjoyed popularity and could halt further deterioration of the situation. India, while interested that her neighbouring Himalayan State should, in the changed situation on her frontiers, grow as a democratic and modern State, was however prepared to help where such help was needed and asked for, without interfering in Nepal's internal affairs.

Deeply concerned over the prospects of world peace receding mainly due to the deterioration in the situation in the Far East, Nehru wondered whether "we should raise this major issue at the UN or encourage others to do so", when the UN itself remained "silent over such a vital matter where a war is being carried on in the name of the UN...." He thought that Britain, while appreciating India's approaches on the question of the truce in Korea and the settlement of the issue of the prisoners of war, was unable to stand up to the United States. The questions of banning recruitment of Gurkhas on Indian soil for British army and the convening by Britain of the Commonwealth Economic Conference, initially viewed as opposed to the cause of the Commonwealth countries, were therefore considered in the background of the overall improvement of relations between India and Britain. Recognition of King Farouk of Egypt as the King of Sudan also, armed coup in Egypt, rapid political changes in Iran and the Iranian oil dispute, the Tunisian problem, the civil

resistance movement in South Africa, the citizenship for Indians in Sri Lanka were some other important questions that needed serious attention.

Access to the papers of Jawaharlal Nehru and other relevant collections was granted, as in the past, by the Nehru Memorial Library. Shrimati Indira Gandhi made available to us documents in her possession and these are referred to as JN Collection. We were also allowed by the Secretariats of the President and the Prime Minister and the Ministries of Home Affairs, External Affairs, the Press Information Bureau and the National Archives of India to use the material in their possession. Some classified material has necessarily been deleted.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AICC	All India Congress Committee
AINEC	All India Newspaper Editors' Conference
AIR	All India Radio
BPCC	Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee
CBR	Central Board of Revenue
CPI (M)	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
CPWD	Central Public Works Department
CWC	Congress Working Committee
CWINC	Central Waterways Irrigation and Navigation Commission
Hicomind	High Commission of India
HMG	His/Her Majesty Government
IENS	Indian and Eastern Newspapers Society
INA	Indian National Airways
KMP/KMPP	Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
NAI	National Archives of India
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEFA	North-East Frontier Agency
NMML	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
NPL	National Physical Laboratory
NRSR	Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research
PEPSU	Patiala and East Punjab States Union
PMS	Prime Minister's Secretariat
PPS	Principal Private Secretary
PTI	Press Trust of India
RSP	Revolutionary Socialist Party
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SGPC	Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee
TNCC	Tamil Nadu Congress Committee
UAR	United Arab Republic
UK	United Kingdom
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNCIP	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
UN/UNO	United Nations Organization
UP	Uttar Pradesh
US/USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WIDF	Women's International Democratic Federation
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
WHS	Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply
WFDY	World Federation of Democratic Youth

NATIONAL PROGRESS

I. The General Approach

1. Five Years of Freedom¹

Brothers and sisters,

Today is the fifth anniversary of Indian Independence. Five years ago, on this day, we had assembled at this spot in the old city of Delhi and unfurled the flag of freedom from the ramparts of the Red Fort. It heralded the beginning of a new chapter in Indian history. Five years have gone by since then. There have been big ups and downs in this period. We have been able to achieve something, but a great deal still remains to be done.

We, the millions in India, became heirs to a great heritage five years ago, the heritage of this vast country which spreads from the Himalayas to Kanyakumari. But it is something more than that, for India's history dates back to thousands of years. We became heirs to thousands of years of history and grandeur and ups and downs which India has witnessed in the past.

Where does our duty lie? How are we to mould the history of India and contribute to her vast heritage for the generations to come? Five years is not a very long period in the history of a nation. But these five years have been momentous in the history of the world and of India. We have had to face big problems. It is now for the historians to give their verdict about our achievements and failures. We should not keep harking back to the past, but look forward to the future. Duty calls, and the tasks left incomplete are constantly with us.

The tasks of a nation are, of course, never ending. There are millions of things waiting to be done and the process will never end. We can measure our achievements by the number of new buildings and schools and other constructions that have been completed. But the real yardstick to measure the worth of our work is to see to what extent we have succeeded in wiping the tears from the eyes of the poor who continue to be in misery. That is the real yardstick of India's progress, not the construction of buildings and grand projects that we have undertaken.

India is not a mere geographical expression extending from the Himalayas to Kanyakumari. India is a nation of thirty six crores of men, women, and children. The welfare of India lies in the welfare of these thirty six crores of people. Our time is nearly over. We have discharged our duty to the best of

1. Speech from the ramparts of the Red Fort, Delhi, 15 August 1952. AIR tapes, NMML. (Original in Hindi).

our ability, and now it is the younger people who must assume responsibility. So long as there was strength in us we carried the torch of freedom without faltering and never letting it fall. Now, the millions of young boys and girls in India have to carry on the task after us with honour and pride, and serve the country, and work for her progress, and above all, to find a way to wipe the tears of millions of people who are in great need. The most important task before us is to ensure that the millions of children in the country get the basic necessities of life, the opportunity for education, and proper physical and mental development, so that they can grow up and take on the burdens of this great country.

This is a challenging task. It cannot be done by merely passing laws or issuing edicts. The Government is certainly responsible for the people, but it cannot discharge its responsibility until the people of the country cooperate wholeheartedly and willingly. It is indeed a gigantic task, and this cannot be accomplished by the Government alone without the participation of all the people. There may be differences of opinion on political, social and economic issues. But basically our tasks can be done only by the mutual cooperation of all the people.

There are a number of issues on which there is a difference of opinion, and the barriers are insurmountable. What are the areas in which the cooperation of all the people is essential? After all, we are all citizens of this great country and, irrespective of our religion, caste, province, or language, we owe a duty to our country. All of us are shareholders in India's freedom and, therefore, equally responsible for maintaining and protecting that freedom. There are certain paths which tend to lead us astray, into violence and internecine quarrels in which voices are raised in anger against one another. It is absurd to think that such paths can lead the country to its goal of progress and development. Such thinking is born out of ignorance and is the surest path to ruin. We must be constantly vigilant against such tendencies because, no matter how great the principle behind the quarrel, the internal feud and disunity can only lead the country to ruin, bloodshed and violence.

Then there are others who fight in the name of religion. We have learned the lesson of the evils of communalism in the past, and it is absolutely certain that it cannot lead to progress but only to further weakening of the country. We will fritter away our energies in futile squabbles instead of concentrating on progress. We must guard ourselves against such tendencies. Another category of people is the selfish black marketeers who get rich at the expense of the poor and needy.

These are the factors against which we must guard ourselves. We are citizens of a great nation with a glorious history behind it. The people of a great nation ought to be large-hearted and perform great deeds. They should not stoop to chicanery and wrong-doing. We achieved independence in a grand

manner and now we must continue to uphold that tradition. We will hand over the torch of freedom, when our strength fails, to the youth of the country. Once our duty is done, we can be thrown on the scrap-heap. But, so long as there is strength in our minds and body, until the very last moment, we must toil for the cause of the country, in the service of India's millions and strive towards progress. Once our strength fails, our time will be up and we need not be bothered about what happens to us, for others will carry on.

We must set about this big task from the larger angle of the whole country, and not from the viewpoint of any single province, community, caste or religion. Every individual is free to follow his own religion and occupation. But ultimately the biggest duty, profession and religion of any person today is to serve the thirtysix crores of people, to uplift the poor, the downtrodden masses and to wipe out every tear from every eye of the suffering people.

We have had to suffer great hardships in the last few years. Natural calamities like drought and earthquakes had afflicted the country. Anyhow, we have nearly overcome our troubles.

This year we have fared much better than we have done in the past. There has been plenty of rainfall, and the position of food and other basic necessities is better now than in previous years. Yet we must constantly bear in mind that India is a vast country and some areas of distress are likely to be present in the country at all times. The rainfall has been good and food production has been above average. Yet in some districts like Gorakhpur, Azamgarh, Deoria and Basti in Uttar Pradesh, some regions in Bihar, and the Sundarbans area in West Bengal, Rayalaseema in the South, some districts in Mysore, Rajasthan and Saurashtra, conditions of great distress and privation prevail.

It is our duty to help these people in every way. Not only should we provide temporary relief but make arrangements to ensure that they can stand on their own feet and participate in the general progress of the country. Ultimately, the thirtysix crores of people of India belong to one large family and we must march together in step and go forward to achieve progress. Those who think that they can progress, while others lag behind, are mistaken, because the latter will drag others down with them. Therefore, it is imperative that the whole country must march together.

There are three main dangers facing the country. One is caused by disunity and internal dissensions, two, by the greed and avarice of black marketeers and profiteers who make money through corruption, bribery, etc., and the third by communalism. It is strange that, in spite of the bitter lesson that we have learnt in the past, there are some people who indulge in such activities, and even take pride in running down other religions and maintain that they are helping their own religion by doing so.

Recently, I was extremely annoyed to read about an incident in Allahabad,

which was wholly uncivilized.² It angered me that any individual in India could be so foolish. Yet there were some other foolish people who, instead of acknowledging that it was wrong and punishing the wrongdoer, retaliated by saying that they would not participate in the Independence Day celebrations, as a protest. How can any Indian behave like this? It may not be necessary that everyone should participate in the celebrations. But it is foolish to express anger and resentment on an auspicious day, no matter what the provocation may be. It is something which stains India's freedom and sullies her honour.

Ultimately, we all must bear in mind that we have to march together. If we let ourselves drift away from our path because of the wrong action of one, a hundred or a thousand individuals, the country will be ruined. Please remember what India's ancient culture and tradition teach us. You must bear in mind what a great Indian has said over two thousand years ago, and not merely said but had his sayings engraved on big stones and columns all over the country. The great emperor Asoka said that if the followers of one religion respect and tolerate other religions, they, by doing so, only enhance the respect of their own religion. Those who show disrespect to the faith of others only degrade their own faith. This has been the principle of India's culture for thousands of years, and not of bitterness, hatred and feuds as some people in their ignorance today imagine.

If you look at the world, you will find it in the grip of a psychosis. There is a constant talk of war everywhere, and nobody knows when things may get out of hand and the world razed to the ground. We are a weak nation. Yet we have raised our voice for peace. We have done so in the past, and we will continue to strive for peace in the world until our last breath. But that is possible only when we all progress together as a nation.

While there is this talk of war throughout the world, there is another kind of war that is going on in South Africa.³ This has a relation in a way to India, because the method being adopted there is the method of satyagraha shown by a great soul of India. The war is for the principle of equality of all human beings.

Racialism is rampant in South Africa, with the whites brutally suppressing

2. An article published on 5 August 1952 in *Amrit Patrika*, a Hindi daily, led to demonstrations on 12 and 15 August in Lucknow, Allahabad, Kanpur and Moradabad in response to a call given by Khaksar and Muslim League leaders.
3. On 26 June 1952, thousands of Indians, Africans and coloured people launched passive resistance to the series of discriminatory laws which the South African Government had placed on the Statute Book. By the end of July over a thousand non-white volunteers had courted arrest by riding in "white" railway compartments, sitting on "forbidden" benches in public parks and refusing to show passes. On 30 July, the South African Government raided the offices and homes of non-white leaders and arrested them under the Suppression of Communism Act. By August 1952, 2,500 people had been arrested.

the blacks. The people of South Africa have learnt the lesson taught by Mahatma Gandhi, and are peacefully opposing racial oppression. I am happy to know that the Indian residents of South Africa are cooperating fully with the Africans in their struggle. I am convinced that the sympathy of the people of this country will go out to the struggling people of South Africa.

It is through this peaceful method we won freedom, and I hope that in future too we will continue to solve our problems by peaceful means. Let us constantly bear this in mind, and renew our pledge once again on this day to work for the progress of India, for it is imperative for our very survival. We must continue to uphold the ancient tradition and culture of India and make every effort to maintain peace in the world. We have on our hands the urgent task of removing poverty and unemployment from the country. We may not hope to complete the task in our life time, but we must do what we can. After that, others will carry on.

I want you on this day to examine what our weaknesses are, and look inwards, instead of criticizing others. If everyone does his duty, the world will be a far better place. We must learn the lesson of cooperation and discipline from the members of our armed forces. They are meant to protect the country, and they are imbued with a sense of discipline. Men from all States and from all religions join the army, navy and air force and work together in harmony and cooperation. They do not fight among themselves. Our armed forces symbolize courage and unity. We must emulate the same sense of discipline and team work. We must not fight among ourselves but work with the firm intention of accomplishing the big tasks which confront us, of becoming self-reliant instead of depending on the Government for everything. Only then can India progress.

2. The Development of the Nation¹

I appeal to the members of the AICC to give sufficient attention to the economic policy resolution passed by the House.

It is not a mere expression of pious wishes but an affirmation of our faith in certain fundamentals. It is not wishful thinking because that will help nobody. You cannot change the present-day conditions by expressing your wishes.

1. Speech on the resolution on economic policy, AICC meeting, Indore, 14 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 15 September 1952.

It will not be incorrect to say that there is nothing new in the resolution. The Congress has said these and so many other things even in the past. What is new is the fact that these are being said when the Congress has been entrusted with a great responsibility.

Congressmen must create an atmosphere for the successful execution of the plans for ameliorating the conditions of the people. There is a reference in the resolution to secure public cooperation and you must pay sufficient attention to this aspect.²

On October 2, on the Gandhi Jayanti day, the work of community projects³ will be started. I myself will go to the site of some projects near Delhi and participate in that work. I hope that other Congressmen in their respective areas will also join the work for community projects.

2. The resolution on economic policy envisaged conditions "in which the community, through various organs of the State and through cooperatives, exercises a much greater initiative in the conduct and development of industry and trade." It hoped that the Five-Year Plan "will lay adequate stress on the achievement of food self-sufficiency, the growth of basic and small-scale industry and increasing opportunity for employment."
3. The scheme of the community development projects, a direct result of the Indo-American Technical Cooperation Agreements signed in the beginning of 1952, had been spelt out in the draft of the First Five-Year Plan published in July 1951. The 500 community centres, contemplated in the Plan, were to undertake house-building, road-making, canal-digging, school construction, medical and health units, cooperative farming, multi-purpose cooperative societies, cottage industries and a host of other projects.

3. Cooperate with the Government¹

I call upon the people to make India strong economically. The strength of a country in the modern world depends not on military strength only, but on its industrial and economic resources. No country can remain independent if it is underdeveloped.

The prosperity of the country is for all. The people from all States have to come to make a determined effort to raise their standard of living. Even if one State remains underdeveloped, or even one individual remains poor, our task remains incomplete.

1. Speech at a public meeting, Indore, 14 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 15 September 1952.

Now that the issue of the capital of Madhya Bharat has been settled,² the people of this State should divert their energies for working the projects which will bring wealth and prosperity to the State. Any campaign to reconsider the issue will serve no purpose. I appeal to the people to cooperate with the Government in the successful execution of the projects under the Five-Year Plan.

It always saddens me a great deal to come across beautiful children who are going about without food and shelter, and without the opportunities which each one needs for advancement. I worry about these children, for they are our wealth and our future and they will serve India after we are gone. And when I think of them, I feel ashamed and unhappy. Of what avail is it if we are Ministers when these children have to go even without food?

But a great responsibility also rests on the women of the country who are such a potent influence in the moulding of the children. If women advance and are strong, the children gain from their strength and knowledge and when they grow up, they become the pride and strength of the nation. I, therefore, appeal to women to realize their responsibilities in this regard and assist in the regeneration and revitalization of the country.

I belong to India and not to any State. I was born in Uttar Pradesh. I was brought up in Allahabad, on the banks of the river Ganga. I have grown up in every part of the country. I have loved her mountains and her rivers, her villages and green fields. I belong to whole of India.

In the few years left to me now, I wish to be of some service to the country. I would like to see my dreams come true, to see that the poor and the downtrodden are no longer poor and downtrodden, that they are better off than they are today.

2. Rival claims were put forward in favour of Gwalior, Indore and Ujjain. Nehru decided on 6 May 1952 that the capital of Madhya Bharat would be Gwalior for the Winter, and Indore for the summer months.

4. Fight against Disease¹

I stress the need for non-Governmental efforts to fight disease. To serve the rural areas, small clinics and dispensaries should be opened in villages.

1. Speech at the opening ceremony of a ward, sponsored by the All Indian Conference of Social Workers, at the Tuberculosis Hospital at Yarragadda, Hyderabad, 24 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 25 September 1952. Extracts.

I have been associated with the foundation-laying and opening ceremonies of many institutions, but I do not remember having performed the opening ceremony of hospitals in recent years. It does not mean that I am not interested in hospitals, but it means only that I try to avoid performing any such ceremony, except in the case of very few which come directly under my jurisdiction, such as scientific laboratories and technical institutes. I am, however, glad to perform the opening ceremony of the ward because of the impressive record of work of the Hyderabad branch of the All India Conference of Social Workers. More and more I feel that the most important thing this country, as well as perhaps other countries, needs is not so much what the governments do, although that, of course, is obviously important, but what persons outside governments do. Some of its schemes are meant to encourage non-governmental, more than purely governmental activities.

Tuberculosis is a scourge and we have necessarily to combat it and give the best possible treatment to patients. I feel more and more that, when we think of fighting disease, the most important antibiotics are food and work, and not medicines or drugs, though, of course, the latter come in handy in case of need. More attention should be paid to this aspect rather than allowing normal conditions producing diseases to be treated. In medieval days, preventive medicine and preventive health services were not so common as now. Doctors only cured diseases. But modern ideas are different. Emphasis has shifted to sanitation and health measures. That is why the state of physical health of the community has now improved tremendously. It is, of course, quite true that new kinds of diseases are coming to light in advanced communities, which are not found in less advanced communities. Probably they are the diseases due to a high degree of civilization and wealth.

The best antibiotics are food and work. Without lessening the importance of hospitals, I regret the tendency to put up big hospitals in cities. I will prefer, wherever this is possible, the putting up of a large number of small hospitals rather than of big ones in cities. You should pay attention to the development of rural areas by putting up clinics or small hospitals, so that the patients may get some relief near their own homes, as far as possible, for minor illness. The more serious cases only may be referred to big hospitals.

I feel that you should develop some kind of a mobile system to deal with rural areas. Well-equipped motor vans should go from place to place and dispense medicines and impart health education to the villagers. It is important that you should look more and more towards rural areas and give them the facilities which they lack, while not being able to get the facilities which the big hospitals in cities are able to provide. We have greatly pampered the cities and it is high time that we strike a balance somewhere....

Community centres, which the Government of India has initiated, are financed by the US Government and are essentially meant to encourage

voluntary efforts. In this context the new organization, the Bharat Sevak Samaj,² is entirely non-official. Although Government officials are also associated with it in their individual capacities, the whole purpose is to encourage voluntary non-official private efforts. There can be no progress unless millions of people do their little bit for the improvement of social and economic conditions in the country....

2. The Bharat Sevak Samaj, a non-political organization, was set up in 1952 by the Planning Commission to mobilize the people's voluntary support and participation in the execution of the national plans.

5. On the Retention of English¹

I thank both the Municipal Corporations for their addresses and the kind words about me. Hyderabad is a very beautiful city, but like all cities, it thrives on the wealth of the rural areas. While cities are no doubt important, they should not be built at the cost of the rural parts. I feel it is now the turn of the cities to contribute to the uplift of the rural areas.

Both the Central and the State Governments are fully alive to the various problems facing the State mentioned in the addresses and are doing the needful to solve them.

I assure the people of Hyderabad that the proposed transfer of control of the Osmania University and its conversion into a Central University is in their best interests and it will in no way obstruct the natural growth of the regional languages. It is a major decision that the Government of India has made in favour of Hyderabad which is calculated to give a special position to this State in the entire South.

The Centre's decision to take over the Osmania University is an important one, and there can be no two opinions on this subject. Hyderabad is a representative city of the Deccan and, during the past, a powerful civilization and culture have grown up there. That should not be pushed aside, but made use of for making India strong. The Centre felt that the Osmania University had the potentialities of influencing the whole of the Deccan and could be a unifying factor. With this in mind, the Centre decided to take it over. I may make

1. Reply to civic addresses by the Hyderabad and Secunderabad Municipal Corporations, Hyderabad, 25 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 26 September 1952.

it clear that by taking over the University, the Centre will not take away anything from Hyderabad, but on the other hand will give financial aid and other help to improve the standards of the University which will only benefit the people of Hyderabad. Therefore, I cannot understand the opposition to it. Perhaps this is due to some misunderstanding. Even after the Centre takes it over, it will be run by the people of Hyderabad, though a few representatives of the Centre will also be associated with it.

The people of Hyderabad need have no apprehensions that by the Centre's taking over the University and giving Hindi a prominent place in it, the growth of regional languages will be retarded. Both Hindi and the regional languages will flourish side by side without competing with each other. After all even Delhi, Benares, Aligarh and Santiniketan Universities had been taken over by the Centre.

One should not be prejudiced against a language. We now want to introduce Hindi in the universities, but that should not be done all of a sudden but gradually. I feel that we should retain English as long as it is necessary.² For, we cannot afford to deprive ourselves of the treasures of knowledge in this language. If the country is to progress our standards should be high.

There is as great a need for discipline in public life as there is in the army. The British people are disciplined and have smilingly faced many difficulties. But here, people make much noise over small things. Even if you want to raise your voice against anything, do it in a disciplined way. The first lesson that we learned from Gandhiji and the Congress was discipline. But that is not enough now. There is still great scope for discipline and this is the time when we need cent per cent army discipline.

In countries like China, where there had been a revolution, the people have been able to achieve something, thanks to discipline. There, the slightest deviation from discipline is severely dealt with. But here, the various communities inhabiting the land suffer from lack of discipline. Among the Hindus, there are too many sects which weaken their solidarity and discipline. Religious fanaticism characterized the Middle Ages. In the twentieth century, we cannot think in terms of the Middle Ages, and those who think in these terms cannot progress. Therefore, India has taken to secularism where everyone is free to practise his own religion, but at the same time, the State sees to it that one religion does not dominate over the other. If we are to solve our

2. English was being used in various ways—as the language of legislature and administration for the Centre and the States, as the language of the courts, as the medium of education, partially for the secondary, but exclusively for the higher education, and as the medium of inter-State communication for certain purposes. The Constitution of India had laid down that English might continue as of old and fixed 15 years (that is, upto 1965) as the transition period for the change over from English to Indian languages.

major problems such as unemployment and poverty, communalism or provincialism should not come in the way. We must rise above communal, provincial and parochial considerations.

The changes that have come over Hyderabad during the last four years have affected several people and some innocent ones too. But that is inevitable, as the semi-feudal economic order in the State had to be changed to keep pace with modern times. While I sympathize with those affected, I would appeal to them to forget the past and go ahead. They would not gain anything by brooding over the past, but would gain much by looking forward. The Government will no doubt help these sufferers, but Government alone cannot solve all problems as its resources are limited. I feel our problems can be solved only by the united efforts of the people and we should plan according to our resources and capacity. In this connection, I may refer to the Five-Year Plan. It is a modest one. We are not very ambitious, but we are modest so that people may not feel frustrated or disappointed later. If everyone of the vast millions in this country contributed his share, imagine what great strength it would be.

The energy of the people was wasted during the disturbances in the State capital a few days back.³ This was a manifestation of ignorance. After all, what can you achieve by wasting your energy in this manner. Everybody commits mistakes. After all, we are not angels. However, with some pride and confidence I can say that our Government is as good as any other government in the world. We can compete with any Government of the world. In a democracy, there is scope for disagreement. You are free to give your opinion, but you must give it in a systematic and disciplined way. Matters can always be discussed and a way out found. But you can't settle these problems by rioting and creating disturbances. We have to know some of these fundamental facts.

There is unemployment both in Hyderabad and elsewhere. Every unemployed person is a liability for the nation, whereas every worker who produces wealth is an asset to the country. There are two kinds of unemployment, one is the poor man not getting employment, and the other is the unemployment of the rich people who get wealth without doing any work. Now the time has come for everyone of them to work to increase the prosperity of the nation.

India's problems are exactly the same which face every other country today. But fortunately we have stabilized our position. Our foundations are quite sound, and at least among the Asian countries, we are better off and we can progress more quickly. The more speedily we want to progress, the more

3. Demonstrations by the students of Hyderabad on 3 and 4 September opposing employment opportunities to non-residents of the State, had resulted in seven deaths. On 5 September, the agitation was called off.

hard work we must put in and be prepared to face difficulties. If, on the other hand, we are inclined to take rest and remain idle and shirk responsibilities, we cannot make much progress.

6. The Uplift of the Masses¹

...There are innumerable problems which beset India and Hyderabad. They are complex problems, and it is difficult to go into all of them just now, for there is not enough time. Nor can I offer any instant solutions to all of them. Anyhow, I would like to lay before you some of the thoughts which crowd into my mind....

Generally speaking, all States and provinces are my responsibility. But more attention has, undoubtedly, to be paid to regions where special problems crop up, as has happened in Hyderabad and, in a different way, in another corner of India, that is, Kashmir. There is a great difference between the two. In Kashmir, our army had to fight a war which lasted a year. Though fighting has now ceased, part of our Army is stationed at the borders, for we don't know what may happen in the future. Therefore, I have always had to give more attention to Kashmir, and, in a different sense, to Hyderabad also because there are peculiar problems.

About a fortnight ago there was a great turmoil in this place. It always saddens me when such happenings take place. But my nerves are calmer in the moment of a crisis, and the mind works with clarity. I do not panic in moments of crisis. The only thing that perturbs me is the thinking and the mental attitude which is responsible for such acts of foolishness. How can we make progress if we get easily carried away into taking wrong action?

The question of aliens in your State is something which I have been hearing for the last twenty years. As a matter of fact, I wonder which province I can call mine. I was born in Allahabad in Uttar Pradesh but my ancestors belonged to Kashmir. For the last five years, I have been living in Delhi. Which then is my province in the narrow sense of the word? Obviously, I have a fondness for Allahabad, Kashmir and Delhi. But I do not claim any province or city as mine. I have grown to love every city and province of

1. Speech at a public meeting, Hyderabad, 25 September 1952. AIR tapes, NMML. (Original in Hindi). Extracts.

India, and feel that they have the right to draw my attention and love. I am proud to be a citizen of India, the Republic of India. I am proud of my country and not of any one province. I want that every part of India should progress well. If any province lags behind, it would retard the progress of the whole nation.

In the world of today, it is just not possible that only parts of a country make progress while the rest lag behind. Such things cannot happen. It is true that equality to all cannot be ensured at once. But the trend in the world today is such that inequality or great disparities between communities and nations are no longer tolerated. Therefore, this huge bastion of thirtysix crores of men, women and children must progress at even pace and as a whole. You can imagine what an enormous task it is.

A gigantic problem requires immeasurable courage to deal with. It is only men of high stature who can rise to a challenge. We must rise above narrow parochialism. It is natural that we are attached to our own locality, our own city and district. But our ultimate goal should be the progress of all the constituent units of the country, the people of all castes, communities and religions.

As you know, a large section of society in India consists, due to their misfortune, or it would perhaps be more accurate to say due to the wrong deeds of our ancestors, of the backward classes whom we call Harijans. Right from the beginning, Gandhiji and the Congress had laid stress on the importance of the uplift of the backward classes in order to become worthy of freedom. How can there be freedom for anyone so long as a large section of the population remained downtrodden, while a small group of people prospered on the labour of the masses? It is absurd. Therefore, great stress was laid on their uplift. It is absolutely wrong and harmful to the nation, for any individual or community to suppress another section of society, the people belonging to a particular caste or religion, for personal aggrandizement.

We have declared that India is a secular State, which means that the State does not favour any religion. Every religion in India is held in respect. But the Government does not favour or suppress any religion. Our people belong to different religions, and they have the same freedom to follow their own religious faith. The Government does not interfere with any of them, and keeps itself aloof from religious matters. It believes in providing equal opportunities to everyone to progress. This is what is known as a secular State. It is nothing new. This is also the general trend in the world today. Religious bigotry, which afflicted Europe and Asia for centuries, is now disappearing.

Unfortunately communalism still rears its head in some parts of our country.... Nobody has the right to stand in the way of others or to suppress them. Every Indian has equal rights. Unfortunately, we cannot bring about

complete equality immediately. In any case, individuals are not exactly alike because there are bound to be differences, mentally and physically. But every individual has the right to equal opportunities, so that he or she can progress as much as possible. For instance, there is a great deal of unemployment in Hyderabad, and for that matter, all over India. Perhaps, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the most urgent problem before the country today is unemployment.²

If you put the issue in another way, the most pressing problem before us is economic, the problem of uplifting India's millions. It is not a question of giving jobs to a few hundred people. It involves millions of people, and the problem cannot be solved until the problem of unemployment is solved. An unemployed man or woman is a liability for the family and a burden on the nation, because every individual who consumes must produce something. He must produce new wealth by his own efforts for himself and for the welfare of the country. The real wealth of a nation ultimately depends on the toil and labour of its millions....

Secondly, it is our duty to see that every child in the country gets education, and not merely that there should be arrangements for health-care, food and clothing and all other basic necessities. It is the duty of a government to see that every individual in the country gets all these things. But at the moment we do not have the resources to provide all of them.

The only course open to us is to make an effort to increase the production of essential consumer goods. That is possible only through the hard work of the millions in the country. It is true that it is the duty of the Government to provide employment. But we can do only as much as our resources permit, and ultimately that depends on the hard work of the people themselves. The strength and capacity of a country depends on the amount of hard work its people are capable of, or willing to do. It cannot come of its own accord, nor is it possible to acquire it by passing laws. We can easily pass a law abolishing unemployment in the country. But that would be absurd, for it cannot solve the problem. The important thing is hard work. It is the duty of the Government to give help. But the Government cannot do anything until it has the full cooperation and willingness of the people....

If India is to progress we must try to understand what constitutes the strength of a nation in the modern world. The key to it lies in learning science as, without a knowledge of science, we will always remain weak and cannot

2. According to one estimate in 1951, 3 million persons, largely urban, were totally unemployed and 30.3 million rural agricultural workers were employed for only seven months in the year, 4.8 million rural non-agricultural workers were employed for six months, 0.8 million urban workers were having work for seven months, and 2.1 million urban non-agricultural workers worked for six months and were idle for the remaining six months.

make progress in any other way. Nations do not progress by doing business though it is essential. I have nothing against business, and it is pretty obvious that there should be trade among countries. But trade does not produce new wealth of any kind, for it merely involves distribution. We need new wealth from land and industries, village industries and crafts. The wealth thus produced belongs to the people. Science shows us the ways and means of increasing production.

So we have laid the foundations of scientific advancement by setting up eleven or twelve huge national science laboratories, and innumerable small ones all over the country which I feel are extremely important. I advise all of you to go around and see how the edifice of new India is gradually being raised on a foundation of scientific knowledge. Young boys and girls are at work there doing good work which fills one with pride. I would say that the modern science laboratories are the temples of knowledge. We cannot afford to be backward in this field....

You must be aware that the community development scheme is entirely new and we are trying to involve the people in the villages in the developmental work. I attach great importance to it. It is meant particularly for the rural areas of India. The target is to set up fiftyfive community projects all over India, from Kashmir to Travancore. Each project will have three blocks and each block will cover 300 villages. We hope to increase the number of projects to 500 in five years. This would mean that more than one-fourth of the population of India will be covered under this scheme. It is hoped that later the scheme can be extended to the whole of India.

Aid from foreign countries is certainly helpful. But the disadvantage in that is that we tend to look to others and fail to develop the habit of self-reliance. Everything will come to a standstill if the expected aid is not forthcoming. It is better to progress slowly, but on our own, instead of relying on others for help. Once the support is withdrawn, we will be helpless. Therefore, I am not in favour of encouraging people to look to others for help.

At the same time, if we get help from others, without any strings attached, our progress will undoubtedly be accelerated. There is no doubt that we have benefited by American aid.³ But I would like to make it quite clear, though some people seem to have reservations, that this will make no difference to our domestic or foreign policy. We will continue to follow the path of our own choosing. We shall not change our views under anyone's pressure or out of desire for foreign aid.

3. The quantum of American aid from all sources received by this time amounted to \$ 268.04 million.

I am grateful to the United States of America for their help. Today when I went to Himayatsagar,⁴ I found two Americans training our youth in the modern techniques of agriculture which are being used in the United States. But the real thing was that they were teaching—or perhaps it was a coincidence—the dignity of manual labour which we in India look down upon. The country which looks down upon manual labour will undoubtedly fall because everything in the world depends on it. File-pushing or desk jobs can get us nowhere. When I went there, I was struck by the fact that these Americans go from village to village cleaning the drains and doing other manual jobs themselves, which our own youth are reluctant to do. But when they saw the Americans doing it, they too had to willy-nilly follow suit. It is strange that we should have to learn from the Americans how to work with our hands. You should go to Sewagram in Wardha where Gandhiji started teaching the people the importance of manual labour. When anyone went to Gandhiji there, he would first assign a low manual task to him in order to test his sincerity and honesty.

The community projects aim not merely at improvement of agriculture, though obviously we want to increase production, but at uplifting the people in the rural areas, at educating them, teaching them the importance of sanitation, etc, so that we may learn to help one another, cooperate with one another, and develop the capacity to progress. The most important goal before us is the uplift of the entire nation and the removal of barriers which divide the people into various compartments. If we succeed in our objective of uplifting even one-fourth of India's population within the next five years, it will perhaps be a great achievement for the country....

Recently we set up a small training camp at Nilokheri near Delhi where young men are being trained in various fields.⁵ But basically the aim is to teach them to work in the villages and elicit the cooperation of the people. Ultimately, the task of uplifting India's millions cannot be done by a fiat from the Government. Nor can Government servants, or a few hundred trained workers, do it. India can progress only when the millions of people in the country learn to stand on their own feet. The community projects aim at promoting self-reliance among the masses. You can imagine what an enormous task it is.

Tremendous problems beset the country, unemployment being the worst of them. It affects the whole country but in Hyderabad, it has been further aggravated by the events of the last few years. Particular areas of Hyderabad

4. At Himayatsagar, where an agricultural farm was organized, the Ford Foundation was giving practical training in agricultural farming and extension work to students.

5. On 22 July 1952, a training camp for 90 community project workers, including four women, was organized at Nilokheri, a model township near Delhi. See *post*, pp. 79-82 for Nehru's address to the trainees.

have been affected which disturbs everyone. A solution must be found as quickly as possible. But, at the same time, you must bear in mind the fact that India, and for that matter the whole world, is in a state of flux. The changes may not be revolutionary or violent and you may feel that there is no change. You are wrong. Revolutions do not necessarily imply violent changes. A revolution is one in which an entire society or community takes a new turn, economically and socially....

Each society dons a garb of its own, and has an economic structure of its own. If the society does not grow but remains stagnant, then its garb will continue. But if a society grows, then it is obvious that the old garb which had restricted the growth of that society, will no longer remain. If this does not happen, there will be frustration, difficulties and tensions. But if the old garb is not removed in due course it has to be torn. This is what is known as revolution. Every growing society must change its garb periodically. Especially in this modern world of ours, when the pace of change has accelerated so much—I will point out to you the reasons for this rapid change—it is impossible that we can continue to don the old garb.

For a long time, India had continued to wear an outworn garb of social and economic structure. We had got accustomed to it, and so we actually suffered from a smug sense of superiority in remaining unchanged. As a matter of fact, it led to our stagnation and ultimately led to bondage, to our being enslaved by foreign powers. All progress came to a complete standstill in India. We have now got rid of our bonds. But it is equally important to get rid of our outworn garb which prevents us from changing. It would be well for everyone if the change is made by common consent, and if it comes about peacefully as far as possible without hurting anyone.

However, there is no doubt that in a period of transition some sections in a society, particularly the vested interests who want to maintain the *status quo*, are bound to suffer a little. It is not our intention to cause hardship to anyone. In other places, revolutions have caused tremendous hardship to the people and, in fact, the aftermath had been terrible. We want to avoid this. As you know, we fought against British imperialism by peaceful methods and without adopting violence. There might have been some exceptions, but basically our approach was a civilized and peaceful one which benefited us in many ways. We achieved our goal, and the biggest advantage to us lay in the fact that it was done without causing upheavals or chaos. People had to bear hardship, but it was nothing compared to the suffering which comes in the wake of violent upheavals. Moreover, once we became free we developed friendship with the British Government.

You must remember that in solving one problem, several others are created. So, this will not be a real solution. But this is what normally happens in the world. Solutions sometimes create new problems. Take for instance the two

world wars. In both, one side won total victory and the other side was completely vanquished. However, in both cases the problems that followed were legion. In the First World War, Germany suffered a terrible defeat. But it led, a few years later, to the emergence of Hitler who created endless problems for the Allies, and ultimately another war broke out. How then can we consider the First World War as having solved any problem? On the contrary it complicated the situation still further.

By the end of the Second World War again, Germany and Japan were completely and totally defeated. The victors felt that the problem had been finally solved, and the world looked forward to peace. But within two or three years, after the end of the Second World War, war clouds once again began to gather on the horizon, and the whole process of war has started all over again.

Thus, twice we have found that war can solve no problem and, on the contrary, it has only complicated the situation. Now, if by some misfortune another war breaks out, there will be no problem left to be solved, for there will be no survivors. That is why it is extremely important to find a solution to any problem in such a way that it does not create any other problem in its wake. The way we fought for our freedom is an example of how a solution can be found. There is no bitterness left between the British and us after we have achieved freedom, and we are free now in every sense to deal with our affairs as we like....

What are the most urgent problems before us today? The political problem of preserving our freedom is of course a constant one. For this the country has to be strong. Apart from that, there are economic problems, the problems of removing poverty and unemployment from the country. These are the most urgent problems before us, and perhaps, more difficult to solve than the other which we faced earlier. It is obvious that they cannot be solved by magic or by shouting slogans and making noise. What we need is hard work. If we keep fighting among ourselves there can be no solution to our problems. Our strength lies in unity. We do not have unlimited resources for economic progress, and if we keep frittering away our resources in futile wranglings and intestine feuds, we will undoubtedly become weaker.

For the last two or three years, there have been great disturbances in Telengana⁶.... How can any government tolerate such uprisings? So long as

6. In the interior parts of the Telengana districts, the Communists had entrenched themselves before the police action took place in September 1948. They set up parallel village governments and resorted to terrorist activities. Between October and December 1950, there were 344 serious incidents of violence, including 96 murders and numerous attacks on the military and paramilitary forces besides attacks on civilians. The movement was suppressed. In the police operations against them, 223 Communists were killed, 143 arrested, and a large quantity of arms and ammunition recovered.

this Government is entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining peace and order in the country, it becomes its duty to suppress rebellions and uprisings, no matter what the intention behind them might be. It is not enough for anyone to claim that the intention behind the uprisings is good. You are welcome to do anything in a peaceful way. But if anyone raises arms against the Government he will have to meet resistance. I am amazed that some people should rise in armed rebellion and then put conditions for giving up arms.⁷ They expect us to start truce talks here in Telengana like the truce talks which are taking place in Korea for the last one year. It is absurd to expect the Government to attach any importance to the rebels.

However, charges of excesses and of suppression are levelled against the Government. I am prepared to admit that there have been excesses on this and other occasions. As far as I know, there have been excesses on both sides. I do not want to hide anything or cover up our mistakes. You know better than me about the charges against the Government. All our actions must be conducted in broad daylight. We will no doubt make mistakes and you have the right to point them out to us so that we can make an effort to rectify them. If we prove incapable of doing so, then you are welcome to choose somebody else to take over our responsibility. There is no doubt that mistakes have been committed in many instances in the Hyderabad affair. But please remember that the picture must be seen in its entirety. After all there have been armed uprisings in Telengana which involved the use of force and clash of arms, whether it is on a large scale or small. It has to be compared not to an ordinary civil war but to a clash of arms between two countries. Then it makes some sense.

It has been said that we have resorted to repressive action by passing the Preventive Detention Act.⁸ I would like to humbly suggest that you must think what steps the Government of any other country would have taken if a Telengana-type of situation arose there. The retaliatory measures would have been far more severe than what we have resorted to....

That does not mean that I want to follow other countries. I am merely giving an example for your consideration. I do not want that the Government or the police should take any untoward steps. It is wrong that a wrong act should be retaliated with another wrong....

The Government is undoubtedly responsible for everything that has happened in Hyderabad. I am fully prepared to accept this responsibility.

7. The Communist Party of India published in June 1951 the terms under which its guerrilla fighters would surrender to the Government.
8. In February 1950, the Preventive Detention Act was passed to check subversive activities. It gave the Government powers of arrest and detention without trial. On 23 July 1952, the Government had to extend it for two more years for similar reasons.

Whether it is the Central or the State Government, or our police force or any other agency of the Government, it is imperative that we should always accept our responsibility, our duty, to be on good behaviour and not to react to bad behaviour with similar acts.

We are a responsible Government. If others create trouble, we must try to control the situation, and if necessary, use force too. No government can shrink from using force if the situation threatens to get out of control. The government which fails to face such a situation with courage is not worth its name. At the same time, a government cannot take recourse to firing at the flimsiest excuse. It should not try to suppress any party, even if it happens to be one in the opposition. Ultimately it amounts to dealing with a small boil which is likely to erupt as a big abscess. A wise government should be able to gauge every situation properly. If there are any signs of internal disturbance, a remedy has to be found for it. Repression can never be the solution.

After all, a government today does not merely govern. Its nature has changed. In the olden days, a government had no responsibility except to maintain law and order, and to repulse external aggression. It used to collect revenue by way of taxes. Otherwise, the government had no other responsibility. These were known as police States. Today the governments are known as welfare states and, apart from maintaining law and order, their real purpose is to work for the welfare of the people, to raise their standard of living. No government can discharge these duties without the help and cooperation of the people.

I have been getting reports about the disturbances which took place here about a fortnight ago. It would not be proper for me to express my views on the subject because an enquiry is being undertaken by a commission of high court judges and officials. I want all the facts to come before it. I am not bothered about what the facts may reveal or who is shown to be guilty. The truth must come to light....

Anyhow, I have wandered away from the main subject of my speech. I have been telling you how a social structure changes with the times....

I am very much interested in the long-term arguments. But I cannot go into them in detail in a public meeting, though I wish to draw your attention to these matters. It is not enough to shout slogans like our Communist or socialist brethren do. They shout slogans which throw no new light on anything. On the contrary, all this shouting of slogans creates greater confusion in the minds of the people. They claim that they will make the people of India better off. It is a noble thought. Who would not like to do this in India? The problem is how we can do it, and which path we can follow. Mere good intentions are not enough, and if it had been so, the world would have been a far better place by now. The difficulty lies in finding a way. The wisest men in the world have not been able to resolve this tangled web. Great atrocities

have been committed in the attempt to find a solution and tremendous hardships have resulted. So how are we to avoid these pitfalls, and make progress?...

There is no doubt that we must change our social and economic structure. But it is better to do it gradually and erect a strong, enduring structure, causing the least possible hardship to anyone, instead of trying to pull down everything and rebuild it again in a few days. If we do that, it is possible that our new structure may never come up and we become backward. We must try to attain our goals by easy stages. That is why we have drawn up the Five-Year Plan. It is possible that there may be defects in it which we should try to rectify. But we must go about it in a civilized way, instead of resorting to abuse and slogan-mongering. That is absurd and most unbecoming of a great country like ours.

There are many problems in this great city of yours, Hyderabad or Secunderabad, which is one of the most famous cities of India.... Hyderabad has been under a feudal system as Rajasthan and other regions were. Though there is a great deal of outward splendour and pomp, the socio-economic structure, however, is extremely backward, much more so than in many other parts of India. Anyhow, there is an opportunity to change all that. But there are tremendous problems because of the backwardness of the State. Great atrocities were committed during the Razakar movement and police action had to be taken. You will have to admit that the Razakar movement did a great deal of harm. The problem is that one wrong action does not end there. Its consequences pursue us in many ways and the poison spreads, and keeps spreading, until it is brought out into the open, and a solution is found to root it out.

Our difficulties in Hyderabad have been compounded by all these factors. For one thing, there was our outdated feudal structure which had to go, and secondly, the events leading to the police action vitiated the atmosphere further. The result was that what could have been achieved by peaceful methods received a jolt and further problems were created. Anyhow, it is of no use to brood over what happened in the past. We must look ahead and try to salvage the situation. We cannot do this until we look at the problems from a broader perspective....

I am amazed at the kind of nonsense that is published in your newspapers, absolute nonsense, lies and rumours, which will worsen the atmosphere even more. Why is this so? I am not talking about all the newspapers but about a few which indulge in spreading of canard. At a time when it is the duty of everyone of us to try to heal the wounds inflicted by the events of the past few years, there can be nothing more harmful than to try to rub salt into those wounds and incite passions. You can imagine how foolish is such a course. We must try to befriend everyone and particularly those who are opposed to us.

Mahatma Gandhi taught us a great many things. But there is one small maxim of his about which I think a great deal. It invariably brings back memories of Gandhiji to my mind. He had many tasks on his hand, but he once described his work as basically to wipe every tear from every eye. Just imagine the depth of meaning behind the remark. From this alone, you can realize what a great human being he was. He came and showed the path to us, to wipe every tear from every eye, to heal the gaping wounds in our hearts and to rebuild India as a nation united by a common bond which can progress by mutual cooperation instead of trying to drag one another down.

Now you must consider seriously how to heal the wounds inflicted on Hyderabad and to undo the damage that has been done. Should we try to heal the old wounds or keep them alive and bleeding? We must try to find a solution to the problems confronting us. It will have to be done gradually. We must try to evolve a path of mutual cooperation and harmony.

As you know, I often raise my voice against communalism because I feel that it is one of the fundamental causes of disunity and weakness in India which led to our downfall in the past. In spite of all our great principles and philosophies, we can never progress until we get rid of our communalist approach and adopt a common economic and political goal. So long as we are full of suspicion of one another, and try to put down the other communities in order to go ahead, there can never be a solution of any problem. This is how we lost our freedom to the British. If we continue with such foolishness, we will have to face greater hardships. I want to warn you specifically against this tendency. There are many people who are confused in their thinking and are easily led astray. But, by and large, the people must grasp the importance of unity....

What is progress? Progress does not mean giving jobs to a few people. Millions of people are in need of employment. I admit that everyone has the right to employment. It is not proper that persons from outside your State should come and deprive you of your job opportunities. But these are problems which can be gone into and a solution could be found....

It is obvious that the residents of the State will have priority in employment opportunities. But, if necessary, people can be called in from outside and, similarly, people from here can go out. There should be opportunities both ways so that there is an equality of opportunity in the country. People must go out of Hyderabad to acquire new experience and vice-versa. We want to give impetus to the principle of national integration whereby each State does not think of itself in isolation. That is absolutely wrong. Political integration has already taken place. What is now essential is emotional and intellectual integration. People's thinking must not be compartmentalized. You belong not only to Hyderabad or Tamil Nadu, or Andhra but to Bengal or Punjab, though you have every right to be proud of your own State....

We are respected abroad because we are citizens of India and not because we belong to Hyderabad or to some other State. We are held in respect because we are the citizens of the Indian Republic. Therefore, it is wrong to live in compartments. Provincialism is absolutely wrong.

As you know, I have never tried to hide the fact that there is a vociferous demand for the division of Hyderabad on linguistic grounds.⁹ It is obvious that the ultimate decision will rest with the people. I am not the one to decide. But I am absolutely convinced that the disintegration will be a retrograde step which, instead of doing any good, will retard the economic progress of the State for the next fifteen years. Trade and industries will grind to a halt, while people will surely be engaged in a debate about who is to have which part. Anyhow, this is my view. As I said, the ultimate decision rests not with the Central Government or any other agency but with the people of Hyderabad. But if you would take my advice, please do not let this matter go any further. Let it not become too important for the present. We can think about all this fifteen or twenty years hence. Instead, let us concentrate on the economic problems that we have on our hands.

I would like to point out one more thing in this connection. In the last three or four years, we have often wondered as to how to help the Osmania University in Secunderabad. We wanted to help in its basic progress and so a plan was drawn up with the help and advice of some people here to change Osmania University into a Central University.¹⁰ We thought that this would be of tremendous help to Hyderabad. But I was amazed to learn that some people object to it. I have tried my best to convince them. Just before coming here, someone came to me from Assam and wanted to know the reason for making Osmania University a Central University. He and some others seem to have formed a separate party on this issue—or perhaps it was already in existence. I don't know. Anyhow, I said that I could not understand what objection anybody could have because the change would be a very good thing for various reasons. Unless the Osmania University is given aid from outside, far from making any progress, it will become weaker, its standards will fall

9. The Communist Party of India and some Congressmen, including Ramanand Tirtha, advocated the division of Hyderabad on linguistic lines. On 17 August 1952, V.D. Deshpande, leader of the People's Democratic Front in the Hyderabad Assembly, speaking at the All India Linguistic Provinces Conference at Amravati, demanded that Hyderabad be divided linguistically so that parts of it could later merge in greater Maharashtra and Mahavidarbha.
10. Early in 1952, the Government of India decided that, in view of its central position in the south and its experience and tradition, the Osmania University should be converted into a Central institution with Hindi as the medium of instruction and run on the same lines as the Benares, Aligarh and Delhi Universities. A committee, set up by the Government of India with Acharya Narendra Deva as Chairman, was asked to examine the proposal.

further and the internal wrangling will continue. I am saying this from my experience of other universities and the events which have occurred in the Osmania University. I know that it has the capacity for great progress and become one of the best universities in India. We want to give it an opportunity to progress in every way.

There seems to be some misconception that by becoming a Central University, Osmania will no longer belong to Hyderabad, but to Delhi. It is obvious that the University will not go away from here and its autonomy will be intact. The people of Hyderabad, not Delhi, will run it, financial aid will be forthcoming from the Centre, but it is the people of Hyderabad who will administer the University and undertake the academic work. We merely want to ensure that its high standards are maintained as befits a grand university....

I find that very often a man who does not have a college degree has more ability than one who has. Very soon a time is undoubtedly going to come when university degrees will have nothing to do with the services, as the University Grants Commission has perhaps pointed out.¹¹ They have no value in this age. But please do not think that we will take people who are less qualified. There is a view that when the degrees are dissociated from government service, the standards of education will automatically improve. Then the people will go in for higher education and for intellectual attainment, instead of taking the degree merely as a stepping stone to a job. Degrees do not make a man well-educated. It is a question of individual ability too....

We have sent a note to all schools and colleges to have proper physical norms for all boys and girls. Unless these norms are satisfied, students will not be allowed to sit for examinations. I would also like to mention that nobody will be given a degree unless he has done a year's constructive manual labour. You may have heard that in other countries military service for everyone, between the age of nineteen and twenty, is compulsory. There is no distinction made in this between the rich and the poor. Everybody has to enlist himself as a private soldier and work for a year or two.

Well, leave military service aside. We want every boy and girl to do manual labour either in agriculture or in a factory, or in some other constructive work for a year. There are many advantages. It is good for health and something constructive will get done. They will become fitter physically for any other task that they may do later on. Above all, it will help them to get rid of the attitude of looking down upon manual labour, which should be highly respected.

11. The Indian University Education Commission under the chairmanship of S. Radhakrishnan, in its report of August 1949, stated that a university degree should not be required for administrative services. Special State examination for recruitment to the various services should be organized and should be open to whosoever wished to take it.

Some people seem to imagine that we want to force Hindi down everybody's throat. That is absolutely wrong. We want that all regional languages should grow and progress. The teaching in primary and secondary schools will be in the regional languages. We want to give the regional languages prominence even at the university level. The fact is that it is simply not possible for higher education to be imparted fully in the regional languages or Hindi. There are not enough books. We will have them by and by. But they are not available just now. We will be making a big mistake if we let our standards of education fall while fighting over the medium of instruction. It would be positively dangerous to do that at a time when we are trying to progress in every field. Therefore, we have to retain English as the medium of instruction at the university stage. We want to bring in the other languages and Hindi gradually, but our first consideration should always be to maintain a high standard of education. Those of you who wish to go in for advanced scientific education, English knowledge is not enough. You must learn French, German and, if possible, Russian too in which a number of books on science are available. So you must not look at this question in a narrow-minded way.

If we want to promote Hindi in the Osmania University and lay special emphasis on its learning, it is because Hindi is a national language which everyone who wants to work in the political or economic field must know. But whatever we may say, the fact of the matter is that those who do not know English well cannot go very far in any field in India, whether it is government service or some other field. It is obvious that soon a time will come when those who know only their regional language, and not Hindi, will find it difficult to work at an all-India level. That is undesirable. We do not want the people in South to face these problems....

Our sole consideration is to find ways and means for your progress so that you may participate in a big way in the national tasks. At the same time, it will obviously be the duty of the Osmania University to give priority to the regional languages too. These are not rigid rules being imposed immediately. We have to always bear this in mind and consider carefully about when we should begin to give less importance to English. Ultimately, it will be up to the university to decide.

I will tell you quite clearly that so long as English continues, there is no problem. But the moment that goes, there will be a tug-of-war between the regional languages, which may lead to disruptive tendencies. We look upon the Osmania University as a great vehicle for fostering unity in India through the development of the regional languages. We therefore want the people to understand the issues which are at stake....

7. Maintenance of Standards¹

Young men and women,

... A few days ago I was presented with a memorandum on behalf of some student associations and I was asked to read it carefully. I read it carefully, although I was neither excited nor exhilarated on reading it. There was nothing very remarkable in it. It was something I knew that you have been saying; so there is nothing new.

Having this opportunity to address you, I would naturally like to talk to you about some matters which to my mind are really important. They are important for all of us, more important for young men and women on the threshold of life, who have to shoulder great responsibilities that life brings with it at any time, more especially at a time of great transition in our country and in the world. Those are important problems for you to think, to consider, to discuss among yourselves. It is important that you should apply your mind to them. But when many of you are rather distracted by trivial happenings of the moment, the mind cannot go beyond shouting and raising slogans.

The memorandum that you presented to me referred to two matters.² Although I do not consider them in a large context, nevertheless, since you have referred to them and since you appear to consider them rather important, I shall say a few words about them. Unfortunately that will mean my saying much less about other subjects that I have in mind.

That memorandum referred to the question of *mulki*³ and non-*mulki*⁴ and the future of the Osmania University. Now so far as the *mulki* or non-*mulki*⁵ agitation or demands are concerned, I really do not know why people should

1. Address to students at the Nizam College, Hyderabad, 27 September 1952. AIR tapes, NMML. Extracts. Nehru spoke in English and later in Hindi.
2. The memorandum stated that the *mulki* movement was the result of the large-scale unemployment among the educated youth of the State. It suggested the appointment of a non-official commission in place of the Cabinet sub-committee, recently set up to go into the question. It opposed the transfer of the Osmania University to the Centre as it felt that the regional languages would suffer neglect.
3. People of the State.
4. People from outside the State.
5. The *mulki* movement which began in the 1930s in Hyderabad State postulated that the privilege of serving the State belonged to the natives of the State. In the wake of the police action in September 1948 in Hyderabad, a number of officers from neighbouring provinces were brought in to streamline the administration. With growing stability, demands were made on the Government to enable the native people to take up responsible positions and to send back the outsiders to their respective States. The fear of socio-economic exploitation led to the *mulki* agitation and to the raising of the slogan, "Hyderabad for Hyderabadis".

get excited at all. I do not like these words, *mulki* or non-*mulki*, because anything that creates divisions is bad. In the ultimate analysis I am prepared to say that even national boundaries are bad. But the time has not come for us, or for the world, to go that far. If we go on creating too many barriers inside the nation, that is bad. But leave that apart.

It is obvious that so far as services are concerned, people of a particular State or province should normally be employed in that State. It is only in special circumstances that one goes out, and therefore, normally, of course, a Hyderabadi should be employed in the Hyderabad service. But when special circumstances require, other people, whether they come from the rest of India or from the rest of the world, can certainly be employed, and should be employed, just as Hyderabadis may be employed in other States if they go there. I think it is desirable on the whole that normal employment does take place in this way. It is desirable from every point of view, both national and individual, that there should be an exchange of all kinds of teachers, students, and servicemen, between the various States of India. In fact, that should be part of your education, and part of your future education.

We, as a people in the country, suffer from a certain narrowness in outlook, that is often seen in big countries. A big country, instead of making the people think in a big way often makes them think in a small way. The very bigness of it produces and encourages divisions that people begin to think more of that area where they live than of the larger country. A small country has this advantage that you are forced to think of the rest of the world. You cannot simply escape the rest of the world, but if you live in a continent like India, you may almost ignore the rest of the world, but you ignore it at your peril. Because, nobody, no intelligent and educated person, can ignore the rest of the world. If he does, he falls back, that country falls back.

One of the principal reasons why India fell to foreign invasion was that we became isolationist. We did not look at the world at all, we looked at ourselves. The technical term to describe that is called narcissism—that is looking at oneself and admiring oneself. It is well that one should be proud of oneself and one's group. There is no reason why one should not, but by looking at oneself inevitably narrows a person's outlook, and he does not imbibe the many good things he can if he looked outside himself.

For my part, my learning has been through travelling about in India. It is always an exciting adventure for me when I travel about, and I have been to many places, rather out of the way places in India, and the more out of the way it is the more I want to go....

I wrote a book called *The Discovery of India*, about ten years ago. That process of discovery for me has continued all the time, and no doubt it will continue. It can never end. I am not for the moment just praising my country as opposed to any other. India is an amazingly wonderful country from any

point of view. The variety in India, the history of India, the different backgrounds of India, the problems of India—they are tremendous. They send out calls to the mind, to the intellect, and the spirit. It is a challenge to understand them and to deal with them. But this variety of India is amazing, it is wonderful; behind all this variety is the unity of India. It is equally wonderful...

If you want to really grow, not in the sense of getting well, by taking some kind of a diploma, you must let your mind grow by reading books. Remember, that a worthwhile book has been written almost through sweat and tears. You may read through it quickly, page after page in the course of a day, an hour or two, or five or ten hours, but that book took years to write. Behind that book lay possibly the author's lifetime's experience and thoughts and agony, and all that. It just depends how you read that book, that is, whether some impression of that lifetime's experience, pain and torture, gets registered on your mind and you learn from it, or whether you have read it superficially and missed what the book conveys.

Nevertheless, books are important, and I am not talking for the moment about the text books but other books. However important books may be, human beings are more important and you have to learn from human beings, and if you want to learn about India, then you have to know something about the human beings in India—the past background of each race, more specially the ancient and the great race of the Indian people, which has got its roots deep down into the past, deep down into the soil of India, going back thousands of years. If you go deep down, you may find all kinds of strange things, good and bad. But it is not a question of good and bad, it is a question of our understanding something. We must not be afraid to look at the bad, because that also helps in our understanding, we need not accept it, but we must know what it is. Only then can we change it or reform it.

So, if you want really to enlarge your vision and to grow, if you have any real ambition of the right type, you should desire to grow mentally and to understand, of course, first of all your own country, but to some extent the world too.

Ambition may be bad or may be good. Your ambition may be to become a clerk in an office, or a deputy collector or something like that. Well, there is absolutely nothing wrong in becoming a clerk in an office or a deputy collector, not that. Obviously, it is not a very high ambition, if that is the ambition. Ambition should be made of sterner stuff and not aim at these petty material ends in life. Everybody cannot become a hero, everybody cannot touch the sky or even attempt to touch the sky. But if you claim to be ambitious, if you really have the real ambition in you, then you must aim at reaching the sky and bringing the stars down to your feet.

So, I should like you to develop this wider knowledge of India. What are

our problems? They are human problems. Ultimately you can reduce probably every problem in the world to a problem of human relationship. There is the relationship of one individual with another, whether it is family relationship, or between husband and wife, father and son, or whatever other relationships there are, the problem is ultimately of the relationship of one individual with another individual. Secondly, there is the problem of the relationship of the individual with the group, whatever the group may be. And the third is the problem of the relationship of one group with another. Now, group again may give expression to national problems, international problems, that is, one group may represent one nation and the other another.

So, it all becomes really a problem of human relationships, whether of the individual or the group; everything falls into it. Everything comes under these three heads. Therefore, you must understand human beings....

Now, I was talking about *mulki* and non-*mulki*. It is clear that people of a particular province or a State should normally be employed in that State. The difficulty sometimes might arise in the higher grades. That difficulty should only arise when there is a want of that particular qualification or talent. If so, it is better to get a first rate man from outside than a second rate man from inside. I am against lowering of standards, as by doing so we go down as a nation.

Secondly, in the interests of getting the benefit of wider knowledge and experience there should be an inter-State exchange of services. That does not mean that this exchange takes place at the cost of this province or that; what I would like to see is that people of Hyderabad are employed in other States and vice versa. If I have to choose some highly qualified officers for the Government of India, do you think I will choose those who have the experience of only one State, and not of more than one State? Normally not, unless the person concerned is some specialist. The Government of India has to deal with the whole of India, not with one State. Therefore, it is desirable for you to have experience of other States, whether as teachers, students or as servicemen.

The difficulty in Hyderabad is that four years ago, after the so called police action, owing to a number of reasons, several people from outside had to be drafted to Hyderabad service. They came mostly for a temporary period. Such large numbers need not have come. It may be that all those who came were not shining examples of efficiency. It may be that in the selection mistakes were made. It all happened under extraordinary circumstances. There was no principle involved in that. It was a question of doing things rather rapidly and perhaps in doing them many mistakes were committed. It is all very well for any of us to judge afterwards of a certain situation. But if you want to form a picture of that situation, you really have to be involved in it, experience the strains of that situation including all its difficulties. Then only can you judge properly, and even then it is difficult because you can never have the same

feeling afterwards. Anyhow that time is over, and we have returned to conditions of normalcy....

Now there is some complaint that some people have been given certificates of being *mulki*s although they are not so. I cannot obviously go into that. If a fraud is committed, well, the fraud should be looked into, but I can only talk to you about broad principles. I therefore really do not understand this agitation, this excitement about *mulki* and non-*mulki*, except in relation to past events which have been very abnormal and in which many developments, no doubt, have taken place which one would not have liked to happen.

Anyhow the real difficulty is not *mulki* and non-*mulki*, but the larger question of employment or non-employment all over India, in every State, in every part of India. It is a big question. And it is not going to be solved by opening government jobs to a few dozens or a few hundreds of persons of this or that category. Because here we have to deal with vast numbers running into hundreds and thousands of people. Obviously, you cannot employ everybody in government service.

You know what the test of an advanced country is. The test is that people do not normally think of government service. Government service is rather a secondary thing in their minds. There are other avenues, but we are not an advanced country. In the past there was hardly any opening for an Indian except the government service. And to some extent there was the lawyer's profession and still to some limited extent the doctor's profession and a few others. So the government service became all important at that time. It was also important from the point of view of social status. That was all wrong. That kind of thing happens when there is a kind of government, as the British Government here, or even more so when there is a kind of government such as you had in Hyderabad previously, a kind of semi feudal government. In such circumstances, other avenues are not open; there are no other avenues, or just a very few of them. But an advanced country has hundreds and hundreds of types of work for the intelligent man. Industry, science and social service of all types offer openings to the bright persons who wish to enter them. Government service hardly attracts such talented persons there.

Therefore, the problem for us is to open out these avenues. That is how the country advances. It is not a question of giving ten jobs to people belonging to Hyderabad or ten jobs to others. If you do that it does not solve the problem. It may solve the problem for ten persons, but it does not solve the same problem for others.

This is the broad question that has to be understood. I would not go into that because that becomes the question of discussing the whole issue of the economic future of India. We discuss it under the Five-Year Plan, we discuss it to a slight extent in our community project schemes. After all the biggest problem in India is that of giving employment. Unemployment pulls down a



INAUGURATING THE 29TH MEETING OF THE BOARD OF COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH,
NEW DELHI, 12 AUGUST 1952



ADDRESSING THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE PLANNING COMMISSION, NEW DELHI, 12 AUGUST 1952

country. It is bad for the country. Whether it is unemployment of the poor and the needy, or whether it is the employment of the rich who do not work and live on others' work, both types are bad for a country. Every person is a consumer, so long as he is alive and he must at least produce what he consumes, indeed he should produce more. If he does not produce what he consumes, he is a burden on the community.

So unemployment is a big problem. We have to build up an India, a new India, and we have to build it up by hard work, by producing more, by providing more employment for millions of its population. As we build up, more and more avenues of employment open out, till I hope every single person is rightfully or gainfully employed.

Now, the other question. I have spoken at length on this question of the Osmania University at two of the big public meetings that I have addressed in Hyderabad and in Secunderabad, and I have expressed myself frankly about it. Nothing has amazed me so much as the fact that the Government of India's decision with regard to the Osmania University should be criticized.⁶ I expected large numbers of deputations coming to me to congratulate the Government of India on this issue. It is so obviously in my mind that the decision has been to the advantage of the people of Hyderabad. Honestly we wanted to do a favour to the Hyderabad State and to the Osmania University when we said we would help it as a Central University. We pointed out certain other things that should be done in it. And to my infinite amazement I find all kinds of misunderstanding, linguistic and other, and some people seem to imagine that the Delhi Government is walking away with the Osmania University by taking it over under its control. It is an extraordinary assumption. Quite a number of our older universities have complained against this decision of the Centre as showing a special favour to the Osmania. That complaint is justified, because it is a tremendous favour and encouragement and help to any university in India to become a Central University. It does not become the property of the Central Government. It only becomes something in which the Central Government is more interested and helps more.

A university in India is an autonomous body. There are certain limitations by statute. It controls itself. Neither the State Government nor the Government of India interferes with it, except if some emergency arises. It enrolls its students,

6. In July 1952, while the Hyderabad Legislative Assembly was discussing the Osmania University Bill to make it a Central University, a section of the people opposed it on the ground that it would take away the power of admissions and appointments which was till then more or less the preserve of those belonging to the State. K.V. Narayana Reddy, a former senior lecturer of the University and an MLA at that time, threatened to form an action committee and start satyagraha if the Central Government took over the University. Ultimately the Bill had to be dropped.

does this and that, and there is no question of interference. The Osmania University of course is obviously going to remain in Hyderabad. Obviously, it is going to be controlled by a senate or a syndicate. The vast number of students in it will be from Hyderabad. I hope there will be others in the Osmania University from outside, just as I hope there will be persons from Hyderabad in other universities. All this is in order to bring about harmony and a sense of communion. You should know about other universities. Other university students should know about Osmania University....

The Government of India has proposed that the principal medium of instruction in the Osmania University should be Hindi. Now, what does that mean? In any university in India today, I do not think it is possible to take away English as a medium of instruction for higher subjects. English is bound to continue in a large measure, even after it ceases to be a regular medium. It is bound to continue in other ways because you must have knowledge of the foreign languages. If you do not want English you can have German, French, Spanish or Russian and Chinese. We must know foreign languages if we are to get out of our frog-in-the-well mentality. So, English is bound to be the major medium of instruction.

Now, we did want Hyderabad to pay very particular attention to Hindi again largely from the point of view of doing good to Hyderabad, of giving its people a great advantage in this larger picture of India. In a few years from now, it is quite clear, that more and more of our work will be carried on in the States, in the Centre, and in very many of the Central activities, in the provincial languages or in the national language, that is Hindi....

Youngmen,⁷

If you remain quiet, I would like to say a few words. Do you mind if I read something that has been sent to me? Just now I spoke in English about some national and international matters in connection with the Osmania University. It is obvious that I would not like to repeat all that. It would be well if you understand this. If you do not, I am helpless.

The issues before us are very large ones. I have touched upon them in large gatherings in two districts of Hyderabad in the last two days, before ten to twelve lakh people whom I addressed. I do not think that the masses of India are lacking in intelligence. I respect them greatly. I would like to mention, to keep the balance straight, that sometimes I do not feel the same respect for the educated people of India. This is something worth thinking about. It is obvious that education leads to the development of a nation. That is not what I mean. I do not mean that education should be neglected. In fact, it should

7. Hereafter, the original speech was in Hindi.

spread more. What I mean is that I have met millions of people in India, individually and in large gatherings, and I have met people in large numbers in other countries too, and the more people I have met, the deeper has grown my respect for the masses in India. Please do not think that I am giving them an exaggerated importance. I am aware that they indulge in stupidity sometimes. They are very often extremely foolish. They fight over trivialities and behave very badly. I am fully aware of all this. I am idealizing them by saying that they are the masses and so they become ideal.

I do not think that the democracy that we talk about so vociferously means gathering together a few million people. Democracy means that the millions must have the ability to elect the right people who take on responsibilities. If they lack that ability, then there is no democracy.

India has become independent, and you have got the right to freedom. But that right entails tremendous responsibilities for you and me and all of us. It often seems to me that nobody thinks about those responsibilities. People think only of their rights and fail to understand that there is no right in the world which does not entail responsibility. Every individual has a duty which he must discharge.

So, as I said, I don't have to feel ashamed before any country in the world because of the people of India, in spite of the fact that they indulge in a great deal of stupidity which I often point out to them. I do not hide from them my opinion of them. And yet they love me to an extraordinary degree. How do I explain this? As I have had very close links with the masses for the past thirty to thirtytwo years, especially with the kisans and others too, my love for them has grown greater and my respect deeper. Even if I talk to them sometimes in a severe manner, or I scold them sometimes, my severity has always sprung from my love for them, and they know that. I have never looked down upon them. I have great respect for them. I regard them very highly, and when you say something out of affection to someone and do not look down upon him then he does not misunderstand you.

What I mean to say is that, as far as I can see, there is a great potentiality in our countrymen. I have no doubt about it that, given the right opportunity, the people of our country can go very far. It would be absurd to say that all individuals are equal. They cannot be equal for there are a thousand differences, mental, physical and intellectual. But it is very important that every individual should get equal opportunities. I am convinced that given equal opportunities for education, there would emerge from among India's innumerable millions, scientists, engineers and doctors comparable to the best in the world.

You must have heard about the great mathematician, Ramanujam, who was a poor clerk in the Madras Customs or at some such place. He did not have much of a formal education. By some chance he went to an English professor of mathematics with some of his graphs. The Englishman was amazed

when he saw them. He made arrangements for Ramanujam to go to Cambridge University even though he was not very well qualified. He stayed at Cambridge for two years and within those two years, he was elected to the Royal Society of Science which is the most prestigious institution in England. He was the first Indian to be thus elected. But he died two years later of tuberculosis because he had remained malnourished in his childhood. Now it was only by chance that the English professor's attention was drawn to Ramanujam. Otherwise, he would have continued as a clerk. He died very young. But the work that he did in two to three years, even during illness, is to this day drawing the attention of great mathematicians all over the world. It is said that he was the greatest mathematician of this country; just think of that, he was a poor clerk.

I am giving you an example to show that so many of our poor masses do not get the right opportunity, and if they did, many Ramanujams might emerge. They must get the opportunity for real education, and not merely go through a diploma-shop. I am convinced that there is tremendous potential among our people provided they get the opportunity, and provided they do not fritter away their energies in futile squabbles and slogan-mongering. Slogans are all right in their place. I have no objection. But if any one thinks that it is a sign of mental progress or that you can solve any problem by shouting slogans, it is obvious that this is wrong. No problem can be solved that way. Slogans merely generate a momentary enthusiasm. But they cannot solve any problem. For that you need to do hard work, physical and mental work.

The problems facing us are many. There is the question of unemployment. The issue before us is not about a few hundreds getting employment. The most important and urgent problem before us is how to change the entire face of the country whereby employment and work are ensured to everyone.

Work is important for all human beings, but it should be constructive work. I do not call white-collar jobs real work. The task before us is to build a new and strong India. It is an exciting adventure, if you think about it. There are innumerable hurdles in the way. We have to deal with stupidity of others and ours too. But the difficulties make the task even more exciting. Everyone can perform simple tasks, but it requires people of calibre to handle difficult tasks. It is only those who are capable of undertaking difficult tasks who can take the country forward. How many of you have this calibre?

The times are not the same as they were in my youth. Those were the days when students were asked to leave schools and colleges. Great movements like non-cooperation, salt satyagraha, civil disobedience, etc. were started. I am not sitting in judgment upon them. Those were different times. In my view, what we did then was appropriate to that time. It was a time of test for all of us, when every person with any ability was asked to give up all hopes of jobs and jump into the arena. We had to be ready to face grave dangers.

Today the only public activity the youth like to indulge in is to take out a procession, and if unfortunately there is a clash with the police, a big hue and cry ensues. But, what we faced was a much more difficult task then and it had very far-reaching consequences. Students who were getting first positions in their universities left them just a month before their examinations were to start and joined the struggle. They scoffed at the university education and government jobs and refused to join them. They fought bravely when they entered the struggle. This was a sign of great courage and ability. Innumerable such pictures come before me of people who braved untold hardships. Thousands of families broke up during those thirty to forty years and yet they remained undeterred. Many of them went very far indeed.

But today, as you see, the times have changed and there is no question any longer of doing all that. But I am constantly in search of one thing; whenever I see young men and women, I am anxious to see how much they are capable of joining the struggle, of facing the difficulties, of accomplishing something instead of merely presenting demands. Those who have this ability to take on responsibilities and perform tasks fraught with danger without complaining are not merely successful but are called upon to shoulder greater responsibilities too.

The old order which attracted young people to join the services or the police with a gradual increase in salaries and a pension at the end of a career has gone now. Those things are over. I do not mean that people's salaries should not increase or that pensions must not be given. But the days when we had a 'Service State', when the State was meant for the services and centred around them, are gone. In those days, the Indian Civil Service ruled the States with Governors as their heads. The services are very important to run the machinery of the nation. Therefore, it would be extremely absurd to malign the services, whatever we may have said in the days of the freedom struggle.

Now the State is no longer for the services but the other way round. The picture has changed gradually and will change further. The real test will be the moves adopted by the State for the development of the masses. In this set-up, it is only those who have ability will do well. University degrees and diplomas cannot take you very far. Anyhow, those with the highest capabilities are always an asset to any nation. They do not have to face unemployment because the services go out in search of them, invite them, woo them. They are so few in numbers. They do not face any great difficulties about employment. It is only the average and the mediocre who face difficulties. They should not have to. Some arrangements must be made for them also. But there is no doubt that they do face problems today.

In short, you must look at the issues that you have raised before me in this new perspective. I am aware that in view of the incidents that have taken place in Hyderabad during the last few months, the upheavals, specially mental

and emotional upheavals, that have taken place, it is difficult to look at these issues in a normal manner. But normalcy will return. You must always bear in mind that the issues before us today, I mean Parliament, etc. are problems that are agitating the whole world. Linked to them is the entire question of India's development and progress. It is not merely a question of giving a few jobs. It is a question of the progress of the entire nation.

Therefore, you must see this in the right perspective and train yourselves for new occupations and jobs. If you do that, India will advance undoubtedly. This is the time for us to lay the foundations of a new India. I feel that the Government has taken a momentous step in this direction in setting up science laboratories all over the country. There are many more things to be done. We can get any number of administrators. Though top quality people are always in short supply, administrators can be found nevertheless. But far more valuable are top class scientists, engineers, etc. The world today is being built by engineers and scientists, not by administrators and lawyers.

The laboratories that have been set up have laid the true foundations for ushering in an age of science in India. They will enable those who go ahead by the applications of modern science. We cannot progress merely by opening up shops or by joining the services. That would be like the ancient days in China where the sadhus earned a livelihood by washing other people's clothes. That is absurd. This is not a matter to be treated in a light manner. People here often attach too much importance to government service. That is only a very small part of the nation's activities. Take trade for instance. It is important, but everyone cannot open up shops. You must become productive, and not be on the lookout to become the middlemen for transfer of wealth from one pocket to another.

Science teaches us to produce. Engineers themselves produce things. We need such products; we must produce the nation's wealth and the more wealth we produce, the greater will be our share of it. We must ensure that the wealth produced does not remain in the hands of a few but is equitably distributed.

You must look at all this in this light, and constantly bear in mind that we are living in extraordinary times. Nobody knows when a war will break out. Anyhow, whether there is a war or not, we are passing through a tremendous transitional stage. Everything is changing. India is changing, and when that happens, a large number of people have to bear great hardships and difficulties. It is those who have courage and grit, and do not flinch in the face of adversity, who flourish in the atmosphere of new opportunities for progress for themselves and the nation. You must be filled with the spirit of adventure if you are to take advantage of the new opportunities. If you are among those who wish to stay clear of danger and prefer to take every step with caution, it is possible that you will not take firm root. You will not

progress an inch. Sometimes you have to take bold steps even if they sometimes turn out to be wrong steps. Therefore, you must be prepared to face whatever difficulties arise....

8. The Livery of Freedom¹

Gandhi Jayanti brings many memories and is a reminder of many duties. I hope that we will think of these duties on this day and, in performing them to the best of our ability, pay our homage to the Father of the Nation.

Among these duties one naturally thinks of khadi which was so dear to Gandhiji. We discuss the economics of khadi, but there is another aspect even apart from economics. Khadi has for long been a certain symbol for us, a symbol in our fight for freedom when it became the livery of freedom, a symbol of simplicity and equality, a symbol of our encouraging cottage crafts and industries. In these days of distress and unemployment, the furtherance of cottage and small-scale industries becomes all the more important.

I hope, therefore, that our people will encourage khadi and wear it and thus pay a small tribute to Gandhiji, and indicate in a small measure that they line up with the common people of India and do not wish to form a class apart from them.

1. Message for Gandhi Jayanti Day, New Delhi, 1 October 1952. Published in the newspapers on 2 October 1952.

9. Good for a Nation to Face Adversity¹

Young friends and comrades,

Normally I am not in difficulty in addressing audiences. But on this occasion I do not quite know what you expect me to say, or what I expect myself to say. I do not want to talk to you in a formal manner, in set phrases, and give you a lot of good advice, though good advice need not be considered bad. I

1. Speech at the Presidency College, Madras, 8 October 1952. AIR tapes, NMML. Extracts.

would like to talk to you in a friendly and intimate manner. It is no good to praise me. If I am worthy of praise there is enough of it. Your adding to it will not add to my stature, nor lessen it.

The other day I said on arriving in Madras that I was happy to come to the intellectual capital of India. It was not a formal compliment. I meant it, but I am not sure if it applies to the present. I should like it to apply. Anyhow, coming to Madras, I feel a certain change in the mental climate, so far as I am concerned, particularly because I am away from many normal problems that beset me. There are other local problems here. I find also a certain quiet graciousness in the city of Madras. It has grown up; besides it is pleasant and restful. I am not quite sure if I would like too much pleasantness and restfulness, because I have been brought up in the midst of storm and tempest. I feel at home in such conditions, and would like to meet them and not be frightened and run away from them. They are a challenge to all of us. Anyhow, it is perfectly true, that I do feel happy to come to Madras, to meet the people, and to savour of the mental climate here.

In the address presented to me all kinds of world problems have been referred to. It is right that you should be thinking about them. All of us should think about them. Whether thinking about them or not, the problems come impinging upon us and interfere with our lives. Nevertheless, I do feel that we can serve the world best if we serve our country, if we serve ourselves, not as individuals but as a larger community of India. Nobody can have much effect on the world, if he does not know how to behave in his own country; or if his own country does not make good, how can we presume to offer advice to the rest of the world? It is no good saying that we are striving for the peace of the world. There is none among you who does not desire peace in the world, and I doubt if there are many in the world who do not want peace, and yet somehow they and we get entangled in forces and problems, which appear almost beyond our control. Things happen which we do not like to see. They sweep us up into their net.

Of course, that does not mean that we should allow ourselves to be swept away. It is wrong for us to try to judge others, to condemn others not knowing the environment in which they function. It is extraordinarily easy to criticize and condemn others. It does no good, because your condemnation and criticism does not affect them. It only angers them. It does not win them over. It does not mean that we should not exercise our right to think and criticize, if we think that there is something wrong. It does mean judging others somewhat tolerantly, and judging ourselves rather strictly, because one ought to know something about oneself. In this world, one should be a little more tolerant in approach.

I say that, because, in spite of the tremendous advances that the world has made, the world does grow more and more intolerant and more and more

troublesome. Each group or individual finds it difficult to carry on with another group or individual. It may be that we are passing through a very severe period of transition, which is perfectly true. During the past two generations, the world has changed beyond all recognition. I may give you one or two very rather simple instances, which people do not quite realize. In the last hundred years, hundred and fifty years or two hundred years, you would have found a world which more or less existed, as it existed a thousand or two thousand years previously. Of course, there were changes, there was progress or want of progress, but the extreme way in which the world carried on was much the same. If a man or a woman living somewhere in the time of the Buddha came back to India two hundred years ago, he or she would find there was no great change. Yet we will find changes. Let me give you a rather crude example of the changes that came. If you travelled from one place to another, it would have taken you almost exactly the same time, whether you did so two thousand years ago, or two hundred years ago. Probably, the fastest methods of travelling, leaving out what is told in fairy tales, was a fast running horse. In regard to communications and travel, tremendous changes have taken place—I do not say whether they are for the good or bad. But they have taken place. In fact, all our life has changed, because of the change in the methods of transport, communication, etc. Whether it is the methods of transport or the business of wireless, radio, radar and what not, all these have completely changed the physical environment in which we live.

How far our mental climate has changed with them, I do not know. Probably not. It is a very odd thing that everything, whether it is science or anything else, is after all the product of the human mind. Still, the human mind, individuals apart, continues to live in the thought of the same past age, and cannot cope with the present. That produces difficulties of adjustment.

This is one aspect of it. Presumably, there are certain other fundamental factors which do not change. Certain principles governing nature or life do not change. If you do not keep in tune with them, you get into trouble. So also we need to adjust ourselves to the tremendous technological changes that have taken place and are likely to take place from day to day at great pace.

Secondly, we have been somewhat uprooted from the basic principles which should govern human life. Therefore, we find ourselves rather estranged from the world. We discuss a large number of ideologies and 'isms', and it is right that we, and especially you, should discuss them and consider them and try to find out what truth there is in them, and may be you cannot find any. It is very difficult for anyone to find out. Ultimately, events will show what truth there is in them. You have some basic yardstick to apply. We are not able to say whether it satisfies the test or not.

Now, I get into deep waters when I talk about these basic principles, and I do not propose to talk about them. It does seem to me that if we look at the world today, we find that an amazing amount of hatred is generated by one nation against another, by one group against another, by the believers in one political or economic philosophy against another. I cannot conceive, regardless of the merits of any philosophy, how good can come out of this ocean of hatred that is generated. This is a matter of feeling and experience. It is something that I do feel. My innermost feeling is that you cannot progress ultimately in an atmosphere of hatred and anger and violence. I am not, even though I try to be, a very peaceful or passive individual. Nevertheless, I do believe that we, or any country, will not go far ahead, if it bases itself on hatred in a large way. I do not, of course, expect everybody to behave in an angelic way. What I object to is the deliberate propagation of hatred, nationally and internationally.

I have read Indian history to some extent, studied it. There is much good in it and much bad also. But there does seem to me that there is a certain background of tolerance and gentleness in India. There are plenty of other things too. Our whole freedom movement was based on those factors which our great leader taught us as something basic in India, and which we used with tremendous advantage to strengthen India and to gain freedom.

We shout "Mahatma Gandhi ki Jai", but we forget what exactly he stood for. He stood for so many things that it is difficult to recount all the manifold activities that he undertook. But he stood for something basic. That basic thing came out of the soil of India, out of our national consciousness, something which had made us great in the past, and in forgetting which we have rather sunk in the scale of nations. He adopted non-violence as a method of action.

I do not preach non-violence. But, sometimes I feel that in the name of non-violence, all kinds of people speak and even act in a most violent manner. We are apt to turn all these things into narrow creeds. We are a nation which is fond of raising barriers by dividing ourselves up into various castes and sects. This has weakened us in the past. So long as we do not get over it, it will no doubt weaken us in future also.

I fear to talk about these matters before great exponents of the philosophy of non-violence. As I understand it, it is more an attitude of mind, a mental approach, rather than sticking to some dogma or some creed. Swadeshi was used as a weapon by people even before Gandhiji adopted it. In the name of swadeshi you may live in some kind of a narrow shell of your own, cutting yourself off from the outer world. That, I think, is fatal. Cutting off from the world or from your neighbours is bad. You do not grow. India lost her capacity for growth because she cut herself off, both physically and mentally, from the rest of the world for several hundred years. It is astonishing how India became static and stagnated, taking pride in herself, and refusing to look at the world.

If you refuse to look at the world, the world will refuse to care for you and go ahead without you.

Swadeshi in another sense means a certain self-reliance, a certain inward looking for growth, a certain going ahead with your own efforts. We must take help from outside, be it in the field of material help, ideas, whatever it may be. We must keep the windows of our minds open to the world. We must cooperate with the outside world, and the world will become one more and more. But, where cooperation and looking outside become dependent on others, mentally, physically, financially or in whatever way it may be, then you are losing the sap of life. You are losing the vitality that ought to go with a growing nation.

You can judge India's resources in many ways. Our Planning Commission draws up the lists. It is very important that we should know what exactly are our resources and our strengths, and not talk loosely and wildly. We all want to do many things, but the point is what we can do and what we want to do. It is bad to indulge in wishful thinking. We must not make promises which we cannot fulfil. But in the final analysis, as you ought to know, if you have studied history, or if you know anything about human beings, it is not gold or silver that counts. It is not either the physical resources which a country might possess that counts, although iron, coal and things like these are important. It is ultimately the human wealth that a country possesses that counts—the quality of the human beings, not the quantity.

You will find in history how often small countries have grown to greatness because of the quality of human beings they possess, not the quantity. Great empires have grown up. Small countries have grown into great empires. You may shout "down with imperialism", and you will be right. Certainly, let us fight imperialism where it functions and more especially if it comes in our way. But let us forget these 'isms'. The point is that it is always men of a certain quality who have raised a nation, and made it great and powerful, sometimes for some notorious deeds, if you like, but it is people of great talents who have made a nation powerful in the realms of peace, literature and everything that adds to human welfare. Similarly there are great periods in Indian history, not only periods when our kings won great victories, but also periods of artistic growth. Those were great periods. The quality of the human beings was such that the country grew. So, having attained our independence, we want our nation to grow. We want, not just a few, but the three hundred and sixty millions of our people to grow.

How are we to grow? We are involved in economic problems which are essential, because you cannot expect cultural growth on a hungry stomach. You cannot expect the country to grow if it is dogged by poverty and unemployment and all the bad consequences that come out of them. We have to fight poverty, and unemployment and the like, always keeping in mind

that we have to produce men and women of quality. You may apply it to education, which presumably is meant to produce quality. We should like to impart that education to every boy and girl in India. Indeed, it is the duty of the State to do so, just as it is the duty of the State to make many other efforts. Then we find ourselves hampered by lack of resources and other difficulties. These are momentary difficulties and I hope they will pass. I want you to realize this stress on quality. But I do not want quality in the sense we produce a superior caste of men, and the rest remain at a lower level. That is not the kind of thing that should be done today. Though it is inevitable that some people will rise higher than others, because of their physical, intellectual, moral and other attainments, we should give everybody the opportunity to rise higher, one's own capacity being the limiting factor and not external circumstances.

You are in college here, and within a couple of years, you will be out of the college and take up some profession. Naturally, and quite inevitably, the future leaders of India will be among those who are now studying. There may be some individuals in India who may be so bright that without going to college, they may become leaders in various fields. This is quite conceivable. But, generally speaking, our education is meant to raise standards and produce men of quality in large numbers. In the past, education was meant to produce men for service in the Government, and just a few for the so-called liberal professions. That was a very narrow view of things. In any country where Government service is regarded as the ideal objective in a man's career, that country is rather backward. It means that it has not got many other openings. Therefore, that country is not really progressive.

Now we have to progress along a hundred lines. The Government service means mostly administrative work. Administration is important, of course, but it grows less and less important as the world becomes more and more complicated. An engineer or a doctor becomes more and more important than a pure administrator. The lawyer, well, never really had any real importance. It was an assumed importance. Lawyers have done great service to the country, of course, and lawyers in their limited field are certainly useful. But in the modern world, probably the utility of the lawyer, that queer person called lawyer, not as a citizen, becomes less and less important, because the stress is on other activities.

You will find that most of the national movements of the nineteenth century, anywhere in the world, not only in India, were led by lawyers. They performed a particularly useful and significant function. They were the progressive persons in those days. They led our national movement and played a very important part in it. That applies to every country almost. They did that. But, as the twentieth century advances, the lawyers' leadership is challenged by others. Other people come into the field. Lawyers still come in,

but they come in not as lawyers, but because they have got a trained intellect, and they are clever and all that. Therefore, they come into other fields and serve undoubtedly. So, if India is to progress, it has to progress in a hundred ways, not by producing just a few clever administrators. In fact, we may conceivably do without a few administrators, but we cannot do without competent engineers. They are more important today in the building up of India.

Probably most of my political colleagues may not even agree with me, because they themselves are pure politicians and they cannot understand what administrators do. But to understand this world everybody should have some kind of a scientific training, and so one of the things I am happy about in the last five years is our building up these great national laboratories in India. I think that is really more important from a basic and fundamental point of view for the progress of India than anything else that we have done.

We have to build up a new India. It is a tremendous job and a great adventure. I want you to feel that you are engaged or are going to be engaged in this great adventure, just as people of an earlier generation, people like me, felt that we were engaged in a tremendous, brave adventure, when we became unarmed non-violent soldiers in the ranks of India's liberation army. It is hardly possible for you to enter into the spirit of those days that we were privileged to see and experience. We felt exhilarated and we forgot ourselves in the work, and once in the struggle we became part of some primal force. We were not merely individuals functioning, but we were part of a great force, representing the Indian people that was functioning, and we were partly carried away by it and were partly encouraging it, all together. We had many ups and downs. But, by and large, we were all intoxicated—if I may rather use that expression in this place of prohibition—with this feeling of exhilaration that we were fighting for the freedom of this great country. We had firm conviction that we were going to succeed. We had no doubt about it at any time. That kind of exhilarated feeling does not last long. You cannot live in a high state of emotion all the time. Now, the previous adventure is over. It was over when independence for India came. But an adventure, even greater than that, now calls us, calls you more than some of us who have not many years left for work. This is the tremendous adventure of building new India.

I have written a book, as you might know, called *The Discovery of India*. The book contains only a little of my own thoughts on the subject. Wherever I go I am discovering India—discovering India historically, physically—and more and more through her people. This discovery of India is a fascinating theme, and I do not think anybody can discover India completely. It is so complicated and yet so fascinating. Anyhow, we can have some glimpses only. From the Himalayas and the snow covered peaks of Kashmir, Ladakh and all that, right down to Kanyakumari, we have this enormous variety—physical,

geological, climatic—of human beings and of so many other things. All these should be fused together not only politically—politically we are one—but in a more intimate way, in mind. To regiment them in one way would be hateful.

We want this tremendous variety, the cultural variety, which has grown out of the soil of India. At the same time, the cultural variety should fuse the people intellectually and emotionally together so as to remove the numerous barriers—communal, religious, caste and what not—which prevent us from really functioning together and which make us narrow in outlook and prevent our mental growth.

I would not mind if one occasionally misbehaves, and gets punished for it. But I have the strongest objection to your being petty-minded or vulgar, to your being small in spirit. And one thing that disturbs me most is when I see this smallness, pettiness and vulgarity in India, and more so among the youth of the country. Because that is something that is alarming as that person, or the concerned group, is not likely to grow.

If we have got really big tasks to perform, then we have to be big in every way—big in mind, big in mental and moral strength, and big in stature—and not to give in because something wrong happens, or some adverse circumstances pursue us. We have to face these. After all, communities or nations become really great by facing adverse circumstances. Nothing is so bad for an individual or for a group as to lead a soft life. Many of our prosperous people in a way almost ruin their children by the soft life they try to give them. We of course love our children. We want to protect them. We want them to grow. But his pampering to a child's whims and fancies, and padding him up with mufflers so that he might not catch cold is bad. You do not have the cold season here, so, perhaps, you do not know about these things. But, in the North, it is an extraordinary sight, the way little children are padded up so that they might not get cold. I remember, seeing children in the mountains of Switzerland being taught such risky game as skiing. I doubt if many Indian parents would allow their children of eight or nine to go down a snow slope, taking the risk of a fall and possibly hurting themselves....

I was talking about soft life, which is bad for a nation. It is good for a nation to face trials and adversities. A Greek historian wrote the history of a nation in three or four sentences. I am not quoting him exactly but it was something like this: "A nation faces adversity and facing it grows strong. By becoming strong, it overcomes that adversity. Then starts its process of soft-living and decay and consequent fall."

It is an odd thing that nothing more dangerous can happen to a great movement than success. Success itself, unless properly handled, is dangerous....

However, nobody in India really has a soft life. We lead a hard life. But, while we do not have a soft life, we begin to have what I call passive life, a static life. That is no good. We have to be active. We have to build up. We are partners in a tremendous adventure. We must not lose heart, if something wrong happens. We must keep our perspective, and not become narrow. Do not imagine that you are looking at a mountain when you happen to be near a mole-hill. Develop character in yourselves. I warn you against the tendency of feeling superior to others. That is a very bad thing....It is completely opposed to any democratic idea. We have to produce men of quality in India, as a whole, allowing those of a higher calibre to go up. I do not know how many of the starving children I saw in Rayalaseema, given the opportunity, would become men or women of quality? Who can say that Rayalaseema would not produce a Prime Minister of India? That is why I dislike the idea of any one approaching to help them with an attitude of superiority. Of course, it is our duty to help—but not by doling out charity in a superior way to a fellow-Indian who happens to be for the moment starving or famished because you did not give him an opportunity to be better. If he is in want, it is our fault. So, for heaven's sake, do not develop this attitude of superiority.

There was in your address some mention about your going to work among the slums of Madras or elsewhere, and there was a hint in it of your working hard in your colleges. Well, I should think that a part of your training, whether you are at school, or in college or university, should be outside these places. You must work with the people to some extent, not in a superior and patronizing way. You learn more about economics in India by spending some time in an Indian village, trying to find out, trying to do things for yourself there, than by reading books. In that way, I think, it is essential that your academic learning should be tied up with this kind of service.

I am quite convinced that every human being should do manual labour to some extent. The idea that manual labour is degrading is absurd. Apart from that, to understand life, a part of your education should be to mix with those people. You should do work in slums and not pretend to be superior beings. In some places fashionable ladies go to slums. It is a thing which ought to be put down by law, because we do not want this kind of patronage by anybody, fashionable or unfashionable. If a person wants to do some voluntary social work, well, there is plenty of opportunity for that. So go to the people in the slums, learn something from them and do some social work. Ultimately, it is the capacity of our learning to cooperate with each other, that will carry us far.

10. Human Approach to Social Service¹

Though I sometimes talk about social service, I neither belong to any organization of social work nor do I have any training. After seeing the various kinds of social work done in this city I got an idea of the exhaustive nature of the social work being done here.

It is really most impressive to read in the literature supplied to me how much social service work is being done in Madras and how many people are taking active part and devoting their time and energy to it. I think it really does an enormous amount of good to a person if he does social service. You are not merely doing some good to another person but also doing far more good to yourselves by doing it.

Just before I came here I addressed the students. I told them that they should not go to a village or any other place with a superior attitude as if they were conferring a favour. If they did so, it was worse than useless, and I would ask them not to go at all to the villages. Rather, they should go there in the spirit of learning something in the process of helping others. Therefore, I have told them: "Do not be the type of the society lady that goes slumming in a superior way."² Now you will understand that I have nothing against a society lady or slumming. But the combination of the two is painful. That is to say, we cannot approach these matters with a superiority complex. It takes away the whole human aspect of it.

So far as I know Madras State has distinguished itself considerably in the field of social service and there are a large number of men and women—and more especially women here—who have not only done remarkable good work but whose fame in this field of activity has travelled to other parts of India. I am happy that, during my stay, this particular function has been organized. It has given me an ocular experience of something that I have heard for long, that is, the social service activities here.

I am coming here from Rayalaseema and even there I saw in some places people, especially women, doing a good deal of work not with a patronizing and superior air but in a comradely, friendly way, helping the distressed. It is of infinite importance how a good act is done—and it might be done badly or crudely, or, in a way, lacking in humanity or the human approach. The whole point about social work is not so much as to what is being done but the manner by which it is being done.

1. Address to the Guild of Social Service, Madras, 8 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 9 October 1952.
2. See the previous page.

The Centre and the State Governments had to face terrific problems soon after Partition. They faced them with courage, determination and with a great deal of success. The problem has not been completely solved but we have met with success to a remarkable degree. Nevertheless, I have felt all along that the Government might provide the suffering persons with food, housing and clothing, but I have always felt that these must be supplemented by the human approach. Normally speaking, Governments do not show human approach. They just are machine-like in their activity following rules and regulations.

I have felt all along how we could utilize social service workers in a variety of ways, more particularly for friendly contacts. Each displaced person has a terrible history behind him or her, a feeling of isolation, of having been uprooted and thrown in a new environment. In dealing with him, I think, this human approach is exceedingly important. After all, human relations are important and a person whose human relations have been broken up, or upset in any way, deserves something to fill that vacuum. So I am very glad that there are people in Madras who are, in a number of ways, giving their time, energy and service to this really important and good work. I should like to congratulate them and the city of Madras on that.

11. Manpower of the Nation¹

I have been taking some interest in the Institute from a distance. In the course of last two or three years, I have often been reminded of it by letters, by personal visits, and in other ways.

I am naturally interested in it for a variety of reasons, one of them being my interest in the growth of scientific and technological institutes in India. The other thing I like is this: it is an effort without much Governmental support and it is an ambitious undertaking.... I would like that this Institute should develop the capacity for self-help which it has shown since its inception and make the best use of whatever they can get.

It is something which touches us far more than if we had everything supplied to us, which made us spoon-fed. The teachers and students should exercise their ingenuity to make the best things out of what they have. This way the students would probably get more training than they can get with

1. Address to the students of the Madras Institute of Technology, Chromepet, Madras, 9 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 10 October 1952. Extracts.

more modern machines. They would find it easy to do a particular job as the very process of training itself will compel them to exercise the best in their ingenuity and mental faculty.

We have to remember always the conditions in which we have to function in India. I have seen many Indians who have come back after a full course of foreign training. They are competent. They can do much, but they always ask for complicated machines to do their work. They seem to be a little helpless without even a bit of machine with them.

Obviously, we cannot produce all those machines. The result is that the work of the individual suffers, although he is competent enough. His competence is dependent on some machines or other equipment. There is a wide range of work which can be done, perhaps not quite so efficiently but nevertheless can be done with far simpler machinery than of the latest type. I am all in favour of using the latest improvements in technology. It is bad to be second rate. I cannot commend the second rate. But I would commend something which compels the students and the teachers to get the best out of the environment, because apart from its being a good training, when they have to deal with the problems of India later on, or while in the institutions, or try to do some work elsewhere, they would have continually to contend with conditions where there would be no machines. They ought to develop the faculty of making their own machines, or managing with such material as they have got. It is better to have that faculty than that of getting complicated machines and pressing a button and so on. There is an advantage in having to struggle through some adverse circumstances in the course of your training in these matters.

In the ordinary colleges, the students are given a pure literary type of education. They might read books, learn them by heart, and pass examinations. In a technological institute, they can see clearly how their inventive faculties are developing. They have got to build up things themselves. In America, in 150 years of technological progress, they have built up an enormous quantity of advanced types of machine, techniques and so on. The students took advantage of them and started their training from a certain base. But in a country like India, we do not have that base. We have to start from scratch and have to build on it. When our students find no such base, they are dissatisfied and disgruntled. They should, of course, acquaint themselves with the latest machines and technical advances. They should not be second-rate, but they should have the capacity to produce as far as possible their requirements with the type of equipment and material that is available in India. They cannot make progress, unless they make their own apparatus, equipment and instruments, etc.

After all, in the ultimate analysis, manpower is the real wealth of the country. The more trained the manpower is, the more valuable it is. Now, we have to make a choice as to whether we should do a certain job effectively and more speedily with the machine. If, for example, we took half a dozen

bulldozers and one hundred to five hundred men, we would find that the bulldozers would do the work more quickly, and are cheaper too. On the other hand, we cannot permit these one hundred to five hundred men to sit down, look on and starve. After all, bulldozers are for men and not men for the bulldozers. We seem to forget this fact.

Therefore, while always trying to have the latest technological improvements—if you do not have, you fall back—you have, nevertheless, to apply them to conditions in India, remembering that the most important thing is the human machine, and the human factor, and its employment to the best advantage. It would be a tragedy if we go on accumulating wealth through some techniques. If wealth is concentrated in a few hands and does not percolate down, a vast number of human beings suffer, and unemployment and all kinds of evil results flow from it....

In the days of my boyhood and subsequently, there was a great deal of talk about swadeshi in India, both about its constructive and negative sides. The negative side is gone, while the positive side is supposed to be looked after, presumably, by the Government. But the entire philosophy of the swadeshi outlook is not to live in your own shells. You must make the entire world your mental home. Unless an individual, a community, or a nation, becomes self-reliant, it cannot go far. If it depends on others, it is not independence, but it is dependence, its growth is somewhat impeded. Therefore, in that sense, I would commend to you the idea of swadeshi and self-reliance....

12. Making India Strong¹

Friends and comrades,

I have come back to you and to this gracious city of Madras after about ten months, and as is your nature you have overwhelmed me with your affection and welcome. I feel it is a little difficult to express myself in suitable language in the face of this warm welcome that you accord me, even though it has been my extraordinary good fortune to have similar treatment given to me in whatever part of India I may go to, and even though I have experienced this many, many times still it is an overwhelming experience and one's reactions cannot be expressed easily in words. I often wonder why this should be so. I cannot find a logical or a suitable answer except that the Indian people are

1. Speech at a public meeting, Madras, 9 October 1952. AIR tapes, NMML. Extracts. For other parts of the speech, see *post*, pp. 343-345, 649 and 677-678.

extraordinarily generous and warm-hearted, and if they take someone to their hearts they are very indulgent and overlook his numerous failings, and act rather like fond parents with their children.

I came here ten months ago or so in the course of an election campaign just for a day² and I wandered about all over India with the speed, well, of the aeroplane and in the course of two or three months, I covered large parts of India, right from the eastern frontier of India which joins Burma and Tibet to the northern Himalayas, to the west, in far away Kutch adjoining Pakistan, and down south to Kanyakumari. I came to Madras city and I toured in some of the Andhra parts of this State. I did not go then to any of the other parts of the State, the Tamil parts or to Malabar. It was difficult for me to go everywhere. Even so, I think, I created some kind of a record in travelling, at least on election business.

But that tour of mine, meant as it was for election purposes, was for me something much more than that. It was a fresh attempt at the discovery of India and the Indian people; because, previously, for sometime past, I had been tied up more or less in Delhi, and had lost contact, to some extent, with the people of India. And so I welcomed the opportunity of touring the country. That was a tremendous experience for me.

As soon as the elections were over, we settled down everywhere, more or less, to our business as usual. Sometimes, in some States, new situations had arisen—as was only right and one cannot have a static situation everywhere—and these new situations were dealt with in new ways. So, we have passed through these eight or nine months, under this new regime after the election. We have time now, I suppose, to think calmly and quietly of what we have done and what we have failed to do, because it is always easy to draw up a list of one's achievements and failures.

So far as I am concerned, I do not wish to slur over, in the slightest degree, any lack of achievement of the Government that I have the honour to represent. Because we have not merely to please the people with mere promises or tickle their fancies as is the habit sometimes of some politicians, but we have to do something, much more serious and lasting. That is not done by promises and assurances. So far as I am concerned, I stand before you here to make no promise; all through my long election tour I made no promises.

What is the good of my making promises? If you have any measure of faith in a person's *bona fides* and trust him, then words are not necessary. If you have not got that faith, then words are more than useless. So I made no promises either on my own behalf or on behalf of my Government. It is true that we did lay before the people of India a programme—that is, the party which I have the honour to represent, namely, the National Congress—and

2. On 27 November 1951.

that contained some kind of assurance of the line we were going to adopt. Also, apart from that programme, we had been a functioning Government before that election. A functioning Government is judged not by what it promises, but by what it has done. Our record, good or bad, was there for you to judge.

I do not want to indulge in promises and appeal to your emotions about the future. It is good to have the right emotions and use them for right purposes. But it is also good to think about our problems calmly and coolly, to measure our resources and strength and use them to the best advantage. We measure our resources, and the Planning Commission, our Government and public organizations do so. But there is something which is beyond measure, which cannot be tabulated or weighed and that is the capacity of the Indian people to do things. In trying to ascertain that capacity, I try to put myself in tune with it, trying to understand their feelings and share, not successfully I fear their sufferings, and to some extent merge myself in the vast sea of India's humanity so that I might be able to interpret somewhat their urges, their feelings, and their instincts and desires. I do not know how far I have succeeded in that. But sometimes I feel even this abundant affection showered upon me by the people indicates my success to some extent. In that moment of success, I feel my individual self, to some extent, gets merged in this sea of India's humanity and I hardly function as an individual self, but begin to act as an embodiment of that humanity. And for that moment I am not like my puny little individual self but a representative and an embodiment of the will and determination of the people of India. And so, I have these various feelings, and whenever I get that feeling that I represent Indian humanity, I draw sustenance and strength from it. I have no other great reservoir of strength except this tremendous reservoir of the love and trust of the people of India.

I have been, as you know, on a tour of Rayalaseema, and I saw the conditions³ there with my eyes. I heard people and I came back with some reactions. And while I was there, innumerable petitions, memoranda, representations and addresses were presented to me, all full of demands that the Central Government must do this and the Government of Madras must do that. I read through them and the effect produced on me by these innumerable demands, addresses and memoranda was exceedingly little. What I saw however affected me considerably. Certainly we can demand many things. But we do not solve problems by demands. We solve problems by understanding them, by working for their solution, and by planning matters. It is quite obvious that

3. The Rayalaseema region consisting of the districts of Anantapur, Bellary, Chittoor, Kumool and Cuddapah, had been passing through famine conditions owing to the failure of the monsoon for seven years in succession.

Rayalaseema has faced great difficulties and the people of Rayalaseema need all succour we can give them.

I went to parts of Mysore. There was the same sorry tale. You can take it from me that four or five districts of Uttar Pradesh are at least as bad as Rayalaseema. There is suffering again in parts of Bihar, Bengal, Karnataka, parts of Bombay Presidency, Saurashtra and parts of Madhya Bharat. And, mind you, this year has not been bad from the point of view of the monsoon. It has been much better than previous years. We have stocks of food which we have not had previously. Yet, we have to face these difficulties, and, what is more, large sections of the people of India have to face them. It is our duty as a Government, and your duty and mine as the people of India, to give them succour and help to the best of our ability.

But, in doing so, we have to look at the entire picture. We cannot get lost in these numerous demands and forget other parts of the picture. We have to march step by step all over India, not losing heart, not losing patience, but realizing that it is only through hard, combined and concentrated efforts that we can gradually solve these problems. So it is better to understand the problem in all its dimensions and complexities and to try to help in finding its solution.

We are too much in the habit, all over India, of advising our neighbours to do their duty forgetting our own little jobs. So, let us understand these problems of India, and if you like, of the world, because, today I receive so much advice also about the solution of the world's problems. We can try to understand them intellectually. That is important. But there is something even more important in dealing with human affairs—whether you deal with them in a small way as an individual, as a small group or as a nation. That is, trying to understand those problems in a human way, and, if I may say so, in an emotional way, to have an emotional awareness of the problems and not merely an intellectual appreciation of it. It is when you have an emotional awareness of a problem or of an individual that you begin to understand that problem or that individual.

I have sought, therefore, to understand the problems of India, not only through statistics and reports of officials or non-officials, but I have tried to understand them through the Indian people. I have tried to understand them by looking at millions and millions of the people of India, at their faces, and trying to probe into those eyes and have some glimpse of what they have behind them. That has sometimes helped me to gain that emotional awareness, and that has also brought me nearer to the people of India, and them nearer to me.

I am trying to explain to you how I try to function. I am a poor type of politician, or, if you like, my politics is made of sterner stuff than that of an ordinary politician. I am not interested in the game of politics as such. I am engaged in a mighty game, in a great adventure, together with 350 to 360

million people. That fascinates me, and fills my mind with a sense of excitement and adventure. I do not care much for the political game or the ways of politics. Not that there is anything bad in it, but that does not interest me.

You see, I have been a very ambitious person. But my ambition was made of sterner stuff and looked hard, and embraced in its fold millions and millions of people—sometimes to some extent the entire world. And so, I wander about not only physically, but in mind, over this vast tract of India with its innumerable people, with their basic unity and infinite diversity and try to understand their problems. I do not know how far I can succeed in understanding those problems or in solving them; because a nation's problems are never fully solved, and if you solve one, another takes its place. And no man can put a stop to a nation's progress.

We had a great problem—the problem of freedom and independence. We have solved it, and solved it in a good way. A good way of solving a problem is that it does not lead to other problems. The bad way is you try to solve a problem, imagine you have solved it, and a hundred other problems invade you afterwards. Like that, people tried to solve the problems of the world by two great world wars, and in each war they gained a tremendous victory—what appeared to be a crushing victory—and on the morrow of the victory they found that that victory had led to graver problems than those that had given rise to the wars.

Here we are seven years after this Second World War, and what does the world look like? There are marching armies and atomic bombs and the like.

How did that Second World War solve the problems? It solved one problem certainly. It put an end to Hitlerite Germany and fascist Italy. Well and good. But the manner of putting an end to them gave rise to other problems.

Therefore, I say that when we solved our problem of independence, we not only solved it but solved it in the right way, so as not to lead to other problems, or let a trail of hatred or violence follow it. That, of course, was essentially due to the policy that our great leader had taught us to follow. We followed it in a very imperfect measure. But even to the extent we followed it, we gained great success. I would like to say here that that was also due to the wisdom of the British statesmen of the day. Let us give credit where the credit is due.

We solved the problem but immediately other problems came—not issuing from that problem, independently of them—for example, the economic problem, which was before us. So, our pilgrimage could not end, and there was no resting place for us. We had to go on and on with this enormous problem of raising the living standards of 360 millions of India's people, to extend to them the economic freedom, to help the poor to get rid of poverty, unemployment and the like problems. And that is a bigger problem than even the problem of gaining independence.

How are we to set about solving the economic problem is the question that must trouble you as it troubles me, because there is no magic way of doing it. It cannot be done by praying, by demands, by resolutions, or by addresses and representations. We can only solve it gradually by hard work. Certainly, we have to think and march along the right path and follow the right policy. But, it is through the hard work of the nation alone that you can solve them. It seems to me that there is some lack of realization of this. People seem to think that by some *firman*, or decree of government, these great problems are solved. It is important that decrees of government and the laws of government are such as to help in the solution of the problem and not hinder it. It is important that the economic structure that we build up is such as to help solve the economic problems. It is important for us to get rid of the feudal or semi-feudal land tenure systems which exist in parts of India.

Not today, but twenty years ago, the Congress laid down, among other things, that the *taluqdari*, *zamindari* and *jagirdari* systems should go.⁴ They represented a past age. It is not that individual zamindars were bad or good. That system represented a past age and did not fit in with the present. It came in the way of human progress, of India's progress. It had to go, it is going, and it has gone in many parts of India—and the sooner it goes elsewhere, the better it would be. Indeed, the land problem is, for the countries of Asia or a great part of Asia, the first basic problem. You cannot talk about industrialization and industrial growth with feudal and semi-feudal systems of land. They come into conflict. Indeed, you cannot talk about progress if you do not change many ideas, which may still linger in your minds—ideas which belong to the past age. So we have to face this major problem.

You know that two years back the Government appointed a Planning Commission. That was the right approach, because the first thing one must realize is that these problems cannot be considered in isolation, because they are inter-linked, and you cannot have any progress unless you see the full picture, unless you inter-relate one thing to the other, and know what your resources are. Otherwise, we start doing many things and cannot completely execute them and will have to give them up. In fact, that is exactly what we did some years back. In a fit of enthusiasm, we started many things, not realizing or not thinking what resources we had. Later on, we did, with great regret and pain, stop some of the things we were doing, because we found that if we tried to do everything, the result would be suffering to the people and nothing would

4. The Karachi Congress Resolution of 1931 on Fundamental Rights demanded abolition of intermediary tenures like *zamindaris*, *jagirs* and *inams*. See *Selected Works* (First Series), Vol. 4, p. 513.

be achieved.⁵ And that has nothing to do or little to do with any particular economic policy that you may pursue. It is important that you pursue a right economic policy. Of course, I am not challenging that. What I point out to you is this that we cannot waste our energy and limited resources, financial or otherwise, taking up odd things in odd places. Because, if we do that, the more important things remain undone. We have to direct the nation's available energy and resources in the right channels so as to lay the foundations of future progress.

Look at our industry today. Well, we are putting up textile and jute mills and the like. It is all right. I have no objection to that; they are useful in their own ways. But that is not industrializing, that is just a profit-making machine for a while. If you want to industrialize India, you have to go down to the roots, not get some machinery from abroad, fix it up, hire a man who knows how to run that machine, and draw dividends from it. These are subsidiary, trivial and rather secondary activities. You cannot industrialize the country by such petty business. If you want to industrialize, you have to create power, electric power in the country. You can judge a country by the steel and iron it produces, by the key industries, the machine-making industries it has. Otherwise, you are dependent on others industrially, economically, and, ultimately, politically also.

We have a fine Army. I am proud of our Army and our boys in the Air Force and Navy. They are a fine lot of young men. And yet, in regard to arms and weapons our Army depends largely upon foreign sources. Do you call that independence when we have to get every important weapon from abroad, and we are dependent on others' goodwill and pleasure? Therefore, if you want to build up India in any way—whether to industrialize the country as we must, or build up our basic industries—you have to go down right to the roots and raise the infrastructure which will provide basis for further development of industry. You have to build up your scientific apparatus and machinery for scientific development. But that does not pay dividends at all. However, it is the basic thing in the world of science.

So, while visualizing these strong foundations of future progress, we have first of all to remove the major obstructions in regard to the economic structure, by introducing land reforms. I have no doubt in my mind that ultimately we

5. The Government after independence moved rapidly to implement some of the river valley schemes that had been proposed and even planned long back. Work on the Damodar Valley project, the Bhakra Nangal, and the Hirakud Dam was well under way by 1951. The same was true with respect to railway improvement and extension, and road and harbour development. So many specific schemes for development had been proposed that the Planning Commission's task was one of cutting down rather than preparing a fresh programme. The First Five-Year Plan in fact finally contained a programme which was but 65 per cent of the Draft Plan.

must have land reforms. I would not say there is need to have uniformity all over. But you may have, on the one hand, relatively small peasant proprietors, with some kind of an upper ceiling on the land they possess—and they should not be allowed to add to it. The ceilings may vary or it may be that you cannot apply the ceiling immediately, but that should be the aim.

And the other more important thing is cooperative farming. That is the most important of all, because if you want to increase your production, you cannot normally do so in small farms. But the economic structure does not mean merely the land problem. You have to apply it to industry. And if you apply it to industry, you have to think, first of all, of basic and key industries. Again, it is more than twenty years ago the Congress said that key industries should be owned or controlled by the State.⁶ I have no doubt that has to be done. But again, people ask us why don't you nationalize all industries? They also ask why we have said that for the next ten years or so, we do not propose to raise this question unless, remember unless, the nation's interests so require.⁷ I want you to understand why we said that. We want industrialization, that is we want more and more industry in this country, big, middling, small and cottage industries. But our resources are obviously limited. If we have unlimited resources, we can do as much as we like in every sphere of national activity. If we have limited resources, the question is how are we to use those resources? If we nationalize many of our existing undertakings, and we pay compensation, our existing resources would be, partly or even largely, swallowed up by the compensation, and we shall have little left for further advance. The actual industrial structure of the country would remain much the same. Only the ownership would be transferred from private hands to State hands. We would like transfer of ownership, no doubt, gradually in regard to key industries; that will be done.

If we use our limited resources today in acquiring those existing industries which are functioning, which are producing goods and material, the result would be that the setting up of the additional industries would be hampered. If you propose that we should nationalize these industries without compensation and just expropriate, then it is another matter. But you cannot say: "Take them over and don't pay anything." Well that is not our policy, and I think that has rightly not been our policy. It is easy to talk in these terms, and I

6. The Karachi Congress resolution of 31 March 1931 on Fundamental Rights included the following clause: control by the State of key industries and mineral resources. See *Selected Works* (First Series), Vol. 4, p. 513.

7. The Industrial Policy Statement of 1948 made it clear that immediate nationalization of existing key industries—coal, iron and steel, ship-building, etc.—was not the main objective of the Government for ten years. Dispelling the fear of nationalization was intended to work as an incentive.

have no, if I may say so, extreme moral scruples about it. It is not the question of morality that comes into the picture, but a practical consideration of a large number of factors. Above everything else at this stage, we do not want—obviously we should not want—to take a step which, in the near future and for some years, results in a lessening of production in India—whether it is from land or from industry. Now, any step that leads to that will bring great misery to our people. We are therefore out to increase production.

It is conceivable theoretically that by some clean sweep in India of many existing things you suffer many tremendous losses for the next twenty years, and out of that something emerges, which is better. Theoretically, it may be possible. But it is not a practical proposition to you and to me to make the present generation and even the coming generation suffer terribly so that twenty five years later something better might emerge. But, are you certain that something better would arise than what there was twenty five years ago? Possibly, no democratic government, however strong, can do something which increases the suffering and the misery of the people for many years to come, mainly in the hope that, in the long run, something good will happen.

Therefore, this business of acquisition without compensation—that is, expropriation—is not likely to yield any practical results. It will produce new problems and new difficulties and conflicts. It will certainly result in lowering of the production for a certain period. It is far better, I think, that we should proceed to apply the nation's existing resources in putting up new industries so that the public sector of industry—the State sector—grows and becomes bigger and bigger in relation to the private sector and ultimately dominates, if I may say so, the private sector. At the same time, wealth production will go up in the country. And, where private industry works in a monopolistic way, or works in a way which injures the nation's interest, well, by all means nationalize it and acquire it. Let that authority remain with the State always.

Look at it from another point of view. This is an age of rapid advancement in technology. The machinery that is being used in these various industrial undertakings in India, in many of them, is rather old, it is rather antiquated and almost obsolete. New types of machines are coming out. Why should we ask the State to pay heavy compensation for something that is obsolescent and nearly obsolete. Why should not we have the latest type of techniques in machinery for our State industry which we build up?

Therefore, you should rule out taking over of industries without compensation. We should rule that out, because instead of solving the problem, it creates new problems and conflicts. And, when you do this kind of thing you have always to pay a heavy cost some way or other. Don't think that you get money thereby. We perhaps have got rather confused to some extent by reading about revolutions that have occurred in other countries. But the background of those revolutions was a peculiar one, and it is no good just thinking of them as

applicable here. I am no judge of the right and wrong that has happened there. I am merely telling you that something arises there from certain conditions. And, remember also that an amazingly heavy price was paid—price in terms of civil war, price in destruction, price in all manner of things. That price had to be paid not for a year or two, but for a considerable time.

So, when people ask me to nationalize this or that, I am perfectly agreeable, at least mentally, to adopt that policy. I want to adopt it provided it does not obstruct production or reduce it. I want production to go up, not to come down, provided also it does not create new problems. The principle may be good that every principle has to be applied in certain set of circumstances. When you are ready for it, when the State is ready—and I do not mean to say that private property as such should cease to exist—I think a large sector can very well continue, not now, but later, as a private sector. But I do think that the basic and key industries, which give the tone to production, should be State-owned and certainly State-controlled.

In fact, when we talk about nationalization, necessarily and primarily, it is a measure of State control—control in various ways. Recently, Parliament passed some legislation, which gives a large measure of control to the State, in case the private sector does not come up to certain standards or violates certain norms.⁸ Indeed, you cannot have planning unless there is some measure of regulation of the private sector and coordination with the public sector of industry.

Well, these are the problems which we have to face in their entirety. It is not a question of putting up a large factory here or there, but planning a balanced scheme for raising the level of investment for the development of India. Unfortunately, in India, the surplus that we have is very little, if nothing at all, and the investment capacity for development depends upon the surplus. If you spend all that you earn, you are left with nothing to invest. We may make demands for development, while doing this, we must also remember that whatever we do today, should be of value tomorrow. But if whatever is available is consumed today, it means we spare nothing for tomorrow. Thereby, the whole process of development suffers. This is the problem being faced by every country, the problem they have to face is, 'today versus tomorrow'. Now, the question therefore is: Are you going to lay greater stress on tomorrow by putting up with certain measure of austerity and difficulty today, so that you may be able to save money for development which will yield results tomorrow and the day after? If you do not, you remain static, and do not go ahead.

I am putting these broad considerations before you to think about, and I should like you to study the Planning Commission's report when it comes out,

8. The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act of 1951, which came into force on 8 May 1952, vested the Government with powers to control industrial enterprises.

as I think, it will probably be in the course of this month, sometime in the middle of November.⁹

We do not wish to rush through it. If necessary, we will delay it by a few weeks, because we are trying to give the fullest consideration to these problems. The Planning Commission's report will not be final on the subject, because there is no finality about consideration of a nation's problems. Whenever occasion arises that report or any part of it can certainly be reviewed by Parliament, by the Government, or by any other agency working under it. Nevertheless, that report, though not final, will give some composite picture of the plan for the development in India which, for the time being, we shall treat as something to work upon, so long as we do not vary it. Therefore, in that respect, there will be something definite about it. Let us work it, instead of arguing and debating all the time. It is better to do something even though it may not be absolutely the best possible course.

A great danger today is to function as debating societies. Our young friends in schools and colleges normally associate themselves with those debating societies, as is right also, and they learn something from those debates. It is an intellectual exercise, which is good, but if they think, as they apparently sometimes do, that in those debating societies of theirs, they can refashion the world and issue commands to others to refashion it according to their thinking, then they are wrong. So I say, as soon as we have this national plan, you may think that it does not go far enough on this or that aspect of development, that it may be varied, it may be bettered, quite so. Let us improve it, but let us, to begin with, go ahead with it as fast as we can, instead of indefinitely and infinitely arguing and debating about it.

We think of this Plan, and we are absorbed by the question of India's economic progress, because after all the major question is how to improve the economic conditions of millions of people. Remember that you should consider every problem not from the point of view of a section or a small group, but from the point of view of the 360 millions of Indians. So, in talking about industrialization, you should be clear about what it involves. I have no doubt that we must have basic industries if we are not to depend upon others. That, however big the industry may come up here, we cannot forget that India will remain for a long time a country of small industries, the cottage industries, and the like. Those who think that there is a conflict between the big and the small industry are on the wrong track. India requires not only basic industries and bigger industries like our big river valley schemes, which produce power and irrigation and are exceedingly important, but also the continuation and even the extension of small and cottage industries. I am firmly convinced of

9. The draft outline of the First Five-Year Plan was presented in July 1951. The final report was, however, published in December 1952.

that. I am rather sorry that the Government of India, during the past five years, have not been able to do as much as they might have liked in this matter. I bear the responsibility, and no one else is so much responsible for it. But we must encourage them. We have to look at it from the point of view of employment, and that is one of the major tests that we should keep before ourselves. It is not good enough even for us to produce more wealth in this country if a large number of people remain unemployed.

So, we must look at it from the human point of view. Even if there is maximum industrialization, we may not be able to employ more than twenty million people which is less than ten per cent of India's population. Of course, most of the others are engaged in agriculture and the like. No doubt, many of our people ought to be engaged in social services. Nevertheless, a large number will still be left to be engaged in some useful occupation and they can only be employed or be given work in small and cottage industries. Therefore, we must realize this fact and think of the issue, not in terms of opposition to big industry, but rather in terms of something complementary to it, supplementing it, and something which gives employment to our people who otherwise may be unemployed.

It is not easy to make these arrangements and adjustments so that there may be no overlapping and each might fit into the other. It is difficult. Not only in Madras, but in North India, in Bihar, in UP, my own province, to some extent in Bengal, in the Bombay State, you have the problem of the handloom industry.¹⁰ It is obvious that the handloom industry is the biggest cottage industry of India, and it would be a fatal thing if those people who are engaged in it were to be severely hit by economic circumstances and the industry allowed to collapse. We have to help them to the best of our ability, remembering always that if something is so totally inconsistent with the economic principles, we cannot keep it going indefinitely. Ultimately the economic principles will triumph. But what the economic principles are, it is not so absolutely clear. No one need imagine that the economics of orthodox economists is necessarily the final word on the subject. Anyhow, the question in regard to handloom industry now and again comes up in many ways.

It is not so much a question of production today, but rather of disposing of the unsold stocks. There are large stocks lying for disposal and the people's purchasing power has gone down in large areas. Anyhow, the people

10. Throughout 1949, the handloom industry's position was bad mainly because of the change in the market from sellers' to that of buyers. The high cost of handloom products could not be offset by the excise duty on mill cloth and even the concession in freight could not bring any tangible relief. Owing to a fall in exports, especially to Pakistan which ceased buying from India in September 1949, and reduced purchases in the Indian market, the handloom industry had unsold stocks and was unable to use its full quota of cotton yarn.

who used to purchase those goods have not purchased them. How can they support production without disposing of what had already been produced? Well, the process will have to halt somewhere, so that one can think of the disposal, of people buying it in every way. The State may help and the problem becomes much more complicated than might appear to be on the surface. Well, it has to be examined.

Anyhow, the point that I wished to place before you is this that when we talk about industrialization of the country, we have to think not only in terms of the big machine, and I am all in favour of the big machine, not for love of the big machine, but because the big machine represents a certain power today without which no country can be independent, without which you are dependent on others. Therefore, the big machine has to come, but the big machine does not and cannot fill the picture in India. You need the small machine, the little machine, and the baby machine and the cottage machine, whatever that may be. Then only can you develop all along the line.

We talk about the economic problems of India. India is divided into a large number of States. The States have autonomy in a large measure, and also considerable influence and legislative and other powers. We have to coordinate them. Our Constitution has tried to do so. But, apart from the Constitution and laws, there is such a thing as an inner coordination and unity of the people and of the people's minds....

It is important that we think of India's unity as something more than strictly legal and constitutional. I have said often that the Congress has got to do many things after achieving independence for the country. It has not exhausted its role. The biggest thing the Congress still has to do, or to continue doing, is to bring about a further and a real integration of India in people's minds, if I may say so. Because we take things for granted, few of us, of course, will doubt or challenge this question of the unity of India. We all believe in it. Yet believing in it, and accepting it almost as something that is there, we function, sometimes, in ways which may well injure that conception.

Reading India's history, repeatedly I have come up against this feeling of how, while we have always had a certain unity in India—even though when it was politically divided, a cultural unity, and unity in many other spheres of life—at the same time, we have so many disruptive forces in India, always pulling apart and often succeeding, in fact. Now that we are trying to build a new India, we must take good care that those disruptive tendencies are not encouraged and are not allowed to function in a big way. Of course, the obvious disruptive things, I need not mention these to you. They are known. The communal way of approach to India's questions has done us enough injury, and it will do us more injury, if we showed it the slightest favour. So far as we are concerned, we propose to show it no favour at all. Indeed we view it with extreme disfavour. And it just does not matter. Whether that communal

tendency functions among the Hindus, the Muslims, or the Sikhs, or any other religious group in India, we shall show it no favour and we shall fight it, wherever it raises its head, because it is a dangerously disruptive tendency. You may not realize that so much here in the South, but we have to face virulent campaigns, murder, and something worse, because of the communal movements in other parts of the country.

Apart from that, we talk about communalism and the like. It is a bad word. It is not perhaps proper to use the word. Now the right description of the religious type of communalism introduced in politics will perhaps be some kind of primitive thinking and primitive action. It is a throw-back to a primitive age. It has nothing to do with any moderately intelligent individual or moderately intelligent period of history. It surprises me more than anything that people who consider themselves intelligent and are well qualified, are so primitive in their thinking and actions so as to behave in a religiously communal way, that is, bring the communal ideas into politics.

People talk about a secular State. Some think about it as a silly word and yet, what we simply mean by it is to have a normal and a civilized country. The communal idea is synonymous with an uncivilized idea. It is a primitive idea, a vulgar and a childish idea. It does not matter where it exists, whether in the mind of a Hindu, a Muslim, a Sikh, a Parsi or a Christian. It may be in anybody's mind. If it is there, it shows an uncivilized thinking. Therefore, if you are to go ahead, you have to get rid of this narrowness of outlook and thinking, which prevents our growth. Now, it is obvious enough that this narrowness of outlook has been one of the major weakening factors in India. It may have had certain advantages at some time or the other. But, certainly, this business of dividing our national community into a large number of castes and the like has this disadvantage.

I have no objection to any kind of religious faith that you practise, or any individual may practise, provided, of course, you do not force it down on me. I want freedom of conscience, just as I wish to give you freedom of conscience, faith and worship. But undoubtedly, speaking from the point of view of the social fabric, certainly, in the last few hundred years, the caste system has been a disrupting influence coming in the way of India functioning with unity. It has weakened us. Each group thought of itself rather than of the other, and of course, was overwhelmed in turn.

In the last general elections—I speak again more of the North, but I think I am right about the South too—casteism was a fairly dominant feature even in the voting. What amused me greatly was that even parties, which call themselves very revolutionary, like the Communist Party, often made a very definite appeal to castes to get votes. Now, it is a very dangerous sign if we carry on in our political life, apart from the other negative features, with caste barriers and the like. If we vote for a man, because he is our caste man, it is



AT THE CENTRAL SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE, HYDERABAD, 26 SEPTEMBER 1952



OPENING THE TB WARD AT YARRAGADDA HOSPITAL, HYDERABAD, 26 SEPTEMBER 1952

a bad thing because by doing so you will degrade yourselves and you will lower your standards due to barriers of the kind which compel you to prefer a man because of his caste instead of his merit. I do not want India to be a second rate or third rate country—I want her to be a first rate country.

I can understand, and indeed I consider it important that we should give every encouragement, and the State should give every encouragement, to those groups who are backward because of injustice done to them by our ancestors. I hate the word “backward classes”, but I have to use it for the moment. It is the State’s duty to encourage these groups educationally, economically and otherwise. Unless these classes make progress, the nation will be pulled back. You have to raise these classes. I am glad that in a large measure attempts have been made all over India in this behalf. But it would be dangerous also to lower our standards merely because of considerations of castes and the like. The greatness of India in the past was due to many things, but certainly it was due to the high standards that India sought to attain. They still inspire us. But if we close the doors to the attainment of those high standards, then it will be bad for the future.

It is the mission of the Congress to consolidate the unity of India. Let no one imagine that the forces of disunity are completely gone. Here and there, some of them consciously and others unconsciously, come into play. For, some people do not have the vision or the intelligence to think about these matters. They are the friends of the Communist Party. I am by no means an enemy of the Communist Party, or any party in India. But, among other things, the Communist Party, it seems to me, delights in doing what can only result in the disruption of India. As an individual and as Congress President, I stand above all for the unity of India. It is the essential conception that we must grasp in its entirety. It is not a vague idea; it is something that you must absorb intellectually and emotionally in your heart and soul. If you do not accept it and act up to it, there can be no great future for India, and we shall be only wasting our energies against each other.

Sometimes I hear people in the South talk about northern imperialism in the South or the North trying to dominate over the South.¹¹ The chief evidence of this seems to be the charge that the Hindi language is being forced down the throats of the people in the South. If you come to Delhi, certainly in the Delhi Secretariat, you will hear some whispers of southern invasion of the North, because a vast number of our Secretariat officers come from the South.

11. The Dravida Kazagham under E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker and the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham under C.N. Annadurai had launched at this time a series of separate agitations against what they called “northern imperialism”. The “imposition” of Hindi was opposed with picketing and burning of Hindi books. The Five-Year Plan was denounced by the Kazaghams as discriminatory against the South.

They are pretty good and they are all there on merit. I have no complaint about it. But I cannot understand this talk of North and South. It is sheer ignorance or some kind of frustration or just some foolish way of looking at it. It seems to me to be so utterly silly. It may be that some people in the North may try to push something they like in the South, quite conceivable, just as you may try to push it in the North. It is bound to happen. But what has it to do with the North trying to override the South or the South overriding the North in anything?

Take the language question. One of the first things that the Congress had laid stress on long ago was that we must develop the provincial languages, educationally and otherwise.¹² It has always been our policy. Also it laid stress on the need for developing a common language in India. We cannot have the English language as the common tongue, even though it is retained.¹³ Therefore, the only possible common tongue that could be suggested was Hindi. What else are you going to have as a common tongue for common purposes? I can think of none. Therefore, by sheer process of logical reasoning you arrive at the fact that it is desirable to encourage Hindi as a common tongue for all-India and such like purposes. But this has nothing to do with any kind of conflict with the great provincial languages, some of which I am quite frank to confess to you, are culturally far more developed than the Hindi language. Some of the northern languages, the sisters of Hindi language, having a bigger literature, have developed more than Hindi. Bengali, I think, is more developed than Hindi. Your southern languages, in some ways, may be more developed than Hindi. Relatively Hindi is easy to learn. Of course, I must say that the type of Hindi that is spoken in Bombay is painful to hear. And the type of Urdu some people still calling themselves Muslim Leaguers talk here in the South is an insult to that language. Let them learn Urdu or give up learning Urdu altogether. Let there be no mockery of that noble language.

Therefore, there is no question of Hindi being imposed. Unfortunately, there are people in the North who are over-enthusiastic about Hindi. They

12. It was an essential feature of the Congress language policy during the pre-Independence days that English should give way to the regional languages in education and administration. Mahatma Gandhi pleaded that a linguistically alienated Indian leadership could not in fact lead a mass national movement, arguing that original thought demanded the use of the mother tongue.
13. The Indian University Education Commission under the chairmanship of S. Radhakrishnan, in its report presented in August 1949, had suggested that: "There must be no attempt at hasty displacement of English as a medium of instruction for academic purpose. Indian languages have to grow and must become proper media for communication. To displace English by a State or federal language may result in deterioration of standards. Therefore, while State Governments should make their languages more potent as early as possible, no time-limit should be prescribed. Languages will have to grow and there cannot be a time-limit. During the transition English will remain."

want to thrust their particular type of Hindi on everybody, including me. I have myself resisted it, though Hindi is my mother tongue. I have often complained of it. When I go to my own province I feel sometimes I am a stranger there. I just cannot make out anything from the name-boards that have been put up there. Let us deal with these over-enthusiasts gently, because they seem to be unbalanced about this question.

The north Indian languages are of Sanskrit origin. Some of the south Indian languages are not, and they have an older lineage. If you like, you can call them sisters of the Sanskrit language. There are close bonds, and there can be no question of the southern languages coming into conflict, in the slightest, because of Hindi. But if we are going to function as a united nation, it becomes quite essential that we have a common language for purposes of business and for other all-India affairs and dealings. For my part, I should like that one or other of the southern languages should be made a compulsory subject in north Indian universities, so that there should be more of understanding with each other. Indeed, there is a proposal to this effect.¹⁴

I referred to this question, because there appears to be a great deal of misunderstanding on it. All this is merely a narrowness of outlook and an act of simple folly. There can be no greater folly than for the grown-up people to go about erasing Hindi names at the railway stations.¹⁵ It is childish nonsense. It surprises me that we have such immature people around us. In all these matters we have to consider that we are, after all, a mature nation, a mature people, perhaps sometimes too mature. Too much maturity leads to too much philosophizing, and too much philosophy leads normally to inactivity. But anyhow, let us behave as mature people in our public life, in our politics and not with this extreme immaturity of the very young in mind.

We have big problems to face and solve, and I am sure we can solve them. The general elections have shown that the Indian people are astoundingly so intelligent. I have the greatest admiration for the Indian people. Mind you, I am not eulogizing the masses as an abstract entity. And the masses often can be exceedingly stupid and foolish. And often enough I feel like fighting the masses. That is, however, a different matter. But the Indian people as a whole are a civilized, cultured, mature and intelligent people. I am not indulging

14. The Indian University Education Commission recommended that "if the mother tongue and the federal language are identical, students should be required to take any other Indian classical or modern language. If Hindi happens to be the mother tongue of a student, the student would be required to study some other Indian language."

15. The Dravida Kazhagam and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam had been carrying on an anti-Hindi agitation in Madras State since 1 August 1952. Volunteers of the Kazhagams, clad in black shirts, entered several post offices and railway stations and dabbed tar on the Hindi letters of the name-boards.

in this praise for nothing. I have the greatest admiration and a great affection for them. They can be compared favourably with any people of any country.

People talk about illiteracy, and naturally we want to get rid of illiteracy, but we should not confuse literacy or illiteracy with culture. I have known of many literates in this country, and even some of the graduates and the like, who are completely unlettered and uncultured and also some people, in other countries too, with degrees attached to their names, who seem to forget the very elements of international culture.

Indeed, what is international politics today? There seems to be a kind of competition in being uncouth and unmannerly. That is an extraordinary state of affairs. Even in the old days of chamber politics, secret diplomacy and the like, people behaved with some restraint in the use of language and show of conduct. Restraint is the mark of civilization and culture. The more cultured an individual is, the more restrained he is in his behaviour. In the modern world we seem to have thrown away all restraint to the winds—in international politics for instance—and behave in a manner which would certainly be considered rather discreditable.

I am sorry to say anything in criticism of others. It is not meant for anyone in particular or any particular nation. But these are general remarks, which I regret to say can now be applied to India too. I hope that we shall endeavour to maintain our balance in foreign and domestic affairs and behave with restraint. We should cooperate with each other. In case we cannot cooperate, we should at least behave with restraint. It can do us little good to adopt the evils of the modern age. There are plenty of good things that we lack. Let us adopt them.

We have tried to follow this policy, I do not know with what degree of success, in some measure at least, in foreign and domestic affairs. It may not be very impressive or dramatic. People want us to line up with this group or that group, or to do something else which is dramatic. In that sense, it may be that our policy has been rather dull. But, I am afraid, it is going to continue to be dull, because we propose to indulge in no adventurism, specially in the international sphere. First of all, we would like to look after our own interests in India, and not interfere in other countries' affairs. Not that we have no ideas about the policies pursued by other countries but obviously we can do good to others only after we have done good to ourselves.

What is the good of trying to preach to others? It is bad form, if I may use that word. It is lack of restraint, telling others to do what they should do. This world is rather complicated and so we get involved in such problems. We have to take part in them and we do. But we have to avoid running down any country though we may have strong views about some aspect of that country's policy. In the present stage of tension, distrust, and fear in the world,

merely running down countries and condemning them does not produce that atmosphere out of which peace may emerge....

13. The Basic Unity of India¹

Young citizens of India,

... I wish I can talk to you in your own language, which you would no doubt understand much better. I can talk to you of course in Hindi, or if you like in Hindustani or Urdu, which some of you may understand, but others will not understand at all. Therefore, unfortunately I have to address you in a language which many of you may not fully understand, though perhaps you may understand it a little.

I am very happy to come here and see this rally. I am told it represents less than half the number of high schools here, because the stadium is not big enough for all of them. Well, whether in this stadium or elsewhere, I seem to have seen a very large number of students of various ages in various places in this city—if not at functions, at any rate, in the streets—and it has been very delightful to see their cheerful faces, bright faces, which showed how they were feeling....

You are living in this great city of Madras and I come to you here from northern India. At present, I spend most of my time in Delhi on business, not for pleasure. To Delhi I went from Allahabad, the city where I was born, where the rivers Ganga and Jamuna meet. It is an ancient city, though not very big. It is rather small compared to Madras. Many years ago, my people came down to Allahabad, via Delhi and Agra, from Kashmir, which is far away to the north of this great country. I hope you will one day visit Kashmir. If you look at the map of India, look at Kashmir, right in the north, and to the Himalayan mountains with Ladakh adjoining the eastern side of Kashmir, and if you measure the distance from there to down south, to Kanyakumari, you will find it is about two thousand miles. Now, covering all this distance and all this vast area between the northern and the southern tips is India. And you and I, whether we are in the north, in the south, or in the centre, we are all citizens of this great country.

You are, in a local sense, citizens of Madras, but really you do not belong to Madras only, as I do not belong only to Allahabad or Delhi or any other place. I am a citizen of the Republic of India, and you are also citizens of the

1. Speech at a rally of over thirty-five thousand school students, Madras, 10 October 1952. AIR tapes, NMML. Extracts.

Republic of India. Remember that, because it is a great honour and a privilege. But it is something more than an honour and a privilege. When you have an honour or a privilege, you have to do something about it also. You have what is called some kind of an obligation. You cannot get any good thing without working for it. If you get anything without working for it, you do not value it. Those people who lead an easy and soft life, without working, do not really get the best out of life. It is only when you work for something, whatever it may be, that you get the best of life after working hard for it; that is what is really important for you. You would value that success then and cherish it.

When you go in for games, you have to work hard to do well and if you do well in them, you may gain a prize or win a championship. You would value these because you would have won them as a result of your efforts, as a result of the hard work which by itself is good for you.

So if you get something big and valued as the citizenship of India, you should not consider it as something ordinary which comes as a matter of course and without any obligations or duties on your part. So what follows from this is that we have to do something to win this honour and privilege. We have to serve India.

Now, what is India? I shall tell you a story. I was once travelling and when it grew dark I reached a village somewhere in the Punjab. A large number of peasants came to welcome me, stout peasants, Jats mostly as they are called, and these Jat peasants join our army. They came and welcomed me and started shouting *Bharat Mata ki jai*. I sat down with them and asked them who this *Bharat Mata* was. These peasants were rather confused. They looked at each other. They could not make out what this question meant. One of them said it was Bharati. Bharati, you know, means earth. They were peasants. To them the mother was Mother Earth. It is Bharati. "Bharati", I said, "at what place? Is it your place, your village or district or your province?" That again confused them.

I went on questioning them to get their answers. They got rather annoyed with me and they said, you tell us all about it. Why are you questioning us? So I said that *Bharat Mata* is, of course, this great big country which those of you who have been to school might know. Big cities, lakhs of villages, green fields, forests, mountains and rivers and all that we have in this land. All that is India, of course. But that is not the whole of India. Ultimately, I said, India consists of the people who live in India, not merely the land, the fields, the rivers or the mountains, although all these too constitute India. So India consists, I said, of 360 million people who live in India. You are among those 360 million people, you are a bit of India. When you shout *Bharat Mata ki jai*, you are shouting "Victory to Mother India", victory to yourself, as bits of *Bharat Mata*. So this idea that they were themselves bits of *Bharat Mata* impressed them very much.

Well, it is so. *Bharat Mata* consists of you and me and the millions like us. It is not something separated from us. We are *Bharat Mata*, we are India, bits of India, little, little tiny bits of a great big thing. If we are little bits of India, we have to remember that we must not do anything which might bring discredit to this great country of which we are little bits. We must bring it honour, because that honour is really honour for us. Ours is a great country. Work for this great country so that it becomes more prosperous.

Again, how to do it? Here thousands of you have gathered, and you are fortunate in that. You go to good schools in the Madras city and learn something, and later many of you will go to colleges and the university, and then you will start working. But there are many many little children who do not yet have a chance of going to schools. Many of them live in villages. They should also go to schools. Every child in India should go to school, and have this opportunity of learning and becoming better in body, in mind, in every way, so that that little tiny self of India, which is represented by him improves.

We want, of course, the whole country to go ahead. But the whole country means these millions and millions of her children. Remember this, and remember also that all of us, big and small, whatever part of India we may live in, whether we are up in the snows in the Himalayas or down South here, are all equal sharers of India's good and bad fortunes. In India there is no part which is more equal than the other. We are all equal in India.

Also, as you know, there are many religions in India. Some people belong to one religion and some others to another. Now, it is up to those people to belong to any religion they like. But so far as India is concerned, they are all the very soul and fibre of India, to whatever religion they may belong. They are all equal sharers of India. It is not right or true to think or say that people of one religion have a greater share in India and people of another less. They are all citizens of India. Religion is a matter of their private lives, private conscience, not a matter relating to their civic or national life. It is not a matter connecting them as bits of India.

Then again, there are all kinds of other divisions like so many castes and sub-castes and what not. I am afraid, I do not like them at all. However, it is not a question of liking or not liking them, but our remembering that these factors should not come in our way and create barriers. We have to build up our great community of the citizens of India, and each one of us, to whatever caste, religion, creed or province and State he belongs to, is a member of that community, irrespective of his being a boy or a girl.

So, we must try to remove these barriers. You, children, do not think of these barriers very much. You play with everybody, but, unfortunately, when you grow up you do not always grow wiser. Sometimes children are wiser

than their parents in some matters. Sometimes the grown-ups quarrel, though they tell their children not to do so.

Now, we must learn from children how not to raise any barriers between us and consider each other as equals having equal opportunities. If some of you happen to be more prosperous than others, it is your good fortune. But if you think that you are better than others, then you are greatly mistaken. Being better does not mean wearing fine clothes or possessing money. Nor is a person wearing fine clothes considered cleverer than a person who does not wear these. We must see to it that everybody has good clothes, good food, good schooling and good shelter. All distinctions should disappear. It is bad and vulgar for people who happen to have a little more money than others to think that they are better.

We must build up this country of millions of children and grown-ups, who, as equal citizens of the Republic of India, would live and work together in peace and harmony, sharing each other's joys and sorrows in a true spirit of brotherhood. So good luck to you. *Jai Hind*.

14. Prevention Better than Cure¹

I am happy that during my present visit to Madras, I have been given the opportunity to participate in the silver jubilee function of the Women's India Association, the Madras Branch of the All India Women's Conference. For many years, I have been watching from a distance the activities of the All India Women's Conference and admiring them on the whole, though not always. I have also been watching the way in which its activities gradually grew up from merely holding annual conferences to other and more important good work. In your address, you have enumerated the manifold activities² this branch

1. Speech while inaugurating the silver jubilee celebrations of the Women's India Association, the Madras Branch of the All India Women's Conference, and laying the foundation stone of the Cancer Institute proposed to be built by the Association at Adyar in Madras, 10 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 11 October 1952. Extracts.
2. Referring to the activities of the Association, Muthulakshmi Reddi, the President of the Association, said that to the list of its social welfare activities, they had added cancer relief. They had taken up extensive educative propaganda for the past few years to dispel ignorance about cancer, to provide facilities for its early detection, control and treatment. For this purpose, they had started a cancer relief fund.

does here and it is really impressive. Indeed, I have seen some of these activities for myself. So, I am glad that I am associated with the silver jubilee celebrations of an association which has made a place for itself in India, and to some extent even abroad.

I attach a great deal of importance to the women of India playing their proper part in national activities of all kinds. As you said in your address, we have also laid that down in our Constitution.³ But constitutions are not enough and they have to be put into practice, which is much more difficult. They can only be put into practice ultimately by the people themselves, and not governmentally. This relates not only to the other activities that you participate in, but to the removal of such disabilities—legal or otherwise—as may come in the way of women. There are many such disabilities as you very well know and ought to know. But, however much sympathy you may get from others, ultimately things are only done or changed by the activities of the people most concerned. In anything concerning the women of India, you will get enough sympathy from a large number of men of India. But, apart from sympathy, you may not get more. The necessary situation has to be created if the changes have to come. This is an invitation to you to create those situations.

The propaganda work done by the Association regarding cancer is good to teach the method of prevention. It is far more important to prevent disease than to provide for the treatment of the diseases, and the modern practice of medicine is more concerned with that aspect. I do not know how far it applies to cancer, because cancer appears to be prevalent in prosperous countries. I am not quite sure if it is a sign of too great prosperity or too much high living....

Generally speaking, all diseases really afflict the human body because of the lack of power of resistance. All kinds of microbes attack and seize hold of the body if it does not resist them. So preventive measures are essential. The preventive measures you can take is to create the power of resistance in the body, to provide clean and congenial conditions and nourishing food for the community. Unfortunately, taken as a whole, the country needs clean and healthy environment. As regards food, taking into account the present areas affected by famine, it is doubtful how much of the total population there really has nourishing food.

The need for paying attention to the children in this respect should be emphasized. It is an appalling sight to see famished children standing along

3. Muthulakshmi Reddi observed that the Indian Constitution provided equal rights and opportunities in every walk of life to all men and women but still many women remained steeped in ignorance and suffered from many legal and social disabilities. She said that she was confident that very soon, in free India, these unjust and unequal laws would be erased.

the roadside in Madras city. The thought comes to me how many of these thousands and thousands of children are getting what is due to them as children of India, whether they are getting proper food, proper clothing, proper housing, proper schooling, etc. It may be that in Madras city, many of them get it. But in the villages, the conditions are bad. Therefore, this vast problem faces us all the time. We have to attack this problem on all fronts....

15. The Care of Children¹

I have been deeply interested in corporations and municipalities and the like, ever since the days, long ago, when I was myself connected with a municipality.² Somehow, these bodies seem to bring one more in intimate touch with the life of the people than the kinds of work, say for instance, work in legislative assemblies, or such like bodies which pass laws and otherwise are in charge of the affairs of the State and the country. When you get to Delhi, you get further away from the common man, sitting on some legislative mountain top from where you may occasionally have a telescopic view. But, there are so many things in between, all organizing themselves, that the poor people are sometimes completely forgotten. So we become more and more the organizers, each one trying to organize the others, and Government departments grow, till one department hardly knows and recognizes the other and often becomes jealous of the other.

That kind of thing, I hope, does not happen in a corporation, though, I am not sure about that, having been associated only with a small municipality, compared to Madras, namely Allahabad, and not having had experience of a corporation. Presumably, in spite of your bigness, you do come in intimate touch with the people of Madras and their problems. And nothing is more interesting and fascinating than dealing directly with this human problem, and the problems of a great city. In a sense, I rather envy you people at times.

Fascinating as it is, it is nonetheless a tremendous responsibility to look after the life and well-being of a great city with its teeming population, with manifold activities and the like. There is obviously a tendency to beautify a city in the sense of putting up attractive and imposing buildings. Beautifying

1. Speech at a reception by the Madras City Corporation, Madras, 10 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 11 October 1952. Extracts.
2. Nehru was Chairman, Allahabad Municipal Board, September 1923 to 1925.

a city is important, no doubt. But beautification does not mean putting up what may be called rather impressive structures. They may not be beautiful though they may be impressive. Opinions vary greatly about the beauty or otherwise, for instance, of the noble pile of buildings called the Secretariat at New Delhi. It is very impressive, no doubt about it, but everybody does not consider it beautiful as it might seem to be. Of course, you should beautify your city, but what I am driving at is this, that ultimately a city's beauty does not consist of a few grandiose buildings, welcome as they are if they are attractive, but of something deeper.

I have been going up and down several times a day the long artery of a road which leads from here to Raj Bhawan, and it is a very fine and attractive road with attractive buildings. Every time I pass, large numbers of people line up and very considerable numbers of them are little children, attractive and cheerful children, not always well clothed or well fed, but nevertheless cheerful, as they ought to be. It seems to me that the first duty of the corporation must be to these children—almost everything else should come after that—and to see that they are properly fed, housed, clothed and schooled. I should like to think of the day when every child in India will have good schooling and also a square meal, or if not a square meal at least a cup of good fresh milk, as this is given by representatives bodies such as yours in some countries of the West. Perhaps we may not be able to do that yet for lack of resources; but I think it would make a tremendous difference if we could gradually bring that about, beginning with the cities, and later taking it to our rural areas also.

There are many things to talk about in regard to municipal affairs. I just mentioned the question of beautifying the city. Beautifying does not necessarily mean spending much money. There is a strange conception in people's minds that, to make a thing attractive, you have to spend a lot of money and erect a number of statues, structures and the like which mean quite a lot of money being spent which had better not be spent. That is to say, we have to develop a taste for beauty, for artistic things and the like in our lives, in our homes, and especially in our public buildings.

Madras is a gracious city and a very pleasant city. A city is not something made merely of brick and mortar; it consists of people. What one gets as an impression of a city is the combined impression of everything there, particularly the people. It does seem to me that the Madras city is a city which has a spirit behind it, and is not just a mere city. It has a background of cultural activities, a very strong background, which is a very good thing. That is more than you can say of many cities. I do hope that you encourage these activities in the right way and not in a grandiose way or a pompous way. Madras and the South are very much more the home of music and the Indian classical dance than any other place in India. That is very important. But I should like, if I may say so with respect, to caution you against the modern habit of putting up

statues and paintings which, to put it very mildly, are very bad, and sometimes exceedingly bad. I hope I would not be taken to be too vain a man if I say that I was shocked to see the picture of mine put up in the Rajaji Hall. It really is an insult. I have also seen Rajaji's picture there and that too is an insult.

Why do these things happen? Have you no proper selection for these things done? Who chooses them and orders for them and puts them up? I may say that I am not very much impressed by these pictures and fountains, etc. Why should we not try to deliberately enforce a certain standard in all these matters? I do hope you will cry halt to this business of putting up unimpressive pictures and statues and try to set some standards which we shall maintain and stick to. You may not create good artists by passing laws but you can certainly eliminate bad ones....

NATIONAL PROGRESS

II. The Community Development Projects

1. The Sowing of a New Seed¹

Young friends,

You have assembled at Nilokheri from various corners of India and I am speaking to you from Delhi.² I would have liked to have been at Nilokheri with you, to meet you and talk to you, and to share some of my thoughts with you. But I am unable to leave Delhi at the moment and so I thought I should at least broadcast a message to you, to convey my good wishes and to tell you a few things about the great task that all of us are taking on.

What is this programme for which you have been selected from every province and sent here? You have a special responsibility because you have been specially selected for this work. But be that as it may, the task that you are taking on is a very important one and that in itself entails great responsibility. What then is this task? You would have been given long books and articles published on this subject. How far have you imbibed the spirit of the programme? The task of educating the people in the rural areas and teaching them new methods of working is only a small part of it. A very great idea underlies this programme. How far have you understood that? We hope to sow a new seed through this programme, and it is necessary that you should understand the need to nurture the plant that will grow and spread all over the country and make an impact on India's millions.

India is a very large country. Her size has its own advantages as well as disadvantages. The advantage is that the people of a large country can take on big tasks and generate tremendous power. But the disadvantage is that it is extremely difficult to control and organize a large country and to give it a sense of direction. It is much easier in a smaller country. Therefore, so long as we do not try to understand these things in a broad perspective and explain to others, we cannot march together in unity and harmony. It is not our aim to help a few individuals to progress while the rest remain where they are. The most crucial task in India today is to ensure the progress of thirty six crores of men, women and children.

How is poverty to be eradicated completely from the country? These are not things which can be done by passing a law. It is very easy for the Parliament to pass a law saying everyone in the country should get a job. But that will not solve the problem of unemployment. Laws merely pave the way. Ultimately it is the people who have to push themselves forward. There are millions of people in India who have to march together.

1. Broadcast from All India Radio, Delhi, 27 July 1952, AIR tapes, NMML. (Original in Hindi).
2. On 22 July, a five-day training camp for ninety community project workers, including four women, was organized at Nilokheri, a model township 85 miles north of Delhi.

How is that to be done? What is the path that they must follow? How are we to fire their imagination with enthusiasm, to create a vision of the future towards which they will be willing to work? You must bear in mind that big projects like this need many things, including funds. But ultimately it is the human beings who have to do the work. A country where the people are strong can accomplish great things. Money alone cannot do anything. India is poor in comparison to many other countries. But we are rich in human resources and manpower and that is the wealth which really counts. It is not gold and silver which constitute wealth. It is human beings who, by their work, create wealth for the nation.

So we have to look at this great task from the larger national perspective. I think to begin with fifty five places have been chosen for setting up community projects. But this is only the beginning. We want the scheme to expand and to cover hundreds of places.³ We want it ultimately to reach every single village in India. It is a gigantic task and perhaps very few people can imagine the impact it is likely to have. When you are engaged in this task, you must always bear in mind that you are participating in something which will ultimately cover 36 crores of people. You have come to Nilokheri for training and then it is expected that you will go to your own provinces and teach others. That is all right. But you must remember that those who train others, seldom do anything constructive themselves. Wherever you go, you must continue to learn and approach everything in a spirit of humility and curiosity.

I find that many of our workers who go to the rural areas make speeches, dole out good advice and go back home satisfied that they have done a good day's work. This is no way to work. When you go to a village, you must first learn from the villagers who themselves can teach you a great deal. Our farmers and peasants can teach you many things if you are prepared to learn. Therefore, you should go to the villages to learn as well as to teach, and regard your work as a kind of partnership.

You must take the lead in work. A strange feeling has prevailed in India for a long time that it is beneath one's dignity to do manual labour and that it should be left to the lower classes. Well, for one thing, we wish to remove these distinctions between human beings and provide equal opportunities for everyone to progress. But it is absurd to look down upon manual labour and to regard white collar jobs as something great. In fact, it is carried even further

3. In the Draft First Five-Year Plan published in July 1951, a programme of starting 500 community centres was contemplated. It was hoped that the number of community projects would multiply from year to year, and before the first five years were completed, at least a lakh and a half of villages of India, a fourth of the total, would be benefited by the scheme.

and the idle rich are held in great esteem. A country where there is no respect for manual labour cannot progress.

You will find that in all the other great nations, in the Soviet Union, China, United States, England, etc., no matter what their ideology is, there is great respect for manual labour. We must also learn to do the same. Therefore, the first lesson that all of you must learn is that the individual, who does not respect manual labour, is a useless person, no matter how superior he thinks he is. In my opinion, every student in India, in schools and colleges, must devote some time to manual labour, either in a field or, factory or somewhere else.

Well, you have been selected specially for this task. We are sowing this seed with great hopes in our hearts that it will soon grow into something big. It is a tremendous responsibility upon you. You must devote your entire attention to training and implementing the scheme, and, at the same time, to kindle a fire of enthusiasm among the people, for only then can we accomplish great things, forgetting the small differences and arguments.

More than thirty years ago a great task was taken up in India under Mahatma Gandhi and soon the entire country was fired with enthusiasm and passion. We forgot our petty quarrels and disputes in the larger endeavour. We are a people of small stature. But even small people grow in stature when they take up a worthwhile task. I want you to understand that there is no greater task in the whole of India than the one that you are taking up.

It is true that there are senior officials and ministers in the country who have great responsibilities. But in my opinion, the task that you are taking on is the most important and crucial. The responsibility for implementing this project is going to fall upon you. You will be put to a severe test. This is not the time for slackness, for you are taking on great responsibilities. Those who do not measure up to the high standards laid down for the task will have to make room for others. Therefore, I hope that you will constantly bear in mind the greatness of the task that you are taking up.

We hope to build through these projects a new India and uplift the millions of people who live here. The progress of human beings is an ultimate aim. We want to do other things as well, like improving agricultural production and what not. Why should we rely on someone else for what we can do ourselves? But the most urgent priority today is to mould the human beings in this country who are no doubt very good but have become backward and have acquired the habit of quarrelling among themselves. These ills that beset us must go.

There is always a debate in the country about the policies and issues that India should follow and very often great heat is generated. Well, those who are interested are welcome to do so. But no matter what policies we adopt, ultimately a nation marches ahead only through hard work, not by vague talks

and debates. We want to put this before the people. Debates and arguments are all right in their own way. But they consist of vague words lost in the air. Work yields results. I am happy that there are some women among you, for this task requires both men and women. All of us have to work together if India is to progress.

My good wishes are with you and I would like to say that though I could not be physically present in Nilokheri today, my heart and mind are with you. I shall get a report on the progress that you are making. I shall be watching you with high hopes. Now please begin your work and be successful in it. *Jai Hind.*

2. A Growth from the Bottom¹

The fifty five community projects launched all over India may be relatively small compared to the area of the country, but if the projects are implemented properly, the surrounding areas will be powerfully affected.

Big projects are, no doubt, very important, but immediately they do not touch the population intimately. Only a multitude of small schemes in which hundreds of millions of people will function can reach the hearts of the people. Therefore, the community projects scheme can be considered as a well thought out one as, after a certain period, it will set in motion something which on its own will produce dividends.

It is a platitude to say that we in India, and the world, are passing through a period of big transition. Nevertheless, whatever is happening in this country, as well as in the world, are signs of the changing times. We have to adjust ourselves to these changing times as we cannot afford to be mere onlookers or playthings of others. Such adjustments may take place either through conflict, or through peaceful methods, the results of which may not be discernible. In the community development programme, the method of peaceful constructive effort is aimed at, and even if it is not cent per cent successful, adverse effects, which the method of conflict produces, will not be experienced. It has got vast potentialities, as it is a growth from the bottom.

In the community projects the aim is two fold. It is improvement of the human being and, secondly, improvement of his technology in small matters.

1. Speech at a gathering of the officers of community projects, New Delhi, 16 August 1952. From the *National Herald*, 18 August 1952.

If these two are achieved, it will bring about a big change, but a change brought about without conflict.

I am not afraid of class conflict or any conflict. If there is a riot in Delhi I do not get frightened. I get angry. Because, it is a tremendous waste of national energy, which, if properly directed, will produce wealth which is the most immediate task for India at the present time.

It is essential to bear in mind that the work in the community projects is entirely constructive, which is more difficult than destructive work. But there is a tremendous drama about it. The ordinary man must be made to feel that he is playing a vitally important part in the building of the nation. He must feel that he is a partner in the tremendous enterprise of building up India as a whole. He should have a sense of pride and glory in his work.

To generate this feeling among the masses in the project areas, first of all the project officers themselves must imbibe that feeling. You must be charged before you can charge others. You must be dynamic before you can make others dynamic.

Only a sense of feeling or ideology is not enough. It is necessary also to know how to do the job, and then comes technology. In this atomic age, we must be first-rate in technology, and possess a proper scientific temper. Equipped with this knowledge, persons in charge of community projects in various parts of the country should make a humble and respectful approach to the villagers.

Do not make any mistakes, I warn you. The average farmer knows much more than you do, because he has the experience of generations. Therefore, in approaching the villager, there must be no conceit. In fact, he has to be drawn in and faith has to be inspired in him. This is extremely necessary as a cynic however brilliant he might be, never gets any big work done because, in spite of brilliance, he does not have that drive, that energy, in short, that faith which can move mountains.

3. The Dignity of Labour¹

Though I will not ordinarily like aid from outside India to push through her

1. Address to trainee workers of the community projects, Hyderabad, 25 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 26 September 1952.

projects, I welcomed American aid² for community projects as, in my opinion, America has proffered the help with right intentions. India is glad to accept this help wholeheartedly. I hope that the successful fruition of community projects will revolutionize the economy of the country and foil the twin demons of poverty and hunger.

At present about 55 community projects have been undertaken in the country. Each project will have under its jurisdiction about 300 villages. In five years, 500 projects will have been started, and about 1.5 lakhs of villages will be benefited by them. There are about 5.5 lakhs of villages in India and if, in five years, a fourth of them are covered by the projects, it will be a great thing for the country. At this rate, within 10 or 15 years, I am sure that the entire economic structure of the country will have been changed, and people will not be so much troubled by the lack of employment, food and shelter, as we do at present.

Projects to which an entire community contributes its share are not novel to India. This is the only method which will benefit the people at large.

There is too much indolence among Indians. We consider it beneath our dignity to engage in manual labour. That is why we are stagnant, while other nations are progressing in all fields of activity. India has been free for the last five years, but nothing has been done to change the psychological approach to the problem of manual work. In the present context, it is the duty of every person to try to earn his livelihood by his own work. Only that nation will be in the forefront which is hard working. For instance, America is the wealthiest country in the world, because rich men there do not think that their job is merely to rest and relax. They are as hard working and industrious as poor men, unlike in India, where rich people are mostly indolent. India is rich in natural resources, and there is immense manpower. If we fight indolence, we will make great progress.

The community projects, run in cooperation with the Government, are designed to create the right psychological approach to that important problem, inspiring lakhs and lakhs of people to engage themselves in useful work.

I exhort the trainees to teach the villagers so that they too can contribute to the enhancement of the national wealth. They should inculcate in themselves the new spirit. I advise you to forge unity among the people by precept and practice and by eschewing caste distinctions. America and Russia have come to the fore, because they are not hampered by class and caste distinctions. That lesson has been taught by the Father of the Nation himself.

2. The estimated cost of each project was about Rs 70 lakhs and the total expenditure for about 350 projects amounted to Rs 250 crores. It was expected that at least half of the outlay would be raised from internal resources. Part of it would come from funds under the Indo-American Technical Cooperation signed in the beginning of 1952 and another part from the Ford Foundation.

On October 2, the birthday of Mahatma Gandhi, the community projects will commence in every part of India. I hope the workers will go to the villagers with the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, and impress upon them his message of dignity of labour.

NATIONAL PROGRESS
III. The Bharat Sevak Samaj

1. A Programme of Organized Self-help¹

Opening the proceedings, the Chairman, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, thanked members of the Committee for having agreed to join the National Advisory Committee. The Committee consisted of leading members of different schools of thoughts, who were, nevertheless, prepared to cooperate in tackling national problems. It was natural that the public approach of political parties should be conditioned by their ideology. An ideological approach was inevitably associated with a certain amount of rigidity which perhaps gave rise to some conflict of views. On the other hand, when the job to be done was discussed, as distinguished from theories and ideologies, the area of agreement increased and the differences diminished. The Draft Outline of the Five-Year Plan, published a year ago, was likely in the near future to be replaced by a final report.² While many had welcomed the Draft Plan, there were others who could not agree with all its recommendations. Speaking for himself, Shri Nehru said that he did not like too rigid an approach to the solution of the important problems which faced the country. He felt that if circumstances so warranted all of us should be prepared to make the necessary change in our respective points of view.

2. The National Advisory Committee, the Chairman said, would have to devote special attention to the fundamentals of public cooperation, the sphere of implementation of the Five-Year Plan as a whole, in the implementation of the community development programme, and helping in the organization of a body through which such implementation could be effectively done. In the sphere of governmental activity there were certain factors, the Chairman said, which had to be balanced. For example, he said, in the modern world there was a tendency towards centralization which in a way meant lessening of individual freedom. Decentralization, on the other hand, at times meant lesser efficiency, but greater individual freedom. It was a question of proper balancing of the two with a view to retaining adequate individual freedom, at the same time, promoting efficiency.

3. Another problem was to find out ways and means to dovetail governmental activity and public cooperation into one organized effort. While governmental activity was important, it is public activity which, in the final analysis, is more important, as the Government's action without the people

1. Minutes, drafted by Nehru, of the first meeting of the National Advisory Committee on Public Cooperation, New Delhi, 12 August 1952. File No. 17(18)/56-PMS.
2. The First Five-Year Plan, a draft of which was prepared and circulated in July 1951, was ready for implementation by December 1952.

behind it cannot bring any substantial achievement. It was possible for the Government to do odd jobs here and there on its own, but the activity which could bring sustained and lasting benefit to the people must be one which strikes a correct balance between the governmental effort and public endeavour. It was seen, Shri Nehru said, that in Russia and China and elsewhere large numbers of people associated themselves with governmental activity. Whatever be their means through which such association was obtained, it was important to bear in mind that the progress made by these countries had been possible because of large-scale public cooperation. In India, we had to function in a democratic way and, therefore, the means must be different.

In this connection, he emphasized that public cooperation must not mean too much of direction from above. There should be a spontaneity of response, a joy for the work, a willingness to render service to the people and a spirit of cooperative endeavour emanating from the people themselves. If that were not done, introduction of official machinery meant a certain amount of rigidity which affected spontaneity. Government departments had a tendency to grow bigger and bigger till it was difficult to control them or their size. The machinery seemed to go round and round itself and the tendency was to forget the objectives. The Planning Commission was started with the hope that it would function differently from the Government's routine; it had, of course, been working differently, but it appeared sometimes that the Governmental machinery was overtaking the Planning Commission also. It would appear that too much intelligence and philosophy came in the way of simplicity of outlook and simplicity of action. The Committee had to consider how the cooperative endeavour of the people and of the official machinery could be balanced.

4. Referring to the Bharat Sevak Samaj, the Chairman said that the idea took shape more than a year ago, and during the preceding two months there had been enough indication that the idea was greatly welcomed. He hoped that the Advisory Committee would give a push to this idea.³

3. The National Advisory Committee for Public Cooperation which concluded its meeting on 12 August requested Nehru to be the President of the Bharat Sevak Samaj and to conduct the activities of the Samaj when it came into operation. The Committee further authorized the President to set up a provisional Central Board for the Samaj in accordance with its draft constitution and approved the national programme that the Board should undertake. The aims of the programme were: (i) economic development, (ii) social education, (iii) social health, (iv) community recreation and natural fitness programmes for youth, women and children, (v) health, (vi) studies, (vii) relief and assistance and (viii) resources.

2. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
August 20, 1952

My dear Rajaji,²

...Durgabai³ has written to me about her meeting with you when she discussed the Bharat Sevak Samaj. While you approved of this idea generally, you did not think it wise to mix up the Bharat Sevak Samaj work with the community centres.

We have given a good deal of thought to this matter and we felt that they should be associated. If we do not associate our voluntary workers with the community projects or with work in that area, others, including Communists, will take advantage of this and function in the area. As a matter of fact, from most places the demand has come that the Bharat Sevak Samaj and voluntary workers generally should be closely associated with the community projects. Criticism has come that this association is not close enough and that we are rather officializing community projects.

I feel that we should have the Bharat Sevak Samaj work in these community areas also. Indeed we cannot escape from this in the greater part of India. It would be a pity if we tried to follow a different rule in Madras.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy was sent to Gulzarilal Nanda. Extracts.
2. Chief Minister, Madras, at this time.
3. Durgabai Deshmukh was the Chairman of the Central Social Welfare Board and a member of the Planning Commission at this time.

3. An Augury for the Future¹

I call upon the people to enlist in the Bharat Sevak Samaj and thus contribute their share in building up a prosperous India. The Samaj is above party politics. It is not formed for furthering the interests of the Congress Party.

1. Speech while inaugurating the Madhya Bharat branch of the Bharat Sevak Samaj, Indore, 15 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 16 September 1952.

I hope that the seedling of the Samaj which has been planted now will grow into a big tree of which we can be proud. The hope has been strengthened as many people are taking interest in the activities of the Samaj. It is a good augury for the future.

The Samaj is meant for undertaking hard work to build up the nation. It is not an office nor does it give any reward for work. Those who want to work selflessly should join and work there.

There are many people who want to work but do not get proper opportunity to do so. The Samaj is meant for providing opportunities to such persons to serve their motherland. The message of the Samaj is spreading, but that alone will not be sufficient. The real value of it will be in the work it puts in to remove the poverty of the people.

4. The Functions of Bharat Sevak Samaj¹

...I had hoped that the Bharat Sevak Samaj would not follow the lines usually laid down or followed by other organizations and that it would concentrate on quiet work, usually of a manual kind. The Samaj would lose its distinctive character if it functioned on any other plane. The whole purpose is that everyone connected with it should do some work and should not merely demonstrate. Indeed, the demonstrative aspect should not be developed at all at this stage at any rate. I would add that the debating aspect also should not be encouraged as otherwise we are apt to discuss things for long instead of doing them. The simplest kind of work should be undertaken. It is thus that we will impress the people, train ourselves and train others, as well as produce results.

There are many kinds of manual work that can be undertaken. They would vary with the environment. The first and simplest kind relates to sanitation and cleaning up a village or a *mohalla* or a street. This should include cleaning up the houses too, in a friendly way of course and with the cooperation of the residents.

Then there is road making or canal digging or simple constructions which may be undertaken with the help of one or two experts to give advice. Such constructions can be of a school building or *panchayat ghar* or a little dispensary or even of an office for the Bharat Sevak Samaj in a village. Any number of

1. Note to M.O. Mathai, 1 October 1952. File No.40(244)/52-PMS. Extracts.

constructions can be made on a small scale. The point is that this should be done by voluntary workers to set an example to others.

It seems to me important that we must distinguish clearly between this type of active manual work, which should be the feature of the Bharat Sevak Samaj, and the normal demonstrative activities of other organizations. We should also try to avoid the normal rivalries and conflicts that take place in such organizations. The test should be work and everyone who is prepared to work should be welcome.

It is clear that this type of active work should be organized and sponsored by the local branch of the Samaj and not by any central body. The central body can only issue general advice and directions. Members of the central body, however, should participate in this kind of work through the local branch. It would not be fitting for any central section to overlap in regard to work with a local branch. That would lead to some difficulties.

I am anxious that the Bharat Sevak Samaj should start off on a sound basis of practical work, even though that might be on a modest scale. We should gain the reputation of being practical workers and not merely those who give advice to others. It may be that at some later stage we can plan out more ambitious schemes of work. But for the moment this appears undesirable. The kind of work that we should recommend and do ourselves at present should be such as can be done by any one, that is, without elaborate equipment.

At a later stage one might perhaps think of some kind of mass rallies, though even these should have for their aim some manual work and not merely the normal speeches. Indeed, speeches as such should be discouraged as we should discourage merely ceremonial functions. If we lay the foundations of work, we can build on them. If, on the other hand, we seek to rouse enthusiasm without that work, that enthusiasm will fade away and subsequent work will suffer.

The immediate and simplest type of work that suggests itself to me is sanitation, cleaning streets, villages, houses, etc. If this is done, it should not be done spasmodically but methodically. Small areas should be mapped out and entrusted to groups of workers and they should be made responsible for that particular area, whether it is a village or a *mohalla* or a street. Friendly comparisons could be made as to which area has done better than the other. As we start this work, we shall learn from experience and do better the next time. Our progress thus will be based on work done and experience gained and not on a theoretical consideration of what should be done.

The Bharat Sevak Samaj has a wide field of activities to choose from. It is better not to get lost in this wide field and thus disperse such energies as we possess. We should concentrate on some particular activity in a particular area and show results. Of course, if there are enough workers, other activities can also be taken up. But the main thing is to do a job undertaken well. This

itself creates faith and enthusiasm in ourselves, as well as in others, and we can extend our activities later to other spheres.

A copy of this note should be sent to Mrs Rajan Nehru, Shri Shah Nawaz Khan and Shri Gulzarilal Nanda.²

2. Gulzarilal Nanda was the Vice-Chairman of the Planning Commission, and Minister for Planning and Rajan Nehru and Shah Nawaz Khan were organizing members of the Bharat Sevak Samaj.

5. A New Work Culture¹

Friends,

It is sometime ago that I was elected, or rather chosen, as the President of the Bharat Sevak Samaj. I have participated in some activities of the Samaj thus far, but so far as I can remember, this is the first function of this kind connected with the Samaj that I have attended. I am glad to be here. But I should like to tell you that I refused to attend a similar function in Delhi. That is to say, I take the view that the Bharat Sevak Samaj must not go in for these flashy functions....

The Samaj came into being after more than a year's discussions. Some friends were in favour and others were against, and much could be said on either side. One hesitates to start a new organization when there are so many. Obviously, any such organization would tend to overlap and conflict with the work of others. There was also some danger of this organization being used, to some extent, for political ends, and so, we hesitated, and we did not know whether it was desirable to go ahead with it or not.

While this kind of internal discussion was going on, there were references to it in the press from time to time, and many people got to know about it. The result was a surprisingly large number of letters coming to us, enquiring about it and expressing a wish to join it. Thus, while some of us were lost in philosophic doubts as to what to do and what not, some kind of a call came to us from a considerable number of people in the country, who obviously wanted it. That turned the scales.

1. Speech at the inaugural function of the Tamil Nadu, Andhra, Mysore and Coorg branches of the Bharat Sevak Samaj, Madras, 10 October 1952. AIR tapes, NMML. Extracts.

Well, if the people wanted it, it was something good. It was not something being imposed from above by a few persons trying to push their own ideas. It was something that, perhaps, was going to supply a want. So, we took the plunge, and after some further consultations, we started it.

We tried to make it clear that this was not a political organization, or one affiliated to any political organization, and that its work will be strictly away from politics, or any other controversial subjects, and would consist indeed of work and work alone—and work, practically, entirely of the manual kind....

You know that Gandhiji always laid the greatest stress on work. In my younger days in the Congress, trying to the best of my ability to carry out some of Gandhiji's directions, I had felt that it was none of my business to go about attending conferences and such things. I thought it was my business to carry on my work in my own part of the country. Gandhiji was always insisting on this, and although many types of work were open to the people, he specially put forward spinning. He even tried to make it compulsory for membership of the Congress at one time. It did not succeed because, as Rajaji was just telling me, it was too much entangled with politics. We wished that way although many of us were intensely political men and women. We do not give up our politics for that. We functioned through other organizations in other ways.

The Bharat Sevak Samaj offers an opportunity for any person who wants to do a bit of work himself or herself, because the work has to be done, and is good for the individual and the community—and also because we want to create an atmosphere of work in the country, and the best way to create that atmosphere is to work and not merely to tell others to do it.

What kind of work to do? Well, there is an enormous variety of it. You can think for yourself, and it is a little difficult for me to make any particular suggestion. It should be, as far as possible, cooperative work in which others can join. Suppose, you go to a village, you can do something and you can invite others to join. In that way cooperative work can develop into mass work. With all our five-year plans, and the like, the main accomplishment in India is likely to depend far more on the non-official, private, and cooperative work done by the people of India than by merely an official agency.

You can take up work of the simplest kind like attending to sanitation, cleaning a village or street, road-making, digging canals, water channels, building a village council house, a school building, a small dispensary or even a dwelling house. You might say that you are not masons and do not know how to do it. Well, in that case learn it if you can, get one or two competent people to help you. You may be unskilled labourers. That is, after all, what you are when you start work.

If you can thus work, you will undoubtedly do good to yourself and to others. And you will gain intimate friendly contacts with the people of the

country, know them far better than by merely delivering speeches to them, and giving them general advice from a distance.

Another question arises. There are many organizations doing social work—private organizations, cooperative organizations, and some non-official organizations. Obviously, the Bharat Sevak Samaj is not going to act as rival to any other organizations.

What I mean is this. If an organization is working in a particular place, we will certainly cooperate with it so that there is no rivalry or conflict. There are no rewards in this organization to anyone who works; no offices to be held. There will be only conveners and others merely for getting the people to come together. There is no special authority, no rewards at all to offer except that which comes from the satisfaction of doing a piece of work. That is the general approach.

When you start an organization like this, it might tend to become artificial, and I use the word "artificial" not in a bad sense. The people in it might be honest or earnest enough, but still it may be confined to a small group functioning at the top, doing good work in a limited way. Or, it may be an organization which develops an ethos of its own and every great organization or national movement, big or small, if it is true to its aims, will develop some kind of an ethos. I should like naturally to see the Bharat Sevak Samaj develop its ethos for itself and which it will transmit, in some degree, to others, who come in contact with it. This would be an ethos of work, of building up India, aiming at raising the people of India, and raising ourselves.

May I give expression to some heterodox ideas? We talk a great deal about service or *seva*. There are various approaches and one is rather a superior approach which we may rule out, of doing good to others, and having the satisfaction from that. But somehow it seems to me a rather selfish approach to the question. It is almost doing something for one's own personal betterment, or it may be spiritual betterment, if you like.

There is a slight barrier between the server and the served. I do not want that barrier. It is a kind of false pride, which one may develop while doing service. Therefore, I would like to have rather a comradely, cooperative approach where every person is served. It is a common job. I would much rather have that approach than certainly the superior approach, not even, if I may say so, the approach of just serving another because we think we are performing the duty to ourselves or to others but rather a joy in cooperating together with others and building up something which is for everybody's good, my good, your good, everybody's good.

I would like the Bharat Sevak Samaj, first of all, as an organization to keep away from politics and, therefore, we should welcome people of all political denominations—or none—provided they always work. They must not



WITH THE FAMINE-STRICKEN PEOPLE IN RAYALASEEMA, 26 SEPTEMBER 1952



AMONG THE WITHERED CROPS IN A SCARCITY AREA, RAYALASEEMA,
8 OCTOBER 1952

be people who come to gain a popular name. It is rather difficult to prevent that always, but one should try. We should not encourage any group to come in and take advantage.

Work should be the test. Every person must be a regular worker, and that work should be more of cooperation with others, so that it may develop into mass work for the good of the people generally. Obviously, if you do some work in your own house for yourself, that will not be counted as work in this connection. Do all this in a comradely, friendly spirit of equality, and with a feeling of humility—because you might probably be a very indifferent worker, much less efficient than those whom you presume to go to and serve. Do it in that spirit, and try to break down any barrier that may exist between you and the people. We have too many of these barriers in this country, all kinds of barriers. We keep ourselves in our separate grooves. Well, we should try to break them. This work before us ought to be well-organized and thought-out. We want it to yield results. You can do the work with your committees or groups as the case may be in each area. It may be that a particular small group may take charge of a village and deal with it. There might be a little friendly rivalry as to who does more. I would like you to function in this way.

You might ask how provincial branches function, because work is done in the field. A provincial committee does not work in the field, it is something at the top. We want no complicated organizations, we do not want many committees and many office-bearers. We want only the barest structure for people to consult each other and evolve schemes of work. If that is the idea, then the provincial organization, and even more so, a central organization, cannot directly work in the field. The provincial organization ultimately is a consultative body, advisory in its nature, sending advice and suggestions. It is the local workers who should work in the field. I am not laying down any rigid approach to this question. As far as I can see, it is the local group on the spot that does the work. If any person from the provincial or national body of the Bharat Sevak Samaj comes, he will function through the local body, not directly as someone coming from a superior committee, as it would cause overlapping and confusion. You must make the local workers responsible for their work, and if the others come, they should join them.

NATIONAL PROGRESS

IV. Planning and Industry

1. To Gopikrishna Vijaivargiya¹

New Delhi
July 28, 1952

My dear Gopikrishnaji,²

Your letter of the 25th July. I appreciate your interest about the present position and our future programme. But you are mistaken if you think that any plan that we are drawing up is based on capitalist cooperation, etc. It is based on certain fundamental factors—our resources in money and technical personnel. There is no such thing as proceeding forthwith with the socialist ideal. If we accept it 100 per cent today, even then we are limited by the resources I have mentioned above. In China, which has gone communist, the Chairman, Mao Tse-tung, announced that it would take them 20 to 30 years to realize some part of socialism.

I am afraid there is a good deal of loose thinking in India and people imagine that we can adopt socialism by resolution or decree. We are giving a very great deal of thought to these matters in the Planning Commission.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. (1905-1984); President, Gwalior State Congress, 1938 and 1941-43, and Madhya Bharat PCC, 1949 and 1951-52; Member, Constituent Assembly, 1947-50; Chief Minister, Madhya Bharat, 1949-50; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1954-66.

2. To Gulzarilal Nanda¹

New Delhi
September 8, 1952

My dear Gulzarilal,

Yesterday there was some talk about the Planning Commission's report and the Congress. Also the Cabinet. I have been thinking about this matter. It does seem to me rather odd that the Planning Commission should present its final report and expect it to be accepted wholesale by the Cabinet. Merits apart,

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

this seems an unusual procedure and Members of the Cabinet have every right to say that they want to examine this thoroughly or, at any rate, the basic principles of it.

When the draft plan came out, it was something for consideration and it did not much matter if the Cabinet was previously consulted or not. This consideration does not apply to the final plan, which we shall have to put up not only before the Cabinet but Parliament. It is not possible to go into every detail, but the broad principles should certainly be discussed by the Cabinet as well as perhaps some priorities. It would not be proper to present the report as finalized to them and then tell them that they must not suggest any changes. Whether they suggest any changes or not, they must be given an opportunity to consider the main principles and the principal priorities. If necessary, the signing or the publication of the report should be delayed so as to give Cabinet a chance of discussing these matters with the Planning Commission.²

I mentioned yesterday to you the question of education and the amount provided for it. I am thoroughly dissatisfied with the present system of education and I have almost come to the conclusion that it is doing more harm than good. But the fact remains that all our future progress depends upon our educational apparatus and something radical has to be done to it. We cannot say that education cannot be looked after properly or that it is just a provincial subject and we have no money for it. I do not know how the Planning Commission has viewed this matter. It is of course complicated. There have been various commissions. In fact the Universities Commission's report has not been given effect to yet, because, *inter alia*, this is supposed to be due to lack of funds.

In dealing with the recent offer of the Russian Government for help in Travancore-Cochin, I mentioned that the export of coir having gone down there was a good deal of unemployment.³ As I wrote that, I felt the weakness of my position. What are we going to do about that unemployment? That is the obvious question that a person might have put, and that applies indeed to other unemployment and the lack of purchasing power and all that. All our schemes will help to a certain extent. But somehow the basic problems will continue and oppress us for a considerable time.

2. Nanda replied on 9 September that Part I of the report dealing with the basic principles, the programme of investment under the Plan and the portion dealing with land reform was to be placed before the Cabinet at the earliest opportunity.
3. There were about 157 coir units in Travancore-Cochin. Coir production had dwindled owing to the shrinkage of overseas markets. A scheme for the reorganization of the coir industry on a cooperative basis was formulated under the Five-Year Plan and various relief measures were undertaken. For instance, the State Government set apart Rs 5 lakhs for providing relief to workers. About, 1,700 persons were provided with employment on various public works.

There are the handloom weavers who also are not in a good way. I am threatened with a deputation from them.

In your report I believe you have put down some targets for sugar and textiles. I understand that these have already been reached.⁴

Provisionally you have allotted 10 crores for aid to Kashmir and Nepal. This sum is not likely to be enough for both. It is a little difficult for me to suggest figures and I hope you are going to examine the Kashmir proposals soon. I should imagine that we should provide at least ten crores for Kashmir. This is not too large a sum for the development of a State. This would be a loan.

As for Nepal, everything is rather vague. When the King came here, he talked vaguely of fifteen crores loan from us. I told him that this was very unlikely and that there must have been some misunderstanding. But in any event, we shall have to help Nepal. To what extent, I cannot say. We have already taken the liability to build the road from India to Nepal. If we take up the Kosi plan, this is partly Nepal's. In the main, help to Nepal means communications....⁵

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Nanda replied that ways were being considered to ensure providing employment to people. Coir and handloom and other village industries were to get special treatment. For sugar and cloth, certain special factors already in operation had to be examined.
5. Nanda wrote that financial provision for Kashmir's schemes could be considered after holding discussions with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. Regarding assistance to Nepal, the report of Planning Commission's officials was awaited.

3. To Gulzarilal Nanda¹

New Delhi
September 10, 1952

My dear Gulzarilal,

Thank you for your letter of September 9th. I am glad that the Planning Commission's draft report will be placed before the Cabinet. We must discuss the basic principles thoroughly in Cabinet before the report is finalized.

I am glad that it is proposed to give the coir and handloom industries special treatment.

We think and talk rather lightly about the distant future or rather about the next ten or fifteen years. For my part, I can hardly think too far ahead

1. JN Collection.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

because I am utterly convinced that the next four or five years at the most will make a tremendous difference to our future. It is what we do during these years that will direct the nation's energy in a particular direction. If we do not succeed, then other methods are followed. I realize, of course, that we have to start from a very low level. But, nevertheless, the pace of development, or the pace of dealing with unemployment appears to me very slow. In this mad race that is going on in the world, we lag behind greatly and there is little pity for those who cannot keep abreast. It is difficult to compare and not at all easy to get exact figures of other countries. But I think it is fairly certain that the pace of progress in many war-torn countries, which had to start almost from scratch again, has been very rapid. In some ways we are more fortunate, but our thinking is frightfully static. Perhaps, if we had been affected by the horrors of war, we might have had a greater sense of urgency.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Nabakrushna Chaudhuri¹

New Delhi
September 22, 1952

My dear Nabakrushna,²

As you know, we have been carrying on negotiations for an iron and steel project for some time and we are likely to come to a decision fairly soon.

I am told that your Government has independently been carrying on some negotiations with Japanese firms, notably with Tagasaki there for a project involving the export of iron ore. This involves a building of a railway line, harbour facilities etc. It must be an expensive project and it is not quite clear to me how you are going to carry it through with your own resources. If you expect help from the Centre for that project, it should come in the Five-Year Plan. For you to rely on the Japanese to do all that seems not only optimistic but not very safe. You could hardly expect the Japanese to build a railway line in India, for railways are not private concerns here.

Will you let me know how far this proposal has gone and what you intend doing in the matter?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(144)/49-PMS.
2. Chief Minister of Orissa.

5. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi

September 29, 1952

My dear T.T.²,

The other day the question of soap came up before the Economic Committee of the Cabinet.³ I saw the papers for the first time that day and could not give much thought to the matter. I expressed my immediate reactions.

I hope that you have had occasion to discuss this matter in Bombay with the Tata people and possibly others, informing them of the exact position.

The more I think of this, the less I like it. Partly of course, this may be due to just past habits of mind. For the last thirty three years I have not allowed any foreign soap to enter my house and I have always considered Lux and Sunlight as foreign soaps for this purpose. Naturally, therefore, I reacted in a particular way to a proposal to encourage Lux in India.

Apart from this, it seems to me almost certain that this encouragement of Lux will hit the Indian manufacturers of soap hard. They will gradually shrink and some of them may die out. It may be that we have a little more soap in the country and possibly a little cheaper soap. Even that is not certain because once real competition goes, prices may well be kept up.

The only possible advantage that I see is the gain in exchange. That is something to be considered. But does it balance the disadvantages, which seem to be serious? We shall be doing something which goes counter to all our past thinking and practice and which, I have no doubt whatever, will be fiercely criticized not only by our opponents but by large numbers of our own people.

Even looking at it from the strictly practical point of view, apart from sentiment, I do not like the idea at all of our pursuing an economic policy of this kind. For some temporary gain, we become more and more bound to big foreign concerns. I think that is dangerous. I do not suggest that we should try to follow some narrow policy of self-dependence, but dependence on others in any way leads to consequences, which are not likely to be good. It produces a mentality, which is wrong and just the opposite of the type of mind that we should like to produce in the country.

Indian industry will of course protest strongly. The Sarvodaya people will be vehement in their opposition, most Congressmen will criticize it, and of course all our opponents will do so. We are likely to raise a storm of opposition

1. JN Collection.

2. Union Minister of Commerce and Industry.

3. The soap industry was in the grip of a crisis as a result of the rise in the prices of vegetable oils in the wake of the Korean war. There was a large contraction of demand and overproduction. Home producers of certain varieties were critical of the plans of foreign manufacturers in the country to expand production.

from all quarters excepting perhaps a few. The matter therefore requires a very careful consideration.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To Maharaja of Bikaner¹

New Delhi
October 2, 1952

Dear Maharaja Saheb,²

Your letter of the 24th September.

The question of unemployment is an all-India one and a very serious one. So far as the demobilized soldiers are concerned, we have considered this on many occasions and tried to do our best. To my great surprise, many of these soldiers refused to be enrolled in the Armed Police, although that was specially suited for them.

There is hardly any need for appointing a commission, for we know the facts. The solution is not large scale industries except in the long run. The Planning Commission has gone as far as it possibly could in regard to large-scale industries which are very costly. The only possible solution for unemployment which can be put in fairly quickly is by way of small and cottage industries. Of course, private industrialists can go ahead provided they fit in with the Five-Year Plan. This Plan will be issued in the course of a month or so. If private industries are shy, the consequence will be that our economic policy will be framed more and more ignoring them. They cannot have it both ways, i.e., expect privileges and at the same time do nothing to deserve them....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Kami Singh (1924-1988); Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-77; member of various Parliamentary Committees; represented India in shooting competitions at World Olympics in Rome (1960), Tokyo (1964) and Mexico (1968); recipient of Arjuna Award, 1962; author of *The Relations of House of Bikaner with the Central Powers, 1952-77*.

7. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
October 3, 1952

My dear T.T.,

Thank you for your letter of the 3rd October.²

For my part I am entirely with you in some of the basic questions you have mentioned in your letter. I think that you should certainly take a strong line in calling for returns from European employees and foreign concerns.³ I think also that we should seriously consider the question of the Imperial Bank.⁴

I have no objection at all to retaining and leavening of foreign industries or of foreign interests in our industries.

I had not heard of any agitation by Godrej or other people in regard to the soap proposal.⁵ Indeed I had not heard of this proposal till I saw the Cabinet note. My reaction that I mentioned to you was entirely my own. I have no great sympathy with many types of Indian vested interests though, other things being equal, I would prefer an Indian interest to a foreign interest. Normally I would not wish to encourage inefficiency and obsolete methods merely because they are Indian.

My own reactions in the soap matter were due to two reasons which I had indicated to you.⁶ One was my feeling that if we decided to encourage Lever Brothers here to increase their output very much, this would undoubtedly injure all Indian soap-making interests and would undoubtedly be criticized by almost every section of Indian opinion. Politically that would be an unwise move and would create needless trouble for us. We should be prepared to face the trouble

1. JN Collection.

2. T.T. Krishnamachari had written that he wished to retain a leavening of foreign economic interests in Indian industries and, subject to severe scrutiny, allow the extension of foreign economic interests including the nature and scope of their activities.

3. An enquiry was made by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry regarding the employment of Indians by foreign firms. It was reported that in recent months the foreign firms which were once eager to Indianize higher executive posts had reversed the policy and were keeping higher posts open to their own nationals only. The Ministry also called for return of big foreign firms which were making huge profits to the detriment of Indian companies.

4. The All-India Rural Credit Survey Committee (1952) had recommended the nationalization of the Imperial Bank.

5. Krishnamachari had written that certain vested interests were organizing a protest against incursion of foreign capital because they imagined that it affected them in their particular sphere. The agitation against Lever Brothers was organized by Godrej and others who had enlisted the support of almost all commercial bodies. He had also received over twenty representations in respect of the grant of a licence to Remingtons to manufacture typewriters which was granted before his tenure as Minister in the Centre commenced.

6. See *ante*, pp. 105-106.

if in our opinion any principle was involved. In the case of soap, I do not see any principle.

The second reason is more important, though rather vague. I dislike these big foreign combines from getting more and more of a foothold in India. Perhaps I cannot justify this for logical economic reasons. I feel that we should not get too much tied up with the money economy of other countries. We should produce more for use than for profit, although, of course, we cannot wholly separate the two.

Lever Brothers have been gradually pushing out Indian soaps. Even I find some difficulty now in buying Tata's soaps which I have been using for many years. In fact I have to ask a shop to order them specially for me. Lever Brothers, with their much larger resources and advertisement campaign, in which many of our cinema actresses boost them, have an advantage as it is over Indian firms, including a big firm like Tatas.

I shall gladly meet you and Deshmukh to discuss the matters you mention.⁷

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Krishnamachari had suggested a meeting with Nehru of Deshmukh, the Union Finance Minister, and himself to discuss these policy matters.

8. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
October 13, 1952

My dear Deshmukh,

I am gradually dealing with the papers which had accumulated in my absence from Delhi.

Your letter of October 7th about sending a team to Washington to negotiate a loan for the iron and steel projects....²

The iron and steel industry is one of the basic industries and it is our policy to bring about State control and, where possible, State ownership of such basic industries. This may take time in regard to some of them and we are not for the present thinking of acquiring the existing privately-owned steel

1. File No. 17(144)/49-PMS. Extracts.

2. Deshmukh had written that the International Bank had agreed to open negotiations for a loan to the combined Indian Iron and Steel Co. and the Steel Corporation of Bengal of about 30 million for expansion of the existing steel production unit in West Bengal. The loan was to be guaranteed by the Government of India.

plants in India. But it is important that our general policy in this respect be kept in view and the public should not be made to think that we are resiling from it. If we transfer the steel project to the Commerce and Industry Ministry, it would obviously appear to the public that we consider it as a part of the private sector and have no great intention of increasing State control over the steel industry. That, I think, will not only create a bad impression, but a wrong one, so far as our general policy is concerned. A good deal of Government money will be put into the scheme in various ways. But, quite apart from this, and even if there was a considerable sum invested privately, I would like to make it perfectly clear that we do not think this steel project, or any other like it, should be treated as belonging to the private sector.

The question, therefore, is not so much about the Ministry dealing with it, although that is relevant, as to what our basic approach is. The Production Ministry³ indicates our basic approach about the State-owned or State-controlled key industries. Therefore, it seems to me right that the Production Ministry should continue to deal with this matter. Of course, as I have suggested above, this will have to be in the fullest consultation with Commerce and Industry, and Finance. Where necessary, the matter will have to be put up before the Economic Committee of the Cabinet.

The negotiating team that will go on our behalf to Washington will, of course, function there under the general guidance and supervision of our Ambassador, G.L. Mehta, who is fully acquainted with this project.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The Ministry of Production was formed in May 1952 with a view to implementing the objectives of the Industrial Policy Resolution of April 1948 for the rapid industrialization of the country. It was responsible for planning and controlling industries in the public sector.

NATIONAL PROGRESS

V. Education

1. Physical Fitness of Students¹

I have already drawn the attention of the Planning Commission on more than one occasion, I think, to the desirability of having some kind of a compulsory labour service, something to take the place of military conscription in some countries. This was approved of by the National Planning Committee of which I was Chairman. The resolution on this of the National Planning Committee can be found in their reports—volume on Education—page 87.

In this connection, I should like to draw attention to another recommendation of the National Planning Committee about norms of physical fitness of boys and girls in schools and colleges. This is on page 88. In this it is stated that certain definite norms of physical fitness should be laid down for every stage of education. These norms should include, weight, height, chest measurement, running a prescribed distance within a prescribed period, jumping a certain height, lifting a certain weight and swimming. These can be varied or added to.

In the English schools where I studied, each boy had to pass a test of swimming and a test of gymnastics. This was compulsory unless there was a doctor's certificate.

I think that we should recommend that in all schools and colleges some kind of gymnastic training should be provided and some tests laid down. If the student passes these tests, he should get a diploma, or there can be two diplomas, "A" and "B", one simpler than the other. The possession of such a diploma would be a certain test of physical fitness to which some importance should be attached in service matters and the like.

Any such general approach would help greatly in increasing the physical fitness of the community. We are very backward in this.

It is not necessary for us at this stage to lay down physical standards for grown-up young men or women. Experts can lay them down for various ages or various classes in schools or at the university. A fairly good general standard of physical fitness might be as follows:

1. Note to Gulzarilal Nanda, Member, Planning Commission, New Delhi, 28 July 1952. File No. 40 (81)/49-PMS.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

1. One mile run in 6 1/2 minutes.
2. 100 yards in 14 seconds.
3. Five-mile walk in 65 minutes.
4. 12 miles cycling in one hour
5. High Jump - 4 feet
6. Long Jump - 12 feet
7. Swimming - 100 yards.

2. To K. Hanumanthaiya¹

New Delhi
August 9, 1952

My dear Hanumanthaiya²,

Your letter of the 4th August. I am happy to know that your administration is doing well and is gaining in popularity.

You refer to educational reform. So far as your resolution of the Mysore Political Conference is concerned, I entirely agree with it. I am thoroughly dissatisfied with the present methods and results of education in India. If you can better them, all good luck to you. I do not quite know what you are going to do, except that you are appointing a Committee.³ I wish you success.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Chief Minister of Mysore State.
3. In September 1952, the Government of Mysore appointed a committee for examining the system of education in Mysore from the pre-primary to the university stage and for making recommendations for its development.

3. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
August 11, 1952

My dear Maulana,²

We had a brief talk about the education budget today. As I mentioned to you, I hope that we shall consider the whole problem in some detail in Cabinet. You know that I am intensely interested in the proper development of education in this country and I shall do my best to help in this.

1. File No. 40/107/50-PMS.
2. Minister of Education at the Centre.

But I am worried about the whole educational system which we are supporting and which we hope to enlarge. I almost fear that by enlarging it we are increasing the disease. It is more important that we try to cure it first. Our standards go down, our discipline goes to pieces and generally the young men and women we are turning out of our educational system are of very poor quality. I do not think that we can improve this quality merely by directions from the Centre. More and more I begin to fear centralization which saps initiative and leads to greater bureaucracy.

We had appointed a University Commission who had presented a useful report.³ So far as I know that report remains where it was and we have not been able to do much in that direction. We are now thinking of appointing another commission for secondary education.⁴ The outlook of this or any other commission can hardly be promising when we have not been able to tackle the University Commission's report with any success. Could we not concentrate on something like university education and make it a living reality instead of what it is today?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The University Commission under S. Radhakrishnan, in its report, released on 29 August 1949, dealt with the existing system of Indian education, including the medium of instruction, professional education, standards of teaching, post-graduate training and research, religious education, financing of universities and co-education.
4. A secondary education commission with A. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar, Vice-Chancellor of Madras University, as Chairman, was constituted to go into (1) the aims and objects of secondary education in India; (2) the procedure for selection of pupils in secondary schools; (3) the duration of secondary education; (4) examinations, syllabus, methods of instruction and text-books; and (5) the relationship of secondary education to primary and higher education.

4. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
September 6, 1952

My dear Maulana,

I have your letter of the 6th September about the allotment for education in the Five-Year Plan.² As you wish it, I shall suggest to the Planning Commission to put up a framework of their general proposals for the Cabinet. Normally, it is the full report that is put up for the Cabinet to consider, and not parts of it,

1. JN Collection.

2. The Five-Year Plan had allocated Rs 151.7 crores for education.

because no part can be considered apart from the rest of the report. When the draft Five-Year Plan was prepared, it was only placed before the Cabinet as a whole and not in parts. Every such plan is interrelated and it is difficult to consider it in bits.

So far as I know, the Plan is not completely ready yet. I understand, however, that it is likely to be finalized by the beginning of October.

Nobody can challenge the importance of education and yet more and more people have begun to have very grave doubts about the entire system of our education. I am almost convinced that it might be a good thing to stop all our universities for a while. The more I look at them, the more disgusted I feel. Why should we spend money in this way without doing good to anybody? I really think that it is far more important to change this system than to tinker with it. To expand a bad system is to expand evil.

I have been looking at reports about Allahabad, Lucknow, Aligarh, and recently Hyderabad, and of course there is Calcutta. What kind of human beings are we producing there after all the money we spend?

Money counts and is necessary. But I feel sure that money is far less important than the method of education to be adopted. More and more I feel that we should approximate to the basic ideals of Gandhiji in this matter.³ Most of our schools do little good as they are.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Although the ideal of basic education as enunciated by Mahatma Gandhi was accepted in principle by all educationists in the country, the necessary change in the outlook of the authorities and educational institutions had not come about even after independence.

5. Scholarships for African Students¹

I agree entirely with the proposal to increase the number of scholarships from 70 to 100. I would specially encourage Africans from Africa to come to India, as facilities for their education are terribly limited and they are looking towards India.

Our Commissioner² in East Africa has recently been touring in the West

1. Note to Cabinet Secretary, New Delhi, 8 September 1952. JN Collection. A copy was sent to Ministry of Education. Extracts.
2. Apa Pant.

Coast of Africa. He informed us that there was an overwhelming desire for higher education there and they were looking towards India. In fact, subscriptions had been raised to send a fairly large number of students to India. How many may come, I do not know, but the figure mentioned was, I believe, over a hundred. If these students come here or approach us in this matter, we should not say no to them because they will be paying their own fees. We might give them some facilities and we shall have to fit them in somewhere....

6. Responsibilities of Students¹

I call upon the students to prepare for their responsibilities as citizens of India in the difficult days of building up the country.

The future belongs to you. You will have to bear the burden of responsibility in the future. You must prepare yourselves for this responsibility. To the extent to which you are ready and have developed the capacity for productive and useful work, to that extent shall you bring about the progress of the country.

I deprecate the tendency among the students to pass resolutions without a thought whether these resolutions can be implemented and as to the manner in which they can be implemented. Without taking an integrated view of the problems facing the country, they have also developed the unfortunate habit of advising others as to how to go about their tasks but have never bothered about acting upon that advice themselves.

They never ever seem to realize that their primary business is to learn, to prepare themselves for the business of life. They are a little too fond of shouting and raising slogans, as if shouting and the raising of slogans will by themselves solve their problems. Not that there is anything wrong with these. They at least relieve the mind and even work up enthusiasm among the people. But they do not make it possible for work to get done. You cannot build a bridge or a dam across a river simply by shouting slogans.

I have gladly accepted the invitation of your leaders, because I always like to come in contact with young minds, to talk to them, understand them and to exchange thoughts with them, because we have all difficult problems to face in the country.

1. Address to a students' gathering, Indore, 14 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 15 September 1952.

The word Upanishad means to sit down together to the serious business of exchanging thoughts and understanding the problems confronting a people. If the problems of the world had been easy of solution, they would have been settled long ago. The things that are worthwhile in life are those that are achieved after facing difficulties and undergoing certain tribulations. A freedom that is obtained cheaply, can easily be lost. We value it because we have sacrificed much for it, and have paid for it in terms of human suffering.

I deprecate the present-day tendency among students to value not education, but the mere acquisition of an academic qualification in the belief that such acquisition will bring them material advantages. The purpose of education is not that. The University Commission has also pointed that out and recommended that, in future, appointments should be made on merit and not necessarily on the basis of the degrees possessed by the candidate.

Real education begins after a student has left school or college, where he has acquired a taste and habit of reading and understanding the issues which face the world today. However, instead, of adopting the attitude of learners, the students today have taken up the attitude of teaching others. This is a dangerous habit against which they must guard themselves, for, if they claim to be teachers, they would never really learn anything.

We have not progressed in the field of education. We want to make education and medical care in hospitals free. But we cannot do so because our resources are limited and we do not have enough money. If we impose additional tax burdens on you, you will protest; if we do not, you will shout again that we do not give you what you want. You do not take an integrated view of things, you do not appreciate that each problem is linked with one another; and that the solution of the one depends on many other factors. It is necessary, therefore, to realize that we must increase the wealth of the country, not of the individual. Hence the Five-Year Plan, so that we may provide for free hospitals and free education as far as we can.

You are students today and, therefore, you must use your time well. You have the opportunity to take a detached view of things. Use this opportunity well. You will not learn if you only raise slogans and try to teach others when you ought to be learning yourselves.

Ponder over the history of Europe during the last hundred years. Why has Europe come up and Asia gone down? It is because the former has developed knowledge and the capacity for work and progress, which makes growth of wealth and power possible. The world today is the child of scientific knowledge, for it is this scientific knowledge which has increased the power and the domination of many European countries over other parts of the world. This scientific knowledge has been made the instrument of wealth, for it has increased and made possible the production of an infinite number of commodities, and increased wealth brings increased wealth to the country.

I refer in this connection to the emergence of Russia as one of the great powers of the world. I am not talking to you about the Soviet pattern of economy for I do not want to raise any controversy. But the fact remains that Russia has come up in the world because its people have the will to work. They did not indulge in slogans; or if they did, it was only to work up their enthusiasm, and they did not stop at slogans alone.

I emphasize the value of technological skill and knowledge. When I was young, Indians generally went to England to be called to the Bar. Things have changed now, and now they go abroad to acquire the technological know-how to become engineers, doctors and teachers. It is they who build up a country. If you want to build up India, if you want your country to progress, you must acquire this knowledge, become doctors and engineers and acquire the necessary skill. The mere possession of a degree will not take you anywhere. The future belongs to you. You will have to bear the burden of responsibility in the future.

7. Progress of Primary and Secondary Education¹

Dr P.S. Deshmukh, the Minister for Agriculture, has sent me a note on the development of primary and secondary education. Dr Deshmukh, as is well-known, has been intimately connected with the development of education in Madhya Pradesh. He has sent this note to the Finance Minister and to the Education Minister also.

2. I enclose a copy of this note. I have read it with great interest and, without going into details, I must say right at the outset that it appeals to me greatly. It appeals to me for two basic reasons. One is that from every point of view it is necessary for us to extend primary education as well as secondary, provided that that education is of the right type and includes some productive labour. I am losing faith in the purely literary type of education that is often given.

3. Secondly, it is highly important to absorb the graduates that are turned out of our universities in large numbers as teachers in village schools. These graduates are today terribly frustrated and go into wrong courses, thus producing new problems for us.

1. Note to Gulzarilal Nanda, 22 September 1952. File No. 40(107)/50-PMS.

4. We have talked about basic education for a long time, and no doubt progress has been made in that direction in many States. But we still seem to be tied up far too much to what I would call traditional methods of education. I think that the progress made by the Hindustani Talimi Sangh² in regard to primary and secondary education is impressive. I do not entirely agree with the rather rigid outlook of some of the leaders of the Hindustani Talimi Sangh. But I find myself more and more in agreement with them in regard to their basic approach.

5. All our planning ultimately depends upon the human material that we produce. We talk about training personnel for specific duties. That is of course necessary. But unless we give some training of the right type to the children as they grow up, we shall be overwhelmed by masses of untrained or ill-trained people who have no discipline and who only make demands and demonstrate for them. It is, therefore, of basic importance that we should give very serious thought to this training of large numbers of our children and boys and girls. They will be the foundation of our planning and future progress.

6. It is not good enough for us in the Central Government to say that this is a provincial subject and obligation and, therefore, we need not worry too much about it. It is for us to worry and to find out ways and means. For, otherwise, all our schemes will be undermined by the element of untrained and misdirected humanity.

7. Personally, I think that we must aim ultimately not only at free education but at providing one meal or substantial refreshment to each child in the school. To offer education to a starving boy or girl is rather fantastic, and he cannot take advantage of it. This may involve heavy expenditure and we may not be able to do it for some time. But, I think, we should keep this in view. Even a glass of milk or skimmed milk with some other light refreshment would go a long way.

8. Some years ago, I visited the basic schools at Sewagram.³ I do not know what progress has been made since then. I hope to go there in about a month's time to see for myself. But I was struck by what they had done there. They were giving a solid meal to all the children plus one light refreshment. The expenditure involved in running the school plus the meal was met in three ways: (i) the sale of what the students themselves produced by manual effort; (ii) by a grant from the Provincial Government or the District Board,

2. The Hindustani Talimi Sangh was founded by Mahatma Gandhi in 1936 for the propagation of basic education. In 1943, the constitution of the Talimi Sangh was altered to include pre-basic, post-basic or university and adult education in its scope.
3. A scheme for the development of twenty basic schools in a compact village area around Sewagram was started in collaboration with the Wardha Janapada Sabha.

and (iii) by contribution by parents in the villages roundabout. Roughly speaking, the income was divided into three parts in this way and the cost to the State was less actually than in a normal school which was not at all as good from the point of view of education. In addition, food was supplied. It was found, I was told, that since some food was given, the progress of the students was much greater. That was natural.

9. However, for the moment, I would not stress this food aspect, though I would very much like to see some small beginning being made.

10. Dr Deshmukh's proposals do not involve any heavy expenditure and yet they would have very far-reaching results both in bringing in a vast number of additional children to school and in providing employment to our young men. The details of his proposals can be considered and followed where necessary.

11. In regard to one matter I am in entire agreement with him. No money should be spent on buildings for these schools. They must be held in the open. At the most a shed might be put up which should not involve much expenditure.

12. I strongly recommend the underlying idea of Dr Deshmukh's proposal to the Planning Commission as well as to the Education Ministry. I think that this approach would not only have a solid educational value but would be psychologically satisfying to a very large number of people. It would meet the very important problem of giving some employment to our young middle class folk.

13. This should be confined to rural areas.

8. To Gulzarilal Nanda¹

New Delhi
October 1, 1952

My dear Gulzarilal,

I sent you a letter from Panjabrao Deshmukh about education some days ago.² He has sent me a further letter which I enclose.

I must say that his scheme attracts me. Somehow we have got into the habit of thinking about everything in terms of money and building. I wish we could get rid of this. The Planning Commission, for lack of money, cannot provide for educational expansion, and yet it must devise some means of training

1. File No. 40(107)/50-PMS.

2. See the previous item.

our people.³ I am not at all enamoured of our present system. But that does not mean that we should postpone any real effort in this direction.

Why have we drifted away so far from Gandhiji's ideas of basic education?

With all this tremendous unemployment among graduates and others, the obvious course is to use them for basic education of some kind. We need not pay them even high salaries, but we should provide them some subsistence allowance.

Again, I feel that in spite of our repeated talk about cottage industries, we really pay no attention to them. We might at least think of them in terms of providing employment, if for nothing else.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Under the Five-Year Plan, Rs 1 crore was provided for 1952-53 for basic and social education. One of the schemes was the development of pilot projects in basic education in selected areas in different States. It was proposed to work out techniques of basic and social education from the primary to the post-graduate level.

9. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
October 12, 1952

My dear Maulana,

During my tour in the Rayalaseema districts of Madras, I came across numerous gruel centres, where a free meal was given to more or less destitute persons. This was confined to children, expectant and nursing mothers and the infirm. I found that seventy five per cent of the persons getting such relief were children. I was distressed to see these children herded together as beggars with the lame.

This scheme of relief was being carried out on a wide scale and in fact about 5,00,000 persons were being given this one free-meal a day. Of these, I suppose, nearly 4,00,000 were children, mostly under 12. I have no doubt that this giving of free meals has saved large numbers of people from death.

The meals have to be continued for some time at least. But I made a proposal to the Madras Government which, I think, they will accept. This proposal was as follows:

1. JN Collection.

This free meal should be given at and through schools. Where there is a school, there is no difficulty. Where there is no school, I suggested that immediate steps should be taken to set up some kind of a temporary school. This would consist really of just one teacher and nothing else—no building of any kind, no equipment at all. The teacher could feed the children and teach them orally what he, or preferably she, could, play about with the smaller children, tell them stories and make them do some kind of easy manual work.

Thus this temporary school would cost the teacher's salary only. This would mean Rs 40/- a month. All the work should be done in the open. The cost of this would be relatively little. The benefit would be very great. First of all, the children would be separated from the infirm and the lame. They would not be treated as beggars. They would get some discipline and some kind of teaching and would do some little work of a simple basic kind. Also this would employ some hundreds, or may be more, of teachers who should be preferably women.

I wrote to you about Panjabrao Deshmukh's note and you have been good enough to send me your comments. In these comments you refer to a school building of one room of mud, bamboo and thatch. I would suggest leaving this out completely and just having no building at all of any type. All this probably does not fit in with the educational code. But if we could go ahead with this scheme in a large way, it would make a tremendous difference in the country without adding much to the expenditure on education. Indeed, I think that with some basic craft, a good part of the teacher's salary can be recovered.

I would certainly add a simple meal for the children. I think even this addition would not add greatly to the cost.

Unless we proceed in this way, there is no hope for any large-scale spread of discipline and education among our children.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

NATIONAL PROGRESS

VI. Scientific Research

1. Importance of Road Construction¹

In the last two and a half years, I have had several occasions to inaugurate Central research laboratories in the country. The programme was begun about two and a half years ago and we planned to put up eleven laboratories. I think this is the eighth. The remaining three, for which the foundation-stones have been laid, are in the process of construction. I have heard that the twelfth one is also coming up. I think that it has been a great achievement. It is not merely a question of putting up buildings but what is important is the idea and goal behind them. Our goal is to make India one of the leading countries in the world. If we compare India with other countries, we will find a number of differences, as there are bound to be, for every country has different customs and traditions. But the fundamental difference between the advanced countries and India is that the former have laid the foundation for scientific progress. Then there were other off-shoots in the application of scientific research which has transformed those countries. Huge industries have come up, and transportation has been revolutionized with the coming of the railways and aeroplane. All kinds of new and lethal weapons have also been invented. All these developments are off-shoots of science which have led to the production of new goods, new wealth. As a result, the West has become extremely wealthy.

Poverty is the greatest disease afflicting India, and the most urgent task that we face is to eliminate that poverty. How do we go about it? It cannot be done by magic. It requires hard work and intelligence. We must take advantage of the experience of other countries. After all, there is no dearth of capable people in India. But our society became stagnant and progress became slow and gradually stopped altogether. Now, our determination and circumstances have shaken the country out of that rut, though there are many people in the country who object to changes. But no matter how much they may object, this is the need of the time and we cannot turn back from it.

What is the biggest problem which we face in the country today for which we are setting up these laboratories? We are trying to lay through them the foundation for the progress of millions of people and to produce more wealth in the country. We may imitate other countries, like some of our big businessmen have been doing. They import some big machines from America or somewhere else and put up a factory and mint money. But this does not lead to progress in any way. We must try to learn from other people's

1. Speech while opening the Central Road Research Institute, New Delhi, 16 July 1952. AIR tapes, NMML. (Original in Hindi). Extracts.

experience. Ultimately, a nation progresses by its own strength and by learning to stand on its own feet. We can certainly learn a great deal from other countries. But until we develop self-reliance, and make progress in the fields of science and technology, we cannot go very far.

Therefore, scientific development is extremely important for progress. I often stress this, but I do not know if the people are also convinced about this. Only this morning, I was reading in a newspaper that people often feel that if the money that has been spent on the scientific laboratories had been used for something else, it would have yielded more benefits. I do not know what the yardstick for measuring a worthwhile cause is. There is no doubt that the gentleman who expressed this view has not understood the world we live in. One must realize that these laboratories are fundamental to India's progress. It is not the big secretariats and other office buildings coming up everywhere which are important. The officers who sit in these buildings only issue orders, but ultimately it is science that is fundamental to India's progress. This is something everyone must realize. Many of my colleagues in Parliament are sitting here. I would say that even Parliament is not fundamental to India's progress as science is. If Parliament realizes this and follows that path, there will be rapid progress. If it sticks to old rules and precedents, it will remain in a rut. The problem is that a lawyer's mentality dominates the country. I try very hard, in spite of being a lawyer myself, to get rid of that mentality and to persuade others to do so too. But I have not succeeded so far. I am therefore stressing this fact once again so that you may understand.

You have come to this new laboratory. There is this research institute and also the National Physical Laboratory. I am filled with fresh hope and strength when I see these institutions. They are symbols of new India. Visitors from other countries, some of them great experts, are profoundly impressed by our science laboratories. They have seen that we have ultimately found the key to the country's progress instead of merely copying others. If you look at the history of the last two centuries, you will find that a great chasm divides the countries of Asia and the West. The differences were not so great about a hundred years ago. It is the new inventions of science and technology which have brought about this tremendous change.

There is no want of ability and courage among our people. It is our failure to make progress in the field of science which was responsible for our backwardness. Therefore, it became one of our most urgent priorities to lay the foundations of scientific advance in the country. We want to learn new methods of production in order to increase our national wealth. But it is more important to develop a scientific temper in the country. We lack that at the moment. If there was a scientific temper among the people, I am sure there would not be such tensions and disputes as we have them today. But that is a different matter.



AT TUNGABHADRA PROJECT SITE, 29 SEPTEMBER 1952



INAUGURATING THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
ALIPUR, DELHI, 2 OCTOBER 1952

I want you to understand the spirit behind these laboratories. The modern temples or mosques are these science laboratories where there is a search for truth and for the upliftment of mankind. Science benefits society and the masses, and not just a few individuals who work for their personal profit....

This Institute has been set up for road research, for building good roads. We need a number of things in the country as there was a shortage of almost everything. We even had food shortages till a few years ago. Even now, we do not have enough cloth or housing. It is difficult to say what we do not need more. But the more I travel in India, the more I am convinced that the most urgent priority should be given to the construction of roads because we cannot reach anywhere without roads. Can all the civic amenities like schools, hospitals and transportation of goods, etc., be provided without roads? It is an acute problem particularly in the hill areas. The want of roads has been responsible for their backwardness. During the years of British rule, Mussoorie, Simla, Nainital and Darjeeling were developed as hill-stations and British officers used to go there during the summer to escape the heat of the plains. But they had nothing to do with the people of the mountains. A few good roads were built for the convenience of the officers only. Nobody bothered about the other areas.

Similarly a network of roads was established connecting the big cities. But in the rural areas, very often there are no roads, not even *kutch*a tracks, leave alone the metalled roads. I feel that though it is necessary to build roads for vehicular traffic, the Road Research Institute should pay more attention to building roads for the easy movement of the bullock-carts. Without good roads, the countryside specially gets cut off; the people cannot move about easily. I want good roads in all the rural areas. At the same time, it would be better, if instead of a hundred miles of very good roads, you build thousands of miles of *kutch*a roads in the rural areas where none exist at the moment. They can be improved upon later.

The Road Research Institute must pay attention to various aspects of road construction. There should be good roads which would be able to withstand the pressure of vehicles carrying heavy loads. Our heavy military equipment cannot be transported easily without good, solid roads. At the same time, the Institute must do special research for laying roads at a low cost in order to open up the rural areas. Once rural areas are connected by roads, there will be a flow in and out of villages, instead of their remaining cut off from the rest of the country. Ultimately, our effort should be to knit the villages all over India. It will take time, but it is necessary to do this in order to reduce the disparity between the people living in the villages and in the cities. The people in rural areas must be provided with various civic amenities, and everyone must get an opportunity for making progress.

As far as road-building is concerned, it is the rural areas which deserve the greatest possible attention. I know this principle is already being followed

by the Planning Commission and the State Governments. In many States, including Uttar Pradesh, two thousand miles of roads have been built in the last two years, not by any government agency, but by the villagers themselves. The Government has helped them by providing some implements and an engineer or two. But the labour was entirely theirs. We want this to spread. If you can help us by finding the ways of building roads at low cost it will benefit the people a great deal. Otherwise we will have to wait for years before we reach the target. The Government must take up these tasks. But the people must learn to be self-reliant and to help themselves. We are here to give them all necessary help....²

I just do not wish that we should wait supinely until we have a solid building about us. I am not against solid buildings, but I am against waiting till we get a *pucca* structure made of bricks, cement and something else.

The Education Department, for instance, should spend far less on buildings and far more on teaching. Not that buildings are not important, but teaching is more important. If no buildings are available for starting classes we should put up straw-covered sheds or huts, neat and clean, which may not be lasting, but that doesn't matter. Even so, it is better if they last only a few years, after some time we can have another shed or a better building.

Everything seems to be hung up until some palatial building comes up before we start working. I think on different lines, or call them, if you like, emergency lines, where we do not wait for some kind of protective covering before we start working. I do not want a housing programme to wait for the availability of adequate quantity of cement, steel and all that. A housing programme should essentially be based on materials which are found locally in a village. Have houses of cement and steel where you can get them, but the essential work must not depend on some special article which is not easily available.

As a matter of fact, our so-called modern structures of brick and mortar, from the point of view of aesthetics, are horrible. They are amazingly ugly, and what is more, uncomfortable. It is true that our Central Public Works Department may say that they will be lasting for twenty years or thirty years while the other structures last only for five years. But the first idea that strikes one on seeing some of those buildings is, how soon can they be pulled down. Why should they last if they are ugly and uncomfortable? There is no virtue in their being lasting. So, the sooner our Central and the local Public Works Department begin to think, not in terms of their permanence, but of their utility, and of some artistry and beauty, the better it will be for the country, and even for the PWD. But it is difficult to see how the PWD mentality can be reformed.

2. Upto here the original speech was delivered in Hindi. Nehru then spoke in English.

In everything that we do, we come up always against this big problem of how to get so many tasks done in the least possible time. There are obvious limitations of finance, trained personnel and so many other things. You cannot simply put aside the limitations and say "we will do it". You must be practical, you cannot be just airy.

Nevertheless, there can be ways and means of getting over many of these limitations. That is what we think about most of the time, whether it is in the Planning Commission or elsewhere.

We come up against a rigid outlook. We are conservative in the sense that we do not like taking a new step because we are used to a certain routine or a certain rut. Yet, what is absolutely necessary is the new step. You cannot meet a new situation in an old way, because it is the old way that has created the new situation. We should realize that we have got to do things rapidly and quickly. It is not quite enough to say that there are limitations which prevent our going fast. We cannot ignore the limitations which prevent our going fast. We cannot ignore the limitations but I want the mind, which tries to get over the limitations and does not submit or surrender to them easily because if we do not get over them, then other difficulties and dangers arise.

We have to deal in this big country with a vast population. All the time I have a feeling, sitting in Delhi, of how cut off this world of New Delhi is from the rest of India. No amount of government effort, however big it may be, can possibly solve our problems unless there is popular effort and popular enthusiasm behind it. Popular effort and popular enthusiasm can come only if you are in touch with the people. If you approach them and speak their language, you can understand their troubles and tell them of your difficulties. You do not do that if you sit in your ivory towers of offices in New Delhi.

But let us not forget that these river valley schemes, whether it is the Bhakra Nangal Scheme, the Damodar Valley or the Hirakud, are tremendous achievements of India. You see something big coming up, not only great as it is, in its inception and in its engineering feat, but big in the promise of good that it will bring to India.

When I go there, I talk to the ordinary workers and to the engineers, and try to find out from them how much they are enthused, not merely by this magnificent sight, which merely as an engineering feat is good enough, but above all by what it means to the people of India. To some extent they understand it. I always try to ask the common worker there: "Oh! you are carrying earth from here to another place or digging here or turning some small machine, what is it all about?" I want them to understand and realize that they are working not merely for a daily wage or a monthly salary but that they are partners in a tremendous undertaking. They are partners in building up this great country, that out of their labour, a million acres will get water and that with the electric power generated they can start factories and cottage industries

and so on. They begin to have a slight glow in their eyes. They feel that they are a little bigger than what they thought they were. They ought to feel that a man who labours is big. You and I ought not to imagine that we, who sit in offices are big and the poor man, who labours, is somebody low in the scale of things.

The tragedy in India is that somehow or other we have begun to despise labour, look down upon labour and think that the man who sits in an office is superior to a man who works in the field or factory. That is not really so. A man may be big anywhere, wherever he may be. The fact that he is sitting in the chair or working in the field does not make him big or small. But so long as we do not respect manual labour and consider it as something of a degradation, no progress will take place in this country. You may talk about communism and capitalism, and this and that, but in every country, whether it is capitalist America, or whether it is communist Russia or some socialist country, labour has an honoured place regardless of the 'ism'. It is only the semi-feudal outlook that looks down upon labour. Therefore, whatever work we undertake, we should always try not only to honour labour but work in harmony with it.

It has long been my idea—call it a fad if you like—that we must have some kind of compulsory labour service in India. Every man and every woman should spend a year or two doing some kind of manual labour at any age between eighteen and twenty one depending on the health of the person. But every person should do a year's labour with, of course, some teaching imparted to him, with some training and discipline. I am absolutely sure that if we had that, we should be able to change the face of our country and so also improve the human life. Physically, he will be much fitter. Many of our people are very far from being fit, cannot even stand up straight. They will be fitter in body and in mind, and what is more, they will be psychologically sound because they will appreciate the dignity and the value of labour....

2. To Mahavir Tyagi¹

New Delhi

August 9, 1952

My dear Mahavir,

...The fact of the matter is that we have, under the British rule, grossly neglected

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

the development of scientific and technical research.² Indeed, the British did not want this to happen. One of the biggest things that we have done since independence is the development of our magnificent national laboratories all over India, which are already showing important results, and which are likely to be the very basis of India's progress in the future. If we had done nothing else during the last five years but the development of these laboratories, we would have had some reason to take credit for our achievements.

Scientific research is not an administrative matter nor can it be measured by the normal financial rules. There is a famous story of Faraday, the great scientist, and Gladstone. When Faraday told Gladstone of a very important electrical discovery, Gladstone asked him how much money it would bring to the exchequer. Faraday's answer was rather rude. That discovery of Faraday has powerfully influenced world development and is much more important than anything that Gladstone did in the whole of his life.

It is important therefore that we should have a botanical survey and botanical research in the proper way. We may start in a small way and not spread ourselves out too much. But not to have it is to have a big gap in our scientific development.

Janaki Ammal³ is a very eminent Indian scientist who has got an international reputation and whose services have been in continuous demand in at least three countries to my knowledge—the UK, France and the USA. It is our misfortune that some of our most eminent scientists are even now working in foreign countries and we cannot take advantage of them. To have her in India is itself desirable. She has done very good work in pure research as well as in applied research. There can be no doubt about her ability and her status in the world of science. For an Indian woman to attain that position is a matter of great credit for this country. As a matter of fact, for the last three or four years, I have had her in mind and wanted her to come to India. In such cases one cannot measure by normal secretarial standards. If there is a great scientist, we want to keep him here and hope to benefit by his work.

2. Mahavir Tyagi, the Minister of State for Finance, had written on 7 August 1952 that in answer to a request from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research for the creation of a post of Director for Botanical Survey and for appointing Janaki Ammal to the post, he had pointed out that, as an economy measure, the Botanical Survey (with a part-time Director) could be transferred to the Government of West Bengal. He also wrote that Janaki Ammal was appointed in 1950 as an Officer on Special Duty in the Ministry of Agriculture for three months but she left for UK after one and a half months without submitting any report.
3. E.K. Janaki Ammal; Director, Central Botanical Laboratory, Botanical Survey of India, Allahabad, 1969; Fellow, Indian National Science Academy.

When Janaki Ammal came here in 1950, she wrote to me about her work here and made a number of suggestions, etc. She could not tackle the food problem; she could only make suggestions about new varieties and types of food. She could not do much in the way of research during that brief period. I do not remember what I did with the letter she sent me.

The position, therefore, is that we want to develop the Botanical Survey in India and not leave it in its present dormant condition. We have a well-known Indian specialist available, who should anyhow be kept in India. Nobody can guarantee the results from scientific research in terms of money, but progress only comes by such scientific research.

Such matters cannot be judged by the Finance Ministry, unless, of course, it goes beyond the total allotments made. It is only the Ministry concerned, especially in a scientific matter, that can decide the need for that particular development. It is right that the Finance Ministry should keep a check on the expensive habits of Ministries in regard to staff, etc. But that check has, ultimately, to be in terms of the money available for the purpose and not the particular need of the special kind of work of which the Finance Ministry can be no judge at all.

The Finance Ministry is not a super Ministry. It is a checking Ministry and it has to take care that certain limits are not passed. So far as a particular scheme is concerned, it is for the Ministry dealing with it to work it out, and if the money has been found for that scheme, the Finance Ministry cannot object to the details of that scheme. That would be interference with the specialized Ministry's work. I am mentioning this, as I find that there has been such interference and delays in the past, for instance, with the Rehabilitation Ministry in the Ministry's schemes which have been carefully worked out by that Ministry, sometimes in cooperation with the State Governments, and then held up by Finance at the instance of some Deputy or Joint Secretary there. This does not appear to me a proper procedure at all and is not fair to the Ministers or other Ministries who give time and thought to their special subjects. As a matter of fact, most Ministries have a fairly senior Finance Ministry official attached to them to check schemes and estimates which have been passed or which are being considered. After going through all these processes the matter goes to the Finance Ministry and is held up there, sometimes for a considerable period. Every delay of course is costly. So far as rehabilitation is concerned, say in Bengal, each delay may account for thirty or forty thousand rupees a day.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To A.J. John¹

New Delhi
August 13, 1952

My dear John,²

I have already written to you a brief reply to your letter of the 9th August³ in regard to ilmenite, monazite,⁴ etc. I should however like to deal with some of the matters you have referred to more fully.

The first point to keep in mind is that the development of atomic energy is of far-reaching importance to India. Because this development is largely taking place in Travancore-Cochin State, the benefit of it will inevitably largely go to that State. I repeat this because this fact does not appear to be realized and if the viewpoint is accepted, we might well do injury to the development of our atomic energy schemes in Travancore-Cochin State, though perhaps one might make a little money immediately. The State has rich resources which have to be carefully husbanded in the interest of the State. In the past, this was not so and much of these resources were squandered. Even now, I understand that proper care is not taken and private people exploit these resources.

You should therefore consider this matter, which is vital, from this larger point of view. It so happens that that larger point of view is in the interest of both the State and of India as a whole.

It is our basic policy that vital materials, minerals, etc., should be completely controlled by the State and should not be exploited privately. That policy really will be applied gradually to all basic industries, minerals, etc. But in any event, it has to be applied, for obvious reasons, immediately to anything connected with atomic energy. Even if this involved financial loss to us, we would have to pursue it. As a matter of fact, it is likely to mean financial gain for us, as well as for your State.

The facts given in your letter do not appear to me to be quite correct. Evidently your informant has misled you. The loss in production of ilmenite was largely due to labour strikes. It might occasionally be due to lack of skill also in reducing the monazite content to 0.1 per cent.

1. JN Collection. Copies were sent to H.J. Bhabha and S.S. Bhatnagar.
2. Chief Minister of Travancore-Cochin.
3. After meeting the representatives of the National Lead Company and following a letter from the Hopkins and Williams Travancore Limited, A.J. John observed that the State had been adversely affected by the restriction imposed regarding monazite content in the ilmenite. John wanted to discuss this matter about the sale of ilmenite and monazite etc. with Nehru.
4. The testing of ilmenite for its monazite content was undertaken in Travancore. The Atomic Energy Commission had devised an instrument for controlling the monazite content.

The representatives of the National Lead Company, one of the biggest buyers of ilmenite, have met us several times. They were of opinion that the loss of production was largely due to labour strikes. When Dr. Bhabha, Dr. Bhatnagar and Dr. Wadia visited Travancore, they found that the monazite fraction in the Hopkins and Williams plant was coming out perfectly and below 0.1 per cent at the very first time. The National Lead Company representatives have written that with the installation of a low cost electrical separator, they will be able to speed up the separation even more and samples are being sent to the USA to test this. Dr. Bhabha and Dr. Bhatnagar are both going to America and will be present at these tests. Dr. Wadia is definite that processing to specification does not reduce production. It is not at all clear how the State lost anything at all. The firm made a large profit in spite of having to meet extra expenditure on labour. Anyhow this matter is being investigated fully.

As I wrote to you previously, it is quite essential that one of the factories should be under the control of the Government of India if we are to do our atomic energy work satisfactorily. We have no doubt that we can come to a satisfactory arrangement with Hopkins and Williams. The Travancore-Cochin Government has no personal experience of running these concerns and will have to depend entirely on private management. In any event, we are prepared to guarantee income on the present production basis to the State Government. If we cannot control the sale and processing of monazite, we shall be unable to compete in the world markets.

While we may actually pay a little less to your Government for monazite than the present world price, you must remember that you are more than compensated by the profit you will receive from the Rare Earths factory.⁵ If we increase the price of monazite, the profits from the Rare Earths factory will decrease proportionately, apart from the fact that the factory will not be able to withstand competition from foreign firms then. During the visit of Dr. Bhabha and Dr. Bhatnagar to the USA next month, they propose to come to a satisfactory agreement for the sale of rare earths. If this is arrived at, the monazite price might be reconsidered.

During 1951-52, the Indian Rare Earths Limited declared a profit of Rs. 2,29,500/- out of which Rs. 1,05,750 ¼ went to the Travancore-Cochin Government. This profit was declared when the factory was not in proper production and work was done on a private plant. During the current year the

5. The Government of India and the Travancore-Cochin State Government set up a joint stock company, the Indian Rare Earths Ltd., to process the beach sands in Kerala for extraction of rare earth minerals and compounds including the monazite sands. The company extracted metals of rare earths group, an important input in the fabrication of nuclear fuel for nuclear power stations.

gross annual profit is expected to be over Rs. 30 lakhs. Out of this the State Government's share is likely to be nearly Rs. 14 lakhs. If the Central Government acquires Hopkins and Williams, it will be possible to improve the processing of monazite greatly, making it more economical and increase greatly the income from the sale of ilmenite.

Some of the ilmenite is now being used for making titanium pigment in Travancore. It is far better to develop the export trade of products made out of ilmenite rather than allow the sale of ilmenite as such at a cheap price. Many new things can be made from ilmenite, e.g., titanium metal and titanium diamonds. It is to discuss these matters that our representatives are going to the USA where they will meet the National Lead Company. All this will bring additional profits to the Travancore-Cochin Government.

It appears to me that some private interests in Travancore-Cochin have accumulated ilmenite containing more than 0.1 per cent monazite. Indeed I know of some such cases. These people want to sell it at a good profit without removing the monazite. This is bad business anyhow and certainly not good for the country.

You will appreciate, therefore, I hope, that the proposal of the Central Government is sound from every point of view and profitable to the Travancore-Cochin Government.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
August 19, 1952

My dear T.T.,

I have long been interested in the solar cooker which has been evolved in our National Physical Laboratory. Indeed I talked about it during the general elections. I have since been pressing the NPL to produce it. They sent me one, and I used it regularly till the rains came. It was fairly successful.

But this was not enough. I wanted this to be put on the market. After repeated enquiries, I have been told that there have been a number of proposals by industrialists who are prepared to do so on payment of some royalty. I

1. File No. 17(131)/56-PMS. A copy of this letter was sent to S.S. Bhatnagar.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

made it clear that there could be no monopoly in this, anybody could manufacture it.

I am told that the delay has occurred because this was referred to what is called the Industrial Liaison Committee and this Committee has done nothing about it thus far. When I asked further about this Committee, I was told that it held four meetings since 1949. The last meeting was held in August 1951, that is, over a year ago. This does not lead to the conclusion that the Committee functions with speed or effectiveness. There are at present, I believe, matters pending before it.

However, I am interested specially in the solar cooker. This is a relatively simple thing and as we propose to give no monopoly, it can be given to any firm that asks for it on proper terms. I think that the National Physical Laboratory might be asked to deal with the offers that have come from various firms and give it to them to manufacture, keeping the price as low as possible. There can be no exploitation of it in this way, since there will be no monopoly.

If you agree, will you please inform the Ministry of N.R. & S.R.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. On 26 August, Krishnamachari replied that after discussion with the Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research, it was agreed to give permission, for the manufacture of solar cookers to any firm which paid the royalty of three rupees per cooker.

5. The Use of Atomic Energy¹

Question: What are your views on the atom bomb explosion² by the United Kingdom in Monto Bello off Australia?

Jawaharlal Nehru: These things are awful reminders of the fate in store for the world, if atomic warfare takes place. If atomic and hydrogen bombs are used in warfare it means complete giving up of civilization, and the result of

1. Remarks at a press conference, Madras, 4 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 5 October 1952. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference, see *post*, pp. 153, 342-343, 412, 431, 510-511, 553-554, 648-649 and 674.
2. On 3 October 1952, Britain tested an atom bomb on Monto Bello Islands off north-west Australia.

that war can only be an eclipse of civilization. Wars are fought presumably to attain certain objectives. But those objectives themselves are destroyed in the process of war. All this means that the world must pull itself together and get rid of the fear and oppression that drive nations to war.

Q: Has any progress been made in atomic research in India?

JN: We are interested in atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Atomic energy represents a tremendous power. If this power can be utilized, as we use hydro-electric power, it would be a tremendous boon to mankind, because it is likely to be available more and cheaper than the building up of huge hydro-electric works. Therefore, we are interested in the development of atomic energy from the social point of view.

We cannot, of course, compare ourselves with great countries in regard to the progress of atomic research, but we have some eminent scientists in this field and in our own way, we have made fairly satisfactory progress.

NATIONAL PROGRESS
VII. River Valley Projects

1. To Morarji Desai¹

New Delhi
August 3, 1952

My dear Morarji,

Your letter of the 31st July about the Koyna and the revised Katrapara projects.² I would gladly help you and indeed I shall try to do so. But the Planning Commission has now reached a stage of something approaching mental disintegration. How to provide for a number of most excellent and important schemes with the resources at their disposal? Arithmetic does not help and magic is not available.

The arguments you have advanced are good. The arguments that half a dozen other States advance are equally good and sometimes better. The demand for these projects from all over the country is tremendous. We are tied up completely with some schemes actually in progress. We cannot leave them, and they are costly. For the rest, we have to rely on our remaining resources, plus certain hopes for the future. We are even prepared to build on those hopes, but even there a limit has to be placed.

As we think of these problems and bemoan our helplessness, other vital questions arise. Are our limitations caused by our present social structure? Can we perhaps overcome those limitations and progress more rapidly if we change that social structure?

These are vital problems and we shall have to face them.

I might inform you that I had a deputation of Karnataka M.Ps two days ago. They pressed upon me some scheme in the Karnataka which apparently you have limited greatly. They complained bitterly of the priority given in Bombay State, to Gujarat and Maharashtra, to the loss of Karnataka.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(265)/52-PMS.

2. The Koyna hydro-electric project contemplated the construction of a dam on the Narmada river at an estimated cost of Rs 10 crores. The Katrapara project had been taken up by the CWINC on behalf of the Government of Bombay for the construction of a dam on the river Tapi for irrigating 50,000 acres of land. The construction cost of the first stage of the dam was Rs 12 crores.

2. To Fazl Ali¹

New Delhi
September 4, 1952

My dear Fazl Ali,²

Thank you for your letter of the 30th August about Hirakud.³ I have read this with interest.

I am not aware of any suggestion that the Hirakud project should be abandoned. There can be no possibility of abandoning a project which has gone so far. At the utmost there might be occasionally a slowing down in future, if circumstances compel us to do this. But even that is undesirable and the sooner we get through this, the better.

I am sharing your letter with our Minister for Irrigation and Power, Gulzarilal Nanda, as well as our Finance Minister.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(46)/56-PMS.
2. Governor of Orissa at this time.
3. Fazl Ali wrote that he had "heard whispers about the possibility of the Hirakud project being abandoned... will be a very great blunder not to complete it."

3. To Gulzarilal Nanda¹

New Delhi
October 13, 1952

My dear Gulzarilal,

Verma² of the Damodar Valley Corporation came to see me today, as he usually does when he comes to Delhi. In the course of the conversation he told me about the appointment of a committee to examine and report "on the various points at issue relating to the execution of the Damodar Valley Project."³ I had not known about this committee and missed seeing the announcement.

1. File No. 44(32)-DVC/53DW.IV, Ministry of Energy, 1952.
2. One of the founder-members of the Socialist Party, Phulan Prasad Verma had been a member in the Constituent Assembly. Subsequently, at the suggestion of the party, he resigned and joined the Damodar Valley Corporation as a member of its Board; later he became its Chairman.
3. A committee to enquire into the problems relating to the Damodar Valley Corporation was set up in October 1952.

I should have said that it was hardly the way of putting things, as "the various points at issue."

The terms of reference include the changes in the design and construction features of the dam. It is not quite clear to me how a group of laymen and administrators (except possibly one person) can give any expert opinion in regard to designs and construction features. As you know, I do not attach too great a value to administrative opinion about engineering problems. We seem to be carrying on the old tradition that the ICS knows everything. I think nobody who sits in an office can ever get that knowledge which a man in the field has and no layman can be asked to give an expert opinion on an expert job. Surely if you want this expert opinion, you should have some really first-rate engineers to do it.

There are at present some top-ranking American engineers functioning in India, one even in the Damodar Valley Corporation. Or some others can be asked to do it.

It is right that we should examine carefully, from the financial and legal and such like points of view, what has been done both to avoid waste, and expedite work in the most economical way. For that purpose, your committee will be a good one. But I rather doubt if persons who think along narrow lines can grasp the social significance of a great work. Among the terms of reference I would have specially said something about the social aspect of the scheme. All our Members of Parliament look upon these big schemes as if it was a small shopkeeper's job. Sometimes I feel that we are not big enough for our big schemes.

Anyhow, I should like your committee to have some conception of this social aspect and not merely think of other features. Indeed, I would like to meet this committee or some members of it to discuss this matter with them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

NATIONAL PROGRESS
VIII. Textiles and Handlooms

1. The Price of Textile Cloth¹

Question: There has been an increase in the price of coarse and medium cloth and steel. By an order of the Government of India, the prices of medium and coarse cloth have been raised, and an increase of Rs 51 per ton in the price of steel has been sanctioned. This has affected very much the economy of the poor people and their cost of living has risen.

Jawaharlal Nehru: As regards the rise in the price of cloth, first of all you will find that certain coarser qualities are really cheaper than they were before. Most of the other qualities remain the same. But there are one or two medium varieties which have slightly gone up. They have gone up simply because they are made of Egyptian cotton. And we have to pay the price of Egyptian cotton. Somebody has to bear that price. Or subsidize it if you like. But that is a heavy subsidy for Government to give. As a matter of fact some time back...

Q: But it is the finer cloth that is made of Egyptian cotton.

JN: I think if you will go into it, you will find that there are superfine, fine, medium and various other grades of cloth. I think the prices have gone up for fine and medium cloth.

Q: No, Sir, coarse and medium.

JN: You may be right. But anyhow there is a formula which was laid down—may be a year or two ago—governing the price of cloth according to the price of cotton. This is merely the application of that formula. Now we may change the formula. That is a different matter. As the price of cotton cloth is affected by it....

Q: The formula was, Sir, that the price shall not be changed within a quarter. And it has been changed within a quarter.

JN: I am sorry. These questions are meant for the Minister of Commerce and Industry. I can tell you that the matter was considered by Cabinet and the formula was laid down. It is only the automatic application of that formula now. In fact, we may change the formula. That is a different matter. But so long as that formula persists, i.e., the price of cloth being governed by the price of cotton used for it, it applies.

1. Remarks at a press conference, New Delhi, 24 July 1952. From the Press Information Bureau. For other parts of the press conference see *post*, pp. 238-253, 583-584, 617, 637-638, 660-661, 662-663 and 665-666.

2. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
September 10, 1952

My dear T.T.,

...I doubt that anything that we can do can make khadi an economic proposition. We may encourage it for other reasons. But I do not think that the handloom industry need be uneconomical or, at any rate, the margin can be small. An industry like that is worth preserving from many points of view, even apart from unemployment, although this is a major consideration.

You will remember that our friends in Sevagram would like to put an end to our textile mills so as to encourage khadi.² That is a view with which very few people will find themselves in agreement. But the other view that the handloom industry should be helped and encouraged finds a very large measure of support. I think that the Planning Commission has suggested that no more textile mills should be allowed to be put up in India, the object being to encourage the handloom industry. They did not say that the present textile industry should be liquidated. But they did wish to lay greater stress on the handlooms. Of course the handlooms should be encouraged to become powerlooms in the sense of electric power being used. If that is done, they could certainly become economical.

It is perfectly true that our handloom industry depended on a certain quantity of exports to Malaya, Indonesia, etc., and this has been reduced. We may recover a part of this market, but that is doubtful. I do not think we should rely on future exports, though we may try for them. More and more I think that we should not place our reliance on export markets. That may be considered a reactionary view. But I think that this dependence on countries abroad should be reduced. It is dangerous and we get entangled in many things. Indeed I am not terribly happy in even getting money from abroad, although I feel the necessity for it and accept it. I find in Europe that this dependence on foreign help has done some good, but in the long run, has had rather serious results, apart from producing a habit of dependence and an incapacity to do without that help. There are large numbers of people in Europe now, in England, France and Germany, who welcomed foreign help and now regret it.

However, that is a different problem and after all we have to balance good and evil in everything. I am all for production by the latest technical device. But this has to be considered always in relation to unemployment. For instance, in our river valley schemes, we have often adopted the latest earth-moving machinery. But we have also laid stress on human labour doing it

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Certified khadi worth Rs 75 lakhs and yam worth Rs 20 lakhs were lying unsold all over the country and nearly one and a half lakh of spinners affiliated with the All-India Spinners Association had been thrown out of work.

even though it was somewhat slower and more expensive because it gave employment.

I am a layman in economics. But gradually I become more and more heterodox and feel that the human aspect of the problem is more important than any theoretical approach which ignores it.

I cannot obviously make any great suggestion to you, because I have not gone deeply into this question. But for the last few years I have been trying to encourage the handloom industry and to impress people with the necessity for this. This has nothing to do with Rajaji's proposal.³ I have felt that some restriction put on the mills might be worthwhile. What that restriction should be is another matter. I do not think that you could rule out saris and dhotis from the mills completely, as apparently Rajaji says. But I imagine that some well thought out restriction which, without doing much injury to the mills or their production, would at the same time help the handlooms, might be worthwhile.

I mentioned the case of China to you. I do not know the facts. In China they worship the machine as in Russia and have no desire to come in its way. But their economics are such and so self-contained that they can encourage anything else they like.

You talk about consumer assistance. Of course the consumer's capacity to pay does not increase and has in many cases gone down. That is a basic problem to be faced.

It is true that in some places as in Madras handlooms, they prefer higher counts. In the UP, to some extent they do that, but generally they go in for lower counts.

All this deserves enquiry.

The Planning Commission target was for the end of the five years or four years as now is the case. If we have exceeded that already, the Planning Commission has to think afresh.⁴ I do not think that there should be any question of our creating unemployment in the textile mill industry. I certainly do not want that. It is some kind of a balance that I wish to create if that is possible. I wrote to you to consider this matter in these broader aspects and not with any intention of hasty action.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. C. Rajagopalachari had proposed the reservation of dhotis and saris for the handloom industry as an economically sound solution to the conflict between the "unprotected handloom industry and the long-protected mill industry".
4. Against a target of 4500 million yards of textile cloth postulated for 1957 by the Planning Commission, production in July 1952 before the commencement of the Five-Year Plan was at an annual rate of over 5000 million yards. Cotton textile production in July 1952 of 422 million yards was an all-time record. The imports of raw cotton on an extensive scale had made such production possible.

3. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
September 10, 1952

My dear T.T.,

I am worried about the handloom situation, and the public controversy between you and Rajaji is not edifying.² Apart from the background which we have cultivated in the country during the past thirty years and more of encouraging cottage industries etc., any approach to our economic problems must give priority to the removal of unemployment. It is not good enough for us to explain that this is due to the vagaries of trade or any other development outside our control. A modern State must be prepared to give employment or to arrange things so that people have work to do. We will not be able to do that quickly or suddenly, but it must be our major objective.

The handloom industry is our biggest cottage industry and quite a considerable proportion of the population is engaged in it. They are our responsibility. A time will come when we may be compelled to give a dole, if not work, to an able-bodied unemployed person. We may not be able to do it, but theoretically that is the position. I am all against a dole at any time. But how can we remain rather supine in the face of large-scale unemployment?

However much we may progress industrially, we do not touch even the fringe of this unemployment problem for some time to come, unless we deal with it on the basis of small and cottage industries.

This has, of course, been the Congress outlook for a long time. It is being put forward by the Socialists also. But, looking at it from any modern point of view of social welfare, we arrive at the conclusion that the problem of unemployment is the most vital. As a major part of that problem, we have the handloom industry which is languishing and quite large areas of our country

1. JN Collection.

2. The controversy between T.T. Krishnamachari and C. Rajagopalachari related to reserving the production of dhotis and saris to the handloom industry. Krishnamachari argued that the mills produced 1700 million yards against which the total produce of the handloom weavers was negligible. It was not easy to give protection to the handloom industry, which was sick. He said that since handloom weaving had become an uneconomic occupation, those dependent on it should be provided with other occupations. Rajagopalachari's argument was that dhotis and saris were peculiarly Indian and could give adequate employment to five million people engaged in the handloom industry. The total number of people engaged in the weaving section of all the mills in India had been estimated to be 60,000 only. In contrast, the number of people depending on the handloom industry in Madras alone was five million. He asserted that handloom weavers could meet the total demand which Krishnamachari denied. According to Rajagopalachari the question was not one of yardage alone but of families surviving on the handloom industry, and the State Government was obliged to take care of them.

are affected by it. We have to evolve some method which gives them work. I cannot straight off say how far Rajaji's proposal is feasible. But there seems much in it, and, in any event, we shall have some time or other to lay down some limitations on mill production. This production has already exceeded, I believe, the targets laid down by the Planning Commission. That in itself is a reason for a reconsideration of this whole question.

In countries, which are more or less situated as we are, say China, they insisted on standardized production by mills of a few varieties and encouraged handloom and cottage industries also. They have no cottage industries outlook, but circumstances compelled them to do so.

I hope therefore that you will give this full consideration because in the final analysis it is the way we deal with unemployment that counts.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Encouragement of Handlooms¹

Question: What are your views on the proposal of Mr. C. Rajagopalachari that the production of dhotis and saris should be reserved for the handloom industry?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not think there are any two opinions in India about the necessity for helping, and even encouraging, the handloom industry. It is our biggest cottage industry. At the present moment the real difficulty is not so much as it previously was in regard to production, but rather about the sales. The result is that large stocks have accumulated and unless markets are found for them, production is bound to suffer. It is this basic approach that has to be considered.

I cannot indicate the details of how this approach can be considered. But the Government of India is giving very serious consideration to the problems. I believe it is setting up special boards and committees² to deal with them. We also propose to set apart some money for the purpose.

1. Remarks at a press conference, Madras, 4 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 5 October 1952. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference, see pp. 138-139, 342-343, 412, 431, 510-511, 553-554, 648-649 and 674.
2. A Cotton Textile Enquiry Committee was constituted to study the inter-relationship between various types of production of cotton textiles namely, mills, powerlooms, handlooms and khadi, in the national economy. Pending the recommendations of the committee, the production of dhotis by mills was restricted to 60 per cent of actual production in 1951-52.

NATIONAL PROGRESS

IX. Rehabilitation

1. Resettlement of Women¹

I suppose we have to steer a middle line between too much legalism and too much rather vague humanitarianism. In a sense the State should be responsible for every citizen. We cannot do so. In regard to people coming from East Bengal, especially women, we have a special responsibility. Even so we cannot assume responsibilities which we cannot discharge.

I should have liked to know how many women are likely to be affected by these proposals.² I do not think that we should throw open the doors of our hostels by framing some rigid rule. But I do think that we should examine each case carefully and with sympathy and give help when we consider this necessary. Where necessity is established, no rigid rules should come in the way.

1. Note to Ajit Prasad Jain, the Minister for Rehabilitation, 24 July 1952. File No. 29(21)/1947-PMS.
2. Ajit Prasad Jain in his note of 23 July 1952 discussed criteria for admission to homes for unattached women. According to him only those persons who entered India from 15 October 1946 onwards, on account of civil disturbances, were entitled to relief and rehabilitation as displaced persons. He ruled out admission, as suggested by the Law Minister, to women sent to West Bengal by their families in East Bengal due to their poverty. However, as there was risk of abduction, molestation or conversion of such women, he was prepared to treat any woman unable to obtain the help of authorities in East Pakistan and certified by the Deputy High Commissioner at Dhaka as coming under this category, as eligible for admission to homes for unattached women.

2. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
July 26, 1952

My dear Deshmukh,

I had a talk with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad about the Nagrota Camp.² I told

1. JN Collection.
2. The Nagrota Camp was formally wound up in March 1952 and, as was the practice, each family was given a piece of land, a rehabilitation loan of Rs 500 and cash doles for nine months after dispersal to last them until they got settled. Dispersal from the Camp began in May 1950 and proceeded smoothly except for the last batch of 3,900 families comprising 15,600 persons who belonged to Muzaffarabad, Bhimber and Poonch. These families after availing themselves of cash doles and loans for rehabilitation were still expecting to be settled. A total of Rs 2,36,500 was spent on the running of Nagrota Camp and on rehabilitation of its refugees from 1948 to 1952.

him that the best course would be for us to give the money required for rehabilitation and loans—the loans part to be advanced by the Kashmir Government to the people concerned, the Kashmir Government to be responsible for the recovery of the loan and the return of it to us. In case of non-recovery of any part, the losses are to be shared by the Government of India and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State.

He agreed that this was quite reasonable, but he said he would like to discuss this matter in Srinager and then write to us. He hoped that this would be all right.

I told him that in view of the urgency of the need we were prepared to send some money immediately, about five lakhs. I hope this will be done so that some work might be started to rehabilitate these people as soon as possible. I am informing the States Ministry of this, as I suppose that they have to process it.

A little while ago, news came about King Farouk's abdication in Egypt and his proposed sudden departure, I do not suppose that many people will regret this. Certainly I do not. These sudden upheavals and changes bring up before us, rather dramatically, the state of the world. We have been discussing this evening the Five-Year Plan. As I heard of Farouk's exit, my mind went back to our discussion in the Planning Commission this afternoon. An element of unreality came in. Somehow five years seem a long way off and any plan based on ordered development for five years or more seemed to ignore the essential lack of order in the world. It may be that we are better circumstanced. I believe we are, but not so well as perhaps we imagine.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
July 30, 1952

My dear Ajit,

Your letter of the 30th July with its enclosures from Bengal.

I confess I do not understand the logic of this repeated argument put forward by our friends in Bengal. There is no doubt that people are coming out of East Bengal.² There is equally no doubt that more people are going

1. JN Collection.

2. In July 1952, 1,68,064 Hindus and 65,831 Muslims came to West Bengal from East Bengal and 1,78,957 Hindus and 84,508 Muslims went to East Bengal from West Bengal by rail.

back to East Bengal. The fact is that there are vast numbers of unemployed and people in distress on both sides, who travel across in the hope of getting something on the other side. There is also no doubt that Pakistan's hand is heavy upon many of these people.

But what do they mean by saying that we must exercise some pressure? What are we doing except trying to exercise pressure? If we have a truce pact, we accept it because it is to our advantage, not to do good to Pakistan. As a matter of fact, the trade pact is not materializing.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The Indo-Pakistan trade agreement which was signed on 26 February 1951 expired on 30 June 1952. It had since been extended upto 7 August 1952. Meanwhile, negotiations for a new agreement began in Delhi on 28 July 1952 between the Pakistan delegation led by Karamatullah, Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, and an Indian delegation, led by S. Boothalingam, Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The new Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement signed in Delhi on 5 August 1952, covered the period from 8 August 1952 to 30 June 1953.

4. Faridabad Development Board¹

4. ... As indicated in the various notes, I presume there have been irregularities,² but I think this noting rather forgets the whole background of Faridabad as well as the responsibility of the Faridabad Board. Many of the things objected to, for instance the loans advanced, were done with full knowledge by the Faridabad Board, because they were anxious to further the cooperative effort in Faridabad and at the same time to build up the place. The way the official organizations of cooperatives function in India is such that every kind of progress is impeded. I have found that the outlook of the average Registrar is seldom to encourage cooperatives, but to be more interested in his rules and regulations. Naturally the rules and regulations have to be followed and if they are not right, they should be changed. But the ultimate aim is to spread the cooperative movement and not to have beautiful rules and regulations

1. Note to the Minister for Rehabilitation, 19 September 1952. File No. 29(197)/50-PMS. Extracts.
2. There were adverse reports about the working of the cooperative organizations in Faridabad.

hanging in the office. The delays that occur in getting a cooperative to start because of the working of the Registrar's office in most States are heart-breaking and make one despair of the success of the cooperative movement.

5. Faridabad was a special case and was treated in a special way by Government and by the Faridabad Board.³ We were anxious to get things going. We have spent vast sums of money on it. Even in pure relief, we have spent a considerable sum. The other day it was pointed out that on transport alone we were spending a prodigious sum daily in order to carry people to work elsewhere and give relief. All this, though very wasteful, was strictly within the rules.

6. We came to the decision that it is better to risk and lose money in doing something substantial through cooperatives than to spend money unprofitably and without getting results. The question, therefore, of loans being realized has to be looked at from a somewhat different point of view. We took the risk. If we had not done so, we would have spent that money anyhow on relief.

7. I find that there is no adequate realization of all this background in this note. The cooperative organizations came to our help at a difficult moment and undoubtedly did good work. We should be grateful to them for this. That does not mean that we should overlook any serious blemish or error on their part. We should examine it. If it is an irregularity, we may ultimately overlook it having regard to all the circumstances. If it is something more serious, we can then give further consideration to it and take such steps as may be considered necessary.

8. The point is that, while we are, after getting the facts and putting right anything that has gone wrong, we should keep the whole background before us and not forget the peculiar circumstances in which this work was done and the benefits we derived from it. It is obvious that the persons we were dealing with were refugees without resources. They could only find resources in the work they were doing and in the earnings they made. They started from scratch.

9. I suggest, therefore:

(1) that Shrimati Kamaladevi⁴ should be consulted in this matter first; and

(2) that a proper enquiry should take place, but that it would be better for this to be done by someone other than the Registrar of the Cooperative Department. We can of course consult the Registrar later.

3. Faridabad was a township of 30,000 refugee population developed with a loan of Rs 2.5 crores given to Faridabad Development Board by the Government of India.

4. Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya was the founder President of the Indian Cooperative Union for rehabilitating refugees on a cooperative basis.

5. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
September 21, 1952

My dear Ajit,

I have received a letter from Hans Raj Wireless.² A copy of this has been sent to you also. In this he informs me that he had been given a loan of Rs 20,000/- from the Rehabilitation Finance Administration to start a factory, that he has been unable to repay the loan and in fact has gone through the money, and now he is being sent to prison because of his inability to repay. I do not know all the facts, but I do not understand why or how a person should be sent to prison because he has failed in his business. This is certainly no way of getting money from Hansraj, because he has not got it and he would not get it in prison. All that we would do is to spend money on him in prison. It was perhaps not very wise to give him the money for this purpose. He has undoubtedly an inventive faculty and deserves encouragement. But inventors are not necessarily business successes.

In any event, it seems very odd to me to send him to prison. If there is some other reason for this, I do not know.

In his letter he tells me that he is going to surrender himself to the Tehsildar on the morning of the 20th.

I should think that the best course would be not to send him to prison but yet to keep the loan pending. At the same time, to arrange for him to do work under someone and to earn something thereby. If his work is worthwhile, he would gradually pay back the loan or part of it. The work of course cannot be normal official work, but some work where he gets a chance of utilizing his inventive faculty.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(41)/48-PMS.

2. He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for conspiring to blow up the Viceroy's train in 1929. He was also an amateur scientist and had wanted a workshop for manufacturing various articles of his inventions.

6. Resettlement of UP Muslims from Pakistan¹

I should like you to find out what the position is in regard to the Muslims who migrated from the UP early in 1950 to Pakistan and who, in terms of the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of 1950, were entitled to return to the UP. Various conditions were laid down for their screening, etc. before return. The process has been slow, but it has gone on. Is it still going on? And how many have returned altogether? When did the last batch come back and what is proposed to be done in future?

An enquiry should be made first from External Affairs. Then from the UP Government.

This enquiry is necessary, among other reasons, because we have received some information that some undesirable people are sent across to India through these batches deliberately to create trouble here and possibly even for sabotage.²

1. Note to B.N. Kaul, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 22 September 1952. File No. 29(223)/50-PMS.
2. Nehru noted on 30 September 1952 that it was not necessary to take any special step in this matter vis-a-vis the Pakistan Government but a stricter scrutiny of those who were coming back should be made.

7. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
September 23, 1952

My dear Ajit,

I enclose a letter from Subhadra Joshi.² The point she has made requires consideration.³

1. File No. 29(224)/50-PMS.
2. General Secretary of the Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee at this time.
3. Joshi had written that the announcement made by the Ministry of Rehabilitation to auction the urban evacuee property had created panic and confusion among the Muslims of Delhi. Most of the Muslims in Delhi were tenants though some owned houses in the areas where they did not reside. Their houses were declared evacuee property or forcibly taken possession of by the refugees for which no rent was paid. She feared that this business of auction would add to the already unsatisfactory communal situation and might lead to outbreak of trouble.

Apart from this, the proposal to auction large numbers of house property anywhere can only mean a lowering prices. When the market is glutted with something, prices go down and you will not be able to get any reasonable price.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. To Jairamdas Doulatram¹

New Delhi
October 12, 1952

My dear Jairamdas,

... Owing to the influx of refugees from East Pakistan into West Bengal and the new situation² that has arisen there, I am thinking of going to Assam via Calcutta and spending a brief period in Calcutta on the way. This will not interfere with my Assam programme at all. I propose to go to Calcutta on the 18th October morning and spend the rest of the day there. On the 19th morning I shall proceed from Calcutta to Gauhati. This really will enable me to reach Gauhati earlier than was planned. Indeed I ought to reach Shillong in time for lunch. I should prefer that as that would give me a little longer time in Shillong.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 8/236/52-PMS. Extracts.
2. The introduction of passport system between India and Pakistan on 15 October 1952 led to an increased influx of Hindus to West Bengal in the first half of October. Between 1 to 15 October 1,57,486 Hindus and 43,564 Muslims came from East Bengal to West Bengal by rail route only. In addition to this large number of refugees came by road and river.

9. Telegram to Chief Ministers of Bihar and Orissa¹

You will no doubt have learnt of somewhat critical situation that has arisen on account of the influx of large numbers of refugees from East Bengal to West

1. New Delhi, 13 October 1952. JN Collection.

Bengal. Apparently, one of the reasons for this is the proposed introduction of present facilities before that system is introduced. Pakistan Government at the last moment asked us to postpone introduction of this passport system for a month. We are not agreeable to this as this merely prolongs period of uncertainty. We would agree to abandonment of passport system. Otherwise it is better to stick to date proposed which is 15th October. We intend acting accordingly.²

Even application of passport system will not put an end to influx of refugees though it will be regulated then and perhaps urge to come over will be less.

In any event, we have to deal with the present critical situation in Calcutta and it is urgently necessary that we should disperse considerable number of refugees from Calcutta. We want to send fifteen thousand refugees as soon as possible to Bihar and fifteen thousand to Orissa. The Central Government will assume responsibility for these.

I know of the difficulties and criticism which were advanced previously. Nevertheless, I think that we must carry out these transfers to avoid crisis and much human suffering. I hope that your Government will agree and help us in dealing with this grave problem.

2. Through its High Commissioner in Karachi, the Government of India had, in response to Pakistan Government's request for the postponement of the introduction of the passport system between India and Pakistan, expressed its intention of giving effect to the passport system from 15 October 1952, as already agreed to, unless postponement did not exceed a period of one week or ten days. However, if Pakistan wished to cancel the passport system altogether, the Government of India was prepared to look into it. It was reported that Pakistan wished to postpone the date as a device to reduce the population of East Pakistan because of deteriorating economic conditions.

10. To Ajit Prasad Jain¹

New Delhi
October 15, 1952

My dear Ajit Prasad,

... About a year or two ago, there was so much delay by the Punjab Cooperative Department in dealing with Faridabad that I had to write to the Governor about it. The fault was of the Assistant Registrar chiefly. The Governor then issued explicit orders and the Registrar went to Faridabad himself and expedited

1. File No. 29(179)/50-PMS. Extracts.

procedure. It would be odd indeed for the Assistant Registrar to come into the picture now.

It seems to me that the Administrator, for some reason unknown to me, wants to push out the Indian Cooperative Union. I do not like this type of approach. Of course, let us have an enquiry by all means if anything wrong has happened. But I see no reason why I should encourage an approach which is not dispassionate.

The Punjab Cooperative Act is a very old and out-of-date one. It compares very badly with other acts, such as that of Bombay. If we follow that act strictly, then it is quite impossible for displaced persons to be organized or indeed for the cooperative movement to make much progress.

I have been given some papers on behalf of the Indian Cooperative Union. These answer some complaints. There is also the report of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies of the Punjab. I am enclosing these papers.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. Discussions at Calcutta¹

I arrived here at 1 p.m. today. The Rehabilitation Minister, Shri Ajit Prasad Jain, had been in Calcutta for some time previously² and had visited one of the border stations from which refugees were coming, some of their camps, and had discussed the matter with the Ministers here. He had also taken a number of steps to deal with the situation.

2. I met Shri P.C. Sen,³ Dr R. Ahmed,⁴ and Shrimati Renuka Ray⁵ and discussed the situation with them. Later, the other Ministers and Deputy Ministers also joined. We considered the possibility of transferring a

1. Note on Nehru's discussions with various people on resettlement of refugees, Calcutta, 18 October 1952. JN Collection.
2. A.P. Jain, the Union Rehabilitation Minister, was on a eight-day visit from 16 October to different refugee centres in West Bengal.
3. P.C. Sen was Minister for Food, Relief and Supply in the West Bengal Government.
4. Rafiuddin Ahmed was Minister of Agriculture, Cooperative Credit in the Government of West Bengal.
5. Renuka Ray was the Minister for Relief and Rehabilitation of Refugees in the West Bengal Government.

considerable number of refugees from East Pakistan to other States. Among those mentioned were Orissa, Bihar, Vindhya Pradesh and Mysore. Shri A.P. Jain said that he hoped that this could be done fairly soon. In particular he said that a considerable number could be accommodated in Vindhya Pradesh and the Government there was willing to help in this.

3. I saw a number of officials. They discussed the general situation with me, more especially the law and order situation. Thus far, they told me, the situation was well under control, but there were inherent dangers in it and one could not be sure of the future. They referred to some of the Calcutta newspapers which by their news, headlines and articles were increasing the excitement of the people.

4. I met the Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioners.

5. Later, I went to the office of the West Bengal Pradesh Congress Committee and addressed about a hundred persons there for about an hour.

6. On return, I gave an interview to Dr Abdul Hamid Chaudhury, Deputy High Commissioner for Pakistan in India. He appeared to be rather put out at recent developments and earnestly appealed to me to bring about a peaceful atmosphere. It was evident that he did not like the passport system at all. He particularly pointed out that this had hit many persons in Pakistan who, though having opted for Pakistan and serving there, still considered themselves Indian nationals. Often they had property here and their families also lived here. They had been put in a difficult position and had to choose between their nationality and their service. Could we not allow them to retain their Indian nationality and yet continue their service in Pakistan? I told him that an official who had opted for Pakistan then would normally be presumed to have become a Pakistani national. Probably this was not the final proof and could be rebutted. (I do not know what the exact position is. I think this should be looked into).

7. The Deputy High Commissioner also said that there were many students in Pakistan who came to Calcutta for their studies. There was no mention of them in our agreement with Pakistan. I told him that there was no difficulty in their coming here for their studies as the passport rules gave adequate facilities for this and in fact we had kept students in mind. He said that this might be so. How were the officers issuing passports to know this and might they not consider students as persons who should be favoured in this respect? He gave some instance of some Indian national who was some kind of a *pir* of thousands of Muslims in Pakistan and who normally went there for a few months to see his disciples. Would he have any difficulty in doing so?

8. Later, I met three prominent Muslim citizens of Calcutta who were brought to me by Dr Ahmed, the Minister. They were rather apprehensive about future developments and hinted that Muslims were afraid of what might happen to them. Thus far, fortunately nothing had happened. They complained particularly of the tone and contents of the newspapers here.

9. I met Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee and other leading members of various opposition parties. All these parties had joined together on this subject. In fact, I was told that this was the first time they had all functioned together, the only parties not represented being the Communist Party and, of course, the Congress. Dr Suresh Banerji,⁶ and Dr Meghnad Saha⁷ and two or three others were members of this deputation. They were all in a somewhat excited frame of mind and expected something to be done quickly. They gave me a resolution they had passed at a public meeting in which *inter alia* economic sanctions against Pakistan were demanded.⁸ In particular they wanted to stop the purchase of jute from Pakistan. They told me that recently five lakh bales were purchased by Calcutta Marwaris and there were rumours that another eight lakhs were going to be purchased soon. I pointed out that our trade with Pakistan was very limited and it would not make much difference to Pakistan if we stopped it altogether. They could easily deal with other countries, though, perhaps, they might have to pay a little more. Thus, if we took any such step, this would give the Pakistani leaders a big excuse to accuse India of all the ills they were suffering from. This would become a cementing factor for various groups in Pakistan. Apart from this, jute will still be smuggled into India, as it was done.

10. They complained of breaches by Pakistan of Indo-Pak Agreement and said that this should not be tolerated any longer. In particular, they referred to the arrest in February 1952, in Pakistan of Manoranjan Dhar, MLA, a member of the Minority Committee in East Bengal. He was still in jail. He was the only Hindu member of the Minority Committee and the Committee could not function as he was in jail.⁹ I told them that this was a valid point and we would draw the Pakistan Government's attention to this. (Shri A.P. Jain has written to Shri C.C. Biswas about Manoranjan Dhar and requested him to take up the matter with the Pakistan Government). I think that External Affairs should also take it up directly with the Pakistan Government. The arrest and detention of a member of the Minority Committee is an important matter.

6. Suresh Chandra Banerji (1887-1961); courted arrest for participation in the agitation against division of Bengal, 1905-06, in non-cooperation movement and Quit India movement; President, All India Trade Union Congress, 1936; Minister, West Bengal Government, 1947-48; left Congress to organize Krishak Mazdoor Praja Party; member, West Bengal Assembly, 1957-1961.
7. Distinguished scientist and a member of the House of the People.
8. Representatives of ten political parties, excluding the Communist Party of India, adopted a resolution at a public meeting in Calcutta on 16 October 1952, which demanded the cutting off of trade relations with Pakistan and imposition of economic sanctions.
9. In fact, Manoranjan Dhar was arrested under Public Safety Act during the State language movement and was released on 30 May 1953.

11. Shri Jyoti Basu,⁷ MLA, Communist, also saw me. He had not joined the other opposition groups because the Communists did not want to have economic sanctions against Pakistan. In fact, he said that they would like to develop trade relations with Pakistan. He complained at the Communists and others being driven out of Sealdah Station by the West Bengal Government. I learnt from Shrimati Renuka Ray that this had been done as otherwise a large number of known and unknown groups planted themselves at Sealdah Station with their flags etc., and were a bit of a nuisance. However, she had invited different groups to work under the Deputy Minister for Rehabilitation here.

12. I met a number of workers of various social service organizations engaged in relief. They said that their resources were exhausted because of the famine relief they had given and like reasons. They would like to continue their work of giving relief to the refugees and even to expand it and for this purpose they would like Government to give them money. (I think this is worthy of consideration). Some of these organizations like the Ramakrishna Mission and probably the Bharat Sevasram Sangha have been doing good work and deserve support. It may, of course, be difficult to distinguish and differentiate between these organizations. But the West Bengal Government should be in a position to do so. They are good workers deserving of every encouragement. I am not naming two specially for this purpose. There are, no doubt, other very good organizations also.

13. I met the editors of newspapers and had a long talk with them pointing out to them gently that their presentation of news etc., had a disturbing effect and appealed to them to help in lessening excitement and generally soothing the minds of the people.¹¹ This was not a question of weakness, because one could be firm and yet friendly. A touch of healing was necessary now and indeed always and I hoped that they would give this touch.

14. Among the places which ought to take refugees, selected for the purpose, are mentioned above.¹² Shri A.P. Jain mentioned this and we might take early steps in this matter.

15. Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee mentioned to me that large numbers of Hindu refugees, who had left their homes and were coming to India, had been stopped and held up somewhere in Pakistan by the Government there. He wanted steps to be taken to enable them to come to India.

16. I pointed out to him that it was easy for them to come here as we had relaxed various regulations for this purpose. We could not directly go to Pakistan

10. (b. 1914); prominent leader of the Communist Party of India, 1940-63 and later of the CPI(M); elected to Bengal Legislative Council, 1946; Deputy Chief Minister, West Bengal Government, March-November 1967 and February 1969-March 1970, Chief Minister since 1977.

11. See *post*, pp. 610-616.

12. Orissa, Bihar, Vindhya Pradesh and Mysore.

to help them. But I was agreeable to our Deputy High Commissioner¹³ mentioning this matter to the Pakistan Government.

17. I pointed out to him that there was some contradiction in their stating, as they had done, that Pakistan wanted to push out the Hindus and the other statement that Pakistan was stopping them from coming here. In fact, it was clear to me from various accounts that I had had that Pakistan Government at present did not like this exodus and were trying to stop it. The Pakistan Prime Minister's speech or broadcast from Dacca¹⁴ also indicated this.

18. All delegations laid stress on the Centre helping liberally so far as finance was concerned.¹⁵

13. B.K. Acharya.

14. Khwaja Nazimuddin said in Dhaka in a press conference on 15 October 1952: "In the Objectives Resolution and in our Constitution rights of citizenship have been secured to all Pakistanis alike." Assuring the minorities, he said, in Pakistan no distinction would be made between them and the majority community. He appealed to the Muslim League members and the press to create a feeling of confidence among the minorities. He said that he had decided to form a consultative committee composed of the minority leaders to advise the Government of Pakistan in removing any misconception arising out of the introduction of passport system.

15. Nehru also asked A.P. Jain, the Rehabilitation Section of the Ministry of External Affairs, and West Bengal Government to take steps as indicated in these discussions and within their respective spheres.

NATIONAL PROGRESS

X. Growth of Population

1. To Gulzarilal Nanda¹

New Delhi
September 10, 1952

My dear Gulzarilal,

Your letter of September 9th about family planning.

I think it is absurd for us to limit consideration of this question on the lines suggested by Amrit Kaur. I disagree with her approach entirely. At the same time I do not wish to commit Government without the fullest consideration. But I am not prepared to limit Government's activity or investigations on the grounds mentioned by Amrit Kaur, and I am not prepared for Government to be committed in any way to the policy or to the views enunciated by Amrit Kaur.

Having said this, I should like also to say that the approach often made to the effect that our economic problems cannot be solved without radical population reduction appears to me to be wrong and a way of escape. Recently Professor A.V. Hill², in presiding over the British Association, laid down this principle as a dilemma of science. This reminds me of the views of the 19th century organizations of England that there could be no progress or development without starving a majority of the people and making them work 16 or 18 hours a day. This is a view which fits in with those who do not wish to change the present set-up because then they cast the blame for every economic ill on the growth of population. I think that this view should be combated. So far as India is concerned, I am sure that we can support not only our present, but even a bigger population, provided we go ahead in production. At the same time, I do not want the population to grow and would like this growth to be restricted.

I shall try to come to your meeting when you discuss this matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Archibald Vivian Hill (1886-1977); Professor of Physiology, Manchester University, 1920-23; won Nobel prize, Physiology and Medicine, 1922; Member, War Cabinet Scientific Advisory Committee, 1940-46; Scientific Adviser, Government of India, 1943-44; Member, Science Committee, British Council, 1946-56; President, British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1952; Publications: *Living Machinery*, (1927), *The Ethical Dilemma of Science*, (1960), *Trails and Trials in Physiology*, (1965), *First and Last Experiments in Muscle Mechanics*, (1970).

2. Need of Planned Parenthood¹

I am glad to learn that the Third International Conference on Planned Parenthood is going to meet in Bombay in the near future.² Whatever individual views may be on this question, it seems to me clear that we should give it the fullest consideration from all points of view. The approach should be scientific and the aim social good. Any scientific approach must not be inhibited by pre-conditions or convictions already held. We must approach the question with a completely open mind and examine every aspect of it. Any question that involves the intimate lives of human beings, produces psychological and other reactions which must necessarily be kept in view.

The Government of India have an open mind on this subject and do not wish any discussion or consideration of it to be limited in any way. They are not committed to any special approach, although they may encourage experiments of a particular type.

In a country like India, with a very large population, this question has an even greater significance than elsewhere. It deserves, therefore, the fullest study of the subject and the application of such methods as are found suitable from all points of view. There is one aspect of this, however, which should not mislead us. Some people imagine that almost all the ills of India are due to overpopulation and, therefore, the basic remedy for those ills is to try to limit the growth of this population. This approach, to some extent, diverts attention from important social problems to the population aspect of them. I think this is wrong. While I am convinced that it would be desirable to limit the growth of India's population by proper methods, where feasible, I do not think that social and economic problems are solved merely by this approach. The other day, the President of the British Association of Science, a very eminent scientist, posed a dilemma of science. By the advance of scientific methods in dealing with disease etc., death rate was falling and, therefore, population tended to increase. This, according to him, created fresh problems and resulted in lower standards and even in gross poverty, especially in the less developed countries. Was science, therefore, to give up dealing with the eradication of disease etc.?

Of course science has another and harsher aspect also. It produces and deals with weapons of mass destruction. The dilemma posed by the British scientist is there, but only so if we have no other social aspect or solution of

1. Message to the Third International Conference on Planned Parenthood held in Bombay, New Delhi, 14 October 1952. JN Collection.
2. The conference was held between 26 and 29 November 1952.

the problem. As a matter of fact, there can be, and are, social approaches. In regard to food and other necessities of life, there is no limit to production, if properly organized.

India is certainly heavily populated and yet taking India as a whole, it is not as densely populated as many other countries with higher standards of living. The question is of higher production per capita and proper distribution.

There is another rather curious aspect of this problem. It is held by some scientists that poverty, hunger and under-nourishment themselves lead to greater fertility and, therefore to a higher rate of increase of population, even allowing for a higher death rate. This argument is based on biological reasoning. If this is so, then one of the methods of restricting population growth is obviously to raise standards and try to prevent hunger and under-nourishment.

I have indicated some approaches to this problem which is obviously very intricate. Many people are inclined to look at it in a very simple way.

I wish all success to the Conference.

NATIONAL PROGRESS

XI. The Press

1. To Kasturi Srinivasan¹

New Delhi
August 19, 1952

Dear Mr Srinivasan,²

Since you were good enough to ask me to look through the papers about the Reuters-PTI partnership,³ which were sent to me, I have done so. These papers are not complete. I have, therefore, to rely on such information as they give as well as such other information as I have gathered from you and from others. Last February or thereabouts I went rather more fully into this question of a partnership between PTI and Reuters.

2. I am reluctant, as Prime Minister, to interfere in partnership arrangements between PTI and Reuters. That is the primary responsibility of the Members of the PTI. But, naturally, I am greatly interested in this matter, because of its wider implications. I should like national news agencies to develop in India as rapidly as possible and I would like to judge every proposal from that point of view. I am also, I need hardly say, greatly interested in the effect and reactions of news services on foreign policies. Foreign policy, or rather India's foreign policy, is my special business and, as is well known, news plays a very important part in building up public opinion for or against a certain policy.

3. Last February, when I heard a good deal about the argument between PTI and Reuters, I was struck forcibly by the fact that the basic difference between the two really reflected the difference in our foreign policies. To put it differently, our independent foreign policy did not quite fit in with Reuters' approach and hence they did not like the PTI to have much free play in this matter.⁴ Such proposals as Reuters made then were obviously meant to restrict

1. File No. 43(22)/48-PMS.

2. Kasturi Srinivasan was Chairman of the Press Trust of India.

3. Sponsored by seven newspapers of India as a Joint Stock Company in August 1947, the PTI entered into a partnership agreement with the Reuters on 21 September 1948 and took over the operations of collection and distribution of news for the zone covering from Cairo to Singapore, which was being done by Associated Press of India, a subsidiary of the Reuters. The agreement came into operation on 1 February 1949 and was due to expire in January 1953.

4. For example, in despatches on the Korean hostilities, any reference by a Reuters' correspondent to the Chinese Communist forces would describe them as aggressors. The Indian desk at the Reuters headquarters would correct such pejorative expressions. Again, a report from the British correspondent at Karachi that a statue of Mahatma Gandhi had fallen down and broken in a gale, covered up an act of vandalism which had to be corrected by the Indian desk by contacting their counterpart in Karachi. The freedom enjoyed by the Indian desk did not find favour with Reuters.

PTI from giving much publicity⁵ to our approach to international questions, more especially in the Asian countries. Reuters also wanted to increase their control in various ways. Quite rightly, I thought then, that PTI refused to submit to this effort of Reuters to restrict and control PTI's activities. Probably when the original partnership agreement was arrived at, our foreign policy had not developed as it subsequently did. Therefore, at that time, Reuters' attention was not drawn to this aspect of the question much. But as our country started playing a more important role in international affairs, and that role was often not in line with the British role, doubts arose in Reuters' mind about the desirability of continuing that partnership agreement as it was. In fact, difficulties arose even in implementing that agreement and objection was taken in regard to various matters, on behalf of the PTI.

4. Our foreign policy, as any such policy, covers the world. But, in particular, it concerns itself with Asian questions, that is, with affairs in the Middle East, South East Asia and the Far East. All these three regions represent a marked divergence of our policies from those of some western countries. In the Middle East there has been in fact a complete collapse of the British policy and we think they have acted wrongly. In South East Asia, there are the highly controversial issues of Malaya and Indo-China, and Indonesia, experience continually a tug-of-war in different directions. As far as I know, this area from Cairo to Singapore and beyond was supposed to be, under the agreement, within India's sphere or rather PTI's sphere. Yet it was this very area which produced these conflicting policies. Hence Reuters' apprehensions, which resulted in their trying to neutralize or lessen our activities in this area. Even in India, a dispute arose about their sending their own correspondent. Pakistan fell in this area. But, owing to the peculiar circumstances there, PTI could hardly object to a direct Reuters correspondent. I seem to remember that one of these Reuters correspondents in Pakistan carried on a peculiarly objectionable and tendentious propaganda against India. I think that PTI took objection to this. Nevertheless it continued for many months. Apart from any Reuters' representative carrying on such tendentious propaganda against India anywhere, this was particularly objectionable in a zone which was supposed to be within the PTI's domain.

5. The despatches from the United Nations by the British news agency would give full length report of the British delegate's speech and just a few words to say that "Iraqi, Pakistani, Egyptian and Indian delegates also supported the motion." India's point of view about most international affairs, particularly where it was a question of East European versus western nations, would be left out. The Indian desk had to stress that in India, which was non-aligned and friendly to both the blocs, the newspapers would like to have a bit of the other side of the "curtain" too. The Reuters editorial staff, obsessed by anti-communism, would strongly disapprove.

5. Because of this background, I approach this question with considerable suspicion and apprehension. It is all very well to say that Reuters are concerned with "the dissemination of truthful, unbiased news, that they are free from any government or tendentious control" etc. I am not aware of any news agency in the world which acts upto that declaration. Even if there is no deliberate distortion, the background and policies of a particular country are reflected in the news service emanating from it. Undoubtedly, Reuters have represented in the past, and largely represent today, the British background. They have every right to do so. I do not object to that. But I do not see why our background and policy should be subordinated to the British background and policy.

6. In the paper that has been sent to me, it is stated that the partnership will continue for a further term of three years. Paragraph 3 proceeds to restate some principles on which the partnership is based. Not having the original papers of the partnership, I do not quite know what this restatement of principles means. Why restate them? Either they were stated before or something is being added on to them or interpreted differently. I get the impression that this attempt as a restatement of principles is meant to lessen the significance of the original agreement in regard to some matters and to leave loopholes for different interpretations.

7. Then there is the excellent principle that "the whole is greater than the part and any rights and privileges of one part should not directly or indirectly affect the whole."⁶ As a philosophical proposition, this cannot be objected to. But what it means in this connection is not clear to me, unless it means, as I suppose it must, that the interests of Reuters as a whole must prevail over the interests of any one partner. As stated, it may sound well. But it can certainly mean that PTI would have to function as a very junior and ineffective partner in this business.

8. Then again, it is stated that "it is also agreed that the full Board of Reuters is responsible for the Reuter world service." Again, this might be a truism. But this emphasizes the very subordinate role of the PTI. The result of all these "principles" might well be that while, apparently, PTI are given an honourable place, in effect this is not so and their men will often be merely figureheads. There is bound to be an increasing conflict in policies between India and many other countries. Whenever such a conflict arises, Reuters and PTI will be faced with difficulties. They will tend to pull in different ways or

6. It read: "The whole is greater than the part and any rights or privileges of one part should not directly or indirectly affect the whole. ...Nothing in this agreement can impair the right of the Reuter organisation or of any of the parties to this agreement to send correspondents as, when and how they please, to any part of the world, including the territories of the parties to this agreement. It is also agreed that the full Board of Reuters is responsible for the Reuter World Service."

one will have to surrender to the other. In the context of the agreement and the "principles", the surrender is likely to be on the part of the PTI. Indeed, the past record indicates this, insofar as the PTI zone in Asia is concerned.⁷

9. You pointed out to me the advantage of news from India being controlled by PTI. There is some advantage in that undoubtedly, though not so great as it would appear. India is news in the world today and is likely to be even more so in the future. In the main, the news that goes out from India is bound to be controlled by PTI. I am, therefore, a little more interested in the news that goes to and comes out of places like Cairo, Baghdad, Teheran, Rangoon, Singapore and Djakarta.

10. Paragraph 4 of the statement of "principles" lays down that in the interpretation and implementation of the agreement in the light of the statement of principles, any differences that might arise, shall be decided by the combined Board. That obviously means that Reuters' British partners, who have the majority, will be able to override the views of the Indian Members. Thus the "principles" will be interpreted as the British Members of Reuters think fit.

11. As I stated at the beginning of this letter, I am interested in two matters: the rapid development of a national news agency and the proper interpretation of our foreign policy in India and as far as possible elsewhere. The question, therefore, is as to whether the agreement with Reuters will further these two ends or perhaps hinder them. There is something to be said for certain advantages to be gained from association in the earlier stages. But how far those advantages outweigh the possible disadvantage, is a matter to be considered carefully. I hope I am not ungenerous. But it is natural to think that Reuters are not anxious to see that a national and independent news agency develops in India and would like PTI to be kept in a subordinate position to themselves.

12. In the rapidly changing world today, with crisis following crisis, three years is a long time and it might well be disadvantageous to get tied up for this fairly lengthy period, whatever might happen. Even if an association is considered desirable, there should be room to put an end to it, if difficulties or differences arise at any moment.

13. I have given you such thoughts as come to me after giving some consideration to this matter with the data before me. Ultimately, of course,

7. Reuters had concluded an agreement with the Eastern News Trust of Pakistan in 1950 for the operation of a separate beam by Reuters which would also cover several countries supposed to be part of the Indian zone under the agreement of 1949 with PTI. A British correspondent was posted in New Delhi on a regular basis whereas the partnership agreement visualized that "Reuters may send correspondents from the headquarters to India on special occasions in consultation and in cooperation with the PTI."

every agreement and partnership depends upon the strength of the people behind it and the firmness they show in sticking to their principles and position.⁸

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. In his reply of 1 September 1952, Kasturi Srinivasan clarified that it was "not a partnership of Reuters with PTI but of the PTI in Reuters; whereas we own a seventh of the shares of the Reuters, Reuters have no shareholding in the PTI. Reuters have no voice in the working of PTIWe have a definite voice in the direction and control of Reuters and that we have a place in international coverage of news which should prove of value when we decide to set up our own. It is conceded that we are dependent anyhow on a foreign agency for basic international news. It will be realised that an arrangement which gives us a voice in the direction and control of that agency provides us just those safeguards that we need." The restatement of principles "was deemed necessary to disarm criticism in unfriendly quarters who had been criticising Reuters for 'abdicating' from the zone." Though PTI would be a minority in the Reuters Board, "it was a recognized convention with the Reuters Board that matters of policy were not decided by voting strength, but resolved on the plane of good faith and mutual understanding."

2. To B.V. Keskar¹

New Delhi
August 19, 1952

My dear Balkrishna,²

Your letter³ of August 19th about PTI and Reuters.

I have not seen the detailed memorandum to which you refer. I have only

1. File No. 43(22)/48-PMS.
2. B.V. Keskar was the Minister for Information and Broadcasting at this time.
3. Keskar had written about his talks with Devadas Gandhi, Editor, *The Hindustan Times*, and Kasturi and C.R. Srinivasan about negotiations between Reuters and PTI for renewal of the partnership agreement. The agreement did not appear to be very happy. Devadas felt that passing Indian news for the world pool through PTI and utilization of Singapore-Cairo Zone at any future date were the only possible advantages. But presence of a Reuters correspondent in Delhi and PTI and Reuters correspondents in Singapore-Cairo Zone took away much of its utility. Kasturi and C.R. Srinivasan who controlled the PTI Board, were for accepting the terms, but the other Board members were for a definite break with the agreement. Devadas thought that PTI would not suffer much from such a break.

seen some papers. Last night I met the two Srinivasans⁴ and had a brief talk with them. I did not say much except to express some apprehensions. They asked me to let them have my views on some papers that they had sent me. I have now written to Kasturi Srinivasan and I enclose a copy of my letter. I would not like you to refer to this letter to any of them.

I have expressed myself frankly in my letter without finally saying what they should do or they should not do. I think that, as a Government, we should not go beyond this.

I fear that, whatever the decision taken might be, there is likely to be a serious split in the PTI. This would be unfortunate. I do not definitely want Government to appear as if they had caused the split or made themselves responsible for it and its consequences. The burden of a decision must rest with the PTI people and Government should keep themselves in the background as far as possible.

The difficulty is that these people, including Devadas, have gone rather far. It will not be a good thing for it to be said that PTI Directors agreed but our Government came in the way.

I would not mind even some agreement being arrived at provided we laid stress on our interpretation or the original agreement and our insistence that it should be implemented. If it is not implemented, then it is always open to us to raise that matter and, if necessary, to put an end to the agreement. The second proviso is that there should be strong men on this side to deal with Reuters. Indeed, whatever the agreement, unless our men are strong enough, they will not be able to do much.

I want you to be rather careful in dealing with this matter, so that it should not appear that we are interfering too much.

I have sent a copy of my letter to K. Srinivasan to Devadas Gandhi also. No one else is seeing it and I do not want others to see it through you.

As for Goenka,⁵ he is not very responsible in such matters and it is difficult to rely on him to take up any definite position for long.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Kasturi Srinivasan and C.R. Srinivasan. C.R. Srinivasan (1889-1962); Editor, *Swadesamitran*, a Tamil daily published from Madras; President, AINEC, 1949-50 and 1951-52, President, IENS, 1953-54; author of *Standards and Values* (1940), and *Press and Public* (1944).

5. Ramnath Goenka, industrialist and proprietor of the *Indian Express*, was in fact suggesting an alternative arrangement with an American news agency.

3. To Kasturi Srinivasan¹

New Delhi
September 11, 1952

My dear Mr Kasturi Srinivasan,

Thank you for your letter of the 1st September. I have been so terribly busy since my return from Kashmir that I could not attend to it earlier. As I am going away to Indore presently, I am dealing with this matter in some haste.

When you asked me for my general views on this subject, I sent you a fairly long letter which was intended more to clarify my approach than to deal with any particular set of proposals. I felt then, and I feel now, that I should not take upon myself the responsibility for giving advice in a particular matter about which I have not enough experience or detailed knowledge, and the responsibility for which naturally rests upon your Directors and members.² As I said before, Government are naturally interested in the supply of news to and from India, because news plays an important part in shaping public opinion and policies. But, apart from this, Government would not like to interfere in the details of any arrangement for which the responsibility is not theirs.

I am just going to Indore and I am writing in some haste and forwarding your letter to our Minister for Information and Broadcasting.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 43(22)/48-PMS.
2. The PTI Board was divided on the PTI-Reuters partnership issue. Kasturi and C.R. Srinivasan wanted to continue the agreement. N.B. Parulekar, M.R. Moharaj, Directors, PTI, and Ramnath Goenka were for a definite break with this agreement. In fact, Goenka had already resigned under protest. Devadas Gandhi, though dissatisfied with the two Srinivasans, was following a middle line and continuing on the Board simply for seeing that the "Srinivasans don't sell PTI to Reuters." He had no objection to a break with Reuters. Kasturi Srinivasan's approach was endorsed by some Board members including Frank Moraes, who felt that it would be prudent and economical to have the agreement for three years, build up PTI's corps of correspondents during the period, and then arrive at an independent management eventually leading to the emergence of an Indian international news agency.

4. The Modern Newspaper¹

Mr. Chairman, Excellencies, Editors and Friends,

It was very good of you to invite me again to this session of the All-India Newspaper Editors' Conference. In a sense, I feel at home here among you, because, apart from the fact that many of you are friends, I have been often enough on the fringe of the newspaper world and so I have sometimes felt that I was entitled to call myself, to some extent, a newspaperman. Nevertheless, I feel some hesitation—perhaps that is not the right word—and do not quite know what you expect me to say or what I should say.

I feel sometimes that I am growing old. It is an uncomfortable feeling, and one of the signs of old age is that one does not approve of or like some of the new things. We become rather conservative, and any development seems to signify some kind of degradation to those who are getting on in years.

Now, I should like to give you one example. I just cannot make out why people see anything amusing in what are called comic strips. I cannot stand them for an instant and, mind you, it is not for lack of time. I read them, and I am supposed to laugh; instead, I feel very gloomy after I have read them. They represent a new development from overseas which our newspapers are taking to. And I suppose they pay good money for it, but, as far as I am concerned, I would even pay money to escape from them if I could.

That is an odd instance, but this flashy type of journalism rather oppresses me. It does not matter, but it might matter very much if I, in my conservatism, if you like to call it that, or old age, drew people's attention to wrong things or educated men in the wrong ways. It is a platitude to talk about the great opportunities and power the newspapers and the press have in the modern world. That power—wherever there is power—can be exercised in the right way or in the wrong way.

Scientific developments can be utilized either for the advancement of humanity or for its destruction. Similarly, education may be of the right type or the wrong type. It may tone up the society or tone down the society. You talk and we talk and all of us talk about the freedom of the press. Every person who has been conditioned by the democratic process to some extent believes in the various freedoms. He would rather allow a little wrong to happen than to suppress it, because if you attempt to suppress a wrong type of thing, a right type of thing may also be suppressed along with it, and it is bad to suppress a right thing. Therefore, one tolerates a wrong thing, to some extent, so that the right may ultimately overcome the wrong. So one believes in the

1. Address to the All-India Newspaper Editors' Conference, New Delhi, 17 September 1952. AIR tapes, NMML. Extracts.

freedom of the press, freedom of expression and other freedoms which are very important. For my part I do think that basically it is dangerous to suppress thought and the expression of thought in any way, because this may, besides suppressing a particular good thing, produce many kinds of evil which stunt the growth of a social group.

Believing this, I come up constantly against instances where this freedom of expression is utilized, not merely to express the wrong thing, but to produce a mental climate which, I think, is not good, and which lowers standards of every type, whether they are cultural standards, or other standards. When this kind of thing is done on a large scale, and done from day to day, I am worried though not for political reasons; I think in terms of the wider implications of the word 'culture', and of the increase and propagation of vulgarity which surely cannot be a good thing. I do not even say that we should suppress vulgarity; perhaps a little vulgarity is good occasionally. Nevertheless, if the mental climate encourages vulgarity, I doubt if anyone can consider it good. What is one to do in circumstances where one comes across what I call, from the cultural point of view, a rather vulgar and indecent approach? What is one to do about it? One can meet it with the right approach in the hope that right will win in the end. When you are up against a mental climate, which encourages the things an immature mind likes, then you do not get a chance to mature or grow up.

You talk about the freedom of the press. What exactly is the press? Can a person bring out a sheet with the liberty simply to say and do every kind of wrong thing, under the aegis of the noble doctrine of the freedom of the press? Obviously, anybody can bring out anything; the only limitation can be that of money or the number of purchasers he will get. But he can do a lot of mischief by propagating all kinds of pernicious ideas. I am not thinking in terms of politics. Suppose some noted gangster started preaching gangsterism, not patently and obviously, but in a disguised way. Well, then the freedom of the press would mean the preaching of gangsterism or preaching of hatred of others, which is common enough in many countries. It may be that, if you have hatred in your mind, perhaps it is better to have it out instead of nursing it; but to preach it from day to day to immature minds, surely, cannot be good.

Again what exactly is the press? Whatever it may be, the money involved, and the proprietor of that paper are major factors. Does the freedom of the press ultimately mean the freedom of the rich man to do what he likes with his money through the press? A poor man or the man with inadequate means, whether he is good or bad, will not have much of an opportunity to express himself except in a very limited and small way. He may be good or brilliant, but the person who gets the opportunity nowadays is the person with means; he can run newspapers, buy them or stop them, employ people whom he likes and dismiss people whom he dislikes.

So, it may be that the freedom of the press means not so much freedom of the writer to write what he wills, but rather of the owner of a newspaper to see that the writer writes something that he wants him to write. A great newspaper, while it is a very powerful organ, is, at the same time, a very, very expensive undertaking financially. Normally speaking, high standards and high intelligence are not allied with large quantities of money. The person with a large amount of money need not necessarily have high cultural standards or high literary standards or any high standards at all, though he may have the knack of making money. Therefore, the freedom of the press may come to mean the freedom of the persons who have a knack of making money and that, after all, is not such a noble thing. I think of all these difficulties and wonder how we can have real freedom of the press—real expression of opinion for or against whatever it might be—and no suppression of any real opinion provided it is not indecent or vulgar, and provided it is not exploited for wrong ends.

Some of you have protested² against certain laws that our Parliament passed a year ago, because, they were considered as an infringement of the freedom of the press. I am not defending those laws, but I want to put to you this difficulty in the way of any person who considered these matters objectively, and not to think of any question in a vacuum, but in relation to life.

A person in authority, in all earnestness and in all honesty of purpose, may begin to think that what he thinks is the right thing, and what the others think is not right. He may think that he must protect that particular idea, or that particular group, party or individual because he honestly thinks that that is the best for the nation. That is a dangerous idea; and it is dangerous, more so when held by honest people. But an honest man who holds ideas strongly like that, is a very difficult person to deal with. Therefore, one has to guard against that, and it is right that persons in authority should be subjected to ceaseless criticism, friendly criticism, I hope, but criticism as strong as you like.

To some extent, politicians and newspapermen have much in common. Both presume to talk too much, write too much, to deliver homilies; both, generally speaking, require no qualifications at all for their job. I do not mean to say that no politician or newspaperman has any qualifications. My point is that for any profession—medicine, engineering or any other—a person has got to go through a long course of training. He must obtain his diploma and degree; only then is he allowed to practise. Not so the politician, and the

2. On 24 June 1951, the All-India Newspaper Editors' Conference resolved to suspend the publication of newspapers on 12 July as a protest against the Press Bill. It urged the electorate to demand from every candidate standing for election to Parliament to accept that the Press Bill restricted the freedom of the press, and feared that the clause defining objectionable matter would be utilized to punish innocent people.

newspaperman. If he has a certain gift of expression, he gets going; whether or not there is any content behind that expression is immaterial. In fact, sometimes he gets going simply because he has the gift or the knack of abusing, just as some people have the knack of making money.

It is amazing that I have never understood it. Some people have also the knack of getting hold of the unsavoury things of life and making a fuss about them, thereby, not only getting on in their profession but making money too. Unsavoury things in life should not be covered up, but one should keep some kind of balance. One cannot constantly talk about the drainage system and the like. It gives one an unbalanced view of life and of traditions. Some people take delight not only in unsavoury things but in things which excite and incite, thus getting more people to buy their newspapers.

The other day, an editor in Delhi came to me after I had said something like this at a press conference. He told me: "What you said is perfectly correct, perfectly right. True, but what am I to do? My boss, my proprietor, insists on my writing in this way. I do not want to write that sort of thing, but I do not want to be thrown out of my job. Therefore, I have to write the things to which you object. I also object to them." It certainly is not a noble confession to make, but still it is rather an extraordinary thing when the editor of a paper with a fairly wide circulation should be compelled or should say that he is compelled to write the sort of thing which is creating communal trouble in Delhi by exaggerating a minor personal incident. It has nothing to do with the public. It could easily have been dealt with in a variety of ways, either privately or in public, legally or otherwise. It was, however, not dealt with that way. On the other hand, people's passions were being aroused because of it. That editor frankly admitted that the paper sold more if he wrote like that. "My proprietor wants me to increase the sale of the paper." Now, how are we to deal with that kind of situation?

The obvious thing is that there should be self-discipline, not only at the group level or at the journalists' or newspapermen's level, but in your organization and in the other organizations. Where there is no self-discipline, another kind of discipline has to be imposed. No society will tolerate utter lack of discipline for long, because it leads to chaotic conditions, whether they occur in a big way or in a small way, since chaotic conditions cannot be tolerated. There must be discipline. This discipline may be self-discipline or to some extent both. You may define democracy in a hundred ways, but surely one of its definitions is self-discipline of the community. The less the imposed discipline, and the more the self-discipline, the higher the development of democracy.

Now, apply that to newspapers. When the newspaper is in undeveloped state in a country, there has to be more of imposed discipline, but it does not fit in with the democratic way of life and it should not be unduly encouraged.

But there cannot be a vacuum. Unless self-discipline develops or standards grow, some kind of standard has to be imposed.

You, Sir, Mr. Chairman, referred to some kind of a code of ethics,³ that you were drawing up and to which I made some reference last year. I am glad you are dealing with this matter, but I would be interested to know what sanctions you put in that code. Of course, your sanctions cannot be in the form of punishments, in the conventional sense of the law, but other sanctions.

The other day there was a very gross case of libel. It was as bad as it could be. It concerned a member of our foreign service and, what is worse his wife was referred to in one of the newspapers in the most indecent terms. The whole thing was a hundred per cent falsehood. The matter went to law court in the ordinary way. But the jury of journalists said that it was not serious enough to punish the writer, although it was a most serious case in all conscience. It did not redound to the credit of the jury that they should deal with a member of their own profession in that way, when the court had found him guilty, and the whole thing was a fantastic fabrication, doing injustice to a member of our foreign service and worse still, to his wife. I do not want a person to be pilloried and sent to prison unless he commits an offence under the criminal law. Unless you have the strongest possible public opinion among yourselves, unless you add some sanction to that, the code of ethics you are laying down will not go very far. Then matters will really be worse than they were previously, because you will have tried your best and failed.

There is another aspect which I would like to put before you. All of you, newspaper editors and others, in fact all of us are city folk. No doubt towns and cities play a very important part everywhere; they also do in India but far less attention is paid here to the vast problems of our countryside. The day before yesterday, I was in the Bhil area, the Adivasi area, and thousands of Bhils came to see me. They interested me. I feel a little more at home among them than I do in the city of Delhi which, in spite of its many good points, occasionally makes me uncomfortable. India contains a tremendous variety of people indeed, besides the Bhils and other Adivasis. There are also millions of our peasant folk in other areas. I find that newspapers deal only with limited

3. A professional code for journalists was announced by A.D. Mani, President of the All-India Newspaper Editors' Conference on 16 September 1952. The code consisted of: A journalist should (1) regard his calling as a trust and guard the public interest and peace; (2) value fundamental and social rights; (3) report with restraint rival tensions arising from racial, religious and economic differences; (4) ensure factual and accurate information and own up the information published; (5) identify rumours and unverified news and treat them as such; (6) preserve professional secrecy and not allow personal interest to influence professional conduct; (7) rectify by publishing the correction of any report found to be incorrect; (8) guard himself against the exploitation of his status for non-journalistic purposes; (9) not accept or demand bribes for the exercise of his duties; and (10) eschew provincial prejudices and provocative language.

topics in a very limited way. Their horizon is narrow. Somebody said that the adventures of innocence are not worth recording. That is true; and so the wrong things have to be blazoned out, giving people the impression that there is much more of the wrong things than there really is. That unfortunately is one of the bad things that the newspapers have brought us—they blazon out to the world the wrong things that happen simply because these things are exciting and, therefore, interesting. There is no remedy for that, except to try and lay stress on the constructive aspect of the other problems.

In international politics, our newspapers give publicity to conflicts, denigrations or denunciations of persons or countries. Occasionally, denunciation may be good. I do not wish to rule it out. But when life is a string of denunciations, it becomes a little unbalanced and overdone. It is difficult to get at the truth, as it is to hear anything if everybody is shrieking at the top of his voice. Nowadays, there is far too much shrieking, and one cannot understand what is being said. Newspapers naturally give more publicity to denunciations and the like than to the normal activities of vast numbers of human beings. Thus, we get an unbalanced view of the world.

I do not know how we can balance it. I am only posing to you some difficulties and problems that trouble me from time to time because, as I told you, I get the impression at times that I am getting old, and the sign of old age is that I begin to philosophize and ponder over problems which should not be my concern at all. Normally, a politician or a newspaperman has few lucid moments, because he functions from day to day, hour to hour, minute to minute. He does not have time to think. He has to deal with the particular piece of news or give a particular opinion, or a certain decision from hour to hour. That is the fault of our present day civilization. Not only newspapermen and politicians but others, too, are gradually being drawn into the whirlpool of incessant activity without thinking.

What this will lead to, I do not quite know. I suppose it is an inevitable development of technological improvements and advancement, which rushes along at a headlong pace, far faster than the average human mind can. With the result that we get entangled in the strings of thought. It is said of Erasmus⁴ that his entire library consisted of fifty books, yet he was supposed to be one of the wisest men of the age.

Nowadays, I do not know how many books we read. Newspapers, periodicals and magazines we wade through and forget soon after reading them. If we do read books, we read them hurriedly. Obviously, nobody can sit down and read newspapers as one reads a book. Therefore, we apply the newspaper

4. Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536); Dutch humanist; scholar of classics and patristics, first editor of Greek version of the New Testament, considered the greatest scholar in the northern Renaissance; author of many theological, educational and Biblical works.

habit of reading to books with the result that our minds sometimes function with alertness, but hardly ever with depth. We may be clever. We may say an amusing or witty thing and be pleased with ourselves, but there is little depth of thought behind it. I do not know why I am telling you all this. It appears to me to be an inevitable development of the pace at which the world lives today.

To put it differently, the machine grows. I am not against the machine at all. I admire the machine very greatly. The machine grows and grows till it becomes almost human. It begins to think—gives answers to questions. The machine becomes human and the human being appears to become more and more of a machine. After all the machine has emerged from the human mind. Whether it is because of political authoritarianism or economic conditions, or just because of hunger, degradation or technological improvements—whatever the reason may be—if the human mind loses its creative faculty and becomes more and more like a machine then surely it is a tragedy for humanity. If that happens the roots of culture and civilization will gradually dry up. It may revive itself; civilization may have some kind of reincarnation. Anything might happen. But the present stage of transition characterized by hurried pace of living and still more hurried decisions, with no leisure, and no opportunity or time for cool and calm thinking, cannot by itself be a satisfactory phase. It may be because of this that we don't think quite so much, and are faced with difficulties all the time.

If we cannot think for ourselves, how are we to know what others are thinking? Surely, in order to understand a problem, it is necessary to try to know what others are thinking... Difficult as it is, it becomes even more so when we hardly know how our own mind is working. So, our thinking becomes a series of reactions and urges to stimuli. That is not thinking. Of course, in a large measure, our thoughts are determined by all kinds of circumstances. We do not have much control over them. Even so, I suppose there must be some freedom, otherwise our thoughts would merely be mechanical reactions to immediate events and things said, done or written. That would be unfortunate enough even in the case of an individual or a group, but when the fate of a country or of the world depends upon these rapid reactions, then one becomes apprehensive about the future. One may, of course, have an infinite faith in humanity surviving every disaster. But, apart from faith, it is a little dangerous for the world's destinies to be governed by sudden and immediate reactions to events.

How far do the newspapers represent such reactions? They function in a difficult atmosphere. They have to say something quickly and they have not much time to think. Nevertheless, if a newspaper is hostile to a person and has to react to what he says, it will react not to what he says; this is what normally happens. If you dislike a country, you react against that country. Not

against what has been said by that country, by that individual, or by that group. If the newspapers do that, then, of course, they are not functioning satisfactorily. They are not functioning maturely or wisely. Of course, it is hardly appropriate to use the word 'wise' in connection with newspapers, but there is no reason why newspapers should not have some amount of leisured thinking and wisdom—if not always—in the leading articles at least.

These are some odd thoughts that I have placed before you for your consideration as they came to my mind.

5. To C.R. Srinivasan¹

New Delhi
September 30, 1952

My dear Mr Srinivasan,

Your letter of the 24th September² reached me in Hyderabad. I have been completely out of touch with PTI-Reuters developments. I was, therefore, surprised to learn from your letter that the PTI Board had taken some decision.³ I have not seen that decision. But it is certainly not right to say, if they have said so, that Government wanted them to decide in that way. That was not my intention, as I tried to explain to you. I was under the impression that the matter had been postponed for some considerable time. I am sorry that anything should have happened which should lead you and Mr Kasturi Srinivasan to resign from the PTI Board.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 43(22)/48-PMS.
2. Srinivasan wrote of "the very clever use your views were put to by a few interested persons to sabotage the partnership proposals". They were rejected "not so much on merits as because the Government were not in favour of it."
3. The PTI Board, at a meeting held on 20 September 1952, concluded that "the basis on which renewal of the partnership agreement is proposed is not acceptable. The PTI Board therefore resolves that immediate steps be taken to enter into an alternative agreement such as bulk purchase....It is taking a step which in effect will terminate formal partnership."
4. Kasturi Srinivasan and C.R. Srinivasan, who had commended the formula for the renewal of PTI-Reuters partnership, viewed the decision of the PTI Board to end it as indicating a lack of confidence in them. They resigned from the PTI Board.

NATIONAL PROGRESS

XII. Tribal Welfare

1. To B.R. Medhi¹

New Delhi
July 17, 1952

My dear Medhi,

Please refer to your letter of July 19th about compensation to Nagas for losses caused during the last war.

I should like to make it perfectly clear that it is quite impossible for us to consider any question of giving further compensation. We have given compensation handsomely and strained our finances to the utmost.² The only part of the area which has not received compensation on that basis thus far was a certain hilly area of Manipur which is also a Naga area. They will be given some compensation soon more or less on the same basis as in the Naga Hill districts.

As a matter of fact, it is exceedingly difficult to distinguish between damage caused by the Japanese or by the British or the Americans. The general impression is that the greatest damage was caused by the Anglo-Americans. Whatever compensation we have given is not meant for one particular type of damage but covers both these types.

You refer to the Indo-Japanese Peace Treaty and the fact that we have claimed no reparations from Japan.³ There is no particular generosity involved in this because it is impossible to get any reparations from Japan, whether one wants to or not. In any event, it is utterly beyond our capacity to give any further compensation. We have gone to the utmost limit possible so far as we are concerned. We have not only paid Rs 20 lakhs but a very large sum of money six years ago.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. During the Second World War, the Japanese army penetrating into the Naga Hill Districts subjected the people there to the dangers and hardships of the modern warfare. The people of this area were later compensated by the Government of India for damages caused as a result of this and the Allied action.
3. India had decided not to demand reparations because the damage done by the Japanese to India was relatively small. The history of reparations also showed that it was hardly possible to realize them even if promises were made. See Nehru's letter to Thakin Nu published in *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 16 Part II, pp. 604-605.

2. To B.R. Medhi¹

New Delhi
August 19, 1952

My dear Medhi,

I have received today a letter from your Governor in which he gives me an account of the visit of our official team to Assam.² I have also had a report this evening from H.V.R. Iengar. His full written report³ will be presented to us in about three days' time. I am going away to Kashmir day after tomorrow for a week or so.⁴ I have however arranged, in order to avoid delay, that this report should be circulated immediately to members of the Cabinet. I hope that we shall consider it in Cabinet early in September. I am anxious to avoid all possible delay.

I am very glad that the visit of this official team had led to a better appreciation of some of the problems of Assam, and that certain definite proposals are being made by them in consultation with you. Thus far I have only a general idea of these proposals.

I was distressed to learn of the condition of the hill people in the Garo and Khasi hills. H.V.R. Iengar had seen them three years ago and he said that during these three years there was very marked physical deterioration of the people there. This is very disturbing and I hope that the earliest possible steps will be taken to render help to them.

As you perhaps know, I am very fond of these tribal hill people and I think it is our duty not only to help them in every way, but to make them feel at one with us. We should go all out to give them this feeling of social and national solidarity with all of us.

Iengar told me of the good work done by the missionaries in the Garo Hills. He also spoke of the excellent work that the nuns were doing in your Shillong hospital. Missionaries have sometimes misbehaved, but there can be

1. JN Collection. Copies were sent to K.N. Katju and Jairamdas Doulatram.
2. A team of Central Government officials led by H.V.R. Iengar toured Assam from 26 July to 17 August 1952 to study the immediate and long-term problems of the area. They also made an aerial survey of earthquake-hit parts of the NEFA.
3. Their main recommendations were: (i) a four-mile long stone revetment at Dibrugarh as a permanent safeguard against erosion; (ii) collection of adequate hydrological data for preparing a long-term plan for prevention of erosion and flood control; (iii) a contour survey of Assam; (iv) adequate priority to various schemes for embankment and drainage works already prepared by the Assam Government and Central assistance for Grow More Food schemes; (v) improvement in communications in the State, construction of roads and bridges; (vi) improvement in border security; and (vii) improvement in the economic conditions of the tribal people of the hill areas.
4. Nehru visited Kashmir from 21 August to 30 August 1952.

no doubt that they have set an excellent example of social work which I wish we could follow.⁵ Because of the fine work they have done in various ways in these tribal areas, I should like to encourage them, even though I might not like some of their activities. I am particularly struck by the trouble they take to learn the tribal languages. How many, I wonder, of our officials take that trouble? I think it should be made a definite rule that no official who does not learn the tribal language should serve there.

I was told that the state of the State hospitals in Assam was deplorable, even in Shillong. In fact, the only decent hospitals were those run by missionaries.

I was further told that the standards of the Assam Public Works Department were astonishingly low and lacking in competence. I heard of a story of a bridge which sounded fantastic. It is evident from the accounts I have heard that your Chief Engineer and may be other engineers are not of much use.

I have often laid stress in my letters to you that it is quite essential to maintain certain standards in our public services. One of the difficulties of Assam has been that these standards have not been maintained. Sometimes when we have suggested sending someone from the Centre, you have not approved of the idea. We have no desire to thrust any person from the Centre, but we are very anxious that Assam should go ahead. It will not go ahead unless these standards are kept high. I was really shocked to learn of the inefficiency of your PWD.

Iengar told me also about the flood situation, about the proposal to collect data which appears to be totally lacking in Assam, about having a river investigation division directly working under CWINC. He also told me of the position in Dibrugarh and the proposal to have a small revetment on the river there.

We discussed border security also and I was sorry to learn of the bad condition of our border police—bad in the sense of being neglected.

I hope that the Central Government and your Government will be able to do something soon about these various matters.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. About 80 per cent of the people had been converted to Christianity in the Lushai Hills and about 30 per cent in the Naga Hill Districts. In other areas the percentage varied between these two limits. The missionaries had done good work in the fields of education and medical help but also had encouraged narrow-mindedness, distinct from the true Christian spirit and values, among the converts. Certain anti-Indian feelings were also said to be inculcated by the foreign missionaries and some British officials.

3. To Jairamdas Doulatram¹

New Delhi
September 1, 1952

My dear Jairamdas,²

...It is clear to me for a variety of reasons that the North East Frontier Agency should not be merged with the State of Assam and should remain as it is.³ I am interested to know about Rani Gaidilieu.⁴ If she requires any help, I shall gladly send it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Governor of Assam.
3. The Assam State Congress had passed a resolution calling upon the Central Government to transfer the tribal areas being administered directly by the Centre through the Assam Governor to the control of the State Government.
4. She was a Naga leader from Manipur who was arrested in 1932 for revolutionary activities. She was released in 1947, but was not allowed to return to Manipur and had to stay in Nagaland. The Government granted her a pension afterwards.

4. To B.R. Medhi¹

New Delhi
October 2, 1952

My dear Medhi,

Your letter of the 24th September about Zapu Phizo. I do not think we need trouble ourselves much because he is reported to have gone to Burma.² He cannot do any real mischief outside Assam. Anyhow we shall try to find out what he is doing in Burma.

1. JN Collection.
2. After boycotting the elections to the District Council in 1951 and the General Elections in 1952, Phizo decided to take the Naga issue to the United Nations. In August 1952, he declared that the Naga National Council "will have no truck with India" and organized a civil disobedience movement. As part of the movement, national and official celebrations were boycotted and acts of sabotage perpetrated. However, as the pressure of the security forces increased on Phizo, he went underground in September 1952 and fled to Burma in December where he was detained.
3. J.N. Hazarika.

I have asked Hazarika,³ my Parliamentary Secretary, to accompany me in my tour in the tribal areas of Assam, Manipur and Tripura. Probably my daughter, Indira, will also come with me. Otherwise my party will be a small one.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

NATIONAL PROGRESS

XIII. Arts and Crafts

1. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
September 1, 1952

My dear T.T.,

During the past year or two, I have frequently heard mention made about proposals to encourage the sale of our arts and crafts and cottage goods in foreign countries. Showrooms had been opened in some places and I believe something had been done. I do not quite know what the position is now. On the whole I have the impression that in the past no intensive effort was made in this direction.

I feel sure that a great deal can be done and that our arts and crafts are not only very good dollar earning commodities, but encourage employment and a special kind of talent which otherwise tends to fade away. We started by opening some kind of showrooms in various places. I should have thought it much better to concentrate on one or at the most two places where the outlook was good. Later of course we could spread out. Thus the only really big market is in North America or the United States. In Europe or Australia and like countries we can do something of course, but it does not carry one very far. I would, therefore, concentrate on the United States, and, to begin with, on New York.

A difficulty is often pointed out that American buyers want standardized goods in large numbers and in the nature of things, we cannot produce handicrafts in such vast numbers or of a uniform variety. I do not think this is a major difficulty and I would not sacrifice quality for quantity. The whole appeal of these handicrafts is their individual character. Of course a certain uniformity can be maintained.

I am writing to you without knowing what has been done. So you will forgive me if I say something that is obvious or that has already been done.

It seems to me that Government should help in having a really big showroom or showrooms in New York, where a variety of our special goods (handicrafts) could be displayed and orders booked. Even sale could take place there, but this will have to be to some extent limited because it will hardly be possible to keep large quantities to begin with at least. I have recently been in Kashmir and it struck me there that a proper showroom of Kashmir articles would be worthwhile in New York and would produce heavy dividends. Kashmir produces quite a variety of hand-made articles which are really beautiful and are much appreciated abroad. So does Kathiawar and many other parts of the country. Our tendency has been to send an odd selection of things like brassware and the rest, which can never have a wide market, though they

1. File No. 26(41)/48-PMS.

will no doubt sell to some extent. I think we should concentrate on a number of selected articles which are likely to have a wide market.

I discussed this matter in Kashmir. You know that the Kashmir Government has got a number of emporia in India—in Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Lucknow and one or two other places. They are doing fairly good business here. Indeed, Kashmir depends largely on her artistic products. It would be a good thing if they could have a large showroom or some kind of an emporium in New York. As far as I remember the building where our Consulate-General is situated in New York, is a very large building with plenty of rooms to spare. Could we not set aside some of those rooms there for our handicrafts? We might even encourage this by investing some money in these goods. I do not think very much would be required—say about Rs 5 lakhs.

I suggest that someone in your Ministry might discuss this matter with the Kashmir people or, if you like, I can ask my daughter Indira to interest herself in this matter and suggest what particular type of goods would be suitable. She knows the American background as well as the kind of things produced in India, which would fit in there.

In the United States, there are a number of our womenfolk, wives etc., of our officers there who could help. One of them is Mrs. B.K. Nehru² who was associated I believe with cottage industries here. She is doing something already. I am writing this letter to you just to make you think about this. I think we can go ahead pretty far if we try hard enough.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. B.K. Nehru was Minister in Indian Embassy at Washington.

2. Kalakshetra¹

Friends,

I am very happy to visit the Kalakshetra again and to see these boys and girls and children dance. I am more or less on the last item on the programme. I am afraid I have not had the benefit of a training in Kalakshetra. And so, I can neither dance nor sing. But, at any rate, I can watch them, and admire them, and like them.

There has been in recent years, some kind of a renaissance in our ancient classical dancing, and it is not only appreciated all over India but outside

1. Speech at a gathering of students and teachers at Kalakshetra, Madras, 4 October 1952. AIR tapes, NMML.

India also. It is fortunate that this has happened, because, as Rajaji was telling me just a little while ago, in the days of his youth there was a fierce attempt made to suppress every kind of dancing and singing, as something immoral and bad. I am glad that attempt did not succeed, because it would have been a tragedy, if this great art of India had been suppressed. Now the Kalakshetra, tries to maintain that in its pristine purity. That is desirable. In many other places, all kinds of mixtures, hybrids, if you like, are growing up. Now being very much a layman myself in these matters, I do not necessarily object to any mixed style going up, and sometimes there may be virtue in that too. But whether we have mixed styles or not, it is certainly desirable to have the pure style also, to set some kind of a standard, and I am glad that the Kalakshetra attempts to and succeeds in preserving that old classical style in its original purity. I have had, we have had, a pleasant hour here watching these children and boys and girls dance and I am very grateful to you all. I wish you success.

Jai Hind.

1. Constitutional Arrangement

1. Constitutional Relationship of Kashmir with India¹

The meeting began at 4.10 p.m. and lasted till 8.40 p.m.

The Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee² of the Cabinet were present. The Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Shaikh Mohammad Abdullah, was also present together with his colleagues, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad,³ Mirza Afzal Beg,⁴ Shri Girdharilal Dogra⁵ and Shri D.P. Dhar.⁶

The principal points in two notes, one by Shaikh Abdullah and the other by Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar, both dated 19th July, were taken as a basis for discussion.⁷

I. HEAD OF THE STATE

The following was agreed:

- (1) The Head of the State shall be the person recognized by the President on the recommendation of the Legislature of the State.
- (2) He shall hold office during the pleasure of the President.
- (3) He may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office.
- (4) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this Article, the Head of the State shall hold office for a term of five years from the date he enters upon his office:
Provided that he shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office.

1. Note drafted by Nehru on the discussions in the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee with the Kashmir delegation held at Prime Minister's House, New Delhi, 20 July 1952. File No. P.V. 102/20/64, MEA.
2. The Committee included, besides Nehru, N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, K.N. Katju and Maulana Azad. Copies of this note were sent to them.
3. Deputy Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir at this time.
4. Revenue Minister of Jammu and Kashmir at this time.
5. (1915-1987); a close associate of Shaikh Abdullah; elected four times to the State Assembly; Finance Minister of the State, 1948; chairman, Kashmir Constitution Drafting Committee, 1951; opposed Shaikh Abdullah in 1953 and joined Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's Cabinet; Minister of Commerce and Industry, 1960-67, and of Revenue and Rehabilitation, 1967; Member, Lok Sabha, 1980-87.
6. Deputy Home Minister of Jammu and Kashmir at this time.
7. Preliminary discussions were held in New Delhi from 14 to 20 June 1952 between the Government of India and the Kashmir delegation headed by Mirza Afzal Beg.

II. CITIZENSHIP

It was agreed that, in accordance with Article 5⁸ of the Constitution, persons who have their domicile in the Jammu and Kashmir State shall be the citizens of India, there being only one citizenship throughout the territory of India which included, in accordance with Article 1⁹ of the Constitution, Jammu and Kashmir State.

The Kashmir delegation were anxious that the rights and privileges given to "State subjects" (Jammu and Kashmir Notification¹⁰ dated 20th April 1927) should be preserved, subject to such variations as the Constituent Assembly of the State might decide upon. These rights and privileges relate more specially to the acquisition and holding of immovable property, appointment to services, etc.

It was pointed out that under Article 19(5)¹¹ of the Constitution this was clearly permissible both in regard to the existing law or any subsequent legislation on the subject. It was admitted that, having regard to the special position of Kashmir, some such protection was necessary for the permanent residents of the State. There were in fact provisions in the Constitution giving special protection, such as in the tribal areas in Assam or in the land legislation in the Punjab and elsewhere, which prevented non-agriculturists from acquiring land.¹² This was a matter which could be dealt with by the State Legislature.

It was agreed therefore that:

The State Legislature shall have power to define and regulate the rights and privileges of the permanent residents of the State, more especially in regard to the acquisition of immovable property, appointments to services and like matters. Till then, the existing State law would apply.

8. Article 5 of the Indian Constitution enjoins that there shall be only one citizenship and every citizen shall be a citizen of India owing allegiance to the Republic, and not to any local unit.
9. Article 1(i) of the Indian Constitution says: "India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States." Jammu and Kashmir State was included as one of the eight Part B States.
10. Maharaja Hari Singh had, under popular pressure, issued this notification defining that all persons born and residing in the State, and also persons who had settled therein before 1885 and had since then been permanently residing in the State, were considered to be hereditary subjects of the State who alone were eligible for employment and possession of property in his territory.
11. Under Clause 5 of Article 19(1) rights of property can be subjected to reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of the Scheduled Tribes.
12. One of the clauses under Article 19 in the Constitution of India provided protection to the residents of Assam and East Punjab against exploitation and, particularly, the prevention of alienation of their lands.

The use of the term "State subject" should be avoided as this was not in keeping with present-day conditions.

III. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

It was pointed out that Fundamental Rights should not come in the way of land reforms already undertaken or that might be undertaken in the State. In the Constitution of India, some form of compensation was provided for.¹³ Such compensation had not been provided for in the State legislation which had been recently passed and given effect to.¹⁴ This was agreed to.

It was further pointed out that, in view of the peculiar situation in the State because of the invasion of the State by Pakistan, subsequent war and ceasefire,¹⁵ very special precautions had to be taken against people infiltrating for espionage, sabotage, or to create trouble otherwise. If, by the full application of the Fundamental Rights in the Constitution, these persons could not be dealt with swiftly and effectively, the situation may well deteriorate and go out of hand. Therefore, the State Government required special powers to deal with this situation and the Fundamental Rights should not take away these powers. This principle was agreed to.

For the rest, there was general agreement about the application of Fundamental Rights to the State. It was stated, however, by the Kashmir delegation that they would like to include Fundamental Rights in their constitution in conformity with those in the Constitution of India. In reply it was stated that while there was no objection to a repetition of these Fundamental Rights in the State constitution, if they did not in any way conflict with the Fundamental Rights in the Constitution of India, it was not desirable to have a separate enumeration of these rights in the State constitution, as this might lead to some confusion in regard to interpretation.

13. Clause 2 of Article 31 under the Indian Constitution lays down that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law and that the State shall acquire no property, movable or immovable, from any citizen for public purposes without paying compensation.
14. On 27 March 1952, Afzal Beg, while presenting the report of the Committee on Land Compensation to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, said that no compensation had been recommended, in spite of the provisions of the Indian Constitution in this regard, because "this part of the Constitution of India is not applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir." On 31 March 1952, the Assembly approved the recommendation against payment of compensation.
15. The UN Commission had brought about a ceasefire on the existing position of the two armies in Kashmir which by mutual agreement between India and Pakistan became effective on 1 January 1949, with 32,000 square miles of Kashmir territory, comprising the western and northern regions, under Pakistan occupation, and the remaining 54,000 square miles, including the Srinagar valley and Jammu, as part of India.

The Kashmir delegation, while in general agreement, said that they would like to think over this matter as to how best to give effect to it.

On the part of the Government of India, it was stated that they would be prepared to apply the provisions of Part III¹⁶ of the Constitution of India to Jammu and Kashmir State with such modifications and exceptions as may be agreed upon to be necessary.¹⁷ Subject to this, Fundamental Rights attached to every Indian citizen, wherever he may be resident in the territory of India.

IV. SUPREME COURT

It was agreed that the Supreme Court should have original jurisdiction in respect of disputes mentioned in Article 131¹⁸ of the Constitution of India.

It was further agreed that the Supreme Court should have jurisdiction in regard to Fundamental Rights which are agreed to by the State.

The State delegation wanted to consider further as to additional Fundamental Rights being justiciable in the Supreme Court.

On behalf of the Government of India, it was recommended that the Advisory Tribunal¹⁹ in the State, designated "His Highness's Board of Judicial Advisers" should be abolished and the jurisdiction exercised by it should be vested in the Supreme Court of India. That is to say that the Supreme Court should be final court of appeal in all civil and criminal matters as laid down in the Constitution of India.

The Kashmir delegation said that they had no objection to this, but would like some time to consider it further.

16. The Constitution of India, under Part III, specifies the Fundamental Rights.

17. The wholesale application of the Fundamental Rights as guaranteed by the Indian Constitution to the citizens would have forced the State Government to pay compensation to landlords. The agreement finally arrived at left the extent of the applicability of the Fundamental Rights to the discretion of the State Legislature.

18. Article 131 of the Indian Constitution deals with the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which covers original and appellate jurisdiction over constitutional, civil and criminal cases.

19. The Board of Judicial Advisers was constituted by Maharaja Hari Singh in 1939. It exercised appellate jurisdiction in the State cases in appeal in criminal and civil matters.

V. NATIONAL FLAG

Shaikh Abdullah had already made it clear in his public statements²⁰ that the National Flag was the supreme flag and that it had the same status and position in the Jammu and Kashmir State as in the rest of India. The State flag was in no sense rival to this. But for historical and sentimental reasons, connected with the freedom struggle in Kashmir, they wanted this symbol to continue.

This was agreed to. It was stated, however, that it would be desirable to make this perfectly clear. As the Constituent Assembly of the State had passed a resolution²¹ in regard to the State flag, it would be desirable that the Assembly made it clear what the position of the National Flag was.

VI. PRESIDENT OF INDIA

On behalf of the Government of India, it was stated that the powers to reprieve and commute death sentences etc., should also belong to the President of the Union. This was agreed to by the Kashmir delegation.

VII. FINANCIAL INTEGRATION

The principle of financial integration was agreed to. The details would have to be worked out.²²

VIII. EMERGENCY POWERS

On behalf of the Government of India, it was stated that the application of Article 352²³ of the Constitution was necessary, as it related to vital matters

20. In his statements, Shaikh Abdullah said that a separate flag for Kashmir should not be regarded as a symbol of independence vis-a-vis the Indian Union flag. The Kashmir Government continued to render its allegiance to the Indian flag as part of the Union. The State flag which had been the standard of the National Conference during the struggle against the Maharaja's rule was only a substitution of the Ruler's flag which was being flown even after accession. It was harmless when its use was limited to special occasions, and was always subject to the primacy of the Union Flag.
21. The Kashmir Constituent Assembly on 10 June 1952 adopted a resolution for having a new State flag.
22. In regard to financial integration of the State with the Union, the two Governments agreed that it was necessary to evolve some sort of financial arrangement. But as this involved far-reaching consequences, the Government of the State felt that a detailed and objective examination of the subject would be necessary.
23. Article 352 of the Indian Constitution visualizes the proclamation of emergency by the President of India during the times of external aggression, war, or internal disturbances, when certain powers of the State Governments become exercisable on the authority of the Central Government.

affecting the security of the State. They did not press for the application of Article 356²⁴ or 360.²⁵

On behalf of the Kashmir delegation, it was stated that the application of Article 352 to the State was not necessary. In the event of war or external aggression, Item 1 of the Seventh Schedule,²⁶ relating to the defence of India, applied and the Government of India would have full authority to take any step in connection, as even some petty internal disorder might be considered sufficient for the application of Article 352.

In reply it was pointed out that Article 352 could only be applied in a state of grave emergency and not because of some relatively small disorder or disturbance.

In order to meet the apprehensions of the Kashmir delegation, it was suggested on behalf of the Government of India that Article 352 might be accepted as it is with the addition at the end of the first paragraph (1) of the following words: "but in regard to internal disturbances at the request or with the concurrence of the Government of the State" (the actual wording to be fitted in the proper place).

This was generally accepted by the Kashmir delegation, but they wanted some time to consider the implications and consequences as laid down in Articles 353,²⁷ 358²⁸ and 359.²⁹

24. By a proclamation under Article 356, the President declares that the Government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and assumes all or any of the functions of the State Government except those of the High Court. As a result of such a proclamation, the Council of Ministers in the State is dissolved and the Governor directly rules the State on behalf of the President of India.
25. Article 360 provides: "If the President is satisfied that a situation has arisen whereby the financial stability or credit of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, he may by a proclamation make a declaration to that effect."
26. Item 1 in the Seventh Schedule relates to the defence of India in the event of war or external aggression.
27. Article 353 of the Indian Constitution, which deals with the effects of the Presidential Proclamation of Emergency, lays down that while emergency is in operation in a State, the executive of the Union shall direct the manner in which (i) executive power is to be exercised, (ii) the powers of Parliament include power to make laws conferring powers and imposing duties, or authorizing the conferring of powers and the imposition of duties, upon the Union officers and authorities of the Union.
28. Article 358 provides that the State would be free from the limitations imposed by Article 19, so that the Fundamental Rights would be non-existent in the State during the operation of emergency.
29. Article 359 of the Indian Constitution suspends the rights to move courts for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Part III during the emergency.

In regard to Article 354,³⁰ they wanted to examine it further before expressing their opinion.

It was suggested that Shaikh Abdullah should address Members of Parliament or, at any rate, Members of the Congress Party in Parliament,³¹ before his departure from Delhi.

It was decided that a further meeting should take place on Monday, 21st July, at 4 p.m. at the Prime Minister's House in order to finalize the decisions.³²

The meeting dispersed at 8.40 p.m.

30. Under Article 354, during the operation of emergency, the President shall have the constitutional power to modify the provisions of the Constitution relating to the allocation of financial relations between the Union and States, by his own order. But no such order shall have effect beyond the financial year in which emergency itself ceases to operate, and further, such order of the President shall be subject to approval of Parliament.
31. On 25 July 1952, addressing Congress MPs, Shaikh Abdullah said that the Delhi Agreement symbolized the union of hearts which no power on earth could loosen.
32. No record of the further discussions is available. Nehru announced the agreement on 24 July in the House of the People and on 5 August 1952 in the Council of States. See *post* items 3 and 11 of this section. Shaikh Abdullah placed the agreement in the Kashmir Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1952.

2. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
July 22, 1952

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Thank you for your letter² of 22nd July about Jammu and Kashmir.

The point you have mentioned has been before us, but the reality of the situation is that we cannot order Jammu and Kashmir Government to do something which they finally object to. Right from the beginning our attitude has been that the people of Jammu and Kashmir can decide for themselves any question relating to them. They have now an elected Constituent Assembly, and thus the Government there can more definitely speak on behalf of the people of the State. At the most we can say that we do not agree with their decision. That means a break with rather far-reaching consequences. It is with a desire to avoid this break that we have spent long hours every day in discussions with them and among ourselves. This has been a most exhaustive business.

1. JN Collection.

2. Not available.

Even before this question arose, we had asked Maharaja Hari Singh to abdicate.³ He had partly agreed to do this, but wanted a large sum of money, both as arrears and in the future. The matter got stuck up there. So far as the Yuvaraj is concerned, he understands the position well, and has been in frequent consultation with us. I have no doubt that he will accept our advice or any decision that we may arrive at.

During the last four years, the Government of India has been trying to help and protect Maharaja Hari Singh in every way. But for our protection, he would have been given short shrift. When he left Kashmir for Bombay, we agreed to pay him nine lakhs a year from the Government of India apart from rupees six lakhs which the Kashmir Government paid.⁴ Even that six lakhs was agreed to by the Kashmir Government after the greatest difficulty and pressure from us.

I entirely agree with you that we should keep the moral aspect in view. This moral aspect also requires that we should agree, according to our repeated undertakings, to comply with the wishes of the people of Kashmir. In any event, we cannot compel them to act otherwise. We can only try to convince them.

We may, of course, out of our own funds, give a large sum of money to induce the Maharaja to agree. That does not appear to me a moral course to adopt, from the fact that we owe a certain duty to the people whose money it is. With starvation and famine in India, no Parliament can ever agree to this large grant. It is not as if the Maharaja was short of money. He has plenty, and indulges in expensive pastimes like horse racing. He has been a headache to us throughout these five or six years, and I have no doubt that most of the troubles of Kashmir are due to his follies and wrong actions; nevertheless, we gave him every consideration and tried to protect his interests.

As I have said above, so far as the Yuvaraj is concerned, we certainly hope to have his consent. Indeed, if he is chosen as the Head of the State, as

3. Nehru had written to Maharaja Hari Singh on 5 July 1952 (See *Selected Works*, (second series) Vol. 18, pp. 419-422) that no rights of the dynasty could prevail if they conflicted with the rights of the people.

4. No sooner had Shaikh Abdullah secured complete power as Prime Minister of Kashmir's Interim Government in 1948 than he insisted that Maharaja Hari Singh should stay out of the State. It was on Vallabhbhai Patel's persuasion that the Maharaja reluctantly agreed to do so. The Government of India negotiated a settlement in regard to his privy purse and other matters. Shaikh Abdullah refused to honour the agreement and the Government of India paid him the privy purse for a long time.

is proposed,⁵ this fact alone indicates his acceptance of the new scheme of things.

This Kashmir question is full of difficulties and we are very far from being out of the wood. I indicated to you yesterday some provisional conclusions or agreements that we had arrived at. Much remains, and we have to proceed carefully. The effect of a wrong step might well be far-reaching.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. In his inaugural address to the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly on 31 October 1951, Shaikh Abdullah had proposed that, instead of dynastic succession, the State would like to have Yuvaraj Karan Singh, who had conducted himself well as a constitutional head, as the first elected Head of the State.

3. India's Relations with Kashmir¹

Sir, I am grateful to you for this opportunity to make a statement in regard to affairs relating to the Jammu and Kashmir State. The House has been interested, and the wider public is also interested, in these developments and, therefore, with your permission, Sir, I shall take a little time of the House to state not only the present position, but go somewhat into the background, because we are apt to forget what has happened in the recent past. Public memory is short and unless we remember that past it is sometimes a little difficult to understand the present.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir for long years was a delectable playground for those who could afford it, one of the famous playgrounds of the world, and though the people living there were for the great part poverty-stricken, it drew many people from the rest of the world. This Kashmir, which was politically speaking a backwater for these long years, was suddenly thrust into the current of history and since then events have happened there, many developments have taken place, good and bad, and naturally public attention has been drawn to them and it has become an international affair. For us in India it is, of course, something much more than that, not only because of our long contacts ranging over a thousand years, but also because of these recent

1. Statement on Kashmir in the House of the People, New Delhi, 24 July 1952, *Parliamentary Debates, House of the People Official Report*, Part II, Vol. III, No. 16, cols. 4501-4521.

developments which have brought us nearer to one another. So, therefore, I would ask the indulgence of the House, if I may put it so, for some background information.

First of all, I would like the House just to form a mental picture of the geography—the geographical situation. From the southern tip of India, Kanyakumari, Kashmir is just about or a little over two thousand miles. It is a far cry. Roughly speaking, Kashmir is about a thousand miles from the sea. While a part of India, it is, in fact, the heart of Asia, geographically speaking, and for countless ages great caravans have passed from India right up to Central Asia through this State. It is essentially, and it has been for two thousand years or more, very closely connected with India culturally and politically often enough. It is also connected in various ways with Central Asia. Even now I wonder how many people realize that Kashmir is further north than Tibet. So one has to think of Kashmir in that peculiar geographical position apart from the other factors in the case.

Now Kashmir, as I said, was suddenly thrust into this current of history. This current is moving very rapidly in many parts of the world and sometimes it becomes a rushing and raging torrent in some parts. We seem, all of us, most of us all over the world, to live on a thin crust of peace and the crust threatens to crack up often enough and does crack up sometimes. Even this morning's news will bring this picture to the minds of honourable Members, the happenings in some States in West Asia, the *coup d'etat*² and the rest, taking place and the lack of stability. We in India are perhaps a little fortunate in this respect, because in spite of many things that some honourable Members may complain of, or protest against, there is, it is widely recognized, a large measure of stability in our machinery of Government and affairs in the country and a continuous progressive development, without those cracks appearing. This is a matter of good fortune for us. But at the same time nobody in this wide world can afford to forget this cracking and sometimes, as it appears, disintegrating world of ours. That is the major background to be remembered.

Now in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as in other Indian States of old, there were strivings for freedom against the feudal rule that existed there. As in other States again, they took their inspiration from the great nationalist movement of India. In essence, they were the outcome of that very movement and the off-shoots of that movement; and their ideals and objectives also very largely came from that big movement and that great leader, Mahatma Gandhi. I think I would be right in saying that of all the various State movements in India during the last twenty or thirty years probably the State movement that developed in the Jammu and Kashmir State, the popular movement I mean,

2. In Egypt, King Farouk was forced to abdicate by General Neguib in a military coup on 23 July 1952. Similar coups had taken place in Syria and Lebanon.

that developed there, was the most powerful and grew up to be the best organized. It came in conflict, inevitably, with the State Government there, as all such movements did elsewhere. This movement was intimately connected with what was known as the All-India States People's Conference. Thereby it became a part of that allied movement in India which affected all the States in the country. It was closely connected with it. This is the background.

There were during these years, as in the rest of India, conflicts with the State machinery and the people there and the popular organization there went through a great deal of torment and suffering. There is much to be said about that period, but I shall now come to more recent times.

When, or a little before Independence and Partition came, the House will remember that we were faced by this big problem of the six hundred and odd Indian States in India. It was a terrific problem and we had to solve it with great rapidity. The announcement that the British Government had made, I think it was round about early in June 1947, had left the position of these States vague.³ We did not like that part of the British Government's announcement, because, in a sense it almost encouraged fissiparous tendencies in these States. It almost led some people to think or imagine in these States all over India—I am talking about the Rulers there—to think that they could function more or less independently.

So, in those months of July and August 1947 we had to face this major problem. Fortunately, we had a man big enough to face it, Sardar Patel. And then during those two or three weeks preceding Independence we saw nearly all these States in India acceding to the Union of India, or to the Dominion of India as it then was, nearly all, barring two or three, barring Hyderabad, barring Kashmir and one or two small ones. Hyderabad's case, as the House well knows, was a very special one. Kashmir, I am dealing with. The other small ones did not count much. So practically all these States acceded to India with great rapidity.⁴ And I should like to say that we were helped greatly in that process by the then Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten. That help had great effect because it proved to all these Rulers in these States that they could not rely upon the British Government, as against India. And so, they

3. The Mountbatten Plan of 3 June 1947, which laid the basis of Partition of India, stated that with the lapse of paramountcy the princely states would be free either to enter the Constituent Assembly or to remain separate. The British Government could recognize no Indian State as a separate Dominion. No reference was made to the people of the States as such.
4. The Rulers of all the princely States geographically contiguous to India, with the exception of Junagadh and two small states under Muslim rulers in Kathiawar, had signed the Instrument of Accession and the Standstill Agreement by 15 August 1947. By the integration of the states the Union had brought in by 1951, an area of nearly 500,000 square miles with a population of 86.5 millions, excluding Jammu and Kashmir.

were faced by this coming independence of India, of which they were afraid. They were faced by their own people who were dissatisfied with them and wanted a change. And when the last support which they perhaps looked up to, that is, the British Government, also failed them they had no prop left, and hence the rapidity of their accession to India. They acceded on three basic subjects—Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications. All the states did that. And so the Dominion of India started on the 15th August 1947 with all these states having acceded to it, excepting Hyderabad on the one side, Kashmir on the other, and one or two small ones.

In regard to Kashmir, even before the 15th August, I should imagine in July, the question came up before us informally. And the advice we gave was that the state of Jammu and Kashmir, for a variety of reasons, occupied a very special place. May I add here that even in regard to the other states in India the Government of India had declared its policy. The Minister of States, Sardar Patel, had declared our policy clearly that where in regard to any state there was any doubt as to the wishes of the people, those people should be consulted.⁵ That is to say, normally speaking, there was no doubt that these states wanted to become parts of the Union of India; there was no question of consultation, no doubt, but where there was any doubt we declared that we will consult the people and abide by their wishes. That general policy and principle applied to every state in India. But there were hardly any cases where this question arose and that is a different matter. So that, when the question of Kashmir at first informally came up before us, it was always before us in a sense, but it came up before us informally round about July, or the middle of July, the advice we gave to Kashmir state was and, if I may say so, we had contacts with the popular organization there, the National Conference, and its leaders, and we had contacts with the Maharaja's Government also, rather vague contacts, but they dealt with us. The advice we gave to both was that Kashmir is a special case and it would not be right or proper to try to rush things there, and the general principle we had laid down that the people of the state should be consulted, specially applied to Kashmir. This was before Partition, before the actual coming of Independence. We made it clear that even if the Maharaja and his Government then wanted to accede to India, we would like something much more, that is, popular approval of it before we took that step. We did not wish by some clever tactics to gain something on

5. When the States Department was set up on 5 July 1947, Vallabhbhai Patel, who was in charge, defined the policy of the Government of India in his inaugural speech. He invited the states to accede to the Dominion of India on three subjects—Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications—after the paramountcy lapsed. "In other matters", he stated, "we would scrupulously respect their autonomous existence. It was not the desire of the Congress Administration to interfere in any manner whatsoever with the domestic affairs of the states."

paper. We were after something much bigger, that is, to gain the hearts of the people there, to have a real union. Indeed, the basis and the foundation for that real union had been laid in the past on a much more enduring basis than can even be effected by any legal or constitutional document. That basis had been these national movements there and here, our working together in cooperation for common ideals, and our having to endure common suffering. That was the real basis.

So we made it clear in the month of July 1947 that the state of Jammu and Kashmir should not be hustled into taking any action, though many of their leaders were personally inclined, but they knew their people too and they said that the initiative should come from the people and not merely from the Maharaja's Government, only then it will endure. We accepted that entirely.

And so we informed the Maharaja's Government, as well as the leaders of the popular movement there, that this matter of accession should not be hurried, that it should wait over till some method was found of consulting the people. And, at that time, what we envisaged was some kind of Constituent Assembly being elected there.⁶ In fact we envisaged that for other places too, wherever such a question arose. And we advised that, meanwhile, there should be Standstill Agreements with India and Pakistan that was going to come soon, so that no change need be made, except minor changes, and a little later, at leisure, this question could be considered further.

Well, of course, there was little of leisure that we had after the 15th August 1947. Upheavals took place in Pakistan, in the states in India bordering on Pakistan, and we had to pass through much pain and torment during that period. We could not think of Kashmir or any other place. We had to deal with the immediate issues that faced us from morning to evening.

Suddenly, the House will remember, in the last week of October 1947 an invasion took place of Kashmir through Pakistan. Now, it has been said in Pakistan often enough that there was some deep conspiracy on the part of India, allied with the leaders of Kashmir, to create trouble in various parts of the state, in Poonch area and the rest. It has also been said, some people have said, that we knew all about what was happening, this invasion, I mean.⁷ The

6. When the Maharaja of Kashmir, faced with the necessity of saving Kashmir from the raiders, was anxious to accede to India, it was decided on 26 October 1947 that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir should be accepted, subject to the proviso that a plebiscite would be held in the state when the law and order situation allowed.

7. It had been alleged that plans were made for sending Indian forces to Kashmir at some date before 22 October 1947, on which day the raid on the state from the direction of Abbotabad began. However, a note signed by the three British Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Air Force and Navy refuted this allegation. No plans were made for sending these forces, nor were such plans ever considered before 25 October, three days after the tribal invasion began.

fact of the matter is that, when we first heard the news of this invasion it came to us as a complete surprise. In fact, even the news did not reach us properly, because communications were not working properly. And when this dawned upon us we were taken much aback. For a day or two we gave very serious thought to this matter, and we did not quite know what we could do about it. We were far out of reach. Physically it was difficult. We were terribly busy with our own troubles here. However, as this raid and invasion developed, news came to us of rapine, killing and arson that was going on in its train, and naturally there was a great public feeling in India. Public feeling was aroused, and the House can well imagine what the state of public feeling in the State of Jammu and Kashmir was at the time. At that time we received independent appeals both from the Maharaja's Government and from the popular organization of Kashmir. The appeals were for help and for accession to India. We gave long and very anxious consideration to these, tried to consider and think out the implications etc., and we had to come to a quick decision. I remember, it must have been the 27th of October, after practically an all-day sitting in the evening we came to the conclusion that in spite of all the risks and dangers involved, we could not say "No" to that appeal and that we had to go there to help them.

It was not an easy matter because we could only go by air. We did not even know if the one and only temporary airfield was working or was in the hands of our foes. There was no other way to get there immediately and time was important, because every day brought further news of the depredations of those raiders. We decided to go to their help with all its consequences and within 12 hours of our decision, our troops were on the way by air. That was a fine piece of staff work on the part of our Army and Air Force. They arrived just in time; indeed it is possible that if they had arrived 24 hours late, the airfield would have been in the enemy's possession and that would have made matters much more difficult. From the airfield they went straight within a few miles to oppose these raiders. The raiders were driven back. Those raiders were supposed by us to be tribal people, no doubt encouraged and abetted by Pakistan. At first we did not think it was a major military operation to drive out these tribal people.

May I add here that before our forces reached there, probably before three or four days, the administration of Kashmir had completely collapsed. There was no administration. There was nobody, I cannot say definitely, but I hardly think there was any police force left or anything else. During these very critical days when this ruthless enemy was advancing on the famous city of Srinagar, the people of Srinagar had nobody to protect them, either big or small, and it was only the popular effort of the people, the volunteers of the National Conference, that protected that city and protected it, not so much from armed forces, they could not do that because they had no arms, but they gave the

necessary moral stimulus to the people and it is a fact worth remembering that when the enemy was within ten or twelve miles of Srinagar city, not a shop in Srinagar was closed. They were functioning. That showed the morale of the people and of the national movement at the moment of the severe crisis. We drove back these raiders and when we drove them back to a place called Uri, where only a year or more earlier, I had been a prisoner of the Maharaja's Government.⁸ Suddenly our forces discovered that a little beyond Uri they were not dealing with the tribal raiders, but with the armed might of the Pakistan army. That was a different matter that had to be dealt with on a different plane, and so for the moment our armed forces stopped there.

Well since then—this was in November 1947—war continued there and elsewhere in the state, on the Jammu side, on the Kashmir side and on the northern side. It continued for a year and a half nearly. Round about December when we saw that we were up against the regular forces of the Pakistan army, immediately we felt that the matter was likely to become much bigger than we had imagined, that might very well lead us to a full-scale war with Pakistan.

I should like the House to remember that time, because we must judge every event in the context of that period. It was a period when soon after Partition with all the troubles we had due to the Partition, and even our armies and services, everything else was split up; we wanted to settle down, and apart from that, so far as we are concerned, we are averse to war, if we can help it. When we saw this matter might well develop into a full-scale war against Pakistan, we decided to refer the matter to the United Nations, I think round about December 1947.⁹ Our reference was that certain tribal people had invaded the Kashmir state territory, behaved ruthlessly etc., that they had come through Pakistan territory and that Pakistan had aided and abetted them in doing so. Our request to the United Nations or the Security Council was that they should inform Pakistan not to aid and abet these people. That was our request and that was the question we put. For the rest we proposed to deal with the situation ourselves.

Our object was that the war should not spread in this way. We had, of course, asked Pakistan directly this question. But Pakistan had stoutly denied having anything to do with the matter.¹⁰ It was rather difficult to understand

8. To help in finding a solution to the problem of Kashmir and to arrange for Shaikh Abdullah's defence, Nehru along with some lawyers had gone to Kashmir on 19 June 1947. He was detained for defying an order prohibiting his entry into Kashmir. On the Congress Working Committee's advice, he returned to Delhi on 22 June. See *Selected Works* (First Series), Vol. 15, pp. 378-419.

9. On 31 December 1947, the Government of India formally appealed to the UN.

10. On 15 January 1948, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Zafarullah Khan, denied in a written reply to the UN, that assistance to the raiders was given by Pakistan and an act of aggression against India had been committed.

how a few thousand people could march through Pakistan territory almost unaware, so far as the Pakistan Government was concerned. However, they denied that the tribal people had marched through their territory with their help at all and they denied absolutely then and for some months afterwards, that any Pakistan force or any part of the Pakistan army had taken part in this Kashmir invasion. Later, we had plenty of evidence of this and in Delhi city a little museum was opened by our Defence people, showing the participation of the Pakistan army when they were doing it, because we had all kinds of captured materials, diaries of soldiers, insignia, etc.

In 1948 these military operations went on fiercely throughout the winter. It is a very difficult time in those high valleys of the Kashmir State during winter when you have to go up 15,000 feet or so.

Simultaneously, the Security Council came into the picture. At first for many months they talked and argued in New York. We were surprised because the question we had put was a very simple one and admitted only of a simple answer. We had not asked them to take our word for it, if it was challenged, as it was challenged by Pakistan. The obvious course was to find out for themselves if we were telling the truth or Pakistan was telling the truth in this matter.

During these four or five years of discussion, negotiation and mediation, that simple question that we put at the end of 1947 has not been answered and has not been considered in that way. It has been answered, in a sense, rather indirectly by the Resolution of the United Nations Commission that came here in 1948 when they said that a new situation had arisen because Pakistan troops were in Kashmir.¹¹ They did say that, because till the very eve of this statement, Pakistan Government had firmly denied the fact that their troops were there. That is an amazing instance of continuing to repeat what was patently false, and without foundation and which was found to be so by this United Nations Commission.

If I may just for a moment go back a little, on 31st December 1948, a ceasefire was agreed to between the parties.¹² Since then, there has been no military operation on any major scale. There have been petty raids; but,

11. The members of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan realized that "the entry of the Pakistan army in Kashmir constituted a material change in the situation" under the terms of the resolution of the Security Council dated 17 January 1948.

12. In the last week of December 1948, the UN Commission for India and Pakistan put forward a proposal for the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir after normal conditions had been restored. On its own initiative, the Government of India directed its Commander-in-Chief, Roy Bucher, to inform Douglas Gracey, Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan, that the Indian troops would ceasefire, provided Gracey could give an assurance of immediate reciprocal action on his part—which he did. A ceasefire was ordered by both army commands to take effect from midnight of 1 January 1949.

otherwise, there has been no serious fighting. That has been the position since then. Apart from local troubles and infiltrations, if you take that kind of thing, there is plenty of that; the scene has shifted to the Security Council of the United Nations, the United Nations Commission, United Nations representatives and the like, who have been visiting India from time to time. I shall not go into that history.

The latest mediator has been Dr Graham. Dr Graham has been here twice and has had long consultations with us and with the Pakistan Government, and is at the present moment in New York still continuing these conversations.¹³ He confined his enquiries almost entirely to what he called the demilitarization of the State. That word is hardly a happy word; but, nevertheless, for the sake of convenience we may use it. The position that we had agreed to when the United Nations Commission was here was this. In our desire to have peace, we had agreed to this, that first of all, Pakistan armies, auxiliaries and the rest, should withdraw from every inch of the State territory. In fact, we had laid the greatest stress on it, not merely for military reasons, but much more so for moral reasons. They had no business to be there. They had to withdraw. They had invaded. Even if Pakistan challenged the accession of Kashmir to India, and as the House knows, they have challenged it and called it a bogus accession¹⁴ and all that kind of thing—even leaving it apart, I shall deal with it a little later—whatever India's position in Kashmir might be, one thing is dead clear and dead certain that Pakistan had no position there, moral, political, constitutional or anything else, and Pakistan had no business to send any forces or abet any forces going there. So that, we made it an essential condition, pre-requisite of any kind of approach to a settlement with Pakistan, their withdrawal completely from that area which they had invaded and occupied. That was the thing agreed to in that Resolution of the United Nations Commission.

13. Frank Graham had been holding talks from 29 May to 16 July 1952, with the representatives of India and Pakistan in New York on a workable plan for demilitarizing Jammu and Kashmir and preparing the ground for the plebiscite administrator. Graham had suggested on 16 July 1952 that the strength of the troops on the Indian side of the ceasefire line should be 12,000 to 18,000, and on the Pakistan side, between 3,000 and 6,000, excluding 6,000 State Militia and 3,500 Northern Scouts respectively. The talks were inconclusive as Graham felt that further talks should now be held at ministerial level, preferably in Geneva.
14. The Government of Pakistan, in a statement on 30 October 1947, characterized the Kashmir accession as "based on fraud and violence and as such cannot be recognized." This was followed on 4 November by a broadcast by Liaquat Ali Khan saying that the accession was "a fraud on its people by its cowardly ruler with the aggressive help of the Government of India."

Meanwhile, something else had happened and that was the building up in the western area of the State, which was occupied by Pakistan, of forces sometimes called the 'Azad Kashmir' forces. They had built up local levies called 'Azad Kashmir' forces. At the time, that is in 1948, we did not have too much information about that, although we knew about it. We asked that these levies should be disbanded and disarmed. We could not ask them to go away from the State because the people lived in the State. We asked that they should be disbanded and disarmed. The form that the Commission put it later in the Resolution was: large-scale disbandment and disarmament of 'Azad Kashmir' forces.¹⁵

There has always been an argument between us and Pakistan on that issue. We have insisted that this meant, and we meant, a complete disbandment and disarmament: complete in the sense as far as could be. Some people may not give up arms, some may hide them, that is a different matter. Officially it must be complete. Pakistan did not agree to that interpretation. And this has been one of the arguments coming in the way of conversion of the ceasefire into a truce agreement. This was what Pakistan had to do.¹⁶ On our side, we had agreed to withdraw the bulk of our forces, mark the word bulk, from the State territory provided that we keep enough forces there to maintain the security of Kashmir from external invasion or any other internal troubles. It was always a condition that we must have enough forces; and we were the judges of that. We had said that we will withdraw the bulk of our forces, that is, when Pakistan armies had gone to Pakistan. We felt we could do that. This was more or less the position. Then came the ceasefire and these talks are taking place. These talks had got rather stuck up over the interpretation of the Resolutions passed in August 1948 and January 1949 by the United Nations Commission. I shall not go into these details.

Now, Dr Graham has been dealing solely with this so-called demilitarization problem. He laid down at one time twelve proposals. I think, as far as I can remember, we agreed to eight; about one or two, we wanted some change; and we did not agree to one or two.

15. Pakistan had surreptitiously built up 'Azad Kashmir' forces of 32 battalions ready to take over the position of the Pakistan forces which had to be withdrawn under UN Resolution of 13 August 1948. India later insisted on the prior liquidation of these forces, before she could undertake the withdrawal of the bulk of her forces. India relied on the assurance given to her by the UN Commission that large scale disbanding and disarming of the 'Azad' forces was to be done before the plebiscite.
16. The UN Commission's resolution of August 1948, acknowledged that the presence of Pakistani troops constituted a material change in the situation, and asked Pakistan to withdraw them first, along with the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident in Kashmir. The Indian withdrawal, limited to the bulk only, was to follow that of Pakistan. The resolution made plebiscite conditional upon Pakistan's withdrawal of troops from 'Azad Kashmir', but Pakistan did not comply.

May I go back a little? We had agreed to two proposals of the United Nations Commission in 1948 and 1949.¹⁷ The other things happened in between. But, at a later period, the Security Council passed a Resolution with which we did not agree and we made it perfectly clear in the Security Council that we could not possibly accept that Resolution because, apart from the fact that it went against even the resolutions passed by the Security Council itself at the instance of the Kashmir Commission, it was going back on that. So, we never accepted that Resolution, or parts of that Resolution.¹⁸ Dr Graham was appointed in terms of it later. We made it clear to Dr Graham.

I am not going into all matters. Other people came in between. I am saying that we did not accept that Resolution. But it has always been our point of view in the Security Council and elsewhere that we shall gladly, because we want peace and settlement, discuss this matter with anybody, certainly with a representative of the United Nations; and we are prepared to treat him as a mediator, but on no account are we prepared to agree to something which was imposed upon us. We are not prepared to have anything imposed upon us and we are not prepared to accept anything which goes against our own responsibilities in this matter. So, when Dr Graham came—he came here as a mediator, not in furtherance, so far as we are concerned, of that Resolution of the Security Council which we had not accepted. I might add that throughout his stay here, his visits here, Dr Graham has never mentioned that Resolution here. So, he concentrated his attention on the demilitarization, what is called demilitarization¹⁹ of the State, and although we agreed to many things that he said, there has always been a gap between our position and the position taken up by Pakistan. That gap has not yet been bridged.²⁰

I should like to express, if I may, my admiration for Dr Graham and his sincere efforts and extraordinary patience. He has undoubtedly, I believe, tried his utmost to achieve results, he desires it; and in some matters he has made

17. As per the Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, India had agreed to have the future of Kashmir State decided by an impartial plebiscite.

18. The Anglo-US resolution of 30 March 1951 bringing in new elements to the UN approach to the Kashmir issue envisaged: (i) the possibility of not treating the State as a single entity for allocation of areas to the two countries; (ii) stationing of a UN force; and arbitration. Though India rejected this resolution, the Security Council adopted it and appointed Frank Graham as its representative to bring about an agreement between India and Pakistan on the procedure for demilitarization and a plebiscite.

19. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 16 Part II, p. 248.

20. In his report of 25 April 1952, Graham, stated that eight of his twelve proposals of 7 September 1951 having been accepted, he had addressed himself to the four remaining points of difference. These were: (i) the character of forces to be left on both sides of the ceasefire line at the end of demilitarization; (ii) the quantum of these forces; (iii) the date for the occupation of demilitarized zone; and (iv) the date for the formal induction into office of the plebiscite administrator.

progress too but a certain gap still remains. So far as we are concerned, if I may say so with all respect, we have also been very patient, and we are prepared to match our patience with others' patience, because the consequences of being impatient are bad. So, these talks are going on, and certain reports appear in the newspapers. They are sometimes partly true, partly not true; it becomes very difficult for us to deal with these reports which are not made by any official source, but get out nevertheless. Now, that is so far as Dr Graham is concerned.

To go back to the other aspect, the position in 1948 in regard to Kashmir and all other states, the acceding states, was that they had acceded on three basic subjects: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. But, then the other states in India, all of them almost, were more closely integrated. The process of closer integration started and was achieved, very largely again, at the instance of Sardar Patel. So that we had a picture in India of practically no difference between the old states and the old Provinces. It is true that provisionally some States were called B States, some were called A States, and some C States, but that is exceedingly temporary, and that goes, that must go and it is going.²¹ In effect, that difference, which marked a Province and an old state was gone, and India became a much more closely integrated State.

Now, while that progress was going on in regard to other states, it did not go on in regard to Jammu and Kashmir state deliberately, for a variety of reasons. Well, reason number one was that the whole matter was in a fluid state, before the United Nations, etc. Reason number two, equally important, that from the very beginning, for obvious factors, we had recognized that the position of Kashmir was somewhat different. Thirdly, that from the very beginning we had repeated that from even before the Partition, I may inform the House that no step will be taken about Jammu and Kashmir state without the concurrence and consent of the people of Kashmir. So, deliberately, Kashmir remained with those three subjects, and those subjects only. Of course, when I say three subjects like Defence, Communications and Foreign Affairs, please remember that each subject itself is a category of subjects. It is a category, if you go into detail. We did not touch that. And Sardar Patel was all this time dealing with these matters.

This came to an end in November, I think, of 1949 when we were designing our Constitution in the Constituent Assembly. Well, we could not leave

21. According to Schedule I of the Indian Constitution, the Union was composed of four groups of States. To Part A belonged the former provinces of British India which already had a democratic form of Government. To Part B belonged the former princely states such as Hyderabad, Mysore, Kashmir, and Unions of States; C and D were under the control of the Central authority and administered by Lieutenant-Governors or Chief Commissioners and did not enjoy the same degree of autonomy as Part A and B States.

everything quite vague and fluid there. Something had to be stated in our Constitution about Jammu and Kashmir state. That problem had to be faced by Sardar Patel. Now, he did not wish to say very much, he wanted to leave it, we all wanted to leave it in a fluid condition because of these various factors and gradually to develop those relations, those legal and constitutional relations, and not to force the pace in any way. As a result of this, a rather unusual provision was made in our Constitution relating to Jammu and Kashmir. That provision is now in Article 370 in Part XXI,²² temporary and transitional provision.

Now, that Article if you will look into it—I will not trouble you by reading it—if you refer to it, if you are interested, you will see the position that emerged at the time of our finalizing our Constitution. And I might say that Article 370, although it is by no means a final Article, nevertheless, it defined more precisely the relationship of that unit—that constituent unit, with the Union of India. After that, on the 26th of January, the President issued an Order in terms of that Article 370, a President's Order defining the categories of subjects and parts of the Constitution that should be applicable to the Jammu and Kashmir State.

The position since the Constitution was framed is thus contained in Article 370 and in the President's Order following it. Article 370 was obviously of a transitional nature, and it allowed the President to make any additions to it, any variations to it, later on, the object being that if any change or addition was required, we need not have to go through the cumbrous process of amending our Constitution, but the President was given authority to amend it in the sense of adding a subject, part of a subject, whatever, it was to the other subjects, in regard to Kashmir. But in Article 370, the old principle was repeated and emphasized that all these changes or any change, required the approval of the Constituent Assembly of the Jammu and Kashmir State.

When this was put down in our Constitution, there was no Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir State, but we envisaged it. We had envisaged it for a long time. And if the Constituent Assembly was not there, then it required the consent of the Jammu and Kashmir Government. So that was the position.

The House will appreciate that throughout our position has been, from before Partition, that we will not take any step which might be considered a

22. Article 370, placed within Part XXI of the Indian Constitution, is intended to be a temporary and transitional provision. According to the provisions of this Article, the Union Parliament could make laws for Kashmir on those matters in the Union and Concurrent List only, which the President, in consultation with the State Government, would declare as corresponding to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession. The President could authorize legislation on other matters in the two Lists with the concurrence of the State Government as well. The State continued to remain part of the Indian Union as defined in Article I of the Indian Constitution and the concurrence of the State Government was declared to be necessary for any extension of Union jurisdiction over the State. The President retained, however, the power to abrogate the Article or modify its provisions on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State.

step in the nature of compulsion or coercion, that everything should flow with the consent of the people concerned. That was the basic position. In addition to that fact, when this became an international issue, we did not wish to do anything which might be thought as if we were trying to override or bypass any assurance that we had given to the United Nations. This rather fluid condition continued, and our relationship was fluid in this sense, namely legally fluid; otherwise there was no difficulty and we carried on. It might have continued sometime longer, one year, or two years, or three years. There is nothing to compel us. We were getting on in an ordinarily friendly and cooperative way. There was no other difficulty. There were minor matters. We discussed them and decided them.

Then came actually the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir into being, and it came into being with our goodwill some time last year. When the subject that the first elections to the Constituent Assembly were going to take place was mentioned there was a good deal of opposition to this idea in some foreign countries, which was voiced in the Security Council.²³ And I need not say that Pakistan disliked it intensely. However, I saw no reason why any foreign country should interfere with the internal relationship of Kashmir with India, and what the people of Kashmir do to themselves. If other countries objected to that, we objected strongly to their objection and we carried on. So this Constituent Assembly came into existence last year and it has done various things, various important reforms it has introduced, but then it set down to itself the major task of drawing up a constitution for the Jammu and Kashmir State.

Now immediately we were faced with this problem. It is all right to have a fluid state for some time, but when you draw up a precise constitution you have to be precise. This was the background and the reason for the talks we have been having amongst ourselves and with the leading members of the Jammu and Kashmir Government. We had no desire to make the relationship as a static, unchanging, or a finalized one; because the position is a dynamic one, a changing one. Nevertheless, it was perhaps too fluid and once a constitution is going to be framed, a greater precision was necessary and it was obviously necessary that there should not be any contradictory provision in that, which might not conform to the provisions of our Constitution. Hence these talks. Well, we had these talks for the last few days and I am going to tell you now what has emerged from these talks.

23. The Security Council passed a resolution on 30 March 1951 refusing to accept the verdict of the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir, for which elections were announced, if it should contemplate ratification of Kashmir's accession to India. India stressed that the decision of the Constituent Assembly would not stand in the way of India's commitment in regard to Kashmir.

But before I say that, I would like to remind you that one of the first things that this Constituent Assembly did was to tackle the land reform question,²⁴ and in the course of a few months, they have successfully accomplished them or almost accomplished them. I confess that I look with some envy on the speed and clarity with which they have performed this task there, considering the enormous trouble we have had in the various States in India, the difficulties, the obstructions and the delays that we have had to face, and so I became a little envious when I saw how this was done in Kashmir State.

I might just give you some indication of what was done there. It is said that they have expropriated the landlords there. That is not quite correct. They have put a ceiling on land holdings: the ceiling is roughly 23 acres, plus orchards. They did not touch orchards. They have allowed about 23 acres to remain with every person possessing land, plus the orchards he possesses. They have not touched them at all. And the House ought to remember that orchards are very important in Kashmir which is a great fruit-growing country. Then there are some other lands, grazing lands etc.; they are also still with the landholders. That matter will be considered further later. I said that each person has been allowed 23 acres. It should be remembered that the average holding of land in Kashmir State is barely two acres, and so the 23 acres is a fairly generous holding ceiling that has been given.

Now, in regard to the talks we have had, the position, obviously the admitted position, is that the Jammu and Kashmir State is a constituent part or unit of the Indian Republic. It is a unit of India and is, therefore, a part of the territory of India. That is the basic position.

The question of citizenship arose obviously. Full citizenship applies there. But our friends from Kashmir were very apprehensive about one or two matters.²⁵ For a long time past, in the Maharaja's time, there had been laws

24. The land reform legislation, enacted in April 1948, abolished *jagirdari* without compensation, protected tenancy in respect of holdings between 4.125 and 8.125 acres, restricted ejection of tenants, and reduced rents considerably. These steps led to the abolition of big landed estates which passed into the possession of the tillers themselves. Under the reforms the State established cooperative and collective farms. By March 1953 the State Government claimed that it had transferred 188,955 acres to 153,399 tillers.

25. In accordance with Article 5 of the Indian Constitution, the persons who had their domicile in the State were to be the citizens of India. The Kashmir Constituent Assembly, however, reserved the right to define and regulate the rights and privileges of the permanent residents of the State in regard to acquisition of property and appointment to services. The permanent residents were the State subjects who had been declared so under the proclamation of the Maharaja dated 27 June 1932. Special provisions were to be made in the law governing the citizenship to provide for the return of those permanent residents of the State who had gone over to Pakistan in 1947 and returned with the intention of settling in the State.

there preventing any outsider, that is, any person from outside Kashmir, from acquiring or holding land in Kashmir. If I may mention it, in the old days the Maharaja was very much afraid of a large number of Englishmen coming and settling down there, because the climate is delectable, and acquiring property. So, although most of their rights were taken away from the Maharaja under the British rule, the Maharaja stuck to this that nobody from outside should acquire land there. And that continues. And in the state subjects notification by the Maharaja, they have defined four grades of subjects, Class number one, Class two, Class three and Class four.²⁶ And unless you come in one of these classes, you just cannot acquire land there, or any immovable property. So the present Government of Kashmir is very anxious to preserve that right because they are afraid, and I think rightly afraid, that Kashmir would be overrun by people whose sole qualification might be the possession of too much money and nothing else, who might buy up and get the delectable places. Now they want to vary the old Maharaja's laws to liberalize it, but nevertheless to have checks on the acquisition of lands by persons from outside. So far as we are concerned, I agree that under Article 19, clause (5), of our Constitution, we think it is clearly permissible both in regard to the existing law and any subsequent legislation. However, we agreed that this should be cleared up. The old state's subjects definition gave certain privileges regarding this acquisition of land, the services, and other minor things, I think, State scholarships and the rest. So, we agreed and noted this down:

The State Legislature shall have power to define and regulate the rights and privileges of the permanent residents of the State, more especially in regard to the acquisition of immovable property, appointments to services and like matters. Till then the existing State law should apply.

Then there was another matter relating to citizenship, because owing to these troubles in Kashmir since 1947, and a little before and after, there have been large numbers of people who have gone out of Kashmir but want to return. In fact in our own Constitution, some provision has been made, and I might inform the House that this question was raised early this year or last year about the inclusion of a large number of migrants from East Bengal. We could not include them in our electoral rolls, because they came too late. We

26. A notification of 20 April 1927 classified the state subjects as follows: Class I included persons who were born and residing in the state before the reign of Maharaja Gulab Singh and also those who had settled and been permanently residing there before 1885; Class II included those, other than belonging to Class I, who had settled in the state before 1911 and also acquired immovable property; Class III included those permanently residing in the state and who had acquired any immovable property or who might have acquired such property after ten years of continuous residence; Class IV included those not covered under the Classes I, II, and III.

are including them now. Those that fulfil the conditions will all come in. So those, who had gone away from Kashmir into Pakistan or elsewhere, and who normally speaking might not be eligible for citizenship, should be provided for, if they want to return. So we said:

Special provision should be made in the laws governing citizenship for the return of those permanent residents of Jammu and Kashmir State, who went to Pakistan in connection with the disturbances of 1947 or earlier in fear of them, and could not return. If they return they should be entitled to the rights and privileges and obligations of citizenship.

Then came the question of Fundamental Rights. Now there was general agreement that there should be Fundamental Rights and these Fundamental Rights should apply to the State. But again there were great apprehensions in the minds of our friends from Kashmir. First of all, the question was how far these Fundamental Rights might come in the way of their land legislation now or any later development of it. Certainly we did not want them to come in the way of their land legislation. We like their land legislation. We thought it was very good. In fact, it is quite impossible to upset a thing that has been done, but we said the matter should be cleared.

The second thing was this. Owing to all this business of invasion of Kashmir State, war, ceasefire, all kinds of continuing tensions, difficulties due to infiltration etc., constant attempts are made by infiltration, espionage cases are repeatedly heard, there is sabotage and the rest, but if you go to that State, you find normalcy there, that is to say, the State functioning normally, but behind that normalcy there is this tension, constant tension of an enemy trying to come in to create trouble, to disturb, and all that. The State Government has to be wary and watchful all the time, and so we were told that it was possible that some part of the Fundamental Rights provisions might very well hamper the activities of the State Government from taking these precautions and these measures. We agreed that it was essential and in the interests of Kashmir, situated as the State is now, that the State Government should have that authority. So subject to this, further consideration can be given to it as to how this could be done, so that a fuller consideration of this and like matters was necessary, so that the Fundamental Rights might be applied with such modifications and exceptions as might be considered necessary from this point of view, and agreed upon.

Then in regard to the Supreme Court, it was agreed that the Supreme Court should have original jurisdiction in respect of disputes mentioned in Article 131 of the Constitution of India. It was further agreed that the Supreme Court should have jurisdiction in regard to Fundamental Rights which are applied to that State. On behalf of the Government of India we recommended that the Advisory Tribunal in the State which is designated as His Highness's

Board of Judicial Advisers should be abolished, and the jurisdiction exercised by it should be vested in the Supreme Court of India, that is to say, that the Supreme Court should be the final Court of Appeal in all civil and criminal matters as laid down in the Constitution of India. The Kashmir Government delegation had no objection to this. They were prepared to agree, but they said they would like to consider the matter in some detail further.

Now I come to the question which has been much discussed and referred to in the newspapers, the question of the Head of the State.

I might mention that, apart from past history, when this Constituent Assembly met in Kashmir, the inaugural address to that Assembly stated quite clearly some of the policies that they were going to pursue, and among these policies was the election, by democratic process, of the Head of the State. That has been the declared policy of the National Conference organisation in Kashmir for a long time. We had no objection with regard to the enunciation of that principle then.

Now, after careful consideration—because we have always had to consider two matters: firstly to give effect to the wishes of the people of the State and secondly to give effect to our own Constitution—we have come to an agreed formula. Of course, you will not attach too much importance to the language—a word here or there. For legal and constitutional purposes the words may be changed, but it describes the way we have been thinking and what we have agreed to. Now it was agreed:

- (1) That the Head of the State shall be the person recognized by the President on the recommendation of the legislature of the State (How the legislature of the State recommends is a matter for the legislature. Whether it is by the process of election or not, it is for them to decide; it may be by the process of a majority, or two-thirds majority; it is entirely for them to decide. Anyhow they recommend and then it is for the President to recognize).
- (2) He, that is, the Head of the State, shall hold office during the pleasure of the President.
- (3) He—the Head of the State—may by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office.
- (4) Subject to the foregoing provisions of the Article, the Head of the State shall hold office for a term of five years from the date he enters upon his office, provided that he shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office. That is so far as the Head of the State is concerned.

Then there has been a good deal of misunderstanding in regard to the National Flag. This has been cleared up, I think, adequately by public statements made. Nevertheless, we thought that this should be further cleared up. Shaikh

Abdullah, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir State, had stated publicly that the question did not arise so far as they were concerned, because the National Flag was the supreme flag and it had exactly the same status and position in the Jammu and Kashmir State as in any other part of India. The State flag was in no sense a rival to the National Flag, but for historical and sentimental reasons connected with their struggle for freedom in Kashmir, they wanted this State symbol to continue. This was agreed to. It was added that this should be made clear in a formal manner, preferably by the Constituent Assembly of the State.

Then in regard to the President of India, it was agreed that the powers to reprieve and commute death sentences, etc. should belong to the President of India.

There has been some talk about financial integration. It was decided that such financial arrangements between the State and the Government of India should be considered further and details worked out. The position, as I said, is a dynamic, changing one. Matters have to be gone into in some detail; so whatever the financial arrangements might be, we shall gradually make them out.

Then there is the question of emergency powers contained in our Constitution, more especially in our Article 352 of the Constitution. It was agreed to. I will remind the House what Article 352 is: in case of invasion, external danger or internal disturbances, the President has power to declare a state of emergency, and then various consequences flow from it. This Parliament is then seized of the position. Now this was agreed to; but the friends from Kashmir were slightly apprehensive of what 'internal disturbances' meant there. For the rest they have said, of course if there is a grave emergency this should happen. So, with regard to adding some words to clear up, not to clear up that matter but rather to bring in the fact that in the case of internal disturbances any action taken should be with the concurrence of the Government of the State. It was agreed that Article 352 of the Constitution should apply to the State with the addition at the end of the first paragraph of the following words:

but in regard to internal disturbances, at the request or with the concurrence of the Government of the State.

That is, the State of emergency will be declared with the concurrence of the Government of the State.

These are the principal things that have been discussed and I think that we have arrived at very satisfactory decisions—agreements which are in consonance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir and in consonance with our Constitution. I would repeat that there is nothing final about this and gradually we can fill in other details later. I presume that at the present moment, as I said, the relationship of Kashmir with the Union of India is governed

more or less by Article 370 of our Constitution. Now the accession has been complete. There is a certain confusion in people's minds. The accession is complete in law and, in fact, Jammu and Kashmir State is a constituent unit like any other. It is a part of the territory of India, the people of Jammu and Kashmir are citizens of India like any other. But the fact that the subjects to which Jammu and Kashmir has acceded are limited, or less than those applying to other States, that fact produces this misunderstanding as if there was partial accession. That is not so. Accession is quite complete. In fact, all the states acceded only in regard to these three subjects to begin with; it may be that we may have more subjects later, but we are proceeding, and we propose to proceed always in such matters with the consent of the other parties concerned. Now, presumably the President of the Union will have to issue some order under Article 370 of the Constitution to give effect to any of these modifications or changes that we have suggested.

I am very grateful to you, Sir, and to the House for the indulgence shown to me.

4. Constitutional Changes in Kashmir¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: You can ask me questions on any of the usual subjects but we shall begin with Kashmir.

Question: Can we take it that the Yuvaraj will be the first Head of the State?

JN: That is not a constitutional matter. That is a matter of personal agreement between the parties concerned.

Q: Referring to Fundamental Rights, do you think the Jammu and Kashmir Government with its present set-up will permit entry of papers which belong

1. Remarks at a press conference, New Delhi, 24 July 1952. Shaikh Abdullah was also present at the conference. From the Press Information Bureau. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference see, pp. 149, 583-584, 617, 637-638, 660-661, 662-663 and 665-666.

to the opposition parties, entry of which has been banned into the State?²

JN: There is no question of the Jammu and Kashmir Government being permitted to do so. The question is how much it will permit itself to do. In regard to Fundamental Rights, the Jammu and Kashmir State is in a very special position. I mentioned the question of land reforms; other questions come and the peculiar situation in regard to Pakistan and all that. Therefore, the Government has to exercise special powers; they have to have those powers. How they exercise them is left to their discretion.

Q: Will the law of the State permit the papers, which are denied entry into the State, to go to the court?

JN: You have not followed my speech in Parliament today.³ Under our Constitution any State Government has large autonomy to decide. For instance, we are discussing here the Preventive Detention Act.⁴ It is a concurrent piece of legislation. Any State Government can have the Preventive Detention Act, naturally within some limits, but the Central Act can override the Provincial Acts. We have got that authority. The State Government has its own. In the same way the Jammu and Kashmir Government can have its own Act. In regard to such measures, it can legislate for the purpose. That is a measure of autonomy.

Q: Have you tried to ensure that the Supreme Court will not be able to undo the land reforms of the Kashmir Government?

JN: At the present moment, the Supreme Court, in terms of the Constitution, cannot interfere because if you look at the Article of the Constitution which applies to Kashmir—Article 370, if you look at the President's order passed

2. On 31 October 1947, all newspapers advocating Kashmir's accession to Pakistan or its independence had either been stopped from publication or put under precensorship. Subsequently, the newspapers like *Pratap*, *The Hindu*, *Milap*, *Prabhat*, the *Organiser* and many others, which had a large circulation in the State, had been banned for having criticized Kashmir Government's policies and calling for full integration of the State with India.
3. See the preceding item.
4. The Preventive Detention Act of 1950 was meant to save the country from the anti-social and subversive forces. While the Union has exclusive power only when such law is required in connection with defence, foreign affairs or the security of the country, the States have power, concurrently with the Union, to provide for preventive detention for reasons connected with the security of the State, maintenance of public order, or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.

therein, you will find the limitations.⁵ It is proposed for the first time to bring the Supreme Court into the picture when constitutional changes are made, but, as I have stated in regard to land reforms and in other matters, that particular Article in our Constitution will not come in the way.⁶

Q: According to our Constitution, the Fundamental Rights are restricted only in respect of security of the State. Shaikh Sahib has said this in respect of class hatred and communalism, etc.

JN: But the security of the State, I fear, applies very much to Kashmir at the present moment. The criterion laid down in laws—the law may be Central or by a State—is that in a particular matter the State will have authority to pass its own laws. That is the criterion.⁷ If they go to the contrary, then of course it cannot apply; it depends how far they go contrary to the State.

Q: You remarked in your speech that the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir State was one kind of machinery that was envisaged to come into being to decide the question of what is the will of the people of Kashmir. Could you tell us, after the Constituent Assembly has been created, is there any necessity of our pressing the case of Kashmir before the Security Council when that machinery is already in existence, deciding the future of Kashmir?

JN: Simply because we have given certain assurances, we do not wish to break any assurances we have given. You may remember that when the Constituent Assembly was being formed about a year ago, even then we assured the United Nations that our assurances will not be affected so far as the Government of India are concerned.⁸

5. Article 370 lays down that the President and Parliament can exercise limited law-making power for Kashmir.
6. Under the agreement, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction was recognized in regard to such Fundamental Rights as would be agreed to by the State, as also regarding disputes under Article 131 of the Indian Constitution. It would be the final court of appeal. But the Fundamental Rights would apply to Kashmir, subject to the provision that they would not encroach upon the programme of land reform without compensation, nor must they hamper the State's measures concerning its security.
7. The agreement left open the extent of the application of the Fundamental Rights to the discretion of the State legislature. Also the persons who attempted infiltration, sabotage, espionage, etc. would be debarred from the enjoyment of Fundamental Rights.
8. B.N. Rau, India's Representative at the UN, stated before the Security Council on 21 March 1951 that Kashmir was an autonomous State in a federation and had every right to have its own constitution. The Constituent Assembly it had proposed to set up could express an opinion on the issue of accession, but this would not prejudice the issues before the Security Council.

Q: Suppose the Constituent Assembly takes one decision and the Security Council takes another decision, will it not clash with the sovereignty of the State?

JN: Unless the Security Council functions under some other Sections of the Charter⁹ it cannot take any decision which is binding upon us unless we agree to it. They are functioning as mediators and a mediator means getting people to agree.

Q: Now that the Government of India have accepted the Kashmir Government's desire about the election of the Head of the State and the land reforms, do the Government of India think of advising other State Governments to follow suit?

JN: That is a matter for the Government of India to consider at leisure.

Q: Just now, Sir, you said that it is a question of the Kashmir Government being able to make laws in conformity with the Fundamental Rights. But when the Kashmir Government is going to define the Fundamental Right in regard to freedom of speech, will there be any restrictions or what will be the additional power of the State under these Fundamental Rights to restrict the freedom of speech?

JN: I cannot give you the legal language or the exact words. But the point is that, so far as the Fundamental Rights are concerned, a large number of them by agreement will apply anyhow. Some others which come in the way of the present conditions of the State will be restricted. As a matter of fact even now under the Fundamental Rights there are restrictions if you look hard enough. Take the question of property. There are restrictions on owning of land and requisition of land. Today, in eastern Assam, there are restrictions regarding acquisition of property from the tribal areas by any outsiders. All kinds of restrictions are there. In the U.P. Land Act it is laid down that no one can acquire land more than 30 acres, I think. These are all restrictions coming in gradually with social reforms. It is rather an abstract conception. The Kashmir Government has passed a land reform law which I believe roughly restricts it to 23 acres. The principle is the same. I cannot say immediately what the

9. The Kashmir dispute was brought before the Security Council by India on 1 January 1948, under Article 35 of the UN Charter, which lays down that any member may bring any situation, whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, to the attention of the Security Council.

decision of the Supreme Court might be on the matter because I am rather in doubt about that. I think the Kashmir Government has every right under the present Fundamental Rights. But, because there might be some doubt, we want to clear up that doubt so that this burden of decision on this point might not fall on the Supreme Court. But other points will come to it.

Q: The question is: Apart from the right of property what will be the position regarding rights of persons and expression to which the Kashmir Government may have no theoretical objection at least.

JN: Shaikh Abdullah has told you that in regard to rights of expression, their present law limits it or restricts it, prevents anything which is considered as promoting communal hatred.¹⁰ There is Section 153 in India—I have forgotten exactly what it is—against communal hatred or something like that. It is only the same principle being applied.

Q: Is it a fact that these agreements will go against the Government of India's assurances to the United Nations?

JN: What has the United Nations got to do? These agreements, so far as the Government of India's assurance to the United Nations goes, do not deal with the internal conditions or arrangements, governmental or other in Kashmir or our relations with each other. They deal with certain basic problems. Suppose we have given an assurance—the original assurance was—that the people of Kashmir will decide about their future. The next step to that was that the plebiscite should be held. Well, we stand by all those things.

Q: Plebiscite to decide what? Where is that necessity of a plebiscite now that you have got the Constituent Assembly?

JN: Maybe theoretically. You may be right. But we have given them an assurance and we stand by it.

Q: You have said that accession is complete.

JN: Yes, because it has been complete all the time. Nobody has doubted that—not even when the United Nations Commission that came here. But being complete, it can be upset by other things or ended.

10. Shaikh Abdullah had said that the policy of the Kashmir Government with regard to the freedom of press was that all those papers spreading communal hatred or class hatred "which goes against the very fundamental basic principles of the secular democratic State will not be permitted and for these papers which fall under that category it will be very difficult for Kashmir to permit their entry into the State."

Q: By whom?

JN: By the wishes of the Kashmir people expressed in the proper way.

Q: It has already been done.

JN: Surely a thing may be complete. It was complete and there was no difference between the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the accession of any other State in India. Every State acceded completely. Only two years later a further progress of integration has taken place between the other States and the Union Government. That had nothing to do with the accession. The accession was complete before that. Take Mysore or any other State. But then further integration took place. They, instead of having a separate constitution of their own, accepted the other provisions of the Constitution.¹¹ This has nothing to do with accession. It may be that some States acceded a little more and some States a little less in regard to certain matters. Some subjects become common, and ultimately it becomes a list of common subjects and a list of separate subjects in the Constitution.

Q: Why don't you send the Nizam and other Princes the Hari Singh way?

JN: I suppose we can rely on history to do that.

Q: Supposing the people of Hyderabad take some initiative in the matter, what will be the attitude of the Government of India?

JN: You don't expect me to say what the Government of India will do and will not do in a certain hypothetical situation.

Q: Can you give us an idea of the latest proposal of Dr Graham to expedite an agreement on Kashmir?

JN: It is rather difficult for me because the proposals are not final, except that Dr Graham is continuing and carrying on the process of mediation and trying to narrow down any differences that may exist, but there are no specific finalized proposals yet.

11. On 29 October 1947, the Maharaja of Mysore had set up a Constituent Assembly to frame a constitution for the State. This Constituent Assembly passed a resolution recommending that the Constitution framed by the Constituent Assembly of the Indian Union should be adopted by Mysore. Effect was given to this by a proclamation issued by the Maharaja on 25 November 1949. The Constituent Assembly of Mysore became the Interim Legislature of the State until elections could be held under the new Constitution of India.

Q: Is the Kashmir Government against all vested interests present or future or any vested interests in land?

JN: These are moot questions, but I suggest to you that you read the Kashmir Government's policy book called "New Kashmir"¹² and it will give you some idea about what you are looking for.

Q: But there have been some departures from that.

JN: Maybe the general approach is modified by circumstances.

Q: Do not the residuary powers continue to vest in the Kashmir State?

JN: Yes, because the present position is that, apart from those powers mentioned in Article 370, the other powers remain with the State. If you read these Articles you will find that no change can be introduced without the consent of the State.¹³

Q: With regard to the emergency provisions, in regard to internal disturbances or breakdown of the constitutional machinery, if any emergency proclamation has to be declared in any part of the territory of India, say in Madras or anywhere else, what happens in the case of Kashmir. Will you have to consult the Kashmir Government?

JN: An emergency? I do not know what might happen if any atom bomb falls on India, but an emergency may be declared for part of the country. India is a huge country. It is inconceivable an emergency will arise all over India unless India goes some other way. It is only for part of the country, in fact in reference to a particular State. In this particular matter, if it is a question of internal disturbance, it is done at the request of the State concerned.¹⁴ I might

12. At the annual session in Sopore on 29 and 30 September 1944, the National Conference adopted a two-part "New Kashmir" manifesto outlining a scheme for constitutional and economic developments. It spelt out that the aim of the National Conference was "to fight the immemorial poverty of the peasant and the artisan, and the unmitigated helplessness of the worker."
13. Under the agreement, in contrast to the Constitution of India which vests the residuary powers of legislation in the Centre, these were to be vested in the legislature of the State. This was in keeping with the provisions of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, and the Instrument of Accession on which it was based. During the negotiations Shaikh Abdullah had said: "We have always held that the ultimate source of sovereignty resides in the people."
14. The agreement stipulated that so far as the internal disturbances in the State were concerned, the jurisdiction of Article 352 would be attracted only "at the request or with the concurrence of the Government of the State." In the case of the other States of India, no such power lies with their Governments.

inform you that I believe this provision is there in the United States of America to declare an emergency at the request and with the concurrence of the State concerned.

Q: Supposing a situation arises in Kashmir, as that in Punjab when the Constitution had to be suspended, what would be the position if the declaration of an emergency was conditional to the consent of the State Government?

JN: That is another Article. That does not apply. That was a constitutional difficulty that occurred.¹⁵ That for the moment does not apply here.

Q: What progress has been made in the discussions¹⁶ regarding financial integration?

JN: Not very much, except that we discuss this matter from time to time and the bigger questions will be gradually discussed. There is no particular urgency about finalizing them. We discuss them as occasion arises.

Q: You said this morning that each of the three subjects for which Kashmir has acceded to India is itself a category of subjects.¹⁷ Can you explain it further?

JN: If you look at the President's Order dated the 26th January 1950, you will find a large number of subjects mentioned in it which really are, shall I say, the children of these three subjects. Each is a category. I will give an example—say Defence. If you look at List No. 1, that is the Union List, there are many subjects in List No. 1 that come under Defence. Defence is a subject plus other subjects that may come in it. It becomes a category. That has been defined in fact.

Q: Has the Kashmir Government accepted the interpretation upon the category of subjects as put out by the Government of India when the order was promulgated.

15. In June 1951, in the Punjab, when an alternative Ministry could not be formed after the resignation of Gopichand Bhargava's Ministry, the President assumed, under Article 356, the functions of the Government of the State.
16. Gopalaswami Ayyangar visited Jammu for three days in the first week of April 1952 to arrange for the financial integration between Kashmir and the Indian Union through the extension of the jurisdiction of the Comptroller and Auditor-General to the State.
17. See *ante*, p. 231.

JN: I do not know what is meant by "accepted it". I cannot say that correspondence took place at that time. But the point is at the present moment, now, a certain precision is being given when the constitution is drafted by the Constituent Assembly. Precision will have to be given for these various matters.

Q: Could you say when these agreements will be implemented?

JN: Because the Kashmir situation has been a dynamic one, deliberately we did not wish to give it rigidity. If the question had not come up, possibly we would not have discussed it now. But when the Kashmir Constituent Assembly is going to draw up its own constitution, the precision is necessary for them and they were anxious, and we were also anxious, that there should be conformity between the constitution and the provisions of the Indian Constitution. Therefore we discussed it. As the Kashmir constitution comes into shape, each part will be discussed fully between us to prevent any non-conformity arising from time to time—I cannot say immediately—by President's order, under Article 370, these will be declared.

Q: In regard to the appointment of a Head of the State, the State Assembly is to recommend the person and the President is to appoint him. In case the President does not agree with the recommended name, what would be the constitutional position?

JN: Conflict. I might tell you this. Let us take the appointment of Governors. There is no constitutional provision about it but no Governor is appointed to any State in India without the concurrence of the State Government—that means the Assembly. For the moment the State Government is supposed to represent the Assembly. Sometimes I have had to send three, four to six names to the States and when they are not approved I have to think of another.

Q: What was the position when the Governor-General was to be appointed? Could you have recommended anybody and would it have been approved by His Majesty?

JN: Of course.

Q: What will be the title of the Head of the State.

JN: It has not been decided yet.

Q: Perhaps Shaikh Saheb could reply to that.

JN: I am telling you after consulting Shaikh Saheb.

Q: Have you definitely come to the conclusion that the Presidential order will be quite enough to amend the Constitution and it will not be necessary to go to Parliament.

JN: That is a matter for our Law Ministry and others to determine. *Prima facie* it appears that under Article 370 this can be done. In fact, Article 370 has made special provision for this very purpose to make changes.

Q: Will the Government of India send a Cabinet Minister to Geneva to meet Dr Graham if so desired?

JN: That raises the question of the convenience of the Government of India and of the Cabinet Minister concerned. For instance, in the course of the next few weeks it is quite inconceivable to go away when Parliament is sitting.

Q: In regard to services, is it the position that only Kashmiris will be taken into Kashmir services, or will persons from India also be allowed to join their services?

JN: Kashmiris will, of course, be taken, and they are taken. Well, in Kashmir, the present law was put into some legal shape in 1927 by the Maharaja's decree, though actually it existed even before that in some form or other. That divided the residents of Kashmir into four classes or groups, group one, two, three and four, in order of preference in regard to services, in regard to acquisition of property, State scholarships and the like. Beyond these four, nobody could acquire property, though by the Maharaja's decree anything could be done. Anyway there was this order of preference—the first class Kashmiri, the second class Kashmiri, the third class Kashmiri and the fourth class Kashmiri. Presumably all this will be put an end to now and something more uniform brought in.

It is always open to the Kashmir Government to engage anybody anywhere. The point is, they will always show preference to their own men, but if they do not get qualified men, they will look for them elsewhere.

Q: Was not Prof. K.T. Shah employed by the Kashmir Government?

JN: Not exactly employed; Prof. Shah worked as an expert adviser.

Q: Barring the constitutional changes that have been suggested, will the constitution of Kashmir be in conformity with the present Indian Constitution?

JN: It will have to be, won't it? That is the whole purpose of these talks. Part of the Indian Constitution automatically applies, some parts do not. You may remember that, although the Indian Constitution is one compact whole, in fact it is something containing the State Constitutions and the Union Constitution all put together. The State has independent entity, having special powers over which the Government of India has no right to interfere, except in a state of emergency when the President so declares. Otherwise, it can do what it likes within that region. Then there are other powers which are confined to the Centre. And then there are lists of powers which are concurrent. There is that division of sovereignty, if you like, in these things. Ultimately there is the sovereignty of the Union, and in an emergency the Union can do this or that. Now, there is no essential difference between putting the separation separately instead of into one constitution.

Q: In view of what you have said that the Kashmiri should be preferred in Kashmir, do you think it is in conformity with our Constitution?¹⁸ While Kashmiris can go to any part of the country—and nobody can prevent them—nobody from any other part of the country can enter into service there.

JN: I do not know and cannot give you a legal answer.

Q: I want a moral answer.

JN: I can tell you that I have known in many States this preference to people of the State being given. I do not want to name any State, but that is a normal policy of the States in India. They prefer their own people, though others are not excluded. It is only a question of preference.

18. Article 16 of the Indian Constitution makes it clear that no citizen of the Indian Republic could be denied employment for reasons of caste, colour, creed or place of birth.

Q: It appears from your statement this morning that the Head of the State will be, in most particulars, like the Governor of an Indian State. Would that include also the salary?

JN: Salary is a matter to be fixed. Salary is not an absolutely permanent thing which cannot be touched. That may be varied at any time.

Q: Specifically will Article 31¹⁹ regarding Fundamental Rights apply to the State of Kashmir?

JN: I told you that there may be others which may apply but with certain exceptions and modifications.

Q: Will the Maharaja continue to receive his salary? At present the State Government is paying Rs 6 lakhs as salary and is actually making a gift. Is it going to be cut?

JN: That is true. We do many things in the world which we do not like, for the sake of peace.

Q: In view of the talks having concluded happily in an agreement and the atmosphere having very much improved, would it be correct to presume that the National Conference would make now an attempt to reach some sort of agreement—at least it can take the initiative—with the Opposition²⁰ in the State?

JN: It is not for me to answer, but I am sure the National Conference always wants to have as much cooperation as possible.

Q: Since the constitutional position has been made clear, is the demand for regional autonomy for the people of Ladakh²¹ and Jammu to be left to the Kashmir Government or will it come up to the Centre?

19. Article 31 of the Indian Constitution stipulates that the law must specify the compensation or the principles on which it should be paid. The courts can have no say unless the compensation is so grossly inadequate as to amount to a fraud on the right to property.

20. Opposition to the National Conference came from Jammu's Praja Parishad which was supported by the Hindu Mahasabha and other communal groups outside the State. The Praja Parishad demanded the recognition of the necessity for different policies for different areas of Kashmir. On 26 June 1952, a big demonstration was staged both outside and inside Parliament in Delhi to reinforce the Jammu Praja Parishad demand. N.C. Chatterjee ridiculed the idea of a republic within a republic while S.P. Mookerjee cast aspersions on Shaikh Abdullah's impartiality, doubting his secularism.

21. The Buddhists of Ladakh at this time expressed preference to union with India or Tibet rather than to being treated as "second class citizens" by the Kashmir Government.

JN: Ladakh and Jammu are parts of the Jammu and Kashmir State. Are they not?

Q: They are as much a part of Kashmir as Kashmir is a part of India.

JN: You are perfectly right.

Q: Will they have the same status, Sir? For the sake of peace you might entertain the claims of the people of Ladakh and Jammu.

JN: What do you mean? Split up Kashmir.

Q: If the Kashmiris do not like to live under the Dogras, are not the Dogras entitled to live separately?

JN: At that rate, you can go on to each village.

Q: Sir, during the last four years Shaikh Saheb has said that he is not prepared to live under the Dogras. Very good. On the same principle, the Dogras are perfectly entitled to ask....

JN: I do not know what you mean by the Dogras. You may mean Dogras as a dynasty or a clan. A dynasty does not mean anything more than a dynasty. So also, a clan does not mean anything more than a clan. There is a Minister of the Kashmir Government who is a Dogra.²² He is the Minister in charge of Finance and he is a Dogra. I am sure he approves of the Kashmir Government and he approves of these things. So, these things are internal disagreements which, I am sure, could be set right.

Q: But there was constitutional unity of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh under one sovereign.²³

JN: I did not wish to say, but Shaikh Saheb has said it, that they have been considering regional autonomy within the larger State.

22. Girdharilal Dogra.

23. Shaikh Abdullah, who replied to this comment, said that the unity was not due to one sovereign. The "New Kashmir" programme visualized that, under regional autonomy, any cultural unit could have full right to cultural freedom. Nobody could force any section of the population to be part of that unit if it did not wish. The constitution of Kashmir, being evolved, would treat anyone in the State, whether he belonged to Kashmir, Jammu or Ladakh, as one within the larger unit.

Q: Sir, I did not put that question with any specific point. You just now said that we have to do so many things for the sake of peace. For the sake of that very peace, I asked, will the Jammu and Kashmir Government be prepared to give all those facilities to the people of Jammu and Ladakh if they did not want to remain with the Kashmiri people?

JN: But I think he²⁴ has just answered that.²⁵

Q: Sir, there was a report that Shaikh Sahib has said that if Jammu and Ladakh wanted to have full accession with India, they could have it. Is it correct?²⁶

JN: I will tell you that I do not know about Shaikh Saheb, but speaking of difficulties about the Indian Constitution, I should like to change it now. And we propose to do it in the course of time. But it is a complicated process. We have had two years' experience now. It is an excellent Constitution, but in a huge Constitution like this there are many things that, after experience, seem to us to be worth changing.

Q: Will you change the Constitution in such a way that the other States in India may be able to have land reforms as in Kashmir?

JN: That is one of the reasons why I should like to change it.

Q: And also to have elected Heads of the State?

24. Shaikh Abdullah.

25. Shaikh Abdullah, replying to this comment, said that there was no question of full accession or half accession. "We are governed by certain provisions in the Indian Constitution. When we are evolving our own constitution, we have clarified that we would work for a fuller and closer relationship with India. We are not trying to evolve a constitution which should be in conflict with the Indian Constitution."

26. In his inaugural address to the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, Shaikh Abdullah had declared that the injustices caused to the people of Jammu and Ladakh would receive attention. He also gave a vague assurance of autonomy to Jammu and Ladakh under the constitution to be framed by the Constituent Assembly.

JN: Maybe. But may I just tell you about elected Heads? You may remember that when we were considering our Constitution in the Constituent Assembly, we had agreed in our first draft that each State should have an elected Governor. We had agreed to that, and elected by adult franchise. It was on reconsideration that we felt that that did not quite fit in with the Cabinet form of Government that we were providing for, because the Governor deriving sanction and authority directly from the people can very well tell the Prime Minister: "I represent the people more than you do." So, ultimately, we decided to have a Cabinet form of Government and making the Head a Constitutional Head, so that he will not be in a position to challenge the authority of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister. Of course, if the Assembly or the legislature elected him, then that difficulty would not arise so much, because the same legislature appoints the Cabinet and the Prime Minister and the same Cabinet elects the Governor also.

Q: After the Kashmir Consenbly has got its constitution, will there be a special chapter in our Constitution embodying the Kashmir constitution?

JN: No. Our Constitution will apply in a large measure to Kashmir constitution, except in regard to certain State subjects for which our Constitution recognizes that the State has authority to enact its own laws, just as today we have got two or three Lists. If you like, there could be a special Article or a special list.

Q: Then why this special constitution of the Kashmir State?

JN: That is because Kashmir has not entered that list as contained in Article 370 plus the President's Order. In the President's Order it is specifically laid down that in order to make it easy for the list, the President can, with the consent of the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir, vary this, add to this list. When that order was passed, there was no Constituent Assembly in Kashmir. Nevertheless, we thought of the Constituent Assembly coming off and we made the provision.

Q: Our Defence Minister²⁷ said in Madras that Kashmir was like any other Part B State....

JN: What is a Part B State? It is an Indian State which came into the Indian Union. In that sense it is. It is not in the sense that the Chapter in the Constitution specifically relating to Part B States applies to it except in so far as it might be applied.

27. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar.

Q: While speaking about Andhra province you emphasized the spirit of integration of the country but in view of the adamant attitude of the Kashmir Government, don't you think that other States or provinces of the Indian Union are liable to catch that spirit?

JN: If my friend will read the history of any federation, big or small, he will always find that there is a continuous conflict between what is called federal rights and State rights. Each State pulls itself in one direction and the federation in another, but they adjust themselves from time to time.

Q: What about the Ahmediya question²⁸ in Pakistan?

JN: The head of the Ahmediya community said that India was at the back of the mischief. Really you don't expect me to say anything about that. We are not interested in the least what the position of the Ahmediya community is in Pakistan or elsewhere. It appears, so far as I can understand it, to be a doctrinal question and we are not interested in doctrinal questions in India, much less in Pakistan. If you have time you may hunt an article I wrote in 1934 in Almora jail but published subsequently and perhaps, I am not sure, included in some collection of essays of mine.²⁹ At that time Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan was appointed an Executive Counsellor in the Government of India and Sir Mohammed Iqbal, the great poet, took exception to his appointment. He said he had no objection to him personally, but if the Government of India thought that they have appointed a Muslim, they are mistaken. They can have Sir Zafrullah Khan certainly, but this should not be considered as a Muslim appointment. They must have some other appointment. Well, that interested me and I wrote an article on that. What is the answer to Iqbal's question, I cannot give it. But I was interested, and I referred to His Highness the Aga Khan.³⁰ I said, I am not an authority, but is he a Muslim because he has been just for a year or two leading Muslim delegations to the Round Table Conference? Here it is. I am told that many Muslims consider him outside the fold. This question, it so happened, interested me 18 years ago....

28. The Ahmediya sect was founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad who was born at Qadian (Punjab) in 1839 and claimed in 1889 to be "the promised Prophet of every nation." After his death in 1908, his followers began to be regarded as heretics by the orthodox Muslims. There was a widespread agitation in West Pakistan against the Ahmediyas at this time.

29. See *Selected Works* (First Series), Vol. 6, pp. 468-470.

30. Muslim leader who supported the British in India and founded in 1906 the All-India Muslim League. Nehru wrote an article entitled, "His Highness the Aga Khan", which was published in *Modern Review*, November 1935. See *Selected Works* (First Series), Vol. 6, pp. 470-474.

5. To Karan Singh¹

New Delhi
July 26, 1952

My dear Yuvaraj,

I have been wanting to write to you for some days, but have been so terribly busy that I could not find the time. You have however been very much in my mind.

You must have read the report of the long speech I delivered in Parliament about Kashmir. A very great part of it of course dealt with past events. Towards the end, I indicated the broad lines of the agreement reached between us and Shaikh Abdullah and his colleagues who had come here.

Our discussions were prolonged and we sat for many hours day after day. It was an exhausting business. We had to keep in mind all the aspects of this complicated matter. There were the legal and constitutional aspects, and there were the other aspects which were at least, if not more, important. I think that the agreement we arrived at was a satisfactory one. Apart from its contents, it brought about good feeling and put an end to the tension that had existed for some time past. The best part of this agreement was this psychological atmosphere of friendship and cooperation.

Many things were decided by this agreement which knit the Jammu and Kashmir State closer to India and which make our Constitution applicable in a greater measure to the State. At the same time, we recognized the special position of the State and gave it greater autonomy in many matters than our other States of the Indian Union possess.

You will, of course, be chiefly interested in the decisions arrived at in regard to the Head of the State.² Perhaps you may not like some part of them, but I had indicated to you, in the course of our talks when you were here, that it seemed inevitable to me that some such change must take place. Circumstances had so developed and they could not be denied without causing injury to all concerned and the cause we have at hand. I think that the decision and the form of words we have used are satisfactory and a fair compromise. Whatever law or Constitution might say, in the last analysis we have to pay heed to the wishes of the people. That indeed has often been declared by us in regard to the Jammu and Kashmir State. But really the principle applies everywhere in India. When this question was raised positively, in the manner it had been raised, it became impossible to bypass it or to postpone it for

1. JN Collection.

2. The agreement declared that the Head of the State should be a person recognized by the President of the Union on the recommendation of the Legislature of the State, holding office during the pleasure of the President for a term of five years.

long. It was better to face it and come to a decision than to leave a feeling of uncertainty and doubt in people's minds and thus not even have the great advantage of a settlement by agreement with all the psychological consequences of friendly feeling that this produced.

In effect now, this means that at the proper moment the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir State will make a recommendation to the President by election of a person who is to be the Head of the State. Although this is called a recommendation, the President will naturally agree. There is no doubt that your name is going to be recommended.

The period is five years. It is quite likely that at the end of the period, you might be re-elected. That is, at any rate, the present intention of the Kashmir leaders and, of course, we would very much welcome it, but any attempt to force the pace or to try to have a longer period, would have defeated the real purpose in view.

As a matter of fact, in the world today, five years is a long time. Only this evening we have had the news of the sudden changes in Egypt and the forcible abdication of King Farouk of Egypt and his sudden departure for America. For any of us to think in static terms of continuing things as they are, is to misunderstand this changing and dynamic world. We have to understand this world and adapt ourselves to it.

I am sure you will appreciate what I am writing. I need not tell you that, now and later, you will be in my mind and you can always come to me for advice or any help that I can give you. The best advice is to accept cheerfully and willingly the changes suggested and, thereby, to put yourself in the forefront of them, instead of appearing as if you unwillingly agreed to something that you disliked. If we have to do something, we should do it gracefully and, thereby, gain the goodwill and respect of others.

I hope, therefore, that you will make it clear to Shaikh Abdullah and others that you willingly accept the changes suggested by agreement with the Government of India and that you will abide by any decisions that the Constituent Assembly of the Jammu and Kashmir State takes. Thus you will strengthen not only your position but the affection that people have for you in the State.

I am feeling terribly tired after many months of continuous hard work. I want very much to go to Kashmir for a few days. It is difficult to be certain about my future programme, but I hope to be able to go to Srinagar on the 18th August or thereabouts. If I can manage it, I shall go on a short trek, probably in the Gura Valley.

Dr Graham has suggested a meeting at ministerial level at Geneva. We wanted this meeting to be at Delhi, but this was not agreed to by the other people. So we have agreed to Geneva. I have suggested the date as August 25th. If this is agreed to, I am requesting Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar to go

there on our behalf. I am reluctant to give him this trouble, but he is obviously the best person to go, and I am glad to say that he has agreed to do so. Probably the Geneva meeting will last about a week.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
July 28, 1952

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

As you know, I promised a debate in Parliament here in regard to Kashmir. We have now fixed next Saturday, 2nd August, for this debate. The motion to be moved will be that the Prime Minister's statement² made about Kashmir be taken into consideration. I shall say little to begin with, because I have already had my full say. In winding up the debate I shall, of course, reply.

You will remember that in the course of our talks here there were some points³ about which, though the proposal was agreed to, it was stated that the Kashmir delegation would like to think a little more. One of these was about the Council of Judicial Advisers, or whatever it is called, which you have in the State. It was suggested that this should be ended and normal appellate jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters, as laid down in our Constitution, would lie within the purview of the Supreme Court. After a good deal of discussion this was agreed to. But a note was added that you would like to give further thought to it.

If possible, I should like to be a little more precise about this in the course of the debate as I am likely to be asked about it.

In view of the agreement arrived at about various matters, it will be necessary for us here to take the necessary steps to give effect to it by Presidential Order, wherever necessary. The form of this will require careful consideration and adjustment. It would be desirable if your Government could write to us on this subject so that we can take formal steps.

1. JN Collection.

2. See *post*, pp. 286-309.

3. Some of the points which the Kashmir delegation wanted to consider further were: (i) detailed examination of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction regarding disputes mentioned in Article 131 of the Indian Constitution; (ii) arrangement for financial integration; and (iii) the implications of the application of Articles 356 and 360 to Kashmir.

On your side also this adjustment and coordination will have to be made.

Last night the Yuvaraj came to see me. I have written⁴ to him in Srinagar but he had not received my letter as he had not returned to Srinagar at all. When he was in Delhi last, he went to see his mother in the Kangra valley on his way to Kashmir. He fell ill there with influenza and had to stay on. He is not quite well yet. Before returning to Srinagar he decided to go and see his father in Bombay. He had not seen him for six months or so. On his way he stopped in Delhi. He left this morning for Bombay.

In the course of my talk with him I explained to him what decisions we had arrived at.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. See the previous item.

7. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
July 29, 1952

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

I have just received your letter of the 29th July about the Head of the State.²

I do not see how we can go through all the various processes about this matter before the 16th August. It is not a perfectly clear matter from the legal point of view how far the President can issue notifications under Article 370 several times. In any event, it would be desirable to include in one notification such present changes that we have decided to make. To have repeated notifications following one another in fairly quick succession would be odd, apart from the possible difficulty about their legality. We are having this matter examined.

There is also the question of how the present Maharaja should be dealt with. The obviously easy and decorous course is for him to abdicate. I hope he will do so. If not, then it may become necessary for the President to take some step. All this has to be thought out.

1. JN Collection.

2. Shaikh Abdullah had written that as the Kashmir Constituent Assembly was to elect the Head of the State on 16 August 1952, he wished that the necessary notification under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution be issued by the President in time.

In this matter you will appreciate that we have to proceed with the concurrence of the President. The final decision, no doubt, is that of the Government. But we cannot hustle the President.

I am sending your letter to Dr Katju and Gopaldaswami Ayyangar.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
July 30, 1952

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

I wrote² to you that the debate on Kashmir in our Parliament will be on Saturday next. This has been postponed now because we are likely to continue the discussion on the Preventive Detention Bill on that day. No specific date has been fixed yet for it, but it will be some time next week in the House of the People. There will also be a separate debate in the Council of States. This will probably be on the 5th or 6th of August.

As I have written to you, we are examining, from a legal point of view, what steps we should take in furtherance of the agreement arrived at. As soon as I hear further about this, I shall write to you. It is obviously necessary for what we do to be coordinated with what your Constituent Assembly does. Any discordance or legal difficulty will come in the way. Therefore, considerable care has to be exercised about every step that is to be taken here or in Srinagar.

It might be desirable for your Constituent Assembly to take up by resolution the agreement we arrived at here and give its approval to it. This will make further steps easier.

I wrote to you that Yuvaraj Karan Singh saw me two days ago. In the course of his talk he said that he was anxious to continue his education and asked me if it would be desirable for him to do so in Europe. From that I guessed that he was not clear in his mind as to what he should do in the future, and whether he should agree to become the elected Head of the Jammu and Kashmir State. I advised him to accept this honour if it was offered to him, and not to think of going abroad for his education. This will also indicate to you that we have to proceed with some caution. Otherwise, difficulties might arise, which would needlessly complicate issues and delay matters.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1 JN Collection.

2. See the preceding item.

9. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad¹

New Delhi
July 30, 1952

My dear Bakshi,

... When you were going away from here, I mentioned to you that every step that we should take, either in Parliament here or in the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir State, should be coordinated. Otherwise difficulties will arise. You must remember that our procedures here are not quite so simple as yours in Kashmir. We have to go to Parliament on every important matter, then we have to consult our law officers, and then there is the President, who takes a personal interest.

It is clear that we shall have to have the President's notification under Article 370. The question is whether we can issue a number of notifications like this or have one consolidated one. This question is not free from difficulty.

On your side apparently you intend proceeding piecemeal. You can do so of course but we have to find some way to fit that into what we do here. I am not quite clear about the procedure, and I am, therefore, consulting our law people. It is possible that, as we have to put before Parliament the points of agreement on various issues, you should also put those points of agreement before the Constituent Assembly. In effect, that will be a directive to the Constituent Assembly itself.

There is another aspect of this question which you might bear in mind. You are proceeding, I believe, on the assumption that Yuvaraj Karan Singh will be elected the Head of the State. You want him because his presence there will be a balancing and stabilizing factor. I agree with you. But, suppose that Karan Singh is not willing to accept this office; he is very anxious to continue his education, and he spoke to me about the possibility of his going to Europe for his further education. I discouraged him in this idea.

I am mentioning this to you because we should be quite clear about every step that we take and should consult the persons concerned beforehand. Otherwise, there might be difficulty.

I wrote² to Shaikh Saheb a day or two ago on the subject of our coordinating our activities at both ends. I shall write to him again as soon as I get some legal opinion. I did not mention to him about the Yuvaraj because I did not have that in mind then.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. See *ante*, pp. 257-258.

10. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
August 1, 1952

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

I have just received your letter of July 30th.²

As I have informed you already, there is going to be a debate on Kashmir in the Council of States on the 5th of August and in the House of the People on the 7th August. In the course of this debate, many points will be raised and questions asked, and naturally I should like, as far as possible, to give definite answers. In making a statement, as I did the other day,³ no questions are asked. In a debate it is different. Hence I wanted some help from you so that I could give more precise answers. I can understand that in regard to Fundamental Rights,⁴ the matter will have to be examined with care by you and by us. But in regard to points relating to the Supreme Court,⁵ questions are bound to be asked and it would have been far better if I could give more precise answers. Your letter leaves things rather vague.

The question of implementation, however, is more important and difficult because this involves action not only by the Constituent Assembly of the Jammu and Kashmir State, but by the President here. As I have written to you, there is doubt here as to whether we can issue a succession of President's orders dealing with these questions piecemeal. Apart from the legality, there is also the question of propriety.⁶

1. JN Collection.

2. Shaikh Abdullah expressed his wish to retain the Board of Judicial Advisers for the time being, which, under the Delhi Agreement, was to be abolished and its jurisdiction in regard to Fundamental Rights taken over by the Supreme Court of India. He wanted time for a careful consideration of the specific exceptions and modifications in the Fundamental Rights which were applicable to the State.

3. See *ante*, pp. 219-238.

4. Under the Delhi Agreement the Fundamental Rights, guaranteed by the Indian Constitution, would apply to Kashmir, subject to the provision that they would not encroach upon the programme of land reforms, including the expropriation of land without compensation, nor must they hamper the State's measures for its security. It was left for future decision whether a chapter on Fundamental Rights should be included in the Kashmir constitution.

5. During the negotiations in July 1952, the Government of India wished the Supreme Court to be the final court of appeal in all civil and criminal cases, but Shaikh Abdullah wanted to leave the question open. It was agreed that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was to be limited in Kashmir to inter-State disputes.

6. Shaikh Abdullah had suggested that the termination of the hereditary rule and its substitution by an elected Head of the State would be dealt with separately and other issues later at appropriate stages by the Constituent Assembly of the State.

Regarding the Head of the State,⁷ it is clear that the President has to take definite action, but it is not clear to me yet what form this action should take, and this has to be carefully considered. The former depends upon various factors which have not been decided yet. Does the Maharaja abdicate?⁸ If he abdicates, does the President recognize the Yuvaraj as his successor, even though this might be for a few days only? Then follows the transfer from him to the Constituent Assembly or the newly elected Head of the State, whoever he might be. All this involves a number of legal questions. The transfer of the power which the Maharaja is supposed to possess in theory,⁹ can either be by some constitutional process or what might be called a revolutionary process. The constitutional process would be regularized by the various steps that our President might take as well as the Maharaja or the Yuvaraj. The other process means that, regardless of other factors, your Constituent Assembly comes to certain decisions. In effect, that would mean, to some extent ignoring the President.

I am pointing out all these difficulties to you and I do not myself see how they can all be got over by August 11th as you suggest.¹⁰ The Constituent Assembly might accept the principle agreed upon and later in due course give effect to it in practice.

What the Yuvaraj will finally decide, I do not know. I wrote¹¹ to you that he seemed to favour the idea of going abroad for his studies. That would mean that he would not like to be the Head of the State. I advised him to accept the offer if made to him.¹² He went to Bombay from here and said that he was likely to be there for five or six days. I do not know if I shall even see him again.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Under the Delhi Agreement, Kashmir would have the right to elect its own Head of the State in the manner prescribed by its Constituent Assembly. He would be recognized by the President of India and hold office "during the pleasure of the President."
8. Although Hari Singh had designated his son, Karan Singh, as Regent, he had not abdicated and still remained legally the ruler.
9. On 5 March 1948, five months after the accession of Kashmir State with the Union of India, the Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, had proclaimed the desire of the people for the establishment of a democratic State based on adult franchise with a hereditary ruler as the constitutional head of the executive responsible to the legislature. The clause relating to accession in the Indian Constitution made it clear that the scope of the subjects included in the Instrument of Accession should be settled between the President and the Maharaja acting on the advice of his Ministers.
10. On 11 August 1952, the Constituent Assembly was to meet when, by a resolution, it would end Maharaja Hari Singh's title to the "rulership" of Jammu and Kashmir and take up the proposal for an elected Head of the State.
11. See *ante*, p. 258.
12. See *ante*, pp. 254-256.

11. Concord on Kashmir¹

...Well, Sir, I do not wish to go back to the beginning of this problem. Indeed in such intricate problems, the beginnings are in the very roots of nature, but very briefly I should like to get back to the year 1946 when all kinds of talks were taking place here in Delhi city between the representatives of the British Cabinet² and the representatives of India, when suddenly in Kashmir the leaders of the popular movement were arrested by the Government of the State there, the Maharaja's Government. Many hundreds of prominent persons were arrested and for a few days, there was something in the nature of martial law in the valley of Kashmir. We were rather surprised at the developments because here we were considering big changes in India, all over India including Kashmir, and here was an exhibition of something which we thought was past and done away with. Indeed, the arrests were started with the arrest of Shaikh Abdullah, who was in fact on his way to India to consult us here. On his way to India he was arrested.³ Many others were arrested later. I tried to get in touch with Shaikh Abdullah even in prison. I sought to go to Kashmir, I had to face some difficulties and ultimately I was arrested there when I crossed the Kashmir border. So, from the middle of 1946 or thereabouts, this new phase started in Kashmir of an open and rather widespread attack on the National Conference and the national movement of Kashmir which had grown during the preceding fifteen years or so, and had become a fairly powerful and well-organized movement, probably better organized and stronger than many movements in any Indian State in India, those so-called States.

This went on. Now we come to 1947 when roundabout May or June an announcement was made by the then Viceroy on behalf of the British Government after consulting various people and various parties here, about changes in India. That immediately brought a new factor into the scene. Big changes were taking place and inevitably they would apply to the so-called Indian States also. A little before that we had been conferring with representatives of the Indian States—with the Chamber of Princes—without

1. Speech while moving a resolution on Kashmir, 5 August 1952. *Council of States Debates*, Vol. 1 No 24-31, (28 July-5 August 1952), cols. 2970-2995, 3025, Extracts.
2. The British Government sent a Cabinet Mission, consisting of Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Stafford Cripps and A. V. Alexander, to India to settle with Indian leaders a new constitution for India. They arrived in India on 24 March 1946 and released, after negotiations, on 22 May 1946, a memorandum on States treaties and paramountcy.
3. Shaikh Abdullah was sent to jail for nine years in May 1946 for having led the "Quit Kashmir" campaign against the Maharaja. On 29 September 1947, he was released under the orders of the Maharaja.

much result.⁴ But this new announcement immediately made a tremendous change in the scene, because many of the Indian Princes then felt that they had to do something. They could not be merely saying nay to these changing events. They had to adapt themselves to these changes, or else, perhaps, the consequences may be even more disagreeable than otherwise, because the position that was created in the great majority of Indian States in India was a peculiar one. By virtue of the announcement of the British Government they were left high and dry, legally speaking, and it was not quite clear what the position of the Indian States was. Some people even said that they would become independent—free to do what they liked.⁵ Of course, they never were independent in the last 150 years or so. Nevertheless, the announcement of the British Government was so worded⁶ as might be interpreted in that way.

We did not like that part of the announcement at all. But while this announcement left them—the Rulers of the Indian States—a certain choice in the matter, events were moving fast and many honourable Members here might remember that in some of these States, in fact before the new Government of India could do anything at all, the people of the States took action. Actually in some States—small States—the people of the States pushed out the then Rulers and more or less sequestered them and took charge of the administration. In fact, the Government of India, to some extent, came to the rescue of these sequestered Rulers in some of these States.

So, the position vis-a-vis the States was, on the one hand the strong arm of the British Government was withdrawn from the States—from giving protection to the States. It was wrong in a way; it was not, to our way of thinking, a good way. However, it is immaterial, but it was withdrawn. On the one hand, that hand was withdrawn, while on the other hand there was popular insurgency in the States by the people who wanted to be full sharers of the new

4. The Nawab of Bhopal who was the chairman of the Chamber of Princes, in his efforts to evolve a "Third Force" out of the States, influenced the State rulers not to accede to India. He, along with the Maharaja of Indore, headed a group of rulers who opposed accession. He suggested that the princes should enter into treaty relations with both the Dominions. See for Nehru's discussions on this matter with the Nawab of Bhopal, *Selected Works* (First Series), Vol. 15, pp. 337–350.
5. For example, the State of Travancore in the first instance declared its decision to become independent on 11 June 1947. However, by the end of July 1947, Travancore had acceded to India. The State of Hyderabad refused to join the Indian Union. It was made clear by the Nizam of Hyderabad that on 15 August 1947 the State would be entitled to resume the status of an independent and sovereign State.
6. The Indian Independence Act, which was enacted by the British Parliament on 18 July 1947, laid down in sub-section (b) of Para I of Section 17 that as from 15 August 1947 "sovereignty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the Rulers of Indian States..."

freedom to come. Between these two factors, of course, there was the new Government of India which was coming into existence. It was in existence in a sort of provisional way. Before the change-over there was the Government of India which represented the nationalist movement of India, and which obviously was not prepared to see the Indian princes continue as they had done previously.

There were these three factors and most of the Indian Princes gradually found that they had no strength to rely upon. They could not look to the British Government nor any of them could look to their own people. In fact, they were afraid of their own people, and the new Government of India, though friendly to them, could not possibly accede to their demand or accept them to continue as they were. So, in those months preceding Independence and Partition, there was this strange thing that these five hundred and odd States in India were all tumbling over each other to come to terms with the new power in India—the Government of India.

It was extraordinary, and people outside India were amazed at the change. Many of the old British officials who were brought up in these Indian thoughts and who had prophesied disaster and who had in fact, if I may say so—some of them, not all—done their best to bring about disaster—they were all surprised and amazed that there was no disaster, that things went on smoothly, and things in these states adjusted themselves to the new order of things.

In this connection, I should like to say that the Government of India, the then Government of India, was greatly helped by the friendly advice that the then Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, gave to the states, because he told them there was no future for them except by accession to India, or to Pakistan, as the case may be.⁷ So then, all these states acceded to India, or to Pakistan as the case may be, and they acceded only in regard to three subjects—Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications. These were supposed to be the basic subjects. They acceded and the accession was complete.

I should like the House to remember this, that the accession is not a matter of more subjects or less subjects. That is a separate thing to consider. The accession is complete when it takes place, and the accession of every state in India was one hundred per cent complete in the month of July or August 1947, when they acceded on these three subjects only. We had, as the House knows, a great leader bringing about this integration and helping to bring it about—Sardar Patel—and in order to achieve it as quickly, and with as much goodwill as possible, we, on behalf of the Government of India, offered generous terms to the princes. Now we may consider them too generous, or criticize them, that is a different thing. But one must remember the state of

7. Lord Mountbatten, speaking at a conference of the Rulers and Representatives of Indian states on 25 July 1947, advised that after the lapse of paramountcy they should affiliate with either of the Dominions.

affairs at that time in India, and judge what was done in the context of things then existing, and the context of things was such that nobody knew in India or abroad, how this could be done easily enough. As it was, it was done and it was a miracle how it was done. So we decided that in the balance of things, it would be better to be generous to these princes in regard to financial matters, not in regard to power, and that it was better to have peace, even if we paid a little more for it, than conflict which would be much more expensive. So, all the states in India, barring two or three, acceded to the Union of India and the accession was complete, although it was only in regard to three subjects. The states that did not accede and which were considered separately were, first of all, Hyderabad, then Kashmir, and one or two minor States. Some of the States went to Pakistan; but that is none of our concern. Now, Hyderabad's story is a very different one and we leave that now.

So far as the Kashmir story is concerned, just before Independence and Partition, when things were moving at a very rapid pace, the Maharaja's Government in Kashmir decided to release Shaikh Abdullah and many of his colleagues who were in prison, and who had been in prison at that time for over a year or so, I believe. They were released because, obviously, big changes were going to take place.

A little after their release and that must have been—I speak from memory—a little before the change-over in India, Shaikh Saheb came here principally, I believe, to meet Mahatma Gandhi and to confer with him and some others too. His position then was, he said: "I have just come out of prison. Many of my colleagues have come out of prison. We should like to study the situation, find out the reactions of the people and then come to some decision." That was his first remark. The second was: The question of accession of Indian states was very much in the air and he said: "This question of accession is not the first question for us. The first question is that the people's authority should be established in some form or other and then the people should decide this and not by a *fiat* from the Maharaja. That would not be agreed to by the people of the State."

Well, he came and the advice that was given to him was on the lines of his own thinking; that is to say, we said that we do not wish to hustle or hurry things in Kashmir. We wanted some strong foundation for a decision, and that in regard to Kashmir, can only come by the popular will to be associated with that decision, not merely the Maharaja saying something.

As a matter of fact, Sir, some two or three months earlier, when these questions of accession of Indian states were being discussed by us here in the Government of India, and sometimes with the British representatives here, and sometimes with the Indian Rulers here, we laid down the principle. That was that where there was any doubt about the wishes of the people in a state on accession, that doubt should be resolved by a plebiscite or referendum or some

means of ascertaining the wishes of the people. That is in the normal Indian states, in hundreds of them this was not challenged, and so there was no question of a plebiscite; where there was a doubt—doubt sometimes arose from the fact that the Ruler happened to be, let us say Hindu or Muslim, and the majority of the people of the state happened to belong to some other religion, there was a possible chance of a doubt of the Ruler deciding against the wishes of his people—we said that in such doubtful cases the people must decide. What the method of decision should be was a matter we did not go into. This was applied, as a matter of fact, in Junagadh. There was a plebiscite in Junagadh to confirm the previous decision taken.

So, in regard to Kashmir, when we were asked,⁸ we said obviously the case of Kashmir is a delicate one and one should not try to come to a decision by some, shall I say, clever means or get the Maharaja to do something. We were keen on the people deciding and so we said, "Let there be no hurry",—though we were hurrying in all the other states. So in regard to Kashmir we said that for the present there should be a Standstill Agreement between the state of Jammu and Kashmir and India on the one hand and Pakistan on the other.⁹ That is, they simply carry on as they were carrying on till a decision is made. The idea at that time was that later on, and it was stated in public, I believe, a Constituent Assembly should assemble in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and decide about accession. That would give their decision popular sanction. Well, that was the position at the time of the change-over in India on the 15th of August 1947.

On that date also, the House will remember, all kinds of upheavals took place. In Pakistan, in the states of India bordering on Pakistan, in West Punjab, in East Punjab and the Frontier Province of Pakistan, upheavals took place and all kinds of inhumanities were perpetrated then, which spread even here, to

8. The States Department of India had not made any approach to the Maharaja of Kashmir as it did in the case of other Indian States before 15 August 1947. After Independence, when a representative of the Kashmir Government sought a lead from the States Ministry on the choice between India and Pakistan, he was told that the Government of India could give no guidance in the matter, and that only if a formal proposal for accession was received it would be considered in the light of all the relevant matters.
9. In fact, the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir in a telegram on 12 August 1947 expressed his desire of concluding a Standstill Agreement with India and Pakistan. The subject matters of the Standstill Agreements which were offered to India and Pakistan were different. While an offer was made to Pakistan only in regard to the state's communications, supplies, post office and telegraphic arrangements, the telegram which was sent to the Government of India extended to many other subjects such as external affairs, control of fares and defence. The Government of Pakistan accepted the offer in its telegram of 16 August 1947. The Government of India replied that some authorized minister should come for negotiating the Standstill Agreement. Before this could happen Kashmir was invaded.

the doors of this Council Chamber in Delhi almost. So we had to face in that month, latter half of August 1947 and September and a part of October, a very serious situation in the north of India, and there was always a danger and a risk of this serious situation spreading to the rest of India. Honourable Members, who may come from Central or South India, may not perhaps realize the situation that North India had to face at that time, and memories are short, people forget.

It was a very serious situation, and although it was called a communal situation, and undoubtedly there was a big communal element in it, it was basically something much more than that. It was an attempt by all kinds of reactionary forces in India to try to upset the new free Government of India that had come into being from the 15th August onwards. It was a deliberate attempt to do that, and we had to deal with that on that ground. Well, we succeeded in controlling that very serious situation but the memory, not of the situation but of the horror of those days, will persist in the minds of everyone who was present or who saw them.

I mention these horrible occurrences to indicate to the House how our minds were full of other things. I think it was July, August, September and October that were full of dealing with the situation in India which was a difficult one. Of course, in Pakistan the situation was also difficult and horrible atrocities were committed there, but that is none of our concern except that it pained us; we were not in charge of that. We were trying to control here so that the question of Kashmir, for the moment, became a distant question. We were trying to control the situation here, and we thought: 'Well, there is the Standstill Agreement and it can go on. We shall see later.'

As a matter of fact, in those days some kind of pressure¹⁰ was exercised on Kashmir by Pakistan, a good deal of pressure in regard to commodities not being allowed to go there through Pakistan and there was also some trouble in those days in the Poonch areas.¹¹ Now the Poonch area of Kashmir is an area full of ex-soldiers of the Indian army—of the army of undivided India. It is a

10. Between 15 August and the end of October 1947, Pakistan, in an attempt to force the accession of Kashmir, used every kind of pressure, including economic blockade, on the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. Essential supplies like foodgrains, petrol, salt and sugar, *en route* to Kashmir through Pakistan, were prevented from reaching the State.

11. The Maharaja who directly took control of the region after the Raja of Poonch was dispossessed of his estates in a law suit during the Second World War, levied harsh and exacting taxes and the Muslims in Poonch defied and started a no-tax campaign in the beginning of 1947. The Dogra troops were billeted in Poonch to enforce collection. The Poonchis, after evacuating their womenfolk to adjacent areas in Pakistan, fought with communal frenzy. The Government of the Maharaja clamped martial law. The situation became worse with the participation of Muslims from West Punjab.

good recruiting ground and it has been, from this point of view, a troublesome area to the State.

Now I am not here to judge whether the State did right or wrong—I mean the State Government, the Maharaja's Government—in regard to what happened in the Poonch area at that time, but the State Government dealt with the people of the Poonch area harshly and these people who were ex-soldiers, and others who were not used easily to submit to harshness, created trouble undoubtedly. Some of them had arms too. So there was some trouble in the Poonch area between the Maharaja's Government and their troops and the people of the Poonch area. We hardly knew about it simply because we were busy with our own troubles. Then came some date—I think it was the 25th October 1947—I am not dead sure—when we heard that a tribal raid had occurred in Kashmir State at a place called Muzaffarabad which adjoins the North West Frontier Province, and people had come and destroyed, committed arson and murder generally and behaved in a very bad way.

Well, we were rather put out by this. It never struck us at the time that we should go and help them. It was a far cry to Muzaffarabad from here, and how were we to go? We were worried. And remember, at that time all our military and civil apparatus had just been divided between Pakistan and India.

However, the next day the news that came from Kashmir was much worse. The great power house at Mahuwa had been gutted and all the power in Kashmir was stopped; all the valley was in darkness. That itself created some panic. The stories of murders and killings and arson and loot that reached us in the next day or two were terrible. Now, we felt that these tribal people—as we thought they were—would probably enter the valley and go up to Srinagar. And if they occupied Srinagar, as they well might unless somebody stopped them, there would be the biggest sacking, and the biggest killing of Hindus and Muslims alike, who were opposing them, and including large numbers of refugees who had gone to Srinagar from Punjab.

May I say that while all this upheaval took place in western Punjab, in eastern Punjab, etc., in the State of Jammu and Kashmir there was no communal trouble at that time—so far as I know, practically none—and large numbers of refugees had gone through the Punjab to Kashmir for refuge. Some were in Jammu, and some were in Kashmir. So we realized that if we did not interfere in Kashmir, the result would be something terrible, in the shape of sacking, looting and massacre of people in Srinagar and in the valley. And we had seen all that. We had seen in other places, right up to Baramulla. They had sacked the biggish township of Baramulla. They set fire to the convent there and killed the foreign missionaries—sisters, nuns, etc.—in a brutal way.

We found that, apart from this tremendous catastrophe that would result from the fall of Srinagar in this way, and from the sack of Srinagar, it would

undoubtedly rouse tremendous passion in India. Naturally, people in India would feel: "What is this?" They would demand of us: "You go on looking when this occurs." And even quite apart from the question of accession and all the rest, if a neighbour of ours, connected with us, is attacked in this way, well, it is in a sense our moral duty to go to his help when called upon. It had nothing to do with accession. It was a separate thing. We were worried by this. Just about that time we got urgent request from two separate and different sources for help¹²—one from the Maharaja's Government—the then Prime Minister of that Government came here post haste—and the other was from the popular party headed by Shaikh Abdullah, which passed some resolution asking for immediate accession to India, presumably because they thought that if accession took place the responsibility for the defence of Kashmir would be ours and then we would rush to their help.¹³ But, as I said, accession or no accession, we could have gone to their help as neighbours, not mere neighbours, but a State connected with India in several ways whose final fate—if you like—had not yet been decided.

When we got this request from the Maharaja's Government and the popular party, right from the beginning we had laid stress on the decision being made by the people of Kashmir. And if the request had come only from the Maharaja's Government, in all probability, we would not have acceded to it. So it made a difference that it came from the popular party. It was impossible in those circumstances, of course, to hold a constituent assembly and take votes, when an actual invasion had taken place. So, we gave prolonged and serious thought to this matter. I believe we sat for four or five or six hours continuously thinking of this and trying to fashion out what the consequences of giving help would be. It was a very difficult matter helping in a military sense. It was a place where we had no forces, where we had to fly over high mountains, where there was hardly any aerodrome, except a temporary one, and so on and so forth. But in the balance we thought that we could not say "no" to that appeal for help, and it would be a betrayal of those people who had been our colleagues and comrades in the struggle for freedom, and that the people of India would hold us to account if we did not help them.

So we came to this decision probably at 6 o' clock, in the evening. Time was the essence because those tribal people were marching on to Srinagar. If

12. On 24 October 1947, the Maharaja of Kashmir sent a frantic telegram to the Government of India for military help. On 25 October, Shaikh Abdullah, the leader of the National Conference, flew to New Delhi to apprise the Indian Government of the gravity of the situation and to appeal personally for effective military aid.
13. The National Conference strongly favoured the accession of Kashmir to India. Later, Shaikh Abdullah, at a press interview in Delhi said that "we, the people of Jammu and Kashmir, have thrown our lot with India, not in the heat of passion or a moment of despair, but by deliberate choice."

they took possession, for example, of the air-field of Srinagar, we would have been cut off completely. We could not go there except very slowly and gradually by the land route. It was a difficult matter. So we decided to send some people immediately. We had no idea at the time what would be the exact situation there. We thought we had to face about a couple of thousands of tribal people and we thought, well, a few hundred soldiers of the Indian army were quite enough for fighting those couple of thousands of tribal people. So we sent them by air. We had no regular transport. We commandeered all the civilian planes. At 5 o' clock in the morning, within 12 hours of our decision, Indian soldiers were flying to Srinagar. And from the airport they went directly to the firing line which was probably within about 10 to 15 miles from the airport.

As a matter of fact, in all probability, Srinagar would have fallen long before we got there but for two facts—two entirely separate facts. One was the perfectly remarkable sense of discipline that the common people of Srinagar showed because the Government had collapsed there. The Maharaja's Government had completely collapsed, and again all the offices had gone to Jammu. There was nobody functioning, no police, nothing of the sort. The people of Srinagar, of course, guided and led by the National Conference and their volunteers, organized the city during those critical days. All the shops remained open even though there was firing being heard at 10 o' clock in the night. That was the major fact which saved Srinagar.

Another major fact was that these tribal people were so anxious to loot everywhere that they delayed their advance. They got held up in Baramulla where they looted and feasted. And thus we got enough time to get there just before they started. Well, this is how our intervention helped in saving Srinagar.

Now, we had accepted the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State. Speaking strictly and in law, the accession was with the Maharaja's Government. That was the rule laid down by the British Government and accepted by us because they were the ruling authority.¹⁴ But we wanted to strengthen that by knowing what the popular feeling there was, and when we knew that the one big popular organization there was also in his favour, then we had no doubt about it. That accession was exactly on the same lines as the accession of any other State in India, i.e., in regard to three subjects, Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications, and the accession was complete in law and in fact, although we did say then, clearly and publicly, that later, when an opportunity arises,

14. The accession of the State was executed in accordance with the Government of India Act of 1935 and as adopted by the Provisional Constitution Act of 1947. Under Section 6, the Act laid down that an "Indian State shall be deemed to have acceded to the Dominion if the Governor-General has signified his acceptance of the Instrument of Accession by the Ruler thereof."

the people of Kashmir will confirm this and will finally decide about it.¹⁵ That was because we did not wish anybody to say that in the moment of danger and peril and hurry we took advantage of that situation and finalized something.

So, the first point to remember is that the accession in law and in fact was complete then. Some people apparently got the mistaken notion from what I said¹⁶ in the other House a short while ago that now the accession is complete because of something that we have done now. That is wrong. That accession was complete on the 27th or 28th of October 1947 in law and in fact. Not only in law and in fact, but it had the popular backing of the greatest popular organization there. It is true that we have said in accordance with our policy that we would give an opportunity to the people of Kashmir to confirm this, to finalize this or do what they liked from their point of view. That is to say, suppose that the people decided ultimately against accession, then that meant, so far as we were concerned, that we would cancel it. Much as it might hurt us, we would cancel it because we have given our word, but that did not lessen in any degree the total hundred per cent validity of the accession.¹⁷ That is the position. Then the war in Kashmir started. We pushed the tribal folk into the mountains from the valley.

Then a curious fact came to our notice that behind the tribal folk was the army of Pakistan sitting there, the regular army of Pakistan. It may be that they did not function as such; they did not call them a regular army. For some time they tried to hide this fact. That made a difference. It was one thing to deal with the tribal folk, and it was quite another thing to deal with a regular army, the army of a modern State. Round about the region of Uri we came across this army and there we stopped for the time being.

15. Lord Mountbatten, in accepting the Instrument of Accession on 27 October, wrote to the Maharaja of Kashmir: "Consistent with their policy that, in the case of any State where the issue of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people." In a statement in Parliament on 25 November 1947 Nehru said that "when the people of Kashmir are given the chance to decide their future this should be done under the supervision of an impartial tribunal such as the United Nations Organization." For the text of the statement, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 4 pp. 340-345.

16. See *ante*, pp. 219-238.

17. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 did not stipulate anywhere that the accession of a State would require to be ratified by the people.

Well, this war developed elsewhere in Kashmir state, and it was patent that the Pakistan army was fighting against us. We pointed this out to the Pakistan Government right at the beginning, but they went on denying this fact that the Pakistan army was engaged. They said that the tribal folk had marched through their territory, but they could not stop them; they were excited because they had heard that their co-religionists were being ill-treated; they could not stop them; in fact they had nothing to do with them.¹⁸

In this connection, it may interest Members that recently in Pakistan, the Khan of Mamdot, who was Prime Minister of West Punjab at that time, has made a claim on the Pakistan Government for money.¹⁹ His claim is that he had spent personally out of his pocket Rs 68,000 for organizing the invasion of Kashmir. He did this on behalf of the Pakistan Government and he claims the money from the Pakistan Government. This is very interesting. Of course, we knew that one of the chief organizers was the Chief Minister²⁰ of the North West Frontier Province then and now. He has not changed since then, although the Chief Minister of West Punjab has changed. The then Chief Minister of West Punjab now claims money; recompense if you like, for his organizing the tribal invasion of Kashmir at the time. It throws a very clear light on the situation as it then was.

Now, the Pakistan Government went on continually denying that they had anything to do with this, which was an extraordinary thing. We came up against their army, we captured materials belonging to the Pakistan Government and we exhibited them here in Delhi and elsewhere.

Then the question came before us as to where all this was leading to. Was this going to lead to an all-out war with Pakistan or not? We did not want an

18. On 22 December 1947, Nehru handed over to the Prime Minister of Pakistan a letter requesting the Government of Pakistan to deny to raiders (i) all access and use of Pakistan territory for operation against Kashmir, (ii) all military and other supplies; and (iii) all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle. See *Selected Works*, (second series), Vol. 4 pp. 391–392. In his reply of 15 January 1948 to the Indian complaint of 1 January 1948 to the Security Council, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Zafrullah Khan, denied that Pakistan had given any assistance to raiders or had committed any act of aggression against India. He described the raiders as liberators having genuine feelings for their fellowmen who had suffered in the communal killings in the Punjab.
19. On 17 July 1952, the Khan of Mamdot, who was accused of certain financial irregularities by the Pakistan Government, claimed from the Pakistan Government Rs 68,000, which, as Chief Minister of the Punjab, he had spent out of his own pocket to facilitate the tribal invasion against Kashmir.
20. Abdul Qayyum Khan.

expansionist war or any war. First of all our minds were not conditioned for war in any way, at any time, more so when we had just come to freedom with all sorts of schemes and plans before us. Were we going to put an end to those schemes by making war with our neighbours when we had all along functioned, however imperfectly, in an atmosphere of peace and non-violence in our national movement? And for us to jump into war was an extraordinarily difficult thing to do. That was one thing. Secondly, it was a day after the change-over, you might say. We were just trying to settle down, and so we did not want this war and we knew that such a war would be catastrophic. And yet how were we going to fight this war—this limited war in Kashmir state? Were we to allow Pakistan armies to hop across the frontier, hit us and go back? This was a difficult problem.

Normally speaking, our army people, our Generals, would like to go and hit the Pakistan army where it was, instead of waiting to be hit. After much thought we decided that we should take some steps to prevent the extension of this war and, if possible, to stop it. We were quite sure, dead sure of our position. It was as clear as daylight. Legally, the accession was complete and proper. Nevertheless, we said that the people of Kashmir could even upset this final decision and we would accept the people's voice. So, why not leave it to them and why all this trouble?

So, we decided to go to the United Nations, and we went there with a very simple plea. We said that certain tribal people have come across Pakistan and attacked Kashmir without any rhyme or reason. The Government of Pakistan has allowed them to pass through its territory, and thus aided and abetted them. So far as I remember, we did not even say that the Government of Pakistan itself had sent its army into the state. We merely said that Pakistan had aided and abetted them, and we asked the United Nations to ask the Pakistan Government not to help the raiders. That is all. Our demand was that they should not help the raiders and we shall deal with the situation, because we did not wish to get entangled into a regular war with Pakistan. The Pakistan Government's reply was a clear denial of their having anything to do with the raiders.

Apart from the facts that came out then, the facts that are now coming out show how false their denial was. It was a regular organized thing from the Pakistan side, from West Punjab. In the Security Council, for about four or five months this matter was discussed, much to our amazement. A very simple question that we had put was never answered. Either what we had said about the facts was proved or it was false.

Well, we did not expect the Security Council to take our word for it while another country was challenging it, but obvious course for them was to find out factually what the truth was. Instead of this, there were long discussions

on other subjects there. To the end, the Pakistan Government went on denying the facts that they had anything to do with it.

Then the Security Council sent a Commission here—the UN Commission. They came here and a little after their arrival here, for the first time, Pakistan admitted²¹ having armies in Kashmir, which they had denied till then, and gave some reasons, that they were afraid of being invaded by India through Kashmir; it was a rather far-fetched excuse, because if India wanted to invade Pakistan, she would hardly go across the Himalayan mountains to do so. Pakistan is quite near on this side here. There was no reason in it. However, these things went on, fighting and all that, and at the end of 1948, I think it was December 31st, a ceasefire was agreed to, and since then there has been no regular fighting, though there have been petty raids. There has been no regular fighting since then, but since then also no step has been taken for a regular truce, and matters remained as they were although all these Commissions had been talking about a truce, and other steps that might follow.

I do not wish to take the House into all these complicated talks with the UN Commission. There are two basic Resolutions, one passed, I think, on the 13th August 1948, and the other probably on the 5th January 1949. These were accepted by us and accepted by Pakistan, in fact passed with our consent, we might say. But in regard to both, subsequently, a certain difference in interpretation arose between Pakistan and us. Our interpretation is quite clear and it was put down in black and white in certain *aides memoire* that we had given.²² But Pakistan refused to accept our interpretation and this is one of the reasons why we go on talking interminably before the Security Council or elsewhere.

The present position is that Dr Graham has now invited us and invited Pakistan to a conference at ministerial level in Geneva to discuss the matters that we have been discussing for the last year or so with him, that is what is

21. Under the Security Council's Resolution of 21 April 1948, a five-member Commission visited India and Pakistan in July 1948. Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Zafrullah Khan, while explaining the background of the Kashmir dispute, informed the Commission on 8 July that Pakistan had at the time three brigades of regular troops in Kashmir and that the troops had been sent into the state during the first half of May for "self-defence". Later, on 4 August 1948, he also told the Commission that Pakistan's army was in overall control in 'Azad Kashmir'.

22. When the Resolution of 13 August 1948 was passed, Pakistan organized 'Azad Kashmir' forces into a fighting army of 32 battalions to take over from the Pakistan army. India urged the disbanding and disarming of these forces as a condition vital to the holding of a plebiscite. The UN Commission's Resolution of 5 January 1949 spoke of the disposal of these forces after the Truce Agreement but before the plebiscite. India insisted, however, that these forces should be liquidated first, before she could agree to a withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces in the State.

called demilitarization, that is to say, reduction of forces in Kashmir. He has confined his attention to this particular matter only during the last year. He laid down twelve proposals out of which seven or eight were agreed to, but the others were not agreed to as between India and Pakistan. Now he wants to pursue this at ministerial level in Geneva. It was difficult for us to go to Geneva at this time and we invited him here. We told him as previously: "We are perfectly prepared to have talks with you, but then it is difficult for us to come to Geneva." And we suggested that the ministerial meeting might take place in Delhi. But this was not accepted by the other party and so, ultimately, we agreed to a meeting in Geneva and the meeting in Geneva is going to take place or rather begin on the 25th August, that is, this month, and it is likely to last for seven or eight days. The time is fixed. And, I am glad to say that my colleague, the Leader of this House, Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar, is going to represent our Government there.

Now, at this meeting, presumably they will consider the discussions that they have already had. It is suggested that they may consider other matters and explore other avenues. Our attitude always has been that subject to certain basic principles that we adhere to, certain basic responsibilities of ours being guarded, we are prepared to explore every avenue for peace.

While all this was happening in Kashmir—war and other things—in the rest of India, the process of integration of other states went much further. The accession of every state was complete. This fact I go on repeating because there is some confusion. The accession of every state was complete when first it acceded in 1947.

But, a further process of closer integration took place later in regard to most of the states, and you all know about it.

Now, that process of further integration could not possibly apply to Kashmir because in the very nature of things with the Security Council and the United Nations Assembly, it could not apply. Apart from that, it could not apply because we had ourselves said, both to the people of Kashmir and to our people, as also to the people of the world alike, and we had given certain assurances, that in such matters we shall proceed with the consent of the people of Jammu and Kashmir who will decide the issues ultimately. It never struck us that that process of integration that was taking place in other states in India could possibly be applied to Kashmir at that stage. If we had tried to do it, it would have meant our breaking the pledge we had given to the United Nations and to the Kashmir state itself.

Then, we arrive at the period of—was it November 1949—when our Constituent Assembly was finalizing our Constitution. By that time, the other states had integrated closely and we had a chapter in the Constitution—I believe it is Chapter VI or whatever it is, it is quite immaterial—dealing with Part B

States. Originally, when we started framing our Constitution, it was not quite clear whether the internal Constitution of the States should be the same as that of the Government of India or not. Some states of course, had merged and were absorbed in Provinces and others were not. But, Sardar Patel proceeded on these lines and brought about a large measure of uniformity by this closer integration. That could not, obviously, take place in regard to Kashmir. The question was completely different. So, when we were finalizing our Constitution, the question arose as to what we are to say about Jammu and Kashmir state. It was in reply to that question that Article 370 was brought in into our Constitution. It is in the Chapter headed "Temporary and Transitional Provisions." I have no doubt honourable Members have seen that Article but, nevertheless, I should read it out:

370. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,

(a) the provisions of Article 238²³ shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir (this Article is in regard to the Part B States);

(b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to:

(i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the Government of the State, are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State; and

(ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may by order specify.

Explanation: for the purposes of this Article the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognized by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the time being in office under the Maharaja's proclamation dated the fifth day of March 1948;

(c) the provisions of Article I and of this Article shall apply in relation to that State;

(d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State subject to such exceptions and modifications as the President may by order specify:

23. Article 238 of the Indian Constitution guaranteed the status and privy purses of Rajpramukhs and defined their rights in the administration of the Part B States. The application of the Article would mean the retention of the post of Rajpramukh in Kashmir and the restoration of Maharaja Hari Singh to his original position.

Provided further that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession of the State referred to in paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b) shall be issued except in consultation with the Government of the State;

Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in the last preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government.

(2) If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in paragraph (ii) of sub-clause (b) of clause (I) or in the second proviso to sub-clause (d) of that clause be given before the Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the constitution of the State is convened, it shall be placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon.

At that time there was no Constituent Assembly in Kashmir. Nevertheless, this Article 370 envisages that the Constituent Assembly should come in there and should give its consent to any changes in this matter.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Article, the President may, by public notification, declare that this Article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify:

Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification.

I have read Article 370 because Article 370 as framed at the time by the Constituent Assembly in 1949 will govern, in so far as our Constitution is concerned, our relations with the Jammu and Kashmir State. Article 370 is obviously in the nature of a transitional Article, but it lays down the process of change. We did not wish, in the course of that change, to have an amendment to the Constitution as it will be a big matter. Therefore the President is authorized to make these changes by public notification, etc. but everywhere in this you will see that the President can only do so with the concurrence of the Constituent Assembly of the State, in consultation with the State in some matter and in other matters with their concurrence. That is the position as it prevails today.

As a matter of fact, when this Article 370 took shape here, as far as I can remember, I was out of the country for a long time—I had gone to America. So I was hardly conscious for a long time afterwards of this Article 370 because I was not here. That has been the position.

This position might well have lasted some time longer, but for the fact that the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir came into existence,²⁴ and came into existence with our goodwill and with our consent. Now it is sitting down to draw up its constitution. When it is drawing up its constitution, it has to be in some precise terms; it cannot be fluid. Therefore, the question arose that nothing should be done by the Constituent Assembly of the Jammu and Kashmir State which does not fit in with our Constitution, which in no sense is contrary to it or conflicts with any part of it. That was why this question arose now to consider. Otherwise, it did not much matter whether we considered it now or a year or two years later. Of course, it is better to make the position clear, and the sooner it is done, the better.

Therefore, it became necessary for us to deal with the leader of the Kashmir Government and the Constituent Assembly and discuss these matters. We discussed at some length a week or a few days ago, and the decisions we arrived at have been announced in the press. The position, therefore, has been not today, not because of our decisions or agreements, but from the moment of accession in October 1947 that:

The Jammu and Kashmir State was a constituent unit of the Union of India and part of the territory of India.

That was the legal position since October 1947. Now, as a consequence of all this it follows that residents of the State are full citizens of India like any others. They have the right as such to be represented in Parliament here in both Houses.

The point was raised by the representatives from Kashmir that certain old privileges dating from several generations past attached to what used to be the state subjects. These are especially in regard to acquisition and holding of immovable property, appointment to services, scholarships and the like.

Honourable Members know that Kashmir is supposed to be one of the beauty spots of the world. And apart from its being a beauty spot, there are many other things which attract people there. And from olden times the old Maharajas, who succumbed to many things that came from the then British Government, did not succumb to one thing. They were afraid that the climate of Kashmir and its other attractive features being what they are, that Kashmir might become a kind of colony of the British if they came and settled down there in large numbers. They were afraid of that. So they stuck to one thing—that no foreigner could acquire property in Kashmir. And they did keep them out. They made rules to the effect that only State subjects could acquire property except by special permission, and so on.

24. The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was convened on 31 October 1951.

In fact, they have made four different classes of subjects for that purpose. Property was given to Class I and Class II. These rules in regard to property still subsist. Those are the rules in regard to property in Kashmir and everybody in Kashmir, to whatever group or community or religion he belongs, wants to uphold these rules, naturally, because they are for the benefit of the residents of Kashmir, whether Hindus or Muslims. They are afraid that people from India or elsewhere, rich people and others, might come and buy up property there, and thereby gradually all kinds of vested interests would grow up in property in Kashmir on behalf of people from outside. So far as we were concerned, we thought that this was only the existing law there, and the existing law prevails under Article 370 of the Constitution, which I have just read.

We thought it was a perfectly justifiable feeling on their part, and that acquisition of property in Kashmir State should be protected on behalf of the people there. They propose, quite rightly too, to change their present laws on the subject, as they are too cumbersome. They have made some simple rules. Nevertheless, in essence, they are to regulate acquisition of property by outsiders in the State.

The House will perhaps remember that we have given protection in this regard in various parts of the territories of India. For instance, in the north-east of Assam tribal areas we have given them protection. Nobody from outside can go and take possession of property there, because if we once give them permission, there is no doubt that these tribal people will be exploited by outsiders who will go there and buy up their lands and use them for making money while the people of those areas will go to the wall. So we agreed that to avoid exploitation of the State territory it was desirable that these rights and privileges should continue. As a matter of fact, under Article 19 (5) of our Constitution this was clearly permissible—and that is our view even now—both in regard to existing law or any subsequent legislation. But if there was any trace of doubt, it should be made clear.

Another point was put before us. It was obvious that the residents of Jammu and Kashmir State, who have had to leave the State on account of the disturbances that were taking place in the last three or four years, should be entitled on their return, to citizenship. As a matter of fact we have made some provision for the whole of India in this respect. Now Kashmir's case is somewhat different from the other one. But the same principle applies and we agreed to that principle. So we agreed to this:

The State legislature shall have power to define and regulate the rights and privileges of the permanent residents of the State, more specially in regard to acquisition of immovable property, appointments to services and like matters. Till then the existing State law should apply.

We agreed that special provision should be made governing citizenship for the return of the permanent residents of Jammu and Kashmir State who went to Pakistan in connection with the disturbances of 1947 or earlier in fear of them and could not return. If they return, they should be entitled to the rights and privileges and obligations of citizenship.

Then in regard to the Fundamental Rights, a number of points arose, the chief point being the one relating to land reform. The House knows that very substantial land reform has taken place in Kashmir. In other States of India too land reform has taken place. The main difference has been that in Kashmir compensation as such has not been given. What has been allowed is that each land-owner has been permitted to keep about 23 acres of land, plus orchards plus various other things. Orchards are very important in Kashmir, of course. So that, although no compensation has been given, a fair amount of land has been allowed to be kept by an individual. That presumably would not have been possible if our Fundamental Rights, as they are now, had applied to Kashmir. It is obvious that one cannot set aside all that land reform there or make it subject to litigation in the various courts, apart from the fact whether we agree or not in principle.

Personally I feel that this land reform is one of the biggest and desirable things they have introduced in Kashmir—the land reform in the way they have done it. So when we consider Fundamental Rights, we have to see to it that in Kashmir this step of land reform cannot be challenged in a court of law. The position of Kashmir is obviously very special owing to the invasion of the state by Pakistan, subsequent war, and seizure. Constant infiltration of raiders for sabotage and for creating other troubles is taking place and very special precautions have to be taken. It is necessary, therefore, for the State Government to have authority to deal with the situation and if, under the guise of Fundamental Rights, this authority is limited or taken away from them, the situation there might become very difficult for them to handle.

Then it was agreed that the Supreme Court should have original jurisdiction in respect of disputes mentioned in Article 131 of the Constitution of India. It was further agreed that the Supreme Court should have jurisdiction in regard to Fundamental Rights which are applied to that State. On behalf of the Government of India, we recommended that the State Advisory Tribunal in the State, which is designated as His Highness's Board of Judicial Advisers, should be abolished, and that the jurisdiction exercised by it should be vested in the Supreme Court of India, that is to say, the Supreme Court should be the final court of appeal in all civil and criminal matters as laid down in the Constitution of India. The Kashmir Government delegation said that they had no objection to this but they would like to consider the matter in some detail.

Then comes the question of the Head of the State:

It was agreed: (1) that the Head of the State shall be the person recognized by the President on the recommendation of the Legislature of the State; (2) he shall hold office during the pleasure of the President; (3) he may by writing under his hand, addressed to the President, resign his office; (4) subject to the foregoing provisions of this Article, the Head of the State shall hold office for a term of five years from the date he enters upon his office, provided that he shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office.

This is almost identical with the language used in our Constitution for the appointment of Governors.

Then, with regard to the National Flag, it was made clear that:

The National Flag was the supreme flag and it had exactly the same status and position in the Jammu and Kashmir State as in any other part of India. The State flag was in no sense a rival to the National Flag, but for historical and sentimental reasons connected with the struggle for freedom in Kashmir, they wanted this State symbol to continue.

This was agreed to.

It was also agreed that the powers to reprieve and commute death sentence should belong to the President of India.

It was also decided that the financial arrangements between the State and the Government of India should be considered further and details worked out.

Then with regard to emergency power, it was agreed that Article 352 of the Constitution should apply to the State with the addition at the end of the first paragraph of the following words: "but in regard to internal disturbances, at the request or with the concurrence of the Government of the State."

These were the major things that were agreed to. We met, of course, not as rival parties but as friends trying to hammer some way out of a certain difficult situation which had arisen during the last few years, difficult because it is not a matter entirely for us in India to determine. It is an international matter. The United Nations have come into the picture. War comes into the picture. We have to keep all these factors in view.

Therefore, it becomes inevitable that the case of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be treated in a somewhat different way from that of the other States in India. To say that it must be put on the same level at present has no meaning because the circumstances are not the same. Things have happened in the past, invasion and war, and all kinds of things are happening there, apart from the United Nations and apart from the pledges we have given.

Therefore, I submit to the Council that the agreements that have been arrived at, which have to be worked out of course gradually, are satisfactory from the point of view of one of the States of India, i.e., the Jammu and Kashmir State, and I hope that this Council will express its approval of the line we have adopted in this matter.²⁵

25. The agreement was approved by the Council of States soon after Nehru's speech.

12. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
August 6, 1952

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

...I have just received your letter² of August 3rd, which apparently D.P. Dhar has brought with him. I have not met him. Tomorrow I shall try to go to Parliament because we have the Kashmir resolution³ before the House of the People and there is going to be a full day's debate.

I confess that I am, to some extent, in a slight difficulty because of this debate. As I wrote to you, one has to be a little precise in a debate when questions are asked and have to be answered. That precision I cannot give to my answers and I have to be rather vague. In regard to some matters, such as Fundamental Rights, etc., it is difficult to be precise at this stage. But it might have been possible to be more definite in regard to other matters.

Then there is the general question of both our Houses of Parliament expressing their agreement and approval of the general basis of our talks and

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Shaikh Abdullah had suggested a procedure to be adopted for the election of the Head of the State. "In case Maharaja Hari Singh prefers to abdicate voluntarily, the President will invite the Jammu and Kashmir Consenbly to recommend to him the name of a person for his recognition...If the Maharaja refused, he would have to be deposed by the Consenbly and the President would then withdraw recognition" conferred on him.

3. See *post*, pp. 286-295.

the results arrived at. The proper course would be for your Constituent Assembly to do likewise, apart from any specific decision later on. In fact, it could be a little more precise in regard to some matters. In any event, that is the first thing to do before attempting to give effect to any particular part of the agreement.

You will appreciate that any decision we take in regard to the Jammu and Kashmir State, though applicable to it only, has much larger implications and consequences. Even the manner of taking a step has those implications. Therefore, we are particularly anxious that all the formalities and legalities should be observed and, as far as possible, nothing should be done which creates a difficulty. Inevitably, our President comes into the picture. The President is the constitutional Head of our State. But we cannot order him about, more especially about procedures. We have to convince him that a certain right procedure is being adopted. He has his own sense of responsibility which has to be satisfied.⁴

This of course applies to our Parliament. While agreeing to certain steps, they might not at all like a particular procedure to be adopted. It is for this reason that I have stressed upon you to consider carefully how we should proceed upon these matters. You may treat the headship of the State separately from the rest of the constitution. But the approval of the other main heads of agreement cannot be separated from this particular item. We have put all of them together before Parliament and we should be able to tell them clearly that it is on that basis that we are going ahead.

I do not myself see the urgency in your giving effect to your decision about the headship of the State by a particular early date.⁵ The fact that you are going to do it is obvious enough and you gain advantage thereby. How you do it, when exactly you do it, are minor matters for arrangement and in this arrangement a very considerable and important part has to be played by our President. All these things have to be carefully worked out to the smallest detail before steps are taken. Indeed, so far as we are concerned, we have had to give detailed thoughts even to formal things agreed to in our Constitution. Take relatively minor things, installation ceremonies and the like. We gave weeks and months of thought to the installation of our new President. There

4. Shaikh Abdullah had contended that Article 370 of the Indian Constitution did not envisage a static situation and its provisions visualized powers to deal with a given situation from time to time. Therefore, when powers had been given to the President to issue orders for providing modifications and exceptions to this Article in their applicability to Jammu and Kashmir State, it might be necessary to issue orders on more than one occasion.
5. Shaikh Abdullah wanted that the dynastic issue, which had been before the State's Constituent Assembly for a long time, should be decided without any delay when it would meet on 11 August.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

were numerous conferences and discussions about every single minor detail. I do not see how you can do all this without previous arrangement. But these are not very important, although they count in the public eye. The really important thing is that all the constitutional proprieties should be fulfilled in dealing with a delicate and unusual matter. Any lapse on our part in regard to these proprieties would lead to difficulties and would be a handle in the hands of our critics and opponents.

During the past week, all of us have been terribly busy with Parliament. Katju, more especially, has had a very heavy burden to carry. Nevertheless, we have discussed this matter of Kashmir on two or three occasions and in the course of our discussions, many aspects and difficulties were pointed out. It is quite possible that some of these are not before you. It may be easy for your Constituent Assembly to pass any resolution. But it is not so easy for us to go through our more complicated procedures, more especially as there are certain uncertain factors still. We do not yet know if Hari Singh will abdicate. Nor are we clear as to the step to be taken immediately after abdication. You have suggested a course which might be considered. You say that he should be deposed by the Constituent Assembly. I am doubtful about the result of such a resolution in the Assembly, because he owes his position there according to our Constitution by virtue of recognition by the President. A resolution of deposition might well be considered a discourtesy to the President.

All this and other questions arise, and I do not find myself in a position to give clear advice without consulting others. For the present it seems to me that the proper course for your Constituent Assembly would be: (1) first of all to give its approval to the terms of agreement arrived at here in Delhi, (2) secondly, and more specifically, to accept that part of the agreement relating to the Head of the State. That will be a firm decision of the Assembly. But the giving effect to it will come later at a suitable moment. The rule will have been established and that is the major thing.

About Article 370 of our Constitution, we have to proceed rather cautiously. We are a nation of lawyers and every step is examined with a hawk's eye by the legal fraternity.

You must have met the Yuvaraj after his return from Bombay and you must know what he thinks of your proposal. I have not seen him again and I do not know exactly what he told you. Obviously his decision, whatever it is, will affect your plans. For my part, I advised him strongly to accept your offer....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
August 6, 1952

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

After dictating a longish letter² to you this evening from bed, I received a copy from Gopalaswami Ayyangar of a draft resolution³ brought here by D.P. Dhar. I have just rapidly glanced through it. I have already indicated to you that the deposition of Maharaja Hari Singh by the Constituent Assembly, when he is recognized by the President, appears to me to be very odd. But apart from this, all these very detailed provisions, including those for impeachment, appear to me to border very much on some of the prerogatives of the President. In any event, each one of them requires very careful scrutiny to avoid conflict with our Constitution and the prerogatives which our President is supposed to possess.

I have a feeling that if all this is put forward in your Constituent Assembly in the course of a few days, the reaction in our Parliament, and in the rest of India, is likely to be very critical and somewhat unfavourable, even though the major fact of the Head of the State being elected is fully accepted. The question that concerns our Parliament is more the relationship of the Jammu and Kashmir State to the Union and to the Head of the Union than the internal arrangements there.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Abul Kalam Azad and K.N. Katju.
2. See the preceding item
3. The draft resolution, which the Kashmir Government intended to move in the Constituent Assembly, contained a clause that Maharaja Hari Singh, if he did not abdicate himself, would be deposed and Yuvaraj Karan Singh would be elected. It also provided for the procedure to impeach the Head of the State for grave misconduct.

14. A Friendly and Affectionate Union¹

"That the Statement made by the Prime Minister on the 24th July 1952 in regard to Jammu and Kashmir State, be taken into consideration."

The House will remember that a few days ago I made a fairly lengthy statement² in this House about the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir State. I do not propose to weary the House by a repetition of what I said then. But at this stage I should like to emphasize certain aspects of this problem.

For the last nearly five years now we have been seized of this problem and it has been one of the heaviest burdens that the Government has had to carry. It has been a heavy burden because the problem was a complicated one, a problem in which our saying 'aye' or 'nay' was not quite enough. Other factors were involved. There are many things in this world which we would like to have as we wish them to be. But we cannot shape the world to our will. We live, as the House well knows, on the eve of what appears to be a tragedy in the world and we try—and when I say 'we' I do not mean we in this House but people all over the world—to avert the tragedy and somehow to assure peace for this world. But nobody can control events completely; he tries to mould them to a certain extent, tries to affect them slightly; but what the ultimate resultant of the various forces and passions and prejudices is likely to be no man knows. It is in this large picture of this world that we have functioned during these last five years or more. And to the misfortune of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and our misfortune, the problem of the State has become a part, may be a small part but nevertheless a part, of this larger picture of the world. And, therefore, the difficulties in our way have increased greatly. It is an international problem. It would be an international problem anyhow if it concerned any other nation besides India, and it does. It became further an international problem because a large number of other countries also took interest and gave advice.

Well, we have tried to fashion our action in regard to this problem, keeping in view always certain obligations and responsibilities that we had. What were those obligations and responsibilities? Number one: To protect and safeguard

1. Speech while moving the motion regarding Jammu and Kashmir State, 7 August 1952. *Parliamentary Debates*, (House of the People), Vol. IV, Part II, cols. 5775-5785.
2. See *ante*, pp. 219-238.

the territory of India from every invasion. That is the primary responsibility of the State. Secondly, to honour the pledge we gave to the people of Jammu and Kashmir State. And that pledge was a two-fold pledge. One was, again, to protect them from invasion and rape and loot and arson, and everything that accompanied that invasion. That was one part of the pledge. The second part of the pledge was unilaterally given by us that it will be for them to decide finally what their future is to be. That is the second obligation. The third was to honour the assurances we gave to the United Nations. And the fourth was to work for a peaceful settlement. That was no pledge to anybody, but it was the policy we had tried to pursue right from the beginning, because it is in the nature of things that we should pursue that policy being wedded to the ideals of peace. And apart from that it was necessary that we should do so because in this world, as I have just hinted to this House, we live, we appear to live, on the edge of a precipice, and one has to be very careful in taking any step which might perhaps make the world tumble over that precipice.

So, these were the four major considerations that we had to keep in view, and sometimes it was difficult to balance them. Sometimes they seemed to lead in different directions. It would have been an easy matter if all these factors led us to the same conclusion. But when they pull in different directions our obligations and responsibilities lead us to think not in one line of action but in several. Then difficulties arise. Well, we have faced these difficulties and we have had the hard time sometimes to decide what we should do and what we should not do. I should like the House therefore to think in terms of balancing these very important assurances, pledges, and factors in the situation.

In the course of these years I have come up repeatedly before this House and placed the situation before this House, and it is with the concurrence and the support of this House that we have continued to pursue the policy that we have pursued. It has been my belief that in this matter, more even than in other matters, the great majority of the people of this country have approved of the policy that we have pursued. And that approval has been shown to us from time to time by this House or the House that preceded it. We have received advice from innumerable people, friends and critics in this country, and we have always welcomed that advice, even though some of it did not appear to be feasible or right. We have received advice from innumerable people outside this country, from other countries. From them too we welcome advice when it is friendly advice. We do not welcome it when it comes from unfriendly minds or is accompanied by any hint of threat. So we welcome the friendly advice from abroad; we reject the advice that is accompanied by a threat and so we have carried on. We took this matter to the United Nations

four years and eight months ago,³ in the belief that thereby we were serving the cause of peace, and thereby we would settle this question of Kashmir by way of agreement. We have not settled that yet, in spite of the labours of the United Nations and their various organs. I do not wish to blame anybody and certainly, I would like to repeat what I said on the last occasion⁴ in this House, when I paid a tribute to Dr Frank Graham, who has shown enormous patience, enormous perseverance in his pursuit of a peaceful settlement, and so far as we are concerned, we shall help him to the end even though people may get tired of our pursuing the same path, because a peaceful settlement and peace are always worth pursuing, however tired we may get in the process.

Many of our colleagues and friends in the country have perhaps got weary of this process, and I can very well understand their weariness, but that weariness which they have is much less than the weariness that possesses those in charge of this business, when day after day, week after week, month after month, we have had to carry this heavy burden. However weary sometimes unconsciously we may have got, we dare not act in a hurry, we dare not act in a temper, we dare not allow ourselves to be led by passion, because the consequences of acting in a temper are bad for an individual. They are infinitely worse for a nation. Therefore, we have restrained ourselves; we have restrained ourselves when from across the border from Pakistan loud cries of war and loud threats arose. We restrained ourselves, and I am glad to say that generally speaking our people in this country, our press in this country restrained themselves. So we have proceeded, and I have every sympathy and every understanding for those who sometimes felt that we should do something, shall I say, more active, less restrained. One can understand that, and I was sure then and I am dead sure now, that to have acted otherwise would have been utterly wrong. I am not talking about any minor step here or there, but rather about the major trend of the policy that we pursued. As before, we have now to keep these four major obligations in our minds.

Having gone to the United Nations, we have pursued that course. Some friends⁵ have advised us to withdraw this matter from the United Nations. I am not quite sure if they have studied this subject or considered how it is possible to withdraw this, or any such matter from the United Nations. When


3. India's complaint to the Security Council was that the invaders were allowed transit across Pakistan and the use of Pakistan's territory as base of operation, that they included Pakistan nationals and drew their military equipment, transportation and supplies from Pakistan, and that Pakistan army officers were training and guiding them in fighting. This was an act of aggression and the Security Council should call upon Pakistan to desist from all such acts. The UN refused to condemn Pakistan despite the evidence presented by India.

4. See *ante*, pp. 219-238.

5. M.S. Gurupadaswamy and Lanka Sundaram.



WITH SHAIKH ABDULLAH, NEW DELHI, 24 JULY 1952



AT MAHATMA GANDHI'S SAMADHI, NEW DELHI, 2 OCTOBER 1952

the United Nations is seized of such a matter, it was seized of it at our instance. That is true, but if we had not moved the United Nations, others might have moved it and others can move it. It continues to be seized of it. If we said, "we withdraw from the United Nations", it would only be a sign of impatience and temper on our part without resulting in what perhaps some people hope. Therefore, the question of withdrawal from there does not arise, unless of course, this House wishes that we, the Government of India and the Union of India itself, withdraw from the United Nations and face all the consequences that it brings. That is a thing, I suppose, this House does not wish, as I do not wish it.

I have ventured in all humility sometimes to criticize the new developments in the United Nations, which seemed to me to be out of keeping with its Charter and its past record and professions. Nevertheless, I have believed, and I do believe, that the United Nations, in spite of its many faults, in spite of its having perhaps deviated, partly gone sometimes in what I consider not a right direction, is a basic and fundamental thing in the structure of the world today and not to have it would be a tragedy for the world. Therefore, I do not wish this country of ours to do anything which weakens the gradual development of some kind of a world structure. It may be that the real world structure will not come in the lifetime of many of us, but unless that world structure comes, there is no hope for this world, because the only alternative is world conflict on a prodigious and tremendous scale.

Therefore, it would be wrong, I submit to this House, for us to do anything to weaken those beginnings of a world structure that we see, even though we may disagree with it, and even though we may sometimes criticize it, as we have done. Therefore, for these and other reasons, I do not understand this cry of our withdrawing this matter of Kashmir from the United Nations. It is not a question of withdrawing it from some law court to the other. This matter is not before the United Nations as a forum. It is before the nations of the world, whether they are united or disunited and whether they are a forum or not. It is an international matter. It is a matter in the minds of millions of men. How can you withdraw it from the minds of millions of men by some legal withdrawal or otherwise from some forum? The question does not arise. We have to face the world; we have to face our people: we have to face facts and we have to solve them.

Then again some friends seem to imagine that the easiest way of solution is by some exhibition of armed might—"Let us march our armies."⁶ That, I

6. V.G. Deshpande had given notice for an amendment in the motion "that the Indian Government should discontinue its participation in the negotiations conducted under the aegis of the UNO and proceed with the task of liberating those territories of Jammu and Kashmir State which are occupied by the so-called 'Azad Kashmir' Government."

submit, in this case, as in every case all over the world, is never a solution, and the more I live and the longer I grow in experience, the more convinced I become of the futility and the wickedness of war to solve a problem. I regret that it is my misfortune even so to spend money on armaments, to keep armies and navies and air forces and the like, because in the world as it is constituted today, one has to take those precautions. Any person in a position of responsibility must take those precautions, and if we take those precautions, we have to take them adequately, effectively, and to keep a fine army, a fine navy and a fine air force. That is so. But to think in terms of throwing our brave boys into warfare, indulging in warfare, is not a thought I indulge in unless circumstances force my hands as they forced my hands on a late evening in October 1947, and it was after the most painful thought and consultation, and if I may, in all humility and without sacrilege, say, after consulting the Father of the Nation, that I came to that conclusion.⁷

So we did that. Although friends may talk about defending the territory of India and may say: A part of the territory of India has been invaded:⁸ It is held by the enemy; what about that? Did you defend that territory of India? You have failed in your defence. That argument would be perfectly justified, that criticism would be right in so far as it goes, and it was our duty, and it is our duty to rid and push out the enemy from every part, and that particular part of the territory of India also. That is where there comes a certain conflict between various obligations and responsibilities.

We decided, right at the beginning, we had decided, as the House knows, that we were agreeable to a plebiscite in which all the people of Jammu and Kashmir State would take part. And it was a curious thing that having so decided, that this war should have to be continued, because there was war for fourteen or fifteen months from the beginning, from the end of October 1947 to the end of December 1948. It continued, and it was for us to decide at the end of 1948 or the beginning of 1949 whether we should carry this war to a bitter end and thereby recover this lost territory, however long it may take, or whether we should call a halt to active military operations and try some other

7. Mahatma Gandhi supported Nehru in the despatch of Indian troops to Kashmir on the ground that India had a moral obligation to go to the aid of the victims of aggression. He said on 9 November 1947 that "it was right for the Union Government to rush troops, even a handful, to Srinagar. That must save the situation.... The result is in the hands of God. Men can do or die, I will not shed a tear if the little Union force is wiped out, like the Spartans, bravely defending Kashmir...."
8. In course of fighting, Pakistan occupied two-fifths of the State's territory which includes important towns like Muzaffarabad, Mirpur, Poonch, Kotli, Bhimpur and Gilgit. A provisional Government, known as 'Azad Kashmir' Government, was formed which continues to be administered by Islamabad. The 'Azad Kashmir' forces have, from the beginning, been a constituent unit of the Pakistan army.

and more peaceful method. We decided, conditioned as we were, and I submit, we decided rightly, to put an end to active military operations, and try other methods. Those other methods have not brought a solution in their train thus far. And yet, I think it would be right to say that the mere fact that such an extraordinarily explosive situation, as in the Jammu and Kashmir State during the last few years, has been halted, itself is no small success. We see in other parts of the world how other countries have functioned, and how they have got more and more tied up and sunk into all kinds of morasses, and how it becomes a more and more difficult—if you pursue the path of war—risk to take yourself out of it. We had the courage, and in all humility I say, the wisdom to pull ourselves out of continuing an unending war before it was too late so that we might think more calmly, more patiently, more wisely.⁹ Well, whether it has yielded any result yet or not, this fact remains that it has yielded this result that we have not been having a war for the last three and a half years, or whatever the period may be. That is not a bad result, although it may not be the full result hoped for.

Then later we declared that any further aggression or attack—I say any further because there had been aggression and there was continuing aggression—any further aggression or attack or military operations in regard to Kashmir, if such takes place by the other side, that would mean all-out war not in Kashmir only, but elsewhere too.¹⁰ That too was a decision not lightly undertaken, but after serious thought and careful consultation. We said that knowing full well the consequences of what we said, balancing them and yet coming to that conclusion, and I believe it is because we came to that serious conclusion—which was no threat, but which was a statement of an absolute fact in our minds, because there could be no attack on Kashmir, any further attack, without this matter becoming a major war, so far as India was concerned—having made that perfectly clear. I think we succeeded in stopping many a possible attack that would have taken place on Kashmir in the hope that the opposite party would have come off with it, and tried to repeat what had been done in the later weeks of October 1947. So, that has been the position.

9. The Government of India withdrew some of its forces from the advanced positions to the ceasefire line because it thought that the withdrawal could facilitate the use of peaceful methods to make Pakistan vacate aggression.
10. In a speech at Bangalore on 16 July 1951, Nehru said that “we shall commit no aggression on Pakistan on any account, but if Pakistan attacks any part of the Indian territory we shall repel this attack with all our strength.” See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 14 Part II, p. 313. Again, in a cable to Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, dated 24 July 1951, Nehru stated that “India has no intention whatever of attacking Pakistan, or seeking solution of any problem by force, but if Indian territory, including Kashmir, is invaded by Pakistan, then India will take armed measures in self-defence.” See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 14 Part II, p. 238.

Now, two or three basic things follow from this. One is that, in so far as the United Nations are concerned, we shall continue, unless this House decides otherwise, we shall continue to deal with them in the manner we have dealt with them. That manner has been to try our utmost for a peaceful settlement, but not to give in on any vital point, not to give up any of the responsibilities or obligations that we shoulder. That has been our position, that is, not to dishonour the pledges that we have given to the people of Kashmir, or to the people of India as a whole. So we shall carry on with them.

The House knows that we accepted certain resolutions of the United Nations and of the UN Commission that came here. We accepted them, not that we liked every part of them, but because in our earnest desire for a peaceful settlement, we accepted them, but even in doing so, we made it perfectly clear that we would not bypass the pledges we had given or the responsibilities we had undertaken. At a later stage, much later, another resolution was passed by the Security Council which tried to impose arbitration on us.¹¹ We rejected that resolution, or that part of it, because it was one thing for us to agree to a certain proposal having balanced all factors, but it was a completely wrong thing for us to give up our responsibilities, duties, obligations and pledges and assurances, and put the matter in the hands of another person whoever he might be. That we could never do. It was quite another thing for us to hand over the faith of the four million people of Jammu and Kashmir State to the decision of an arbitrator. Great political questions, and this was a great political question, are not handed over in this way to arbitrators from foreign countries or any country. So we had to reject that resolution of the United Nations. And we stand by that rejection, and we are not going to agree to anything which comes in the way, which prevents us from honouring the pledges or the assurances we have given.

Subject to that, we shall go all out to seek a peaceful settlement. Now, among the assurances and pledges that we have given has been the pledge which really flowed from our policy, which was no new thing for us, the pledge that the people of Jammu and Kashmir State would decide their future. Let me be quite clear about something about which there seems to be a good deal of misunderstanding, namely this business of accession to India. The other day I said in this House¹² that this accession was complete in law and in fact. Some people and some newspapers chiefly abroad seem to think that something

11. On 28 April 1949, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan failed to secure the approval of both the countries to its truce proposals. The UNCIP, therefore, on 28 August 1949, proposed that all points of difference should be submitted to arbitration. It also named Admiral Nimitz as the arbitrator. India rejected the proposal of arbitration on 8 September because it amounted to placing the aggressor and the aggressed on an equal footing. Pakistan accepted this proposal on 7 September.

12. See *ante*, p. 238.

that had happened in the last week or fortnight or three weeks had made this accession complete according to my views. What I said was that this accession was complete in law and in fact in October 1947. It is patent, and no argument is required, because every accession of every state in India was complete on those very terms in July, August or September or later in that year. They all came in on these three basic subjects, Foreign Affairs, Communications and Defence. Can anybody say that the accession of any state of India was incomplete in the month of August or September or October or November of 1947, because they came only on these three subjects? Of course not. It was a complete accession in law and in fact. So was the accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State in law and in fact on a certain late date in October, probably the 26th or 27th if I get the exact date.

It is not open to doubt or challenge. I am surprised that anybody here or elsewhere in the world should challenge it. I was telling the House that when the first United Nations Commission came here, accompanied by legal advisers and others, it was open to them to do so. But it was quite clear to them, and their legal advisers said that there could be no challenging the legal validity of that accession apart from everything else. So, while the accession was complete in law and in fact, the other fact, which has nothing to do with law also remains, namely our pledge¹³ to the people of Kashmir, if you like, to the people of the world, that this matter can be reaffirmed or cancelled or cut out by the people of Kashmir, if they so wish.

We do not want to win people against their will, and with the help of armed forces, and if the people of Jammu and Kashmir State so wish it, to part company from us, they can go their way, and we shall go our way. We

13. When, on 26 October 1947, the Maharaja of Kashmir sought accession, and the following day when Lord Mountbatten replied to him, accepting the accession of Kashmir to India, Mountbatten stated that the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state soon after law and order had been restored in Kashmir. In his cables to Attlee, the British Prime Minister, on 26 October, and to Liaquat Ali Khan, on 28 October, Nehru underlined the fact that accession was to be referred to the people. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 4, pp. 274-275, 286-289. On 31 October 1947, the Indian Government cabled to Karachi: "Kashmir's accession to India was accepted by us at the request of the Maharaja's Government and the most representative popular organisations in the state, which are predominantly Muslim. Even then it was accepted on the condition that as soon as the invaders had been driven from Kashmir soil and law and order restored, the people of Kashmir would be able to decide the question of accession." On 25 November, in a statement before the Constituent Assembly of India, Nehru said that when the people had the opportunity to decide the future, this should be done under the supervision of an impartial tribunal such as the UN. Again, India's complaint to the Security Council dated 1 January stated that India had offered the people of Kashmir a chance to decide their future by the method of plebiscite or referendum. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 4, pp. 340-345.

want no forced marriages, no forced unions like this. I hope this great Republic of India is a free, voluntary, friendly and affectionate union of the States of India. I do believe that the people of Jammu and Kashmir state not only came to us as they did, but indeed it was at their request that we took them. It was not under pressure, but it was at their request that we took them into our large family of States, and I believe that they have those friendly feelings which the other States have towards us. I believe that, on repeated occasions, they have shown this fact, and even in the election of this Constituent Assembly that took place nearly a year ago, they exhibited that feeling of friendship and union with India.

And I am personally convinced that, if at any time there is any other method of ascertaining their feelings, they will decide in the same way. But that is my personal opinion it may be your opinion or the House's opinion, but the fact remains that we said openly to them and to the world, that we will give them a chance to decide, and we will stand by their decision in this matter. Therefore we must honour that pledge. Within the limits of these assurances and pledges, we shall pursue the policy that we have pursued, and I submit it is in keeping with all these assurances, pledges and policies that a short while ago we met the representatives of the Government of Kashmir, who are not merely the representatives of the Government but who undoubtedly are the popular leaders of Kashmir. We met them, we talked to them, and we discussed many matters with them. We did not discuss with them in a spirit of bargaining or in a spirit of two opposite parties meeting and trying to pull each in its own direction. We discussed matters with them, with a view to solving our intricate problems, with a view to unravelling the knots, and with a view to finding some way which would fit in with the various assurances that we had given and they had given, and with the policies they stood for and we stood for—many of these policies were of course common. So we discussed with them in a friendly way and we came to certain agreements which I placed before this House during the last occasion.¹⁴ It is obvious that those agreements do not finalize the picture. Much has to be done, and much has to be thought out, but two or three facts remain.

One is that in the nature of things at the present moment, it is necessary to consider the case of Jammu and Kashmir state on a somewhat separate footing from the other states of India. It is inevitable that we should do so, if you bear in mind this past history of four or five years, the assurances we had given and the fact that Kashmir has become an international issue, apart from being a national one; that does not mean any special right or privilege except in so far as it may mean some slightly greater measure of internal autonomy. Certainly it does

14. See *ante*, pp. 219-238.

mean that. It may be that it is a developing, dynamic situation. One may change it gradually more and more, but it is not right under existing circumstances for us to try to do something by any kind of mental coercion or pressure exercised to that effect. That would defeat our object, and that indeed would be playing into the hands of those who criticize us. So that is the method we have employed, and it is in the full freedom of friendly discussion that we arrived at certain agreements which I placed before the House. Anyway, I trust that today in this debate the House will consider all these various aspects of this question and give us its support.

15. The Fundamental Unity of Kashmir with India¹

I must express my gratitude to the many honourable Members who have spoken in the course of this debate, and spoken generously about the policy that the Government has pursued in regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. We have had today an abundance of generous acknowledgment of the policy.² We have had criticism³ also, and I welcome it, because criticism is always a little helpful in understanding a particular position, and in this very difficult and delicate matter the more aspects we examine the more light is thrown upon it and the better it is for all of us. We have dealt with this matter for near upon five years now. We have fought the good fight about Kashmir on the field of battle for over a year there, and many of our brave young men went there and remained there. We have fought this fight in many a chancellory of the world and in the United Nations but above all, we have fought this fight in the hearts of men and women of that State of Jammu and Kashmir. Because

1. Reply to the debate in the House of the People on the motion in regard to Jammu and Kashmir State, 7 August 1952. *Parliamentary Debates* (House of the People), Vol. IV, Part II (30 July 1952 to 12 August 1952), cols. 5905-5921.
2. Members of the Congress and left parties in the House of the People welcomed the agreement as a step forward.
3. Certain provisions of the agreement were criticized on the ground that they created an impression that the Union Government had given away more than it received. By agreeing to a qualifying clause in the citizenship formula, the Union had created two classes of citizens—privileged and non-privileged. The special provision for the returning migrants discriminated in favour of the displaced Muslims. It was also questioned why the Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution could not be conferred *in toto* on the residents of Kashmir. A separate State flag and postponement of financial integration were the other points which were criticized.

ultimately—I say with all deference to this Parliament—the decision will be made in the hearts and minds of the men and women of Kashmir, neither in this Parliament, nor in the United Nations nor by anybody else.

So we have dealt with this problem in a variety of ways in various fields of action, and we have not solved it. We may have gone on in a particular direction, but we have not yet solved it, and I want to be perfectly frank with this House. I promise no speedy solution. Why should I make promises which I might not be able to keep?

And may I remind this House that in the world today there are ever so many problems, big problems, affecting the world's future which remain unsolved, which go on from month to month and year to year and are not solved? It is mercy enough in this world that they do not go much worse. That itself is supposed to be a great mercy and a blessing. It is all very well when some people in foreign countries, who occasionally think it their duty to give us good advice, tell us: "Why do you not solve this question of Kashmir which may lead to, well, big things, to a world conflict and all that?" There are many people who are generous with their advice to us in foreign countries. One feels tempted to say to them that they are also engaged in some problems, whether it is in the Far East or in Europe or elsewhere, that somehow carry on from day to day and year to year. Why do they not find a solution of them? Why is it that we are at fault because we cannot solve the question of Kashmir, but they are right in carrying on not only these problems but preparations for future creation of problems? But that would be a cheap reply for us to make to them, because we are all in difficulties struggling against all manner of developments in the world which perhaps are not entirely within the power of any one country or any one people.

So I should like this House to consider this problem, as it has considered it in all its aspects and to forget for the moment the minor things, the lawyers' points, if I may so call them with all respect to the lawyers who have their particular place provided they keep it. There are many things that have been said. My honourable friend, Dr Mookerjee, has said a great deal about this clause and that clause.⁴ If I have the time I may deal with them, but really it is of little importance what this clause or that clause says or does. What is important is your approach to this problem, what is important is the fundamental basis of it—whether you understand it or not—what is important is what is your objective really and what is the way to gain that objective. If it is your

4. S.P. Mookerjee drew attention to the inconsistency in the arrangement which created two sovereign Parliaments, two Prime Ministers, two classes of citizens, two systems of Heads of State, and of Fundamental Rights. He said: "You cannot have a divided loyalty. It is not a question of fifty-fifty. It is not a question of parity."

objective—as I claim it must be and should be and there can be none other—that this problem has to be decided by the people of Kashmir, by their goodwill, by their minds and hearts being with you, then you must adopt a policy to gain that end; there is no other policy. Why issue threats? Why talk to them and say, “you must do this, you must not do that?” It does not matter.

I am called a Kashmiri in the sense that ten generations ago my people came down from Kashmir to India. It is not that bond that counts in my mind today but other bonds, bonds which have arisen much more in these five years or so, bonds which have tied us much closer. Not me only—I am a symbol for the moment. Vast numbers of people in India and Kashmir have been bound together in these five years of conflict against a common adversary. So we accept this basic proposition that this question is going to be decided finally by the goodwill and pleasure of the people of Kashmir, not, I say, by the goodwill and pleasure of even this Parliament if it so chooses, not because this Parliament may not have the strength to decide it—I do not deny that—but because this Parliament does not function in this way and rightly so, because this Parliament has not only laid down in this particular matter that a certain policy will be pursued in regard to Jammu and Kashmir State, but it has been our policy, it has been our heritage that we would not impose our will against the wishes of other people. We choose other methods, other approaches, we follow other policies.

Therefore, we must be clear in our minds that this question in regard to the future of Jammu and Kashmir State can ultimately be decided only by the people of Jammu and Kashmir State. Having come to that conclusion then let us fashion our other policies accordingly; then let us not find fault with something here and there because it does not fit in with our wishes.

Many things have happened in Jammu and Kashmir which I do not approve of—there it is. I have no doubt many things have happened and will happen that my honourable friend opposite may approve of, and I may not approve of, just as many things happen not only in Jammu and Kashmir State but in the rest of India that I do not approve of. I do not control everything that happens in India—I do not presume to do so. I put up with it. But what is our approach going to be? If that is our approach then we must not do anything which counters that approach, which undermines it, which uproots it, which really encourages the hands of those who are opposed to us—our enemies, our opponents, our adversaries and the like. That is the basic thing which we must understand. Let us be clear about it.

You can criticize Shaikh Abdullah. Shaikh Abdullah is no God—he commits many errors, he will commit many more. He is a brave man and a great leader of his people. That is a big enough thing. He has led his people through weal and woe, he has led them when they were facing grave disaster. He did not shrink from leadership at that time—that is a big enough thing to

be said about any man. If he has failings, if he has made a mistake here or there, if he had delivered a speech which we do not like, what of that? Bigness is bigness in spite of a hundred mistakes. It is not a matter of Shaikh Abdullah or anyone else.

It is a bigger matter than any individual, and in a sense this question of Kashmir, as this House well knows, has not been for us—certainly it has not been for us—a question of territory. We gain nothing. Financially, in money matters, we gain nothing—it may cost us much until ultimately it develops; because it is a rich country ultimately, undoubtedly, it will develop. But anyhow we have not cast covetous eyes upon Kashmir because of any gain. We have cast eyes on Kashmir because of old bonds, old sentiments and, well, new sentiments also, and it has become very close to our minds and hearts. And if it so happens that by some decree of adverse fortune Kashmir goes out of India, it would be a wrench and a pain and a torment to us. But whether it is a pain and a torment, if the people of Kashmir want to go out, let them go because we will not keep them against their will however painful it may be to us.

That is the policy that India will pursue, and because India will pursue that policy people will not leave her, people will cleave to her and come to her. Because the strongest bonds that bind will not be the bonds of your armies, or even of your Constitution to which so much reference has been made, but bonds which are stronger than the Constitution and laws and armies—bonds that bind through love and affection and understanding of various peoples.

That being the approach, many of the arguments that some honourable Members opposite have advanced seem to me to be inapplicable. They do not apply. I can easily criticize many things that have happened: I should like some things to happen which have not happened—that is easy enough. I might try to better it, but that is a different matter. But the point is: whether in doing so you are trying to get what you are aiming at, or, are you really coming in the way of your very objective? The honourable Member from Kashmir⁵ who spoke last—he is a representative of the minority community of Srinagar, a Kashmiri Pandit, much more so than I am—gave you some kind of a graphic account of those days when everybody in the vale of Kashmir, Muslim or Hindu, but more especially the Hindus and the Sikhs, stood in terror of the morrow. Nobody knew what might happen—or perhaps they knew too well. The people of Kashmir, and the women of Kashmir especially, have a certain reputation outside Kashmir also. And mind you, the women of Kashmir, Hindu and Muslim, in considerable numbers, were taken away by these raiders and others, they were spread out way up to Afghanistan and beyond even, and sometimes sold for a pittance. Honourable Members should think how these stories and these accounts must have affected the people of Kashmir, and those

5. Shiv Narayan Fotedar.

connected with Kashmir, and how they must have thought that this might be the fate on the morrow of their own sisters and mothers and wives, etc.

Now, they have gone through that and they faced that; they did not run away from it—it is not particularly easy to run across mountains unless you have cars, etc. So, during these five years there have been these ups and downs.

No doubt many mistakes may have been committed, but looking back on these five years I think that the people of Kashmir, the people of India, and with all humility, if I may say so, the Government of India, in spite of numerous small mistakes that they may have committed have stuck to the right path, broadly speaking. They have not given up the straight and narrow path. They have stuck to it as sometimes even when it appeared not very opportune; sometimes when others were displeased; sometimes when a little swerving to the right or to the left may have gained some advantage to us in foreign countries, and the like. And foreign countries began to count for us. It did not matter much what we thought of them, but there they were sitting in the Security Council and talking a great deal, sometimes some sense, sometimes nonsense.

That was happening all the time, and we had put up with these people trying to judge us, trying to judge a thing which was so important to us, not because of territory as somebody suggested but for other reasons I have mentioned. They thought of Kashmir as a geographical unit, as a plaything for them. Here was Kashmir, very much in our hearts. Due to all those circumstances, it had become so much tied up with our feelings, emotions, thoughts and passions that it was a part of our being. And we saw these foreign countries dealing with it in this casual way, and talking about India's imperialism, about India trying to conquer Kashmir, etc. We restrained ourselves, but very often there was anger in our hearts, anger at this intolerant criticism, at the way people have the presumption to talk to us, to this great country of India.

They were talking of imperialism to us when they were carrying on their own imperialism and their own wars and all that, and were preparing for future wars. They talked to India like that, and because we went there to protect Kashmir from territorial invasion, they dared and had the temerity to talk of India's imperialism.

Well, as I said, we restrained ourselves, and we shall endeavour to restrain ourselves still in future, but restraint does not mean weakness. It does not mean giving in in this business. To the end we knew, because we were firm and convinced of the rightness of our position, because as I said—and I said it with all honesty of purpose—I have searched my heart and I have looked into every single step that I have taken in this Kashmir matter, and while, of course, my Government is responsible for it, ultimately I have been personally

concerned with every single step during the last nearly five years.

Looking back over those five years, I think that there are some things that I may have done otherwise—maybe some minor things—but I do not see any major step that we have taken which could have been otherwise than what we have done. It may be that there may have been a miscalculation, but it was a fundamentally right step demanded by circumstances from that first day when we sent our young men flying over the mountains to Kashmir in the end of October 1947. In other steps we may have erred sometimes in the cause of peace, in the cause of avoidance of war, if you like. I want to err in that way always, but for people to accuse us of avarice, of covetousness, of imperialism, of breaking our words and pledges—well, I say and I repeat it that every single step that we have taken, every single word that we have given to the United Nations, to the United Nations Commission or to anybody else who has come here,—every single word and pledge that we gave and every assurance that we have given we have kept to the uttermost letter, which is much more than can be said for Pakistan in this matter, because this whole Kashmir business is based on a fundamental lie, the lie of Pakistan in entering Kashmir and denying it.

I do not mind if they want to go there. Let them go there and fight. But why lie? For six months they did it and then said they did not do it. When you base a case on a lie, the lie is repeated, and it was repeated in the Security Council month after month. There were their armies, and their Foreign Minister went on saying that they were not there—an astonishing thing—and when the United Nations Commission was here and was on the point of going to the front, of course there was no possibility of concealing this fact. Then they admitted it; and admitted it how? They had to admit it anyhow, and a paper was put in by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army and that Commander-in-Chief was a well-known British officer. That Commander-in-Chief put in a paper saying that he had been compelled in the interests of protecting Pakistan to send his armies—the Pakistan armies into Kashmir because he was afraid that India was going to invade Pakistan across Kashmir somewhere down from Central Asia.⁶

6. Early in 1948, General Gracey, who was Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, submitted a memorandum to the Pakistan Government, containing an appraisal of the military situation in Kashmir and advising his Government to send regular Pakistan forces into Kashmir. He had advised that for security reasons and for the sake of the rivers which flow from Kashmir, vital for the interests of Pakistan, the Pakistan forces should enter Kashmir. When the Government of India came to know of General Gracey's memorandum, Nehru wrote to Attlee, the British Prime Minister, on 20 December 1948. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 9, pp. 203-204.

Now, that is the beginning of this extraordinary story of Kashmir, and it is as well that this is repeated again and again because people forget it—not honourable Members, but other people—and this matter has become international, and it is talked about in the various capitals of the world. This simple story, these simple facts of invasion, of brigandage, loot and arson are forgotten and passed over and other discussions take place. It has been an amazing education for many of us these five years over this Kashmir question—education, if I may say so, in world politics; education in how nations behave; education in how great countries get distorted visions and cannot see straight in the simplest matter when it so suits them.

Well, I am perhaps talking a little apart from my present brief, but I would like to come back to this very matter and say that it is not merely that we have stated it to the United Nations or to the people of Kashmir, but in the very nature of things, in the very nature of the policy we have pursued, not in Kashmir alone but everywhere, it follows that the people of Kashmir only can decide, and that if I may say, in spite of our five years of trouble and expense and all that we have done, if it was made clear to us tomorrow that the people of Kashmir wanted us to depart from there we will come back, however sad we may feel about it because we are not going to stay there against their wishes. We are not going to impose ourselves there at the point of the bayonet. If that is so, then the ultimate thing, the final thing, the chief thing that counts is their wishes.

It is true that their wishes do not mean that we should do the wrong thing. Suppose they want us to do something wrong in Kashmir. We refuse. We cannot do it. We may even say, "Well, we prefer rather not to have this kind of wrong association at all." It is a conceivable thing. We do not want a wrong association. Nobody can force us into a wrong association, just as we cannot force them into an association against their will. An association is a matter of mutual understanding, affection, union, etc., and if there is going to be an association, our wishes and willingness count. In our desire to gain the goodwill of the people of Kashmir we cannot gain their own ill-will and take the wrong path. That is a different matter. We are not considering this matter as a bargain, as a matter between strangers, but as between partners, between part of ourselves, who consider it a difficult and delicate problem and try to find a way out. The way out may not be completely logical; it may not be completely reasonable from the point of view of this law or that constitution, but if it is effective, then it is a good way out, whether it offends against some legalistic arguments or logical arguments or not.

My honourable friend referred to various matters. One thing I should like to say in this connection, although it is rather perhaps not to the point, and I am afraid of saying it because of so many lawyers here. When the British went away from here there was a good deal of misunderstanding as to the

situation that was then created in India, because of the Partition, and because of the statement⁷ issued by the United Kingdom about the Indian states etc.

Now I may venture to put forward my own view, for the moment functioning as a jurist and constitutional lawyer. It is this. The Partition took away a certain part of India, separated it from us with our consent. But all the rest of India, including the states, remained as a continuing entity. Till something happened to take them away, we were a continuing entity. We are a continuing entity. We did not come out of Partition. Pakistan was cut off at the time of Partition. India was, India remained, India is, India will be. So every state, till some final decision was made about that state deciding to go out of India, continued that old relationship with India, for the intervening period, if you like. In the nature of things, there could not be, whatever the British Government might say in any statement, innumerable authorities in India.

By the removal of the British power from India in 1947 to some extent we were thrown back to the days when the British power came here. That is an interesting and good parallel to pursue in other ways too. But I will not pursue that, because it may lead to some controversial argument. When the British power came here and established itself, it became quite evident that power must be predominant in India and nobody else can remain independent. They may remain semi-independent, they may remain as protectorate, in a subordinate capacity and all that. Gradually, the British power brought all these princes and others within its domain and under its suzerainty.

So, it was impossible after the British power went away, in fact more impossible than it was in the distant past, for any odd bits of independent territories to remain here. Pakistan was, of course, out of the picture. For the rest it was inevitable that the princes and others, whoever they might be—whether they acknowledged it or not, whether they wanted it or not, it is immaterial—must acknowledge the suzerainty, the sovereign domain of the Republic of India.

Now, if that was so, even if Kashmir did not, as it so happened, decide whether to accede to Pakistan or India and we allowed the matter to be postponed for a while, that did not make Kashmir independent for the time

7. It declared that paramountcy of the British Crown lapsed without being transferred to the new Central authority in India. This created a vacuum. Formally, the States became independent and reverted to the position they held before they came under the suzerainty of the British Crown. Legally, each state was free to join either India or Pakistan or declare its independence.

being.⁸ It was not independent and our responsibility even then continued as the continuing entity if anything happened to Kashmir. I wish to say this because our duty to come to Kashmir's help was there, whether Kashmir acceded to India or not. On account of that continuing entity, India's responsibility to other parts continued, except to those parts which had definitely and deliberately parted company.

Dr Khare⁹ made a curious statement on Hindus being killed somewhere. This is the first time I heard of it. I really could not understand what place he was referring to. Perhaps his geography was weak. He was perhaps thinking of some other part, may be Pakistan. I have not the faintest notion how I can connect it with Kashmir.¹⁰

There is no doubt that people were killed in Mirpur—I do not know about the numbers. I rather doubt the correctness of his numbers, because the whole population of Mirpur was not that much. There is no doubt that there was killing there when the Pakistan troops and raiders came there.

There has been a good deal of the use of the word "monarchy".¹¹ I do not just understand the sense in which it was used. We have no monarchs in India. I understand the meaning of the word "monarchy". I do not know why these wrong words are used to delude us. We have got some persons, who by the generosity of our States Ministry are still called 'Rulers'. Why, I do not know, because they rule nobody. Our States Ministry in the last three or four years has been known for its generosity and I am afraid we shall suffer for that generosity for a long time to come.¹²

I remember sometime ago I was told by the States Ministry: 'Of course, they have no position left. They are pensioners. Would you mind, just to please their vanity, if we call them rulers still?' I said 'please yourself'. But it

8. By 15 August 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh neither declared himself an independent ruler nor acceded to either Dominion but announced his desire to sign Standstill Agreements with India and Pakistan for the continuance of the existing administrative arrangements in respect of communications, posts and telegraphs and civil supplies, leaving the accession issue to be determined later. The status of Kashmir state at the time of independence was a political anomaly—a "neutral" territory without an international recognition.

9. N.B. Khare, leader of the Hindu Mahasabha.

10. S.P. Mookerjee intervened here and said: "He was referring to Mirpur-Poonch, that is in Jammu and Kashmir."

11. During the debate, K. Velayudhan had remarked: "I am not giving much importance to the abolition of monarchy in Kashmir, because it is only a mirage; there is no monarchy in Kashmir today. Some Members supported the Government for abolishing the monarchy or opposed the Government on the point of this monarchy question."

12. Here, K.N. Katju, Minister of Home Affairs and States, remarked: "They are known as Ex-Rulers, not rulers." Nehru said: "I think they are known as Rulers." Katju again said: "I always use the word "Ex-Rulers".

is really wrong for us to use these terms which mislead, for example "monarchy".

There is no monarchy in India. There are in certain places, certain families, princely families, if you like, who have got large endowments, very large, unnecessarily large. They hope to live on those endowments for generations to come. Then there are a few Rajpramukhs. There are now three States headed by Rajpramukhs: in other places there are groups of States and one of the rulers or ex-rulers has been chosen to be Rajpramukh¹³ for life.¹⁴

That shows how the Constitution requires amendment.

So we have got these Rajpramukhs. Some of them are excellent people—it is not a personal matter—some of them may not be quite so excellent. But it is obvious that this decision to give life tenure to anybody in a particular office is entirely not in keeping with either modern thought or intelligent thought. It may be accepted in a particular context of events of course, as we did. One must remember the particular context of events and not be too critical of what was done. That particular context of events was when hundreds and hundreds of states had to be absorbed rapidly within a few weeks into India, when, as a matter of fact, a number of those princes might well have given a lot of trouble, when in fact to our knowledge some were on the point of giving major trouble,¹⁵ when some secretly did give trouble and when the other troubles came—the communal troubles, after August 15, which were really largely political in their nature—some of these people and their families and cousins and uncles did a lot of harm and injury and participated in them and gave money and gave guns and sent gangs of rowdies to go about creating mischief.

Now, that was the position: there were these hundreds and hundreds of states all over India, big and small, not knowing what their future was going to be, afraid of their own people, afraid of the Government of India, left in the lurch by the protecting hand of the British power. We could have decided many things at that time. We could have decided, if you like, to remove them completely from the scene, or to come to terms with them and thereby buy immediate peace at a moment of great peril to our country. I think Sardar Patel acted very wisely. It is very well for us to be wise after the event and say: 'This might have been done this way and that might have been done another way'.

13. The Constitution provided life-tenure for the Rajpramukhs.

14. Thakur Das Bhargava interjected: "They are not ex-rulers. They are rulers as defined in the Constitution itself."

15. In 1946-47, the Chamber of Princes, dominated by the Nawab of Bhopal, stalled the Constitution-making and the accession of Indian States with India.

But if you remember that particular context, when there was grave danger, possibly, of India going to pieces, under the stress and strain of the passions raised by the Partition and the huge killings all over, the communal things, and all these reactionary *jagirdari* and feudal elements throwing themselves into the picture just to create trouble and disruption and hoping—some of them, I know for a fact—in the confusion to enlarge their domain,—it was foolish of them to hope that, but nevertheless hoping that way,—well, one had to come to some decisions. And Sardar Patel chiefly, and all of us also partly, came to the decision that it is better to consolidate India quickly and rapidly even at the cost of some money than to allow this wasteful fratricidal warfare and civil wars to continue, because apart from other things, even from the point of view of cost they are much more costly, and then they leave a trail of tremendous bitterness behind. So we came to these conclusions and came to certain settlements which by themselves are hardly just, financially or otherwise, but which were the price we paid for a quick settlement of a very difficult and vital problem.

Now, I am not going into the question as to how we are going to deal with all these matters in the future. That does not arise now. Obviously, the matters will have to be dealt with in the future, dealt with I hope in a friendly spirit by all those concerned. Obviously also, what happens in one place has its reactions and repercussions on another. And undoubtedly, what is happening, or is likely to happen in Kashmir, must have its reactions elsewhere.

Now, the honourable Member, Dr Mookerjee, referred to various things. About Article 352 he said a great deal and he asked me whether certain other Articles dealing with financial chaos or financial emergency or the Constitution breaking down would be applied. I shall answer it. As we are concerned at present, we are not applying those Articles. We have not even put them forward for consideration. I would beg the House to remember that we have to proceed on a certain basis, a basis it so happens—I am not excusing myself but it so happens—a basis which was made in my absence from India—I was in America at the time—and laid by that stout builder of this nation, Sardar Patel. At that time when this new Constitution—I have said this before but I repeat it—was being finalized, when the question of Kashmir came up, it was dealt within Article 370 of the Constitution. I would beg of you to read that Article 370, because if you discuss this question now, you must discuss it on the basis of the Article which we agreed to, which is part of our very Constitution. Do not say that we go outside the Constitution. We go to the Constitution itself to find out how to deal with Kashmir.

That is what the Constitution says. It is true, as has been pointed out, that Article was not a final and absolute provision. That Article itself was a transitional Article. But it laid down the method of decision in the future. It laid down the mode of how we should proceed in the future, and if more things

are to be added on the subjects or anything how it should be done. And, everywhere throughout you will see two classes of subjects. One was something in relation to the three major subjects or rather to the three categories of subjects namely, Defence, Communications and Foreign Affairs. In relation to them, if any change was to be made in their interpretation, the President was to do it "in consultation with" the Kashmir Government or the Constituent Assembly there. In regard to anything else the words used were not "in consultation with" but "with the concurrence of". Those were laid down in the year 1949 in November or December. And that is part of our Constitution.

Why then should anybody complain that we are going outside the Constitution, that we, or the people or the Government of Kashmir, are committing a breach of the Constitution? It may well be that the Government of Kashmir may ask us to do something which we do not consider proper. Maybe, but then it is a question of our talking to each other and finding a way which both we and they consider anything proper, and if we do not consider anything proper, well, then it does not happen and the consequences are faced, whatever the consequences are, obviously. And the consequences may not be agreeable to them or to us. There is no other way. There is no question—as some of the amendments of honourable Members say—of our issuing some kind of a decree or sending some compulsory order: "Obey, or you will suffer for it." That is not the way to deal with this matter. That is not the way we can deal with this matter. We have either to come to an agreement, or we do not come to an agreement and face the consequences.

But I do submit that we approached this matter and we shall, I hope, always approach this matter in a spirit of friendship, because we have to remember that there are so many aspects of this question—external and internal. The internal aspect is at present under the Kashmir Government. The effect of what they do in that part which is called wrongly 'Azad Kashmir', which is under Pakistan, the effect of that on others, the effect of foreign countries on India—there are so many aspects of the thing that you cannot just look at it from your own point of view. You must consider all these matters. It may be that the people in Kashmir have a particular aspect in view and it may be that you have not considered it, and if you consider it, you may be convinced. May I point out to honourable Members that Dr Mookerjee complained that he was not consulted....¹⁶

He mentioned about it, if I may say so, and yet only a little later he said that Shaikh Abdullah wrote to him and wanted to meet him and consult him....¹⁷

16. Here, S.P. Mookerjee contended that he did not complain.

17. Mookerjee mentioned: "After the decision was taken."

That is true; it is difficult; surely Dr Mookerjee will not expect Shaikh Abdullah or a member of this Government in the course of any important talks to be constantly consulting others. It is impossible; it cannot be done. If I may say so, members of my Cabinet were hardly consulted, and apart from those members who had a particular commission to deal with this matter, others were consulted after the talks were over. We discussed with them and we got their agreement to it.

What I was going to say was this: Shaikh Abdullah was anxious to meet the Members of the Opposition. He did not have the advantage of meeting Dr Mookerjee,¹⁸ but he did meet his colleague, Mr Chatterjee,¹⁹ and he had a two-hour talk with him. I was not present at the talk, but Mr Chatterjee was good enough to write to me and to inform me that he had this talk, and that he had been influenced by what Shaikh Abdullah had told him. That is what he wrote to me, that he now realized that there were many other aspects which had not been put before him previously. You see there are many aspects to this question. Then there is another thing. I refer to Article 352 which deals with Proclamation of Emergency. It reads as follows:-

If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance, he may, by Proclamation, make a declaration to that effect....

In a sense the President can do all manner of things including taking charge of the whole State. What in these talks we suggested, and we agreed to at the request of our friends from Kashmir, that where there was reference to internal disturbance, this action should be taken with the concurrence of the Government, and whether it is external aggression or war or other things, then their concurrence is not necessary. Undoubtedly, that is a variation in favour of that Government, and honourable Members are entitled to criticize it.

Will honourable Members remember again the basis from which we start? We start from Article 370 for the present moment. Article 370 rules out Article 352 and all the other Articles, that is, at the present moment, keeping strictly to the Constitution as it is applicable to Kashmir State, none of these provisions apply, so that what we have said whether in regard to this matter, or in regard to the Supreme Court, or in regard to the President's other powers—these are all new things added on to Kashmir, that is the supremacy of the President or this Parliament or the Supreme Court to the extent that they accept it. These

18. In a letter on 30 July 1952, S.P. Mookerjee asked Shaikh Abdullah to show no hesitation in accepting full integration of Kashmir with India if he regarded himself as an Indian.

19. N.C. Chatterjee.

are all new things added on to that extent. So it is not as if we are giving up something. We have very specifically laid down this very important provision of the Constitution, "that the President can take charge of the whole State itself under a grave emergency", should apply to that State but in case of internal disturbance with their concurrence. This seems very odd and some people say: How can you ask or wait for their concurrence? It is not such an odd provision. As a matter of fact, if the whole is in a chaos, then nobody waits for anybody's concurrence; he takes the steps, but I might say that this particular phraseology is taken from the American Constitution, where the Federal Government can take charge in an emergency of the State with the concurrence of the State Government. So it is not very new, and undoubtedly it is open to Members to criticize or not. But the point is that there is nothing very odd, or very special about it, and in all the circumstances, we felt that it is better for us to take it in this form than to leave it.

Then Dr Mookerjee asked a somewhat rhetorical question....²⁰

That was not so rhetorical.

The rhetorical part was: Is Kashmir subordinate to this Parliament of India.²¹

The mere fact that all these provisions that we have been considering, whether they are emergency provisions, whether it is the President's special powers, whether this is Parliament's powers in a certain domain, or whether the Supreme Court comes in, surely indicates that it does not require any other answer as to where a certain measure of sovereignty lies. I am being rash—I am talking about the Constitution and all legal matters, but obviously in a federal constitution sovereignty is divided between a State and the Federal Centre. In a moment of crisis, it may vest with the Federation or in the Centre. It is a different matter. I see that the Law Minister apparently does not agree with this. I am not quite sure, but anyhow, whatever it is, it is a small matter. In a Federation it is an old argument, whether it is divided or not. Take your own Constitution. There are parts of the Constitution, List III or whatever the list may be which is within the power of the States completely.²²

I know there is a certain list, whatever it is; it is the State List. List I is the Union List. List III is the Concurrent List. So that there is a sphere of State sovereignty which may be upset in the final analysis, which may be put an end to. In that sense I may say that the Centre is sovereign. Federations may differ about this, and there is a tendency for the Federal Centre to become

20. S.P. Mookerjee said: "citizenship rights."

21. S.P. Mookerjee raised the points: "So far as this Parliament is concerned, whether this Parliament is a sovereign body, or the other body, the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir, is sovereign and also about the two Prime Ministers."

22. N.V. Gadgil remarked: "In List II we cannot claim anything."

stronger all over the world. Therefore, the question—the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir, if I may say so, in one respect can certainly be termed sovereign—not in law, I am not talking about law—just as, if I may say so. I started with this presumption that it is for the people of Kashmir to decide finally about their own future. We will not compel them. In that sense the people of Kashmir are sovereign to decide their future—whether they are with us or not. They are not sovereign in the sense of accepting the Constitution and breaking it, in the sense of coming into partnership with us in our Constitution and accepting that part over which we are sovereign and then trying to get out of it. But they are sovereign in that sense that they may accept the whole, or not at all, or they may come to an agreement with us about other matters.

Now, there is one thing, if I may say which I was rather distressed to hear. The honourable Dr Mookerjee referred in rather contemptuous terms to our Governors, as dismissed and rejected people.²³

These were the honourable Member's words.

And a short while ago, on another occasion, an honourable Member opposite referred to one whom, I think I can say with a great deal of assurance, all of us have honoured and respected very greatly, a lady²⁴—he referred to her in terms of great disrespect.²⁵

The honourable Member did not refer to her, but another Member. She is not now a Member of this House. She is a Member of the Planning Commission, and she was referred to in terms which did not affect her, which I am sure, nor us, but which did a certain amount of discredit to the honourable Member who said that, as if she was a person who was being provided with jobs, as if nepotism was being shown to those who had been defeated in the elections. I submit that this kind of thing is wholly and totally unbecoming and improper, and especially in the case of people who are not here, who cannot say anything to defend themselves.

Now, I have taken a lot of time of this House. I am sorry for it. In a few days' time my colleague, Mr Gopalaswami Ayyangar will be going from here to Geneva. I will not be very truthful if I say that I expect great things to happen at Geneva, but we have to carry on with this business, with the rough and the smooth of it, and not run away from it. Well, our good wishes go with him, but, above all, our good wishes should go to the people of Jammu and Kashmir State who have become the plaything of international politics, and even our debates.²⁶

23. S.P. Mookerjee said: "Governorships are often reserved for various classes of persons—disappointed, and defeated, rejected, unwanted Ministers and so forth."

24. Durgabai Deshmukh.

25. S.P. Mookerjee denied having said like that.

26. Immediately after Nehru's speech, the amendments tabled earlier were rejected and the motion was adopted.

16. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
August 7, 1952

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

...While I have not been able to consult others, except very brief talks in the Parliament itself, I gathered from them that they were also rather perturbed at certain developments. It is clear to me that our President cannot possibly take any action on the lines you have indicated in the course of a few days.² Even before we can approach him for that action, there should be a resolution of your Constituent Assembly in regard to the various points on which we agreed. That clears the way for a further consideration and for such advice as we might be able to give to the President. After that comes the question of the Head of the State. We would naturally have preferred to include, in any Presidential Order that might be issued, several matters, if not all. Whatever your legal advisers may think about this, we have to proceed on such advice as we get here. But apart from legal advice, there is a question of constitutional propriety also, and in this matter the President naturally has a say.

Apart from this, and even considering the question of the Head of the State singly, the detailed resolution that you have sent with D.P. Dhar goes far beyond the terms that we agreed upon. It may be that some parts of it are consequential. Other parts of it are not necessarily so and indeed raise new issues. For instance, any question of deposition raises an entirely new aspect of the question, and directly touches the President's prerogatives. The detailed provisions for impeachment also seem to me very unnecessary even if they might be needed. You may be in a hurry to change the Head of the State, but surely you are not in a hurry to impeach him. You are postponing the rest of your constitution. It does not appear how any possible need arises to go into details about impeachment and the rest of it at this stage. I am not, for the moment, referring to certain other aspects of this question which affect our President who recognizes the Head of the State.

It does seem rather odd that, while you are not in a hurry about the constitution as a whole, you should have leisure to go into such intricate details about a remote contingency like impeachment. Obviously, that is a matter of intimate concern to the President, and in whatever form decisions may ultimately be taken, have to be carefully considered.

I do not know what you intend doing on the 11th of this month. But if

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Shaikh Abdullah wanted to take piecemeal decisions on the constitutional issues as they came up for consideration from time to time.

this resolution, the draft of which is brought by D.P. Dhar, is considered and passed, it will undoubtedly create great difficulties for us. Our two debates here in Parliament have resulted in creating a very good and favourable atmosphere for the changes we agreed upon. It will be most unfortunate if that atmosphere is vitiated by fresh problems and doubts arising in the minds of many people.

I think I understand your difficulties and your desire for early action. I think that desire can be fulfilled adequately in the manner I have suggested, without in any way giving up any principles. What I suggested in my last letter³ was that your Constituent Assembly should, by resolution, first of all, accept the points of agreement that we arrived at, secondly, as a part of the agreement which relates to the Head of the State. Details as to salary, allowances, etc., are not made part of the constitution as a rule. They are given in syllabuses attached to a constitution. You can say that other details will be provided for in a syllabus. The part dealing with impeachment etc., should be left out completely at this stage, as there is absolutely no point about it.

Having made this Head of the State question a definite part of your new constitution, the next question that arises is to give effect to it. That, though not involving any high principle, is yet a matter which requires very careful handling. It is not what we do merely that matters, but how we do it is equally important and in that come in our Presidential Orders and several factors about which we are yet uncertain. In any event, I think that a resolution directly deposing Hari Singh would be very unfortunate. If that has to be done, it can only be done by the President ceasing to recognize him.

It is not my wish to delay, but I do feel that important steps should be taken with due constitutional and other proprieties. To bypass them is to lessen the significance of the step.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. See *ante*, p. 258.

17. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
August 7, 1952

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

I have just written to you a letter.² Naturally, I have dealt only with some major points in that letter. There are any number of other points that arise in regard to the draft resolution that D.P. Dhar has brought. I am not for the moment dealing with them.

There is one aspect, however, which I should like to put before you. We have argued at great length in Parliament here about the actual terms of the agreement we arrived at. I have justified the language we used, and I have justified that language from various points of view. If that language is changed in any resolution of yours, then my argument in Parliament here will fall to the ground and that, you can well understand, would be exceedingly embarrassing, and would give a big handle to our critics and even disconcert our friends.

The whole position that I took up in Parliament does not fit in with the draft resolution you have sent.

You will remember the wording that we arrived at after much discussion about the Head of the State that he should be recognized by the President of India on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly. This wording has been changed, and the change will immediately be noticed by all those who have carefully argued this point in Parliament here.

Again, the State President is supposed to hold office during the pleasure of the President of India. What exactly does this mean? It has no meaning in the context of the resolution.

In the First Schedule, among the qualifications for the State President is that he should be a State subject of Class I. Thereby you are perpetuating in your constitution the various divisions of State subjects and classes which were made many years ago, and which you said were out of date and were going to be revised.

The procedure for impeachment is also rather singular. The trial of the State President is to be by a tribunal, which is appointed by this impeaching authority itself. I am not aware of any such procedure anywhere. The State High Court Judge is to be its chairman. The State High Court is supposed to be subordinate to the Supreme Court. Where does the Supreme Court or the President of India come into the picture? I am putting to you some of my immediate reactions, even before I have considered this matter carefully, because

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to K.N. Katju, Maulana Azad and N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar.

2. See the preceding item.

I shall have to deal with these matters here, and I do not know how I shall be able to explain them or justify them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

18. To Karan Singh¹

New Delhi
August 8, 1952

My dear Yuvaraj,

3....I have unfortunately not been keeping very well owing to a slight accident. The accident was not much, but an anti-titanus injection that was given to me produced powerful results and all my body swelled up and caused a great amount of trouble. In spite of this, I had to carry on in Parliament because of urgent work. Part of this work indeed was due to resolutions in regard to Jammu and Kashmir State, which were moved by me in the Council of States and the House of the People.² There were long debates and I spoke at some length.³ You will no doubt have seen the reports of these debates. As a result, the resolutions embodying the points of agreement⁴ arrived at here, when Shaikh Abdullah and his colleagues were here, were accepted by Parliament. In fact, our general policy in regard to Kashmir was approved of. Our Government is, therefore, clearly committed to that policy.

4. In spite of my indifferent health and the heavy pressure of work on me, we have given a good deal of thought to the reports we have received from Srinagar and to your letters.⁵ I have written to Shaikh Abdullah myself at

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. See *ante*, pp. 262-282 and 286-295.

3. See *ante*, pp. 295-309.

4. See *ante*, pp. 211-217.

5. In his letter of 3 August 1952, Karan Singh stated that: "My highest ambition is to be able to serve effectively the people of my country, and any position which gives me that opportunity will naturally be welcomed. However, in the present circumstances, I feel that it is not possible for me to come to any decision until the new constitution for Kashmir emerges in its final shape from the Constituent Assembly, and receives the approval of the Government of India... It is hardly possible for me to accept a position without knowing exactly and clearly the duties or functions which attach to it...." In his letter of 7 August, Karan Singh reported to Nehru a gist of his talks with Shaikh Abdullah on 6 August. "I tried to persuade him to understand that it was just not possible for me to say anything until the new constitution was completed and I knew exactly what my duties and position would be, and that anyhow the question of choosing a Head of the State would only arise after that. He was, however, very adamant that the matter would be taken up by the Consenbly on Monday the 11th, and asked that I should make up my mind and let him know my decision as soon as possible before that date."

some length twice since day before yesterday.⁶ I have naturally consulted Maulana Azad, Mr Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Dr Katju. This afternoon all of us had a talk with D.P. Dhar and explained to him what our views were as to the steps that should be taken in furtherance of the agreement arrived at. He is returning early tomorrow morning to Srinagar, and will no doubt communicate our advice to Shaikh Abdullah.

5. Some drafts were shown to us by D.P. Dhar. We did not like these drafts or much that they contained and we have made suggestions for considerable changes in them.⁷

6. I can very well understand your anxieties and difficulties in this matter. To a large extent, I share them with you, and I have not liked much that has happened. But, in dealing with public matters, one has to take a dispassionate view, and not allow oneself to be governed merely by likes and dislikes.

7. I quite agree with you that this business of hustling through a part of the constitution is neither normal nor ordinarily desirable. The proper course would have been to pass the full constitution and then give effect to it. But this matter was discussed by us at very great length when the Kashmir delegation was here, and ultimately we came to the conclusions which were embodied in the points of agreement. It serves little purpose to go back on them and renew the old arguments. Much has been done which cannot be undone at the present stage, and any attempt to do so would only produce further complications. Therefore, we have to accept the present position as it is. That is to say that a part of the constitution dealing with the Head of the State, in the form agreed upon, should be adopted first.

8. You will have noticed that several other important matters were agreed to between us. This whole picture has to be seen together. Some of these other points bring the Jammu and Kashmir State closer to India and to our Constitution. If all this is given effect to, then the other remaining provisions need not make much difference. In a sense, we get a broad framework of the constitution in its relation to India. The details can be filled in later. In filling in these details also, of course, care should be taken.

9. Our Parliament has accepted this broad framework. It is desirable and necessary that the Constituent Assembly of the Jammu and Kashmir State should do this also, that is to say, it should adopt a similar procedure and, by resolution, accept the points of agreement, as we have done here.

10. This is our first and basic suggestion to Shaikh Abdullah. Having done this, the Constituent Assembly can proceed to consider the other important matter, namely, that relating to the Head of the State. We have suggested that the identical language used by us and agreed upon should be used. Some

6. See *ante*, pp. 310-313.

7. See *ante*, pp. 312-313.

minor ancillary provisions might be added. To this might be added that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State be authorized to forward the decision of the Constituent Assembly to the President of India and should further be authorized to take such other steps as may be necessary to implement that decision.

11. I am not giving the exact language of the resolution and I am writing from memory. Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar is giving a note on this subject to D.P. Dhar.

12. This procedure thus gives time for the consideration of what other steps should be taken, and how all this should be done. It gives time for the President of India also to issue such notifications as may be necessary.

13. In the draft proposals sent to us, there was a good deal of detail. There was reference also to possible impeachment for grave misconduct etc. We thought all this is wholly unnecessary. Of course, a full constitution deals with such matters just as our Constitution lays down a certain procedure for the impeachment of the President. The question does not arise, so far as we are concerned in regard to Kashmir, because the Head of the Jammu and Kashmir State will be formally recognized by our President and will hold office during the pleasure of the President.

14. Thus what we have suggested is a simple form to be passed now with authority given to work it out later for purposes of implementation. This does not mean that there will be great delay, or that we shall wait for the full constitution to take shape. It does mean that we shall have some leisure to think out various consequences and decide on the procedure to be adopted.

15. In your letter you lay stress on two points. One is that the whole constitution should be framed before the question of the Head of the State is taken up and secondly, the question of tenure and re-election.⁸ As for the first point, I have already said that we discussed this matter at length and decided ultimately not to press it. Events had gone too far to be reversed. As for the tenure and re-election, re-election there can always be, and I am told that this is the present intention. But in the nature of things it is hardly possible for any person to guarantee it. I told you when you were here that the next five years would very probably see the end of the present system of Rajpramukhs for life. Indeed I think that a change is likely to occur long before those five years are over. Already people are beginning to talk about it and press for it.⁹ It is true that the developments in Kashmir have made people think of this more than they might have done at present.

8. In his letters of 3 and 7 August 1952, Karan Singh had raised the question of reelection.

9. In July 1952, a conference of the representatives of Part B States, held in Kashmir, urged the abolition of the system of Rajpramukhs.

16. Personally, I do not think it at all wise to ask for a longer tenure than five years to begin with. Even if this was agreed to, it would have little meaning in this changing world, and pressing for it rather takes the grace out of it. Normally speaking, if you accept this for five years, conditions are such that you will continue. But no present guarantee will make that more assured, and your asking for it does not appear to me to be right.

17. I can well understand your doubts and hesitations. The real answer to them is that nobody can compel you to stay on if, at any time, you feel like quitting. That decision no one can take away from you. To quit now, unless there are present any adequate reasons, is merely to do so for fear of a future contingency which may or may not arise.

18. I have thought about this matter not only from your personal point of view but also from the larger point of view of the State. Grave decisions are being taken which will naturally affect the future of the State. I think that from this larger point of view, it is highly desirable that you should undertake this responsibility. For you not to do so now would create grave difficulties for the State. As I have said above, even after taking this responsibility, you are not bound down to it whatever happens. You retain your freedom of action to a large extent.

19. I would, therefore, advise you that if Shaikh Abdullah and his colleagues accept our advice in this matter and follow the procedure we have recommended to them, then you should accept the offer made to you. Before you finally make up your mind, you might observe how these developments take place in the course of the next few days. After that, according to our suggestion, the details and the procedure will have to be worked out, and naturally this should be done with propriety to all concerned.

20. The alternative to your not accepting this will not only be bad for the State but will be of no advantage to you at this stage. You mentioned to me your desire for education abroad. A year or more abroad may do you good, no doubt. But we learn more about life and its problems by facing them than by mere changes in geographical environment. You are likely to have a fair amount of time at your disposal for study. You are attracted to it, and you can thus prepare yourself in many ways better in the State than if you went abroad. Most foreign countries today are full of the noise of war and its preparations, and are not very pleasant places to go to except for brief visits.

21. I feel, therefore, that it would be the right thing for you to accept the offer in the manner I have suggested, and thereby put yourself right with your people, and do them much service in many ways, which may not be so obvious and yet which is important. And then, after all, you retain your freedom of choice at any later moment, should occasion so demand.

22. Owing to my injury and subsequent happenings, I fear I must give up the idea of trekking in Kashmir. But I still hope to go there for a few days. I

am sorry I shall not be able to go for the convocation. I might come on the 21st of August.¹⁰

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. Nehru visited Kashmir from 21 to 30 August 1952.

19. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
August 14, 1952

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

...I think, as I have previously said to you, that it is very important not only to do something correctly but to do it in a correct manner. We are dealing with important matters affecting the future of the State and of India which are of great interest to large numbers of people. The approaches of many people are different. We cannot satisfy everybody. But we should, as statesmen, disarm as much opposition as possible. It is from this point of view that it becomes important how we proceed and what successive steps we take. One step at a time is better because that enables us to fashion the next step more easily. If we take a number of steps altogether, and some difficulties arise, then it is more difficult to get over these difficulties. It was for this reason that I had originally suggested that it would be better to draft the full constitution, before giving effect to any part of it. But we have argued that matter, and you have felt the necessity of going ahead with one part of it, namely that relating to the Headship of the State. We accept that position. But even that part can be divided up to some extent, and all of it not passed simultaneously.

This for two principal reasons, apart from the general reason of getting more time to deal with each part. One reason is that we have to adapt our side of the picture. There is to be a continuous adaptation on both sides to each other. If one side goes far, then a certain difficulty arises. If, however, we proceed step by step, then the adaptation is easier.

The second reason is the Yuvaraj. I have, as you know, strongly recommended to him to accept your offer.² I do not quite know how his mind is working. I am sure our advice to him goes a long way, but not necessarily

1. JN Collection. Extracts. Copies of this letter were sent to members of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
2. See the preceding item.

far enough. He is put in a difficult position. His father probably is obstructive.³ Many others may bring their influence to bear upon him in the wrong way. Recent developments in Jammu have given some prominence to those elements there who are out to obstruct.⁴ They would no doubt like to add to your difficulties by trying to prevail upon the Yuvaraj not to agree.⁵

Undoubtedly, it would be a new difficulty if the Yuvaraj does not agree, and it is, therefore, important for us to convince him that it is better to accept the offer. If ultimately he does not agree, I do not know what alternative choice you have in mind. It is not at all easy to find a suitable person. In the newspapers I have seen reference made to Sardar Budh Singh⁵ as a possible choice. Sardar Budh Singh is an estimable person in some ways. But he seems to me to be peculiarly unfitted for this office. His choice will not please, or carry any weight with hardly anyone. It will be a purely negative choice of a person who does not count at all from any point of view. Certainly the reason for your choosing the Yuvaraj will not be satisfied at all, and Jammu difficulties will continue and possibly increase.

Therefore, we have to deal with the Yuvaraj in a friendly and convincing way, so that he might agree. Much might depend on how we proceed about this matter.

I am afraid most of us here feel rather worn out after the session. The unhappy conviction comes upon me that we are all aging people. Maulana does not keep good health. Gopalaswami has had high fever as a reaction to his cholera injections. Katju has also had fever for the last two days and is far from well.

I am enclosing a separate note about some odd matters that have come to my mind.⁶

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. When the draft proclamation to be issued by Karan Singh for the convening of the Constituent Assembly, for which elections were to be held, was sent to Hari Singh for his comments he wrote to Vallabhbhai Patel that it was *ultra vires* as it conflicted with constitutional principles. He also wrote to Karan Singh that he should not sign the proclamation without his approval. In his correspondence with the States Ministry he insisted on his rights and the commitments given to him.
4. The Conference of the Praja Parishad at Jammu on 9 and 10 August 1952, which was attended by S.P. Mookerjee and V.G. Deshpande, opposed the decisions of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly and the limited application of the Indian Constitution to the State. It demanded: (i) complete accession of the State to India; (ii) use of the Union flag to the exclusion of the State flag; (iii) self-determination for the people of Jammu, if there was no complete accession; and (iv) dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and re-election of a more representative body.
5. Budh Singh was a Minister in Shaikh Abdullah's first Cabinet.
6. See the next item.

20. The Resolution of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly¹

This is a hurried note about the proposal regarding the Head of the State and the resolution now being discussed in the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly.² Regarding the resolution before the Constituent Assembly now, there is one rather important matter which deserves attention.

2. In our agreement in regard to the Supreme Court, after stating the views of the Government of India, it was said that the Kashmir delegation had no objection to the proposal made, but that they would like to consider it further. As stated in Shaikh Saheb's speech before the Constituent Assembly, the part that "the Kashmir delegation had no objection to the proposal" has been left out, and it is merely stated that this would need a detailed examination and further consideration.³ This omission has attracted attention and it is desirable to rectify it. Importance was attached to the Supreme Court exercising normal appellate jurisdiction in regard to civil and criminal matters as laid down in the Constitution of India and thus becoming a final court of appeal for the State. Naturally the Supreme Court would in doing so apply the laws of the State. This was considered to be a vital link between the Jammu and Kashmir State and the Union, and as such, it was stressed in the Parliament of India. It has also been emphasized to the Yuvaraj. If some doubt arises about this matter, then difficulties might be created.

3. In regard to the National Flag, it was agreed that it would be desirable to have a formal declaration⁴ by the Constituent Assembly. There is no reference to this in the resolution.

1. Note for Shaikh Abdullah, 14 August 1952. JN Collection.
2. The resolution was discussed in the Kashmir Constituent Assembly for four days from 11 August 1952.
3. According to the statement of Shaikh Abdullah in the Kashmir Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1952, in which he spelt out the agreement of the State's association with India, his version of this particular arrangement was as follows: "The Supreme Court's jurisdiction was recognized in regard to such Fundamental Rights as would be agreed to by the State, as also regarding disputes mentioned in Article 131 of the Indian Constitution. It would be the final court of appeal. But detailed examination of this would be necessary and it was agreed that we should have time to consider it further." The words "on the insistence of the Kashmir delegation the matter was left for further consideration" had not been mentioned.
4. At the time of the negotiations in July 1952, it was understood that the part of the agreement on the State flag would contain a declaration that the State flag was no rival to the National Flag and the Government of Kashmir extended their allegiance as part of the Union and the National Flag would therefore occupy the supremely distinctive place in the State. The continuance of the State flag was however necessary for historical and other reasons.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

4. The new draft is different in many ways from the old draft that was sent here and to a large extent conforms to suggestions made here when D.P. Dhar came. But it is felt that it would be better at this stage not to have the schedules attached to the resolution. The schedules related to the manner of election and to the emoluments, etc. Both these matters could easily be dealt with a little later after the main proposal has been passed. This need not involve any marked delay. This procedure of taking the schedule separately would make it easier for the President of India to deal with this matter and will also probably make it easier to get the consent of the Yuvaraj.


5. I am not dealing with the details in the schedules. But I think it would be desirable, even keeping the main content as it is, to word them differently in order not to make it appear that the President of India's function is merely to rubber-stamp a decision. In practice, the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly or the Legislative Assembly will naturally be accepted by the President. But the wording should be such as not to lessen the dignity of the President of India and the importance of his recognition. This approach could involve a certain amount of redrafting of these schedules.

6. While this part of the constitution deals with the permanent method of choosing the Head of the State by the Legislative Assembly, in effect the first choice will be made by the Constituent Assembly. It is not, therefore, necessary for all these details and qualifications to be laid down for this first choice though many of them might of course be observed, just as the President of India was at first elected by the Constituent Assembly. Later he was elected by the more complicated procedure laid down in the Constitution.


7. Thus the proper course appears to be to pass the main proposal about the Headship of the State, and to add that the procedure etc., will be contained in schedules to be hereafter framed, and further to say that the first President shall be recommended to the President of India by the Constituent Assembly itself in such manner and by such procedure as that Assembly may think fit and proper. Thus this matter is left a little flexible for this first choice, and the Constituent Assembly can determine the method whenever it feels like it without any great delay. It need not at all have a complicated procedure for that.

8. This has the additional advantage of making it easier for the President of India to function in this matter, as well as for any step to be taken which might appear necessary a little later. In any event this appears to be the normal procedure for the first choice by a special body like the Constituent Assembly.

9. Coming to the main proposal about the Headship of the State, I would suggest that the identical language used in the agreement should be used here also. Any change in that gives the appearance of departing from that agreement. I would suggest, therefore, that the main body of the resolution should consist of the four sub-heads which were agreed upon in that very language. Another



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sub-head should be added after the fourth "that the Head of the State should be designated as the Sadr-i-Riyasat."

10. Further sub-heads might be added, as indicated above, relating to emoluments and other matters which should be prescribed in the constitution, and until these are so prescribed, shall be set out in the rules to be framed for the purpose by the Constituent Assembly later.

11. Para 3 of the resolution, relating to the Head of the State exercising such powers and performing such functions etc., might remain as it is.

12. Para 5, dealing with gross misconduct, should be left out. It is totally unnecessary at this stage. It may come in the fuller constitution. It is always open to the State legislature to make the recommendation to the President for withdrawal of recognition. Putting this in here at this stage is not at all helpful, and indeed has the reverse effect.

13. Para 6, about a casual vacancy, also appears to me to be unnecessary at this stage. We are dealing with a brief period. If by mischance any such contingency arises during this brief period and before the constitution is finalized, it can easily be dealt with in the manner suggested, even without making any special provision for it.

14. I think that some slight changes in this would be desirable to keep it in line with rest of the resolution. Thus, for instance, it may run as follows:

Whereas this Constituent Assembly adopted the recommendations contained in the interim report of the Basic Principles Committee in regard to the office of the Head of the State;

And whereas by its resolution dated the 12th June 1952 this Assembly directed that the above-mentioned directions be implemented and for that purpose charged the Drafting Committee to submit appropriate proposals;

This Assembly having now considered the report of the Drafting Committee, resolves...

15. As I have said above, this is a very hurried note giving some first reactions for consideration.

21. Impracticability of an Independent Kashmir¹

I am writing this note to convey to you my own basic views about the situation in Kashmir. During the last five years or so, I have naturally given a great deal of thought to the various factors governing this situation—military, political, economic and others. I have tried to make my approach as objective as possible. Naturally, to some extent, I am influenced by my own personal feelings and attachment to Kashmir. Thus it may be said that I have two approaches—that of the Prime Minister of India and the personal one. As a matter of fact, however, I have not found any conflict between those two. Some difficulties have arisen occasionally in my mind, because I was not sure if my approach, personal or official, was completely in line with your approach. So far as I was concerned, you represented to me what the people of Kashmir wanted to be done, and as that was a paramount consideration for me, in the ultimate analysis I would accept that in preference to my own views. As a rule, there was no such conflict or difficulty.²

2. My own view has been clear for the last four years or so and, in spite of changing circumstances, I have found no reason to alter it basically. Because of this, I have not been worried much on account of new developments. Being clear in my mind as to what should be done, it did not matter much to me what Pakistan did or what the United Nations might do. I was, however, sometimes a little surprised, and somewhat worried, to find that the leaders of Kashmir were not so clear in their minds about the present or the future and were, therefore, worrying a great deal. To give an instance, the present talks with Dr Graham in Geneva do not appear to me to have any great importance.

1. Note for Shaikh Abdullah, 25 August 1952. Camp Sonamarg. JN Collection.
2. On 31 October 1951, in his address to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, Shaikh Abdullah asserted that Kashmir had no alternative but to belong to India as an integral part. Abdullah observed that three courses were open to Kashmir: accession to India, accession to Pakistan and an independent status. He listed seven arguments in favour of India: democracy, secularism, common struggle for freedom, land reforms which were easier to implement in a democratic India than in "landlord-ridden Pakistan", marketability of Kashmir's products, availability of consumer goods in the State, and expectation of greater assistance to Kashmir's development and administration. In favour of Pakistan, the arguments were: existence of all-weather road, timber trade through State rivers, and the Muslim majority in Pakistan. But Abdullah also noted that Pakistan was a theocratic State without a constitution, healthy political tradition and a progressive policy. As for Independence it was Utopia, for there was no security against aggression, no guarantee of the goodwill of its neighbours and no likely unanimity among the neighbours on the question of assistance against external danger.

They do not alter my appraisal of the situation, or what we should do about it. I find, however, that much greater importance is attached to these Graham talks in Geneva, here in Kashmir, and there is some apprehension also about their result.

3. From October 1947 to the end of 1948, the military situation was paramount, and our attention was mostly given to that situation. Even then we thought of the political aspects, as they were important. Owing to the reference to the United Nations, certain international aspects come into the picture also. Whether that reference to the UN was a right step or not is now an academic question. We took it primarily to avoid the extension of the war elsewhere, i.e., its becoming an all-out war between India and Pakistan. We thought that that would be a dangerous development, bad for India and Pakistan. This judgment had little to do with success of the war. By normal standards, we could expect to defeat Pakistan, but the cost would have been heavy and there was always the possibility of international complications. Anyhow we referred the matter to the UN.

4. After some experience of the UN, I came to the conclusion that nothing substantial could be expected from it. It was clear that we would not give in on any basic point, whatever the UN might say. It seemed also clear that Pakistan would not simply walk out and revert to the *status quo ante-war*. Thus, towards the end of 1948 it seemed to me that there were only two possibilities open to us: (1) continuation of the war in a limited way; (2) some kind of a settlement on the basis of the then existing military situation.

5. I have not mentioned the plebiscite, because it became clear to me then that we would never get the conditions which were necessary for a plebiscite.³ Neither side would give in on this vital issue, and so I ruled out the plebiscite for all practical purposes.

6. So far as continuing the war was concerned, it was clear to me that while gradual success would come to us, no quick or effective decision was likely. We might carry on the war in Kashmir itself for a considerable time, gaining some successes and advancing our fronts, but this would be a long drawn-out affair, and would not put an end to the conflict or the problem. There was a possibility of the war extending beyond Kashmir State, i.e., becoming an all-out war between India and Pakistan. That was not a prospect to be welcomed, and it was much more likely at that stage that there might be foreign intervention in such a war. Even that war, apart from foreign intervention, would not be a very easy or quick one. We had definite superiority

3. On the basis of the proposals of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, the future of Kashmir was to be decided by a plebiscite under the UN auspices. But the plebiscite was to be held when Pakistan and India had withdrawn their troops from the State territory.

from the military and industrial points of view, but that superiority was not so great as to overwhelm the enemy. And then, there was always the question of what foreign powers might do either in interfering or in aiding Pakistan in other ways.

7. The result of all this thought, and my own powerful inclination to avoid war on a big scale which brought disaster in its train, whatever the result, led me to certain definite conclusions towards the end of 1948. These conclusions were that the only possible way of putting an end to this conflict was by accepting, more or less, the *status quo* then existing. We were not prepared to give up any territory we possessed to Pakistan. But we might, for the sake of peace and a settlement, agree to their holding what they then had. I was doubtful if Pakistan would accept this. If not, then we continued where we were.

8. This conclusion was not a very pleasant one to me, but logically I could not help arriving at it. When I met Attlee and Bevin and Liaquat Ali Khan in London in the last quarter of 1948, I mentioned this briefly to them saying that it was entirely a personal suggestion because of my desire to end this conflict.⁴ I was not at all sure how far my own Government, or the Kashmir Government, would agree to it, because they felt strongly on this question of Pakistan aggression. Liaquat Ali Khan refused to consider this matter on this basis and there it ended.

9. At the end of 1948 we agreed to a ceasefire. I think it was a right move, but the question was not properly approached. We could have got the ceasefire on a somewhat better line if we had given more thought to it. However, that is a past mistake.

10. Since then, we have had the ceasefire, and all kinds of talks with the UN people have gone on without much result. Throughout this period, my old conviction has taken root in my mind that the only feasible solution, short of resumption of war, was the acceptance of the *status quo*, more or less. War, I ruled out for a variety of reasons, unless it was thrust upon us by Pakistan. But we could never be sure about Pakistan and hence we had to keep in readiness all the time. Partly to prevent any sudden eruption in Kashmir on the part of Pakistan, and partly to make our own policy quite clear, we declared repeatedly that any attack by Pakistan across the ceasefire line would mean full war between India and Pakistan.⁵ That has been the position ever since.

4. During the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in October 1948, Nehru met Liaquat Ali Khan, with Prime Minister Attlee and Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin present, and suggested that either both countries accept the resolution of the UN Commission or the State be partitioned with certain areas in western Poonch and the north-western part of the State being allotted to Pakistan. Liaquat Ali rejected both alternatives, and was willing to accept ceasefire only if the details of the plebiscite were settled immediately.
5. See *ante*, p. 291.

11. It must be remembered that Kashmir is not the basic cause of friction and conflict between India and Pakistan. It is a resultant of that basic conflict, though, undoubtedly, it has added to it. Thus, in 1950, we were very near war with Pakistan on an entirely different issue which arose in eastern Pakistan and West Bengal and Assam.⁶ From this it follows that even if the Kashmir issue was solved, it would not necessarily end that basic conflict which can only be resolved either by war or by a natural course of events and acceptance of things as they are. War, of course, was normally ruled out, as I do not think it solves any problem. So we aimed at a gradual lessening of tension between India and Pakistan by tackling other problems that arose and development of trade and other relations. This has not been very successful, but it is true that tension has relaxed considerably, in spite of the fire-eating propaganda of Pakistan. Progressively, even that propaganda has become more and more artificial and has been kept up by the Government of Pakistan for its own political and other purposes. The fact is that the whole basis of Pakistan, politically, is unstable⁷ and they dare not stop all that propaganda for fear of political consequences. But there is some evidence that the people of Pakistan do not react to that propaganda and are getting a little tired of it. The Government of Pakistan is like someone riding a bicycle. They feel that the moment they return to normalcy the bicycle stops and they fall down.

12. I am convinced that in the long run India and Pakistan must come closer together, and have more or less friendly relations. But we have to live down past events and passions, and it is very difficult to produce normal behaviour for some time to come. All we can do at present is to prevent anything which adds to the tension.

13. As Prime Minister of India, I have to look ahead and consider the basic national interest of India. It is my duty to guard that interest. That interest fits in with ideas of world peace and the avoidance of war whether in the world or with Pakistan. But, of course, that does not mean that we should not be prepared for any contingency. That interest itself demands full preparation for war or peaceful effort. Fortunately, we have no troubles with any of our

6. In early 1950, the communal tension in the two Bengals and Assam reached unprecedented levels.

7. In 1952, constitution-making was stalled in Pakistan. There were disturbances in East Pakistan in the wake of Urdu being made the official language for the entire country. Despite harsh measures, the Government of Pakistan could not subdue the Pakhtoonistan movement. The refugee problem was far from being solved. The Government was finding it difficult to sell the raw materials on a glutted market. The principal export of jute did not show much improvement. Meanwhile, the provincial governments were riddled with personal rivalries. Nazimuddin, the Prime Minister, tried to arrest the growing estrangement between the people and the administration by intensifying propaganda against India.

neighbours, or, for the matter of that, with any country in the world. Nor are we afraid of any country, however big it may be, invading India or compelling us by force to do something that we do not want to do. There is one present exception and that is Pakistan. We are superior to Pakistan in military and industrial power. But that superiority is not so great as to produce results quickly either in war or by fear of war. Therefore, our national interest demands that we should adopt a peaceful policy towards Pakistan and, at the same time, add to our strength. Strength ultimately comes not from the defence forces, but the industrial and economic background behind them. As we grow in strength, and we are likely to do so, Pakistan will feel less and less inclined to threaten or harass us, and a time will come when, through sheer force of circumstances, it will be in a mood to accept a settlement which we consider fair, whether in Kashmir or elsewhere. The only danger is that the Government of Pakistan, or some military clique there, might, in sheer desperation, launch on an adventure. That danger has to be faced and prepared for. Otherwise, our national interest demands that we should adopt a firm but non-provocative attitude towards Pakistan, and build up our economic strength, keeping our defence forces in good condition for any possibility. The world situation also demands that we should follow this policy.

14. What is the position of Jammu and Kashmir State *vis-a-vis* India? Looking at it objectively, this State is of importance, both from the strategic and other points of view, to both India and Pakistan. Hence, the conflict between the two. We are not prepared to give in to Pakistan on that issue, even though it means war. The utmost we can do is to give in so far as that area is concerned which is occupied by Pakistan. That itself, strategically, is a disadvantage to us. But we are prepared to accept that disadvantage for the sake of peace. If the whole of the State went to Pakistan, it would be a danger to the north of India, and there would be continuous tension between us and the party controlling that State. Thus, purely from the point of view of India's national interest, we cannot agree, unless circumstances force us, to see this part of Kashmir State go to Pakistan. There are no circumstances visible that can force us to do this. Pakistan cannot. The United Nations cannot override our wishes in this matter.

15. This is an objective statement from the point of view of India's national interest. There is another aspect which we have stressed, and which is important. This is the wishes of the people of Kashmir. If the people of Kashmir clearly and definitely wish to part company from India, there the matter ends, however we may dislike it or however disadvantageous it may be to India. But, as I have stated above, I see no chance or whatever of any proper plebiscite determining this question, because the plebiscite itself raises highly controversial issues in regard to the conditions governing it and all that. So, ruling out the plebiscite we have to accept the present leadership of Kashmir and the

Constituent Assembly there as representing the will of the people of Kashmir. If the Constituent Assembly told India to get out of Kashmir, we would get out, because under no circumstances can we remain here against the expressed will of the people. As far as I know, the Constituent Assembly will not do such a thing and therefore, the question does not arise for me.

16. Speaking now for a moment purely as a Kashmiri, I think that it would be the ruin of Kashmir if Pakistan took possession of it. I need not dilate on this issue, but I am convinced of it.

17. Certain alternatives have been mentioned, such as an independent State of Jammu and Kashmir. I think that this is inconceivable, and what is worse it will mean not peace or normality, but continuing tension and conflict between various forces in and out of Kashmir, because Kashmir is so important strategically that these forces will try to control the so-called independent Kashmir. India will not tolerate Pakistan gaining an upper hand here, and Pakistan will, no doubt, be equally unwilling to see India gain the upper hand. The result will be that Kashmir will continue to be the scene of conflict between India and Pakistan, even though it might be called independent. There is a possibility of other powers coming in, more especially if the United Nations has a voice in the matter. In any event, Kashmir could not be independent and will not be peaceful or normal either.

18. The agitation of the Praja Parishad in Jammu has been thoroughly misconceived even from their point of view. If their demand for Jammu's separate and closer accession to India was acceded to, it would mean surrendering Kashmir immediately to Pakistan.⁸ It would mean further that the conflict with Pakistan would then be on the borders of Jammu. Jammu would be surrounded by Pakistan on three sides and would not be easy to defend. In any event, Kashmir would go, and so would Ladakh, because Ladakh can hardly hold out as a separate entity with very difficult communications with India.

19. In fact, Jammu and Kashmir have to hold together. If Jammu is separated, Kashmir goes. If Kashmir goes, Jammu's position becomes precarious and the conflict does not end. Statesmanship therefore requires that Jammu and Kashmir should hold together. The people of Jammu, therefore, should be made to feel the advantages of this union and the dangers of breaking. They should be won over and not irritated, because the safety and freedom of Kashmir is linked up with the retention of Jammu.

8. The Jammu Praja Parishad Convention on 9-10 August 1952 urged the full integration of Jammu and Ladakh with India if the Kashmir Constituent Assembly persisted in asserting its right of independence as against India.

20. Another suggestion has been made that the valley of Kashmir should stand by itself as some kind of an independent state guaranteed by India and Pakistan and the UN, Jammu going to India and the other areas going to Pakistan. This is completely unworkable and there is not a ghost of a chance of the little valley of Kashmir surviving under those conditions. If the whole of Kashmir State as an independent entity cannot really survive, and is likely to become a cockpit for other powers, the valley by itself can much less survive either economically or politically. It would disappear with great rapidity as a separate entity.

21. Therefore, any idea of separating the valley from Jammu and Ladakh or of separating Jammu from the rest must be given up as leading to disaster. Certainly, it would lead to complete lack of autonomy in these areas. From the point of view of India it would be against her national interest. The question of India and Pakistan or the UN guaranteeing any small area like this is also completely impracticable. Such a thing has not been seen anywhere in the world previously, and now it is more difficult than it might have been in the distant past.

22. Kashmir has a great potentiality for development, but it is exceedingly poor and has no resources. It cannot develop unless it is helped by some country with greater resources. Certainly, America can help substantially. But the cost in terms of autonomy and freedom will be great. Whether it is America, or any other foreign country that undertakes the development of Kashmir, this itself would lead to difficult international situations and possible conflict. In any event, from the point of view of Kashmir itself this is very undesirable. From the point of view of India, of course, it is also undesirable. India can help the development of Kashmir, though the resources available will not be so great. But that development will not interfere with the autonomy, and with the natural growth of the State according to its genius.

23. It must be remembered that the people of the Kashmir valley and roundabout, though highly gifted in many ways—in intelligence, in artisanship, etc.—are not what are called a virile people. They are soft and addicted to easy living. They are surrounded by hardy tribes in the north-west of Pakistan and even in the northern areas of the State. It will be difficult, and indeed hardly possible, for the people of Kashmir to survive by themselves, if left to

their own resources. It was all very well when there was a strong suzerain power like that of England which could prevent harassment and raids. But if a strong suzerain power is absent, then Kashmir is likely to fall an easy prey to these depredations.

24. The result of all these considerations is that the only desirable future for the State is with a close association with India, retaining her autonomy in most ways; that Kashmir and Jammu should hold together; that we should consolidate our position in these areas and not care very much for what happens in the 'Azad Kashmir' areas. Most important of all is that we should have no doubts in our minds about these matters. Doubts in the minds of leaders percolate to their followers and to the people generally. The weakness of the situation in Kashmir is the constant discussions which go on between people holding different views. I do not know how many such groups there are, but obviously some people talk about a close association with India, others talk about a loose association with India, yet others think, if not talk, of an association with Pakistan, and yet others talk about independence. All this confusion in ideas and constant debate weakens the basic position. What is required is a firm and clear outlook, and no debate about basic issues. If we have that outlook, it just does not matter what the United Nations thinks or what Pakistan does.

25. Personally, I have that clear outlook and have had it for these years and it has surprised me that there should be so much discussion about obvious matters.

26. We have to consolidate the position in Kashmir, firstly, on the political plane by having this clear-cut idea about the future, and no nonsense tolerated, and, secondly, by improving the lot of the people, i.e., economic and other issues. Personally, I think that more important even than economic issues is an efficient administration. The common people are primarily interested in a few things—an honest administration and cheap and adequate food. If they get this, then they are more or less content. That is not enough, of course, and we have to go ahead. But there is far too much talk of going ahead, when we do not pay enough attention to basic things like administration and food policy. Slogans are good in their day, but slogans are dangerous companions when these basic problems have to be faced. It is dangerous to make promises which cannot be fulfilled, or to talk tall just to gain the goodwill of the people for the moment. Facts cannot be ignored and have to be faced. The most important thing today in Kashmir is efficiency in administration and in food policy. I am not criticizing because I do not know much about it. But the mere fact that the price of rice is terribly high is a dangerous portent.⁹ Why it is so, I do

9. In 1952 rice had been sold at Rs 110 per maund.

not know. All the energies of the State should be diverted to keep the prices of rice low, as that is the basic test of success. Kashmir used to supply foodstuffs to Baltistan and other deficit areas. Now it does not seem to have enough for itself even. Land reforms should have added to the produce. There are complaints of profiteering and the like. Whatever it is, it is of the most urgent significance to bring down prices by opening fair price shops or by any other feasible method. In India our food policy is gradually showing good results.

27. Finally, I would repeat that there must be a clear-cut idea about what we want in Kashmir and about Kashmir, and that idea must be adhered to without debate or argument in future. I have indicated that the only possible course for Kashmir is for the State to be closely associated with India, that association not interfering with its autonomy in most respects. If that is so, then it is not wise to say or do things which imperil that association. Again, Jammu and Kashmir have to hold together for the sake of each other. They cannot be separated. If that is so, then every effort should be made to encourage that idea, and not to say or do anything which irritates people or makes them think of parting company.

28. Our general outlook should be such as to make people think that the association of Kashmir State with India is an accomplished and final fact, and nothing is going to undo it. I am not talking of speeches repeating this, but rather of other facts being mentioned which tend to make people believe it. For instance, I should stress the fact that a tunnel is going to be built under the Banihal or that trade etc. is developing with and through India or that development schemes are being undertaken.¹⁰

29. This note has become a very long one and, perhaps, it is not as concise as I intended it to be. But I hope it will give some idea of how I have been thinking about these matters. I would repeat that I have held these views concisely and precisely for the last four years, and nothing has happened during this period which has made me change them in the slightest. It is for this reason that meetings with Dr Graham or anyone else, or any developments in Pakistan, do not worry me in the least, in so far as Kashmir is concerned. What has sometimes worried me is what happens in Kashmir, because I have found doubt and hesitation there, and not clarity of vision or firmness of outlook.

10. The Kashmir Government drafted a five-year plan for the State envisaging expenditure amounting to Rs 13 crores. The Union Government agreed to make available Rs 7 crores for the capital requirement.

22. To Karan Singh¹

New Delhi
September 1, 1952

My dear Yuvaraj,

I was surprised to see in today's paper that some of the persons you had invited from Jammu had refused to meet you. I was also surprised to see that Dhanwantri,² the Communist leader, had also been invited. However, that does not matter much.

But the refusal to come by Girdharilal Anand, the President of the Chamber of Commerce of Jammu, as reported in the press cutting attached, is not only a discourtesy to you but an insult to both you and even the Government of India. Mr Girdharilal Anand, by his refusal, has put himself outside the pale. In future, there can be no dealings with him and he must be made clearly to understand this. Certainly I will not meet him or any of his crowd in future, even if I go to Jammu. I do not think you should meet him either in Srinagar or Jammu in future. He should be made to understand that his behaviour, quite apart from politics, is highly objectionable, and there can be no dealings with him, or even with the Jammu Chamber of Commerce, in future, so long as he is connected with it. It is really extraordinary that any person should have the temerity to behave in this manner to the acknowledged Head of the State. This shows the mentality of some of these people in Jammu who are shouting such a lot. If they think that they are going to gain their objective by insulting both the Kashmir Government and the Government of India, they are very much mistaken.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Dhanwantri had been deputed by the Communist Party of India to Kashmir to settle the differences among the Ministers in the Kashmir Cabinet who had leftist leanings. But he formed a liaison with the Praja Parishad leaders and his stand was contradictory to the party's appreciation of the Kashmir policy of the Union Government.

23. Infiltration and Internal Security¹

I have seen the note of the Intelligence Bureau dated 30th August which was sent to Mr Mathai.

1. Note to the Ministry of Home Affairs, 2 September 1952. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Almost everything in this note was discussed fully at the conference that was held in Srinagar on the 28th August, which was attended by senior officers of the Central Intelligence, as well as Army Commanders.

3. During a period of six to nine months preceding March 1952, every effort was made to stop infiltration. This was because it was feared that the elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly would be interfered with by large-scale sabotage. That effort to prevent infiltration met with remarkable success, and in fact exceedingly few persons came through. Probably, not more than ten unauthorized persons came in, and nearly all of these were traced. Therefore, to say that it is not possible to stop infiltration because of the length of the ceasefire line, etc., is not wholly justified although obviously the difficulties are patent.

4. The relaxation since March 1952 onwards was largely due to the rather confused policy of the Jammu and Kashmir Government and the discretion given to civil officials on the ceasefire line. It was also partly due to Indian Army detachments being placed somewhat further away from the ceasefire line. This new arrangement was certainly more convenient from the Army point of view, but it left a number of *nallahs* unguarded.

5. It is also not wholly true to say that the people, who have come through in such large numbers since March 1952, are untraced. I saw very long lists containing thousands of names of these persons with full particulars about each. No doubt a few were not traced.

6. It is clear that the Kashmir Government must issue more stringent orders, and that these should be acted upon. These orders have been issued and we have been assured that effect will be given to them.

7. Certain new dispositions of Army pickets have also been arranged to keep watch over certain fairly well-known routes. The Kashmir Government has good information about the Pakistan centres on the other side of the ceasefire line and the routes usually taken by people who infiltrate.

8. It is true that it will take some time to enroll more Home Guards.² That cannot be helped. All we can do is to expedite the process.

9. So far as internal security is concerned, while no absolute guarantee can be given, the use of an extra battalion of Militia³ will obviously go a long way.

2. During the tribal invasion, the National Conference organized from among peasants, artisans, workers and students a volunteer corps, the National Guards, to help people remain calm and to put up resistance.

3. The National Militia was a formation set up by the National Conference to protect strategic and vulnerable parts of Srinagar and to challenge and halt the tribal hordes in September 1947. It became part of the State forces after Shaikh Abdullah took over the Government.

10. It seemed to me that the Kashmir authorities, or at any rate Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, was fully aware of what had been happening. His sources of information were good and often added much to the information received from our sources. He is perfectly wide awake to the situation, and has every intention of dealing with it effectively.

11. As for the proposal made in paragraph 12 of the note to have interrogation centres with trained personnel, there can be no objection to this and a beginning might be made....

13. The report referred to in paragraph 14 about a bridge in 'Azad Kashmir' having been blown up, was received by me from Army authorities in Srinagar. Subsequent information indicated that this was not true.

14. I would repeat that the Kashmir Government are very anxious to do their utmost in regard to infiltration and internal security and they propose to work in full cooperation with the Army authorities and our Intelligence.

15. There is a possibility of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad coming to Delhi during the next few days.

24. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
September 7, 1952

My dear Mr President,

Thank you for your letter of the 6th September, 1952, enclosing a note in regard to the Jammu and Kashmir State.²

1. JN Collection.

2. The note dealt with the legal and constitutional aspects of the proposal to substitute a system of elected Head for the Jammu and Kashmir State in place of the existing Regent.

The Minister of States, Dr Katju, is already in touch with the Attorney-General,³ and will, no doubt, take his opinion on the points raised in your note.

I have received a copy of the memorandum which Maharaja Hari Singh has sent you. This memorandum is a very tendentious one, and is obviously written in some anger. In the main, it is an attack on Shaikh Abdullah and, to a lesser extent, on me. Those of us who have been intimately connected with developments in Kashmir during the past few years know that this bald statement of the Maharaja, apart from being incorrect in particulars, leaves out an account of the entire background of rather revolutionary changes that we have had to face. Because we have addressed the Maharaja occasionally in a friendly manner, trying to induce him to agree to certain proposals, and not to embarrass him, he has now tried to take advantage of these communications. It has been very difficult to deal with him during all these years. I have little doubt that the very unusual developments that have taken place in Kashmir would have been very different but for the ineptitude of the Maharaja.

In the years preceding the Pakistan invasion, the Maharaja's Government functioned in an extraordinary way, and the Maharaja himself kept aloof from everybody, even his Ministers. Except for his Minister-in-waiting or the Prime Minister, he did not encourage his other Ministers or others to see him. In 1946 a repression on a widespread scale was launched against the national movement in Kashmir, and all the leaders of it, including Shaikh Abdullah, were arrested. It was in this connection that even I was arrested on entry into Kashmir. Every effort of ours to help in the solution of the difficulties in Kashmir was repulsed. The Maharaja at the time, as he confessed later, was entirely in the hands of his then Prime Minister, Mr Kak.⁴ It was this state of affairs which led directly to the serious developments that followed.

The Maharaja was practically unapproachable. Even when Lord Mountbatten went to Srinagar as Viceroy, the Maharaja avoided discussing anything with him, although that was the purpose of the Viceroy's visit. Lord Mountbatten told me then that the Maharaja went on postponing a talk to the last day of his visit. On that last day he sent word that he was feeling ill and therefore could not meet him. The result was that Lord Mountbatten had no occasion to discuss this matter with the Maharaja, although he met him casually at some meals. The Maharaja refers to the advice that Lord Mountbatten gave him. He must have got this impression from some very casual conversation, because Lord Mountbatten was very much annoyed with him at the way he had avoided talking to him about important matters for which he had gone there.

3. M.C. Setalvad.

4. Ramachandra Kak.

This has been the practice of Maharaja Hari Singh whenever any important discussion was to take place. I find that our States Minister was sending the Secretary of the States Ministry, Shri Venkatachar,⁵ to Maharaja Hari Singh for a discussion. The moment this information reached the Maharaja, he telegraphed to say that he was down with fever, and would not be able to talk with Shri Venkatachar for some days. Hence the visit of the States Secretary has been postponed.

Maharaja Hari Singh has been in the past a very difficult person to deal with, living in a narrow world of his own, without contacts except with some intimate courtiers, weak and afraid of meeting people, and yet obstinate and raising all kinds of difficulties at every stage. His Government in previous years could hardly function, because nothing new could be done without his permission, and he remained silent. He was abnormal then; now from such accounts as I have received, he is more than abnormal and has almost become a mental case.

I have been very intimately connected with Kashmir during these many years, and in my opinion Maharaja Hari Singh has to shoulder a very heavy responsibility for the ills that have descended upon the Jammu and Kashmir State. Even after accession events happened in Jammu which were deplorable in the extreme, and which were said to have been initiated or encouraged by the Maharaja. Mahatma Gandhi spoke publicly about these events at his prayer meetings and held the Maharaja responsible for them.⁶

In spite of all this, the Government of India tried to protect the Maharaja from the consequences of his own follies and treated him with all courtesy. That courtesy is now utilized as a witness to some special position guaranteed to him.

As you are aware, the question of the Jammu and Kashmir State is of high political, and even international importance. It is something much more than the individual case of Maharaja Hari Singh. During these past five years the mere question of accession to India has been in dispute before an international organization. A war has taken place and now we live in some kind of a condition which is between war and peace. There has been a ceasefire, but no regular truce yet, and our armies have to guard the ceasefire line and our frontiers continuously. We have declared repeatedly before the world that it is for the people of Kashmir to decide their future. Maharaja Hari Singh does

5. C.S. Venkatachar ICS.

6. On 25 December 1947, at a prayer meeting, Mahatma Gandhi said that the Maharaja of Kashmir "is responsible for the happenings in his state. He has the Dogra troops under his control and he must be responsible for all the acts of the people who had murdered Muslims, and of the abduction of Muslim women in Jammu. He must step aside and give the responsibility to Shaikh Abdullah to deal with Kashmir."

not come into this larger picture at all, except that we have always tried to protect such of his interests as we thought worthy of protection.

Recently other developments have taken place and not only our Government, but our Parliament have signified their approval of a certain agreement arrived at with the Kashmir Government. This agreement has been ratified also by the Jammu and Kashmir State Constituent Assembly.⁷ That agreement has to be given effect to, and any repudiation of any part of that agreement would not only be highly improper but would entail very serious consequences. The matter has, therefore, to be viewed on this high political level and not on the basis of the personal wishes or aversions of Maharaja Hari Singh.

The Yuvaraj has informed us of his acceptance of this agreement and, as a consequence, he will accept the Headship of the State when formally offered to him.⁸

The proper course would have been for Maharaja Hari Singh to abdicate formally.⁹ If he is not agreeable to doing so, it is inevitable that he should be removed from his formal position by other means. He had agreed to this abdication, but he made certain conditions, the chief of which was that he should be paid some arrears of his privy purse amounting to, according to him, rupees thirty eight lakhs. So far as I know, he has absolutely no justification for this claim. At any time this would have been extraordinary, but to claim this money when his State has been ravaged by war and upheavals and has suffered greatly, shows an insensitiveness and an ignorance of contemporary events, which is truly amazing.

We have no desire to treat Maharaja Hari Singh with discourtesy, or not to make adequate provision for him. As a matter of fact, he has very large private resources. What exactly these are is not known to us. But it is believed that his investments in India and abroad amount to several crores of rupees. According to his own Secretary's statement they amount to 85 lakhs. There is no chance, therefore, of his suffering from lack of financial resources. Out of the privy purse that he has been receiving during the last three years or so, he has been far from generous even towards his wife and his son.

It is our intention to fix a privy purse of rupees ten lakhs for the new Head of the State. Out of this rupees one lakh should go to the Yuvaraj's mother and five lakhs to Maharaja Hari Singh. The balance of four lakhs would remain with the Yuvaraj, who presumably will be the new Head of the State. This is a generous offer for Maharaja Hari Singh.

7. On 14 August 1952.

8. Yuvaraj Karan Singh was unanimously elected the Head of the State or Sadr-i-Riyasat on 14 November 1952.

9. On 16 September 1952, Maharaja Hari Singh accepted Nehru's advice to abdicate in favour of his son, Yuvaraj Karan Singh.

As I have mentioned to you, it is our intention to take up the whole question of the privy purses of all the rulers and princes in India and to try to arrive at a fairer adjustment of these figures¹⁰ which will be more in keeping with conditions as they are in India. That is a larger matter which will have to be considered later in consultation with the princes concerned.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. The total cost of privy purses paid to ex-rulers and princes of 562 states in 1951 was Rs 580 lakhs.

25. To Karan Singh¹

New Delhi
September 9, 1952

My dear Yuvaraj,

I have just received your letter of the 8th September.²

I have no doubt that the Jammu people have a number of grievances and feel rather frustrated. Some of these grievances have, I believe, justification. Indeed, both Shaikh Saheb and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad mentioned to me some of the disabilities that Jammu province was suffering from, and their desire to remove them. At the same time they pointed out to me certain difficulties. Thus, for instance, the lack of water in Jammu is a very serious handicap.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. In this letter Karan Singh stated that the Jammu leaders, who met him, "feel distressed and injured for several reasons. They say that they have neither any voice in the State Assembly (which they hold they boycotted under protest, and which contains representatives of only one party), nor in the State Government and nor again in the Indian Parliament, because the members from our State were nominated, and not elected. They, therefore, feel extremely frustrated, as they hold that there is none who can effectively voice their grievances and demands, and see that justice is done to them... The proposed ending of the ruling dynasty has upset them immensely, not because of sentimental attachment alone, because they feel that this step will break the only link which bound them to Kashmir, and that unless it is followed by complete accession to India their position will be even more precarious than it has been for the last five years."

The Praja Parishad people have largely to blame themselves for the plight they have landed themselves in. Others may also be to blame. But, consciously or unconsciously, the Praja Parishad in Jammu has acted in a manner which has been quite deplorable and excessively stupid. It is not that they have not had a chance of meeting other people and discussing affairs with them. They have met them. As you know, I met Pandit Premnath Dogra and had a fairly long talk with him. In the course of our talk he agreed almost entirely with what I told him. Soon after he made public statements exactly contrary to what he had said to me and embarrassed me greatly. I found him and his companions completely irresponsible.

The kind of agitation they have been carrying on in the past in Delhi itself, apart from what they have done in Jammu, has been pernicious in the extreme. They have sided with the most communal elements³ in Delhi and attacked the Government of India in every way. If a person is to be known from his associations, then the Praja Parishad's associations were the most undesirable in Delhi or the Punjab. Their activities did more harm to the Kashmir issue, from our point of view, than anything else that has happened in recent years. As a result, they received the greatest publicity in Pakistan.⁴

There is a certain looseness in the use of language in regard to accession. Kashmir has fully acceded to India. It is true that, because of international complications, there was a loophole and a vague possibility of a change, but that did not affect the fulness of the accession. There is a difference between full accession and full integration. It is that integration that has not been full, although accession has been complete.

As the position is, any attempt to give effect to their demand would not only fail in itself, but might put an end to even the present accession. I explained that to you.

The Parishad people have been .. disruptive influence⁵ at a time when it was most important to lay stress on unity. Their influence has been disruptive not only in the Jammu and Kashmir State, but indirectly in the whole of India. The forces in India, which we consider most harmful, have been encouraged by the attitude of the Praja Parishad of Jammu.

I do not like being exploited and treated with discourtesy by any one in my official capacity. The Praja Parishad people have done that and, normally, they

3. S.P. Mookerjee, V.G. Deshpande, U.M. Trivedi and Ram Narayan Singh, Members of Parliament, who had visited Jammu and Kashmir, said in a statement on 12 August that the people of Jammu were not prepared to be tagged on to Kashmir valley unless the principle of full integration with India was accepted.
4. The Pakistan press described the Praja Parishad leaders as "the heroes of Jammu".
5. Some leaders of the Praja Parishad had threatened Karan Singh to boycott his meeting with them on 31 August in case he accepted the offer of elected headship of the State. They felt that he should not accept Shaikh Abdullah's offer in its ambiguous form.

would have scant courtesy for me. But I have no objection to meeting them should you so desire.⁶ I am sure Maulana Saheb would also be prepared to meet them. So also Dr Katju and Shri Gopaldaswami Ayyangar. But it would be improper for all of us to meet them together, and to hold a kind of a conference. They will have to meet people individually and separately. I do not think that Dr Radhakrishnan should be dragged into this particular picture. As a matter of fact, he is soon going away to Europe. D.P. Dhar might be present when one of us meets the Praja Parishad people. I shall mention this matter to Shaikh Saheb. He is coming here tomorrow to accompany me to our Congress meeting in Indore.

I do not like the statement issued by Premnath Dogra after the conclusion of his talks with you.⁷ It might of course have been worse. But it might have been better also. In any event, you should not issue any statement about these talks. If you see Shaikh Saheb, of course, you should tell him briefly what the nature of the talks was.

I have seen the long memorandum which your father has sent to the President. There is no reference in it to a referendum. The memorandum is rather an angry and tendentious document. Your father does not seem to realize at all that the world has changed, and is changing rather rapidly. It was Dr Katju's intention to send the States Secretary, Venkatachar, to Poona to see your father, but just as he was on the point of going, a telegram came that your father was not feeling quite well. So, Venkatachar's visit has been postponed for two or three days.

I am rather surprised at your reference to the referendum.⁸ This is not at all possible either from the local or from the international point of view. We have been talking about the plebiscite over other issues and even this cannot come off because there is no agreement. If the question of a referendum on a limited issue was raised, this would immediately lead to all kinds of international complications and the demand for a plebiscite immediately over the wider area. Even this referendum, it would be said, if held at all, should be over that wider area, including that part which is held by Pakistan. Within the present boundaries of the State under our control the referendum issue would, naturally, lead to bitterness and controversy, and in effect tend to split

6. Karan Singh, in his letter, urged that senior leaders, especially Maulana Azad, K.N. Katju and Gopaldaswami Ayyangar, should grant interviews to the Jammu leaders and give a sympathetic hearing to their difficulties and demands.
7. After meeting Karan Singh in Srinagar, Premnath Dogra in a statement, while reiterating the demand for complete accession, added that "till the new constitution for the State assumes a concrete shape, it would be premature to give any definite opinion on this single issue of accepting the office of the Head of the State by Shree Yuvaraj Bahadur."
8. Karan Singh had stated in his letter that a referendum would give the people of the State a democratic method of expressing their decision as to whether they would like a member of the dynasty to be their Head of the State or would prefer to elect someone periodically.

up the State, regardless of the final issue. Indeed, I think that such a proposal is completely out of court in present circumstances. Pakistan would, no doubt, profit by it, but no one else....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

26. To Karan Singh¹

New Delhi
September 23, 1952

My dear Yuvaraj,

Thank you for your letter of the 13th September. I am glad you went to Ladakh and took your wife with you.²

You write to me about Jammu Parishad leaders. I read two days ago another statement by them. They have a peculiar knack of saying the wrong thing and saying even that in the wrong way. They are all the time issuing an ultimatum. If a great power like the USA or the UK addressed my Government in this way, our reply would be expressed in the strongest language. But the Praja Parishad leaders evidently have got such an idea of their high importance that they presume to speak as if they could dictate terms. I am not used to this manner of speaking or being addressed. All that they will do is to injure themselves in this process.

As I have told you, I am prepared to see them in the normal course if they apply for an interview and when I have time. But I confess that the more I learn about them, the less I like them. It is quite possible that when they come to see me, they will hear something from me which they will not like. They have done enough mischief already, and I wish to make this clear to them.

D.P. Dhar has not returned yet, as he fell ill in Paris.

I am going to Hyderabad tomorrow morning for about a week.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. After a visit to Ladakh in early September 1952, Karan Singh wrote to Nehru that the Ladakhis were feeling uneasy and insecure under Shaikh Abdullah's administration. "Ladakh is strategically very important, more so for India as a whole even than for the State, and it will be a tragedy if for lack of an accommodating spirit the people of Ladakh remain unhappy and discontented, and thus an easy prey to all sorts of exploitation, both communalist and communist."

27. To Karan Singh¹

New Delhi
October 2, 1952

My dear Yuvaraj,

Thank you for your letter of the 24th September and for your note on Ladakh.

The points you have mentioned in the note are well known. I have discussed those matters with Shaikh Saheb on several occasions. His attitude has been a favourable one. Some of these matters can easily be taken up in the framing of the new constitution in the Constituent Assembly.

The real difficulty about Ladakh is its terrible economic backwardness and the Kushak Lama² has no remedy for that at all. He can hardly be expected to suggest anything. The very straightened finances of Kashmir State have made it difficult for much money to be spent there. We are however having a community centre there for which we shall be directly responsible. We are also considering other economic projects, I believe, but something has been included in the Kashmir five-year plan which we have largely approved of.

We should like to make a road to Leh from Kulu Valley, but this is a very expensive undertaking and, for the present, it is difficult to take it up. That road will open out the mineral deposits of Ladakh and will bring a certain measure of prosperity to that region.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Kushak Bakula, head of the monastery at Spituk, found little difference between Abdullah's revolutionary programme of land reform and communism and desired autonomy for Ladakh within the Indian Union. In a memorandum addressed to Shaikh Abdullah he demanded "a statutory provision in the future constitution of the State under which the province of Ladakh would become a federating unit of Kashmir as long as the accession of the State to India endures." Bakula, however, pointed out that if his plan was not "feasible just now", a statutory advisory committee elected by a joint electorate could be set up for Ladakh districts and no measure affecting the economic, political and religious life of Ladakh should be passed by the State Constituent Assembly or the Government without the approval of the committee.

28. The Security of Kashmir¹

Question: Would you explain India's attitude to the latest position on Kashmir?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Our attitude and policy in regard to Kashmir have been clear throughout the last four years or so and during the many discussions. Our policy is to avoid warfare and to have peaceful settlement on the one hand and to carry out our obligations on the other.

In August 1948 and in January 1949, the United Nations Commission on Kashmir passed two resolutions which we accepted. We accept them still and we are perfectly prepared to proceed on those lines. Since then, repeated attempts have been made to go outside the scope of those resolutions. We have refused to go back on them. These resolutions were based on the fundamental fact of aggression by Pakistan in Kashmir and on the obligation of India to protect Kashmir from any such attack. Hence, it was laid down as the first step that all Pakistan troops, as well as allied and auxiliary forces, should completely vacate the occupied areas of Kashmir. That was an essential preliminary to any other action. When that was done, we promised to reduce our forces in the State, subject always to maintaining the minimum number necessary for the security of the State. That was the basis of the UN Commission's resolutions, which we accepted and which Pakistan also accepted.

But repeated attempts are made to go behind these resolutions, on the one hand by allowing Pakistan to maintain some troops in the territory occupied by them, and on the other, by trying to reduce our troops below the minimum necessary. We cannot agree to this, both on moral and on practical grounds. We cannot admit the right of Pakistan to keep a single soldier in Kashmir territory, because that would mean admitting their right to aggression. Nor can we agree to any step which might endanger the security of Kashmir in future. That has been the simple issue debated during the last year or two. Of course, there are many other issues also. But they have not been considered recently.

Every now and then, and more specially when the matter is before the Security Council, cries of war are raised in Pakistan, presumably to frighten the Security Council or other countries. These cries themselves demonstrate that we cannot endanger the security of Kashmir and take any risks in such a grave matter. They justify completely the position India has taken up. Indeed, we have offered to reduce our forces to a very small number. We cannot go beyond that figure.

1. Remarks at a press conference, Madras, 4 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 5 October 1952. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference, see pp. 138-139, 153, 412, 431, 510-511, 553-554, 648-649 and 674.

It must be remembered that our original agreement was to remove the bulk of the Indian forces from the Kashmir territory after all Pakistani and allied forces had withdrawn from the State. Our offer now is to remove far more than the bulk—indeed to leave only about one-fifth of the forces we had there at the time of the ceasefire.

We have made it perfectly clear that we do not wish to resort to military operations, and we want a peaceful settlement. We have also made it clear that any further attack on Kashmir on the part of Pakistan, or on its behalf, will necessarily result in a wider conflict which we wish to avoid. It is clear that even a tribal invasion of Kashmir can only take place, as it had five years ago, with the active connivance and help of the Pakistan Government. Thus, we do not distinguish between what might be called a tribal attempt at invasion or a regular attack by Pakistan. Both will be armed aggression by Pakistan and will be met and resisted to the utmost.

It is admitted, in law and in fact, that Pakistan has committed aggression on the territory of India and Kashmir State. They have thus no right in law or otherwise to remain there and we can never admit any such right. Nevertheless, for the sake of peace, we have sought a peaceful settlement by negotiation and we shall continue to seek that way, because we always wish to avoid war. But, if any attack is made on any part of the territory of India, it will be resisted.

Q: What are your views on Dr Graham's report?

JN: Dr Graham's report is a good factual report and there is nothing more in it.

29. India's Position on Kashmir¹

We have had a great deal of trouble with Pakistan for the last five or six years. We have had the Kashmir problem and we have had other problems and we have these problems still on our hands. Even as I speak to you, in a day or two, Dr Graham will present his report to the Security Council. The report has been published, and there is nothing more to be said about it. It surprises me how some intelligent people in other countries have shown a

1. Speech at a public meeting, Madras, 9 October 1952. AIR tapes, NMML. Extracts. For other parts of the speech, see pp. 51-69, 649 and 677-678.

complete lack of understanding in this matter, and have often presumed not only to advise us but almost to lecture us about it. We are not so vain or conceited as not to listen to advice or even to a lecture if it is properly delivered.

But I have been intimately concerned with this Kashmir matter from the days in October 1947, with every step, both military and other. And if one fact has stood out, right from the beginning, it is the fact of the Pakistan Government inciting, encouraging, helping and aiding, and later on itself participating in the invasion of Kashmir territory; and doing all that as a sudden onslaught on a friendly country, on a country which had caused it no harm. There had, no doubt, been troubles inside Kashmir. There had been worse troubles in Pakistan, and also worse even in Delhi, a month or two before. They were a common feature in North India. In fact, Kashmir had been rather free from them, and then this aggression took place suddenly, and it was followed by destruction, rapine, loot and murder, not of the Hindus of Kashmir only, but of the Muslims also—Muslim men and women, Christian men and women. At Baramulla, there was a famous Catholic convent run by foreign missionaries. The nuns were slaughtered at the very altar of their church. They had nothing to do with this political problem. It was not a Hindu-Muslim problem, or anything like that. It was partly a political problem, of course, and partly just encouragement of the worst elements in the tribal areas to loot and murder. That was the beginning which we have to keep in mind, because every attempt has been made during the last four years or so, not to allow that beginning to appear in the consideration of the problem. This matter has been before the Security Council for four and a half years, and not once has this particular question even been discussed there, in spite of our mentioning it on numerous occasions. They ask us not to go back to the old story. They tell us: "We are out for peace. Why condemn this and condemn that. We want to arrange all matters to mediate and help."

Certainly India wants peace, and would welcome mediation and help. But if such mediation and help mean covering up falsehood, ignoring truth, or worse still falsifying it, and then drawing certain presumptions from that false background which they create, surely there can be no possible solution of this problem on that basis.

If you falsify the very truth of the problem, how can you solve it? We have gone to the utmost limit in this matter. I think I am not wrong in saying that I know of no country in Asia, Europe or America which, if it had been faced with such a problem, as we have been faced, and had suffered sudden and brutal aggression of this kind, would not have reacted in a far more violent way than we have done. When originally this problem faced us, just imagine how some of us felt. We had for generations been brought up in non-violent tradition. It was through those methods we had gained freedom. In the wake of our gaining freedom in a non-violent way, we had to use our armies. It was,

therefore, an extraordinary problem for us, because our minds were opposed to carrying on this kind of warfare. We did not know how it would extend itself, and yet circumstances were such that we had to decide against our way of thinking to go to defend Kashmir.

It is perhaps not right for me to bring in Mahatma Gandhi's name in this connection. He was fortunately with us then. I took no serious step without reference to him, and finding out what his reactions were. And so, when this trouble arose in Kashmir, I went to him, not once, but several times. Of course, Mahatmaji could hardly be expected to function as a commander-in-chief in an armed warfare. But he did give us his blessings in the action we took and so my mind was lightened. I felt that I was not doing anything wrong. And since then, day after day, during a year and a quarter of warfare in Kashmir, we had to face this problem. I used to look into my mind and ask my conscience at every step and ultimately after a year and a quarter later when there was a ceasefire, it was at India's instance that a ceasefire took place. It was simply because of our intense desire to stop shooting and killing, although from another point of view it might have been said that our national interests demanded the carrying on of that war, till we had driven out the last invader from the Kashmir soil. That has been all along our policy in the last three or four years in Kashmir.

Yet I find in Pakistan, talk of war all the time and the language used is unbecoming for any country or any person. Their papers are full of it. We have tried not to say any harsh words about Pakistan. For, we have no basic quarrel with Pakistan, certainly not with the people of Pakistan. Until yesterday, they were our countrymen. Tomorrow, we shall make friends with them again as it is in the nature of things, whatever may happen in between. We do not wish to pursue a policy in regard to Pakistan, which will leave a trail of hatred and struggle for the future. It is a bad situation to have that kind of relation with a neighbour. But what are we to do when their papers and their politicians repeat lies and incite people? We have to take precautions. We have to be ready for any contingency and we are ready, whatever Pakistan does.

What surprises me, however, is how some foreign countries express themselves in this matter and often say that India is intransigent, or that India is unreasonable. What am I to say to them? They tell us: "Why don't you solve this problem of Kashmir quickly? It is a danger to world peace." Well, there are greater dangers to peace in the world today, and they are not being solved. It is not fitting for us, or for me, to say that to them, or to answer one taunt with another. I believe, in all honesty, that our position there has been strictly right and correct from every point of view. Whether you judge it legally, constitutionally, morally, or from any other point of view, I say it has been the right position. And we shall stick to it to the last, whatever happens.

30. To A. Soekarno¹

New Delhi
October 11, 1952

My dear President,

I returned from a week's tour in the south of India today and received a message from our Charge d'Affaires at Djakarta conveying a message which you were good enough to give him. This related to Kashmir.

I am always happy to hear from you or about you. You know how interested I am in the welfare of Indonesia and of you and your family personally. I hope that you and your wife and children are keeping well.

Your suggestion about Kashmir rather surprised me because it ignores certain basic facts. Long ago, even before the Kashmir trouble arose, we stated our general policy in regard to such states and declared that the people of the state should decide about their future. When the Kashmir Government, as well as the people's organization there, decided to accede to India,² we again repeated that. We have stood by that policy all this time.

But, apart from this, the basic facts are that in law the state of Jammu and Kashmir became, by the accession, a part of the territory of India. The Kashmiri is a citizen of the Republic of India and the Government of India are responsible, *inter alia*, for the defence of the state and for maintaining its security.

Pakistan invaded the Kashmir state, and we had to defend it in accordance with our obligations. That aggression of Pakistan has continued. In our desire for peace we invited a ceasefire at the end of 1948, even though some part of Kashmir territory was illegally occupied by Pakistan forces. This ceasefire was agreed to on the basis of the United Nations resolution which admitted the aggression of Pakistan and laid it down that the first step to be taken is for all Pakistan forces to be withdrawn from Kashmir State territory. Subsequently, we agreed to withdraw the bulk of our forces. It was clearly understood, however, and stated that in view of our responsibility for the security and defence of Kashmir, we would have to maintain adequate forces there pending a plebiscite.

Up till now Pakistan has not withdrawn any of its forces, and there is continuous talk in Pakistan of further aggression.

1. JN Collection.

2. In October 1947, the National Conference appealed to the Indian Government for armed help to meet the tribal invasion and as a condition of this help it decided that the state should provisionally accede to India. In October 1948, the National Conference adopted a resolution in favour of accession. The manifesto of the National Conference issued before the elections to the State Constituent Assembly acknowledged the unconditional acceptance of the state's accession to India.

A major development took place in Kashmir last year when through adult franchise a general election was held for a Constituent Assembly. This Constituent Assembly was formed, and is actually drawing up the constitution of the State and is also authorized to function as a Legislative Assembly. This Assembly is thus representative of the people of Kashmir. Any decisions made about Kashmir are subject to the concurrence of this Assembly. The Government of Kashmir at present is responsible to this Assembly and, through it, to the people.

Your proposal goes behind the decisions taken by the UN Commission in past years, ignores the Government of Kashmir and the elected Assembly there and puts the aggressor country, namely Pakistan, on the same level with India which is legally and morally committed to the defence of Kashmir as a part of Indian territory. It would leave Kashmir State defenceless against future invasion which is continually threatened. It would be against the guarantees we have given to the people and Government of Kashmir.

You will appreciate, therefore, that it is quite impossible for us to break our repeated pledges, go against our own Constitution, and betray the interests of the people of Kashmir. Any consideration of this problem must proceed from the basic fact of aggression and invasion, involving massacre and loot, as well as the subsequent developments that have taken place. To accept your suggestion would be to ignore these basic facts and leave the door open to Pakistan to commit further aggression. No Government in India can ever agree to this. The Government and the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir oppose this completely.

I entirely appreciate your desire for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue. Indeed, we have been working hard to this end during these past four years and shall continue to do so. But for us to take a wrong step now will not lead to peace but to greater conflict with all its incalculable consequences.

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

31. To Shaikh Abdullah¹

New Delhi
October 15, 1952

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

I have just received your letter of the 15th October.

1. JN Collection.

In the last paragraph of this letter, you refer to the necessity for early action in regard to the changes suggested in the constitution. I entirely agree with you. I had hoped that action would begin soon after the talks we had here some little time ago. We sent you the opinion of the Attorney-General. I have been away from Delhi for much of this time. On my return I asked immediately what had been done. I was informed that no answer had come from the Kashmir Government. I asked immediately that a reminder be sent and I suppose it was sent. I met Girdharilal Dogra yesterday and told him also that we were anxious to expedite this. There has thus been no delay on our part.

In your present letter you inform me that your legal advisers do not agree with the opinion of our Attorney-General. That opinion was stated after repeated discussions with the Law Ministry and some of us. As a matter of fact, the President, who is himself an eminent lawyer, was of the same opinion. In the circumstances, as you wish it, I shall send your letter to the Attorney-General, but it is hardly likely that he will change his considered opinion because all the matters mentioned in your letter have already been fully considered.

In the event of our Attorney-General and our Law Ministry holding to a certain opinion definitely, we cannot overrule them and act contrary to their advice. You will appreciate, therefore, that the opinions of your legal experts, which you have conveyed to us, are likely to delay matters still further. The very thing we wish to avoid, namely delay, now results because of this marked difference of opinion as to the procedure to be adopted.

Unfortunately Gopalaswami Ayyangar is very ill. Dr Katju is here and I shall send him, of course, your letter immediately so that he can consult the Attorney-General on it. I am again leaving Delhi for Calcutta and our north-east territories and shall not return till the 26th.

As regards para 5 of your letter, I do not think there will be any difficulty in adopting such wording as you suggest.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

KASHMIR

II. Geneva Conference

1. Cable to Frank Graham¹

Our representative² at the United Nations has sent me copy of statement³ which you made at the joint meeting on July 16th and which you were good enough to give him. I am grateful to you for this courtesy.

We have given earnest consideration to this statement. You will not expect me to deal with any particular part of this statement at this stage. The position that the Government of India has taken up in regard to these matters has been clearly placed before you on many occasions.⁴

We welcome your proposal for a meeting of representatives of the two Governments at ministerial level. We have always been prepared for direct conversations of all matters in issue. I am afraid, however, that the place of the meeting and the dates suggested do not suit us at all. I realize that from many points of view Geneva is a suitable venue for this meeting. But it is exceedingly difficult for any of our Ministers to be absent from Delhi. Our Parliament is meeting at present and is likely to continue till the second week of August. It is dealing with matters of vital importance to us and the daily presence of our Ministers is necessary in one or other of our two Houses of Parliament.

In view of the importance of the various matters to be discussed at the meeting proposed by you, it would be necessary for us to have representatives of the Jammu and Kashmir Government available to us for consultation as they are not only vitally concerned with all these matters, but their approval is also necessary to any proposal.

1. New Delhi, 20 July 1952. JN Collection.

2. Rajeshwar Dayal.

3. In his statement, Graham explained the disagreement between India and Pakistan on the demilitarization plan of his twelve-point proposal. During his discussions with the representatives of the two countries at New York from 29 May to 16 July 1952, he had suggested that at the end of demilitarization of Kashmir, Pakistan retain some 3,000 to 6,000 troops on its side, counterbalanced by an Indian Army of 12,000 to 18,000 on their side of the ceasefire line. The 'Azad Kashmir' forces were to be separated from the regular Pakistan Army so as to be commanded by neutral but local officers under the surveillance of the UN. As no agreement was reached on the quantum of troops on both sides, Graham suggested a conference of the representatives of the two Governments at the ministerial level in Geneva.

4. India had reiterated that she was in Kashmir by right and considered herself constitutionally responsible for the internal order and external security of the State. India made a fundamental difference between an area under lawful government, and one under the occupation of rebel forces and she held that she alone was entitled to keep military forces. Any maintenance of troops, as against civil forces in the occupied area, could be a violation of India's and Kashmir's sovereignty.

We would welcome a meeting, such as proposed by you, in Delhi on any dates convenient to you in August. We would gladly make all necessary arrangements here. I would welcome you and your party, as well as the Pakistan's party, as our guests.

2. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

New Delhi
July 24, 1952

My dear Gopalaswami,

We have to send a reply to Graham's last message.

I do not think there is much point in our insisting on Delhi as the venue of the conference. That would certainly be convenient for us, but from some points of view, it has its disadvantages also. That would also mean our being dragged to Karachi later on. Apart from this, I do not think Pakistan will agree, and we shall thus have a continuing argument about this question.

In view of the issues² to be discussed, I do not see how we could have repeated conferences. A decision this way or that way, at any rate on some basic propositions, will have to be arrived at. We cannot anyhow say no to this conference.

I think, therefore, that we should agree to Geneva. We cannot agree to the dates suggested. No date till the 15th and a little after suits us. I do not know how long this session will last. I imagine it will go on till the 12th or 13th of August. So far as you are concerned, you will be busy in the Council of States right to the end. Therefore, the earliest dates we can suggest would be round about Monday, the 18th August.³

I have been giving a good deal of thought as to who can go on our behalf. I just cannot think of anyone except you. You are the only person who is thoroughly acquainted with every aspect of this problem from the beginning till now. You have had a very heavy time. But then I thought that perhaps a week in Geneva might even be refreshing. Geneva is very pleasant at this time of the year. I cannot imagine these talks in Geneva to last more than a

1. JN Collection.

2. The object of the tripartite talks in Geneva was to evolve a workable plan for demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir and to prepare the ground for the plebiscite administrator.

3. The ministerial-level conference was held in Geneva from 26 August to 10 September 1952. India was represented by Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Pakistan by Zafrullah Khan.

week or so. At the outside, therefore, it would mean an absence of about ten days.

It would be desirable to take someone from Kashmir like D.P. Dhar. We could spare someone from External Affairs. If necessary, I could even ask R.K. Nehru⁴ to go. He has been in charge of this matter since he came, and is fairly well acquainted with the papers. I am very short-handed in External Affairs since Bajpai and K.P.S. both went.⁵ Pillai⁶ has been overburdened with work. He is going away on long leave soon. K.P.S. is not returning till the 10th of August. However, we shall fix up somehow.

I should like you to give thought to this matter and agree, so that I can send a reply to Graham.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. He was Foreign Secretary at this time.

5. G.S. Bajpai had become Governor of Bombay, and K.P.S. Menon, India's Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

6. N.R. Pillai.

3. Cable to Frank Graham¹

Our representative at the United Nations has communicated to us your message for which I thank you.² We are ourselves anxious to avoid delay. It was with a view to this that, at considerable inconvenience to us, we agreed to the meeting taking place at Geneva as other places were found unsuitable. But as I have pointed out to you our Parliament is in session now, and is considering important legislation. After this legislation is passed in our Lower House, it will go up to the Upper House where it will take some time. It is impossible for me to say when this process will be over. But it may well last till almost the 20th of August. That is why I had suggested 25th August for the meeting. The senior Minister who will probably go to Geneva on our behalf is leader of the Upper House here, and his presence is therefore necessary till the last day of the session. It may be possible for him at the earliest to leave India on the 22nd reaching Geneva on Saturday 23rd. Because of all these considerations,

1. New Delhi, 27 July 1952. File No. 52/200/NGO-52, MEA.

2. The message conveyed by Rajeshwar Dayal, the Indian representative at the UN, to Nehru stated that Graham was concerned about the delay of the meeting at Geneva.

I had suggested a firm date, namely August 25th. I hope you will appreciate our difficulties and agree to this date.

4. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

For your personal information. You know already of repeated and serious acts of sabotage committed recently in Kashmir. We have definite information that Pakistan authorities have set up several centres in Pakistan and 'Azad-Kashmir' area to give training in sabotage. Some persons arrested here have confirmed this.

News has just been received of blowing up of a bridge in 'Azad Kashmir' territory. We have no information as to who might have done it. There are many rival factions in 'Azad Kashmir' at present, intriguing against each other.

United Nations observers here continue to function in very unsatisfactory manner. Their chief concern appears to be not ceasefire line but some kind of intelligence work, as well as private propaganda for Pakistan.²

1. Srinagar, 27 August 1952. JN Collection.

2. At this time, there were 60 UN observers, including 24 on the Indian side of the ceasefire line and 18 on the Pakistani side, with nine each posted at the headquarters located at Srinagar and Rawalpindi. They consisted of Australians, Canadians, Dutch, Norwegians and Americans, with General Nimmo as the head.

5. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

I returned yesterday from Kashmir. In view of Pakistan's studied attempts at sabotage, we have now taken special measures to stop infiltration and practically seal ceasefire line. Also for internal security, one battalion of Militia has been handed over by our Army for internal security work. We propose to increase strength of Home Guards from present seven hundred to fifteen hundred. These will do police duties chiefly along ceasefire line.

1. New Delhi, 31 August 1952. File No. 52/316/NGO/54, MEA.

Because of transfer of Militia battalion from Army we are asked by Army to send extra battalion troops to take Militia's place. We are considering this.

Report of destruction of bridge in 'Azad Kashmir' area appears to have been exaggerated.

Political conditions in Pakistan reported to be steadily deteriorating. Prime Minister and other Ministers losing influence. Report on Liaquat Ali's murder recently published has added to discredit of Government.² Internal intrigues within Government continue. According to report one section of Pakistan Cabinet has been demanding military operations in Kashmir, Prime Minister opposing them.

Economic situation in Pakistan also deteriorating. General feeling of frustration there and discontent with Government. In such conditions there is always risk of adventurist action on the part of Government and we have to be prepared for contingencies.³

2. The report of the Commission of Inquiry into the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan found no reason to believe that the crime was an act of a maniac. The report referred to the existence of two or three conspiracies with which Liaquat Ali Khan's assassination might be connected.
3. Nazimuddin stated that his country was straining on the leash over Kashmir.

6. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Your telegram 7² dated August 30th.

Proposal made by Graham and Marin about Pakistan giving guarantees against infiltration and keeping military force of six to seven thousand on 'Azad Kashmir' side is entirely opposed to position we have thus far taken

1. New Delhi, 31 August 1952. File No. 52/316/NGO/54, MEA.
2. On 30 August 1952, Gopalaswami Ayyangar cabled from Geneva to Nehru that he had reminded Graham that India had accepted with some risks even a strength of 21,000 troops for the Indian area of Kashmir. Suggestion was then made by Graham that Pakistan might give guarantees against infiltration, breaches of ceasefire agreement and propaganda, etc. Miguel A. Marin, a member of the UN Secretariat who was an aide to Graham supplemented it by asking if in the event of these guarantees India would accept military force of 6,000 to 7,000 on 'Azad Kashmir' side and 21,000 on Indian side and leave the question of converting 'Azad Kashmir' forces into civil armed forces to the UN Representative and plebiscite administrator after the latter had been inducted.

up.³ I attach no importance whatever to any guarantees that Pakistan might give and our acceptance of Pakistan force on other side of ceasefire line would weaken our entire position, politically and militarily, greatly, and have very bad effect in Kashmir. Leaving question of converting 'Azad Kashmir' forces into civil armed forces to UN representative and plebiscite administrator is also dangerous. We have had plenty of experience of how these people function. Present ceasefire line is illogical and patently partial to Pakistan. We committed grave error in leaving this matter to UN representative.⁴ I would not like to leave any future important matter for decision of UN representative. On the whole I dislike greatly Graham's and Marin's approach.

I have already informed you of deteriorating condition in Pakistan and danger of adventurist tactics there.

New York Times of August 29th contains long despatch from their correspondent in Rawalpindi. This is headed "New strife feared in Kashmir dispute" and threats are held out that "Azad Kashmir" with help of Pathan tribes will attack us in Kashmir even without consent of Pakistan Government. Pakistan official reported to say that if this happens, it will not be responsibility of Pakistani Government.

All this is clearly pressure tactics to frighten American and United Nations' opinion. But we cannot ignore such threats.⁵ Any step taken by us to weaken our position in Kashmir either politically or militarily will be dangerous.

London *Times* reverts to proposal about independent Kashmir. I discussed all such matters in Srinagar and it was firm opinion of all concerned that idea of independence for whole State or part of it completely unpractical and should be resisted. Kashmir leaders also entirely opposed to limited plebiscite in Valley.

3. India wanted a minimum of 25,000 troops, excluding State Militia of 6,000, for reasons of security on her side and would allow no more than 4,000 civil armed forces, 2,000 to be the followers of 'Azad Kashmir' on the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line. India was prepared to reduce her force to 21,000 and allow minor variations on the Pakistan side. In regard to the plebiscite administrator, she felt, he should be inducted into office only after the demilitarization and shortly before the plebiscite.
4. The ceasefire agreement effected from 1 January 1949 had left two fifths of Kashmir territory occupied by Pakistan. The arrangement equated the status of India and Pakistan, gave more than a local character to the 'Azad' authorities and violated the UNCIP assurance of 13 August 1948 to India that there should be large scale disarming of 'Azad Kashmir' forces, and that the Kashmir Government would be restored over the northern areas after Pakistan had evacuated it.
5. The Pakistan Government representatives and the press felt indignant and impatient, and declared in bellicose statements that the UN had let them down. Prime Minister of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, declared on 15 August 1952 that "there is a limit to our patience", and "God willing we shall never rest until we have liberated the people of Kashmir."

7. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

... In view of fresh talk of raids and invasion from Pakistan or 'Azad Kashmir' with help of tribal folk, and obvious possibilities of adventurous action, we can afford to take no risks especially as present ceasefire line is bad and has no relation to geography.

1. New Delhi, 5 September 1952. File No. 52/200/NGO-52, MEA. Extracts.

8. Cable to N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

Your telegram 20 dated 6th September. Zafrullah's proposal² to withdraw 'Azad Kashmir' forces into Pakistan territory and keep them as organized body may have some advantages but has also some obvious dangers. These forces together with Pakistan army would be perched on the frontier and could easily enter in strength. There will probably be only some kind of formal disbanding and very little disarming.

Idea of taking votes on Pakistan's side also likely to create difficulties and it will hardly be possible to distinguish between those entitled to vote and those not so entitled. If principle of such voting accepted there, demand might be made for extension of it to large numbers of refugees on both sides....

1. New Delhi, 7 September 1952. File No. 52/200/NGO-52, MEA. Extracts.
2. Gopalaswami Ayyangar informed Nehru that, in his informal discussions with Zafrullah Khan, the latter had agreed that the danger from 'Azad Kashmir' side was that of infiltration and outrages, but suggested that the presence of the Indian Army might influence voting to be free from intimidation at the time of plebiscite. Zafrullah also suggested that Pakistan might withdraw the disbanded and disarmed 'Azad Kashmir' forces into her own territory and keep them as some kind of an organized body. They might be sent to 'Azad Kashmir' area only for voting.

9. Information on Pakistan for Foreign Governments¹

The Governor of Bombay, Shri G.S. Bajpai, in his fortnightly letter to the President has discussed Kashmir situation. He has drawn special attention to the talks of war in Pakistan and the general deterioration of the situation there, both political and economic. There is thus great danger that wild men might take control or might push the others into dangerous action. This may not happen, but the possibility is there and we cannot possibly ignore it.

2. Meanwhile, we are discussing with Dr Graham this Kashmir problem in Geneva. We are trying our best, without giving up any vital interest or principle, to come to some agreement. The likelihood of our doing so is remote.

3. In view of these developments, Shri Girija Shankar Bajpai suggests not only that we should be prepared for all consequences but that we might keep the more important foreign governments informed of these developments. It is obvious that if Pakistan takes any aggressive action in Kashmir, even though this is covered up by saying that the aggressors are tribal folk or 'Azad Kashmir' people, we shall be forced to meet it and there will be a resumption of hostilities which may not be limited to a small sphere. Shri Girija Shankar Bajpai has particularly mentioned the USA, the UK and the USSR in this connection i.e., that these Governments might be informed.

4. I think that we should follow his advice in this matter and draw the attention of the Ambassadors of these three countries more particularly, and possibly of some others also, to this situation and to the dangerous possibilities that might flow from it.

5. I think we might also write to our heads of missions in these countries about this situation. They should draw the attention of the Governments concerned to it. This need not be done formally. But it will be worthwhile to say something about it on our behalf.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 7 September 1952. File No. 52/184/NGO/52, MEA.

10. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
October 2, 1952

My dear Krishna,

I am having sent to you separately some of the latest Kashmir papers² including a note by Gopalaswami. I want you, as well as Vijayalakshmi, to be fully informed about the present position. I do not know what developments might take place in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. It is possible that either Vijayalakshmi or you might have to deal with them, and in any event, you should know what the position is because this will come up in conversation frequently....

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers. NMML. Extracts.
2. Krishna Menon had been included in the Indian delegation for the next session of the UN General Assembly in New York.

11. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
October 12, 1952

Nan dear,

...We are not quite clear yet as to what we should do about Kashmir in the Security Council. Graham has made his report² and no date has yet been fixed

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. On 19 September 1952, Graham reported to the Security Council the failure of the Geneva talks. On 10 October 1952, he made a statement in the Security Council in which he said that one of the unresolved points was regarding the meaning of "final disposition" of forces. But the crucial points of differences were regarding "large-scale" disbandment and disarmament of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces and "further withdrawal" on the Indian side and the quantum of forces to be left on the two sides of the ceasefire line. He also emphasized the importance of the appointment of the plebiscite administrator and the association of Admiral Nimitz with the process of demilitarization.

for the next meeting when, I suppose, the parties will be asked to make statements. Zafrullah is likely to deliver a long speech. We have sent some material, nothing very new, to Rajeshwar Dayal. I am inclined to think that at this preliminary meeting Rajeshwar Dayal had better himself make the statement. But I should like you and Krishna Menon to keep in close touch with him and discuss matters. If there are further discussions, probably it would be better for you to take charge or, if you are too busy, Krishna Menon might do so. It is desirable, therefore, that you, Krishna Menon and Rajeshwar Dayal should keep in close touch with the Kashmir affair throughout...

About Kashmir, there is a possibility of the UK or the USA or both bringing forward some resolution.³ I think they should be asked if they intended doing so and if so, what it is likely to be. We should be given full notice of any such move...

I hope you are keeping well.

With love from
Jawahar

3. In a resolution, introduced by the USA and the UK on 5 November 1952, the principles enunciated by Graham were endorsed; the progress towards demilitarization was noted on the issue of the quantum of forces, and further Indo-Pakistan negotiations under the auspices of the UN representative were urged.

1. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
July 22, 1952

My dear Bidhan,

I received your telegram today.² Rafi Ahmed Kidwai arrived this morning and I have discussed this matter with him also.

I am afraid I just do not understand all this trouble about food in Calcutta.³ I do not see how the Centre can possibly pay further subsidies for reduction in price. It seems to me that there has been a grave misunderstanding somewhere and a very good position,⁴ which had been accepted by the public gladly, has somehow got muddled up. The officers of your Food Department do not appear to be too bright. So far as the Centre is concerned, we have fulfilled every commitment that was made on our behalf and we shall continue to fulfil them.

I understand that Kidwai has sent you one of his Food Secretaries to explain the situation fully.

It is obvious that all this trouble in Calcutta has little to do with food and is purely political. My own information is that much of it is due to personal objection to your present Food Minister, Prafulla Sen. I was afraid that his appointment would lead to resentment among a considerable number of people and I wrote⁵ to you to this effect. You have now got entangled, quite needlessly, in a situation and have somehow to get out of it.⁶

Yours affectionately,
Jawahar

1. *With B.C. Roy and other Chief Ministers* by Saroj Chakrabarty, (Calcutta, 1974), p.206.
2. In his telegram of 21 July 1952, B.C. Roy stated that the rice sent by the Centre to Bengal was costlier than the internally procured rice. The Congress Assembly Party had decided to ask the Central Government to supply rice at the same price as was the price of internally procured rice or subsidize the difference.
3. On 15 July 1952, the United Famine Resistance Committee, breaking the police cordon, took out a procession to the Bengal Assembly and instigated acts of lawlessness throughout greater Calcutta. The demonstrations lasting several days, with widespread arson and damage to property, led to tear gas and lathi charge by the police.
4. Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, the Central Food Minister, announced in Calcutta in June 1952 that the Central Government would meet the food requirements of the Calcutta industrial areas. The Government would release 100,000 tons of rice, and an additional 100,000 tons of imported rice for sale at economy price through special shops to enable the people to supplement their rationed supplies.
5. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, pp. 168-169.
6. On 25 July 1952, Roy replied that the food movement was political and not against Prafulla Sen or his food policy. This movement was the result of a fight for supremacy among the different groups and "food is made the scapegoat." Roy stated that he had taken over the responsibility for the food movement as Sen consulted him for everything.

2. To Govind Ballabh Pant¹

New Delhi
July 23, 1952

My dear Pantji,

I enclose a letter I have received from Shibbanlal Saksena, in which he alleges that hundreds of people are dying every day in Gorakhpur and neighbouring districts from starvation.² This is a terrible picture. I do not usually accept Shibbanlal's word. But when he says that he saw all this happen, we cannot just ignore it.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 31(98)/50-PMS.
2. Shibbanlal Saksena wrote on 22 July 1952 that during his tour of Gorakhpur, Deoria, Basti and Azamgarh districts, he found severe famine conditions. He had a list of 131 persons who had died of starvation in the past three months. Crop-failure for three successive years had left no money with the people who had sold their ornaments, cattle and even utensils at ridiculously low prices. He also alleged that the UP Government was trying to prevent the situation from being exposed and stopped Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, the Minister for Food, from going there on the ground that roads were not motorable.
3. Govind Ballabh Pant replied that Shibbanlal Saksena's list of persons alleged to have died of starvation had been investigated and not a single person in the scarcity areas had died of starvation. In fact the death rate in these districts indicated that it had not gone up.

3. To Ravi Shankar Shukla¹

New Delhi
July 27, 1952

My dear Shuklaji,²

I understand that Rafi Ahmed Kidwai will be contacting you soon. His chief object in doing so is to try to get some more foodgrains, especially rice, for Bengal, which is facing a very difficult situation indeed. Although we have in a sense turned the food corner in the country³ and the promise of the future is

1. File No. 31(92)/50-PMS. Nehru wrote a similar letter to Nabakrishna Chaudhuri, Chief Minister of Orissa.
2. He was the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh at this time.
3. In 1951-52, the gap between consumption of food and the produce was 3 million tons which was made good by imports from abroad at a cost of Rs 200 crores.

fairly good, in the present we have to face a very difficult situation in some parts of the country.⁴ Bengal is the worst situated from this point of view and deserves all our help. I do hope that you will be able to help. We shall have to pull together in this matter.

I am told that this year you have taken over only 60 per cent of foodgrains from merchants and millers instead of 75 per cent. If you could get the remaining 15 per cent our difficulties would be over.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Madhya Pradesh was a surplus State in food and in 1950 it had supplied 1,55,000 tons of rice to scarcity areas in the country. The quantum of rice Madhya Pradesh sent out to other States in 1952 was 83,000 tons.

4. To Mahavir Tyagi¹

New Delhi
August 9, 1952

My dear Mahavir,²

Your letter of the 7th August about the purchase of rice from Burma.³ What you say is perfectly right. But what would you like us to do in the matter? The whole of Burma's economy depends upon rice and they have tried to make as much money as possible from sale of rice not only from India but from every other country. For the last several years there has been a continuous civil war going on there⁴ and a good part of the country is not even under the control of the Burmese Government. Probably they would have collapsed but for the help they got from the rice. All we can do is to try to avoid getting their rice or to fix a price above which we will not go. The rice difficulty is a world difficulty....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Minister of State for Finance.
3. Mahavir Tyagi, wrote that in 1948 India paid £38 per ton to Burma for importing rice and £61 per ton in 1952. He stated that taking advantage of her bargaining position, the Government of Burma had made a profit of Rs. 40 crores while Burma Government's Separation Debt of Rs. 65 crores due to India had not been paid.
4. In the central areas of Burma, the Communists had conducted guerilla warfare against the Central authority for the last five years.

5. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
September 18, 1952

My dear Deshmukh,

I paid a brief visit to some parts of Madhya Bharat which have been suffering from scarcity conditions for some two or three years. Madhya Bharat is one of our more prosperous provinces from the point of view of the general people and yet even there was this large area, chiefly inhabited by adivasis, where conditions were really bad, and undoubtedly people were terribly under-nourished and often starving. They had nothing to fall back upon. They had little in the way of clothes. They clamoured for work.

Conditions in the eastern districts of the UP are, if anything, worse over some areas and the sight of any collection of human beings in the villages in Gorakhpur is pitiable, children with bloated stomachs and men and women often with their bones sticking out. There is plenty of food roundabout, but the capacity of people to buy it has largely vanished. There has been an argument about deaths from starvation and the UP Government have denied this with vigour. Their denial is literally true, but the fact is that when people have been terribly under-nourished for a long time, they grow so weak that any little upset puts an end to them. Deaths sometimes occur when a starving person has suddenly too good a meal which he cannot stand.

I have received a letter from one of our Congress MPs from Chittoor.² I enclose a copy³ of it. This discloses a distressing story of conditions in Rayalaseema and roundabout.⁴ In adjoining areas of Mysore conditions are almost equally bad. I am told that some parts of Karnataka are also suffering greatly. There are many other pockets in the country.

We appear to have quite enough food in the country, but everywhere the difficulty is of lack of the power to buy it. The kind of relief works that are started give some temporary relief, but usually without yielding any permanent results even in the shape of development schemes.

1. File No. 31(94)/50-PMS. Extracts.

2. T.N. Viswanatha Reddy (1919-1989); Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-62; member, Parliamentary delegation to China, 1952.

3. Not printed. In his letter of 12 September 1952 Viswanatha Reddy complained of severe famine conditions in several taluqas of Chittoor and Cudappah districts and said that Madras Government's relief measures being inadequate, the people were selling their movables, cattle, agricultural implements, utensils in their homes and even their children. He wanted the implementation of the Madras Famine Code and some more relief measures.

4. Failure of monsoon for four successive years had caused serious famine in the Rayalaseema area.

I am naturally worried about all this. The State Governments may not be functioning with success or as efficiently as possible. But we cannot divest ourselves of our ultimate responsibility for the people concerned. I have nothing for the moment to suggest and I am merely passing on this information and these difficulties to you for you to consider....⁵

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Deshmukh replied on 18 September 1952 that relief proposals could be formulated for Madhya Bharat under the direction of the Centre and any proposal by the UP Government for relief works could be considered. While suggesting that Reddy's letter be sent to the Chief Minister of Madras for his comments, he added that complaints about famine relief in Rayalaseema had continued to come despite Rs 6 crores having already been spent. Deshmukh also attributed the growing clamour of Rayalaseema for famine relief to the Andhra-Tamil discord.

6. To Govind Ballabh Pant¹

New Delhi
September 19, 1952

My dear Pantji,

I know that you are doing all you can for the scarcity areas in the UP and yet all this seems to me a valiant effort at some kind of a temporary relief. It seems to me that we must look a little further ahead and the only way to meet this difficulty appears to be some standby in the shape of work which is worthwhile. I do not like this famine relief work. This means encouraging small development schemes and cottage industries, even though they are subsidized.

I believe you had some proposals of this kind for Gorakhpur, etc. I mentioned this matter to Deshmukh here. He said that he had not received any proposals from the UP, or, at any rate, he did not remember them. He would be prepared to consider such proposals which would create more purchasing power.

I am passing this to you so that you might suggest some methods of dealing with this situation.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. File No. 31(98)/50-PMS.

7. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
September 19, 1952

My dear Deshmukh,

Your two letters of September 18th and 19th. I entirely agree with you that what is most wanted is good government and efficient administration. Can you come and have a quiet dinner with me on Monday, the 22nd September? We can then have some talk about your experiences.

I sent Reddy's letter to Rajaji in Madras. It is possible that Reddy's account is rather exaggerated, but it seemed to me an honest man's reaction.²

I am worried not merely by the immediate difficulties in these scarcity areas, but much more so by the future prospect. For a variety of reasons, people in these areas have no reserves of any kind left, financial or even bodily. The relief we give reaches some of them, and just manages to keep them going. As a matter of fact, some of the deaths that have occurred have actually been from over-feeding on long-starved stomachs. The general level goes down. Even if we had some luck in the rains, which we have not had in these areas, it will be a temporary alleviation. Relief works of the kind we normally have are also in the nature of immediate and temporary relief and do not have any lasting results. How can we tackle these problems in these areas a little more thoroughly? There is after all enough food in the country. The question therefore is only of supplying the purchasing power for it which can come from public works. These public works for relief are far too much of the old famine kind which are neither practically nor psychologically very helpful. If these public works could be of a more enduring nature, in the shape of small development schemes, that would go much further and would be of permanent benefit.

Could we not, therefore, devise, a number of such small development schemes in Rayalaseema, eastern UP, Karnatak and the adivasi area in Madhya Bharat? Each scheme by itself need not be a big one.

Both Madras and UP are spending fairly heavily on their relief and taxing their resources to the utmost, and yet the permanent good they do appears to be very limited.

I am rather surprised to read in your letter that the UP has not suggested any such thing. I seem to remember some proposals from the UP.

We have to tax and, indeed, we might have to tax more. But the burden seems to fall more heavily on the lower middle class. Indirect taxation goes up and that affects the poorest. On the whole food and cloth have not gone up in price, and food is likely to come down further after the present harvest.

1. File No. 31(94)/50-PMS.

2. See *ante*, p. 366.

Nevertheless, the purchasing power appears to be very limited and the quantity of cloth that is sold is also, I believe, much less than previously.

Rents in cities are terribly high and hit the middle-class very badly. Is it not possible to get them reduced? That would bring considerable relief to large numbers of people.

The only possible way of worthwhile relief appears to be the development of cottage or small scale industries plus small development schemes.

In Madhya Bharat, there had been some relief works in the adivasi area, but these had been stopped during the rainy season. As a matter of fact there was precious little rain. I impressed upon the Chief Minister³ to start something immediately. He said he would try to do so, but complained of his utter lack of resources. I am afraid the Madhya Bharat Ministry is a very poor one.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Mishrilal Gangwal.

8. To Rafi Ahmed Kidwai¹

New Delhi
September 21, 1952

My dear Rafi,

We are continually having trouble from lack of rain or insufficient rain in large parts of the country. The obvious course to adopt is for us to develop what is called dry farming in many of these areas. This is a method which requires a minimum quantity of water. I do not know how far your Ministry is paying attention to this. In America, it brought very great results and, I am sure, here also it would do so.

There is a Member of Parliament from the Punjab. I forget his name, but he is a farmer and I think he calls himself Chinari.² He has repeatedly written to me about this dry farming and he appears to know much about it.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Hira Singh Chinaria (1895-1955); detained and interned, 1940-45; member, All India States People's General Council, 1945-47; Member, AICC, 1948-51; Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-1955; member, Pepsu PCC and its Working Committee; member, Pepsu Hindi Sahitya Sammelan; published many books on agriculture in Hindi.

9. Increase Employment Opportunities¹

I can say nothing at present about the demand of the Madras Government for a loan of Rs. 10 crores from the Centre for financing relief measures in Rayalaseema. I have no doubt this matter will be discussed in the forthcoming Finance Ministers' Conference in Delhi.

It is obviously the desire of the Central Government to help to the utmost not only the Madras Government, but also all other States that are facing difficulties and famine and scarcity conditions. The way to help appears to be to increase employment by public works. How far this can be done, and to what extent we can go, depends upon the balancing of a number of factors.

I have no definite plan in my mind for helping Rayalaseema, I have no plan except to go and see. But I may tell you that it is our intention to send not only to Rayalaseema, but to other scarcity areas in India, a high-power team of competent observers to report, not only on conditions, but on what should be done there to meet the situation from a temporary, as well as permanent point of view.

You may remember that we sent such a team of Assam last month with very good results.² Assam again is one of our difficult States. It is not only a border State having frontiers with Pakistan, Burma, Tibet and China, but it has also vast tribal areas. There are all kinds of difficult problems, communications are very limited, it had an earthquake, it has periodical floods and it has been badly affected by Partition. It was difficult to deal with all these matters separately by correspondence. So, we sent a team there of competent senior officials to examine things on the spot and make recommendations on how to remove the difficulties. They were there, studied the conditions and presented a report. Practically speaking, we accepted all their recommendations and we are trying to give effect to them. We want to do that in the case of Rayalaseema and other scarcity areas instead of correspondence with the State concerned.

1. Talk with the newsmen at the Madras railway station before leaving on his tour of some parts of Mysore and of Rayalaseema, 5 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 8 October 1952.
2. A Committee of Enquiry headed by H.V.R. Iengar, Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, was appointed by the Prime Minister on 29 July 1952 to make a study on the spot and report to the Government on the problems created by the floods in Assam in the second week of July. Due to continuous heavy rains, the Brahmaputra and most of its tributaries had risen flooding 10,000 square miles. There had been disruption of rail and road communications.

10. Need for Courage in Crises¹

I call upon the people in the scarcity areas not to be down-hearted but face the situation with fortitude and courage, each one doing his or her duty, so that by their joint effort they can find a solution to ward off famines.

It is no use people saying they have lost all hope and contenting themselves with presenting memoranda and petitions to the Government and other authorities. I admit that in the areas I have visited, people are facing a crisis. It is the duty of the Government—Central or State—to do what they can to help the people tide over this crisis. But the people, on that account, should not sit with folded hands. I do not want people to say that in free India they have become helpless and have waited patiently for the Government to do something. The country is passing through a crisis, and it is the duty of each one to do his duty—in small or big ways. They must all pull together and do something.

In a memorandum some local leaders have stated that they have lost all hope for future prosperity of the drought-affected districts of Mysore. If any municipal councillor or legislator were to say that he has lost all hope, he has no business to continue, but must vacate the place, so that someone else who is hopeful of the future might get elected to his place.

Apart from the Central and the State Governments doing everything possible to bring relief to the people in the distress areas, apart from asking us to do this and that, I must say that it is the duty of every man and woman to help his neighbour in the village in his suffering. To see that India as a whole is made a better place for us all to live in, it is the bounden duty of every one to see that his neighbour does not starve for want of food, while he himself has enough to eat. If any man allowed his neighbour to starve in a village, then I say he is guilty of a grave crime. If, on the other hand, everybody helps his neighbour in the way in which I want you all to help, take it from me, there might still be suffering but it will not be felt so heavily. Therefore, we have to help each other wherever possible in this crisis.

1. Speech at Chellakarai in Mysore State, 5 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 6 October 1952.

11. The Famine-Stricken Areas¹

I

I am noting down my general impressions of this tour from day to day. At the end of the tour I shall indicate briefly what my final impressions are.

2. During the last week or so, there has been fairly widespread rain over these areas. This has certainly made a difference to the appearance of the countryside, which is greener. It has also raised the morale of the people. But this rain is not likely to affect those crops, which had already withered away, such as *jowar*. As for future crops, this will depend on more rain.² The recent rain, however, has certainly helped in supplying drinking water.

3. "Famine" is rather an indefinite word and may be interpreted in different ways. I saw no cases of what might be called acute starvation, but under-nourishment was obvious and sometimes this was very marked. On the whole, the children appeared to be better fed than the older people. It was the older people who showed some signs of emaciation. The general impression certainly was of hunger.

4. Everywhere, both in Madras and in Mysore States, and more especially in Mysore, there were repeated demands for work of any kind. In both areas demands were made for help from the Central Government for various kinds of subsidies, grants, *takavi* and subsistence loans.

5. It was repeatedly suggested that there should be a survey of water resources as well as of mineral resources.

6. Electric power, more especially for lift irrigation, was asked for.

7. It was pointed out that these areas were almost entirely agricultural. While agriculture must be encouraged by water supply, cottage and other industries were ultimately necessary to give employment and more purchasing power.

8. Ordinary wells, tube wells and tanks were to be built or repaired.

9. Community projects in these areas were asked for.

1. 5 October 1952. The letters and speeches of this period have been interspersed with the impressions. File No. 31/(94)/50-PMS.

2. Rayalaseema was a chronic famine zone and it suffered severely in 1952 due to a succession of drought conditions over the last several years. The year's monsoon also brought just half the normal rainfall of the season. It was not enough for the standing crops. This necessitated urgent relief operations which included organizing relief works, providing subsistence loans and opening of gruel centres.

10. Great stress was laid on the handloom industry being helped and encouraged in every way.

11. More gruel centres were asked for.

12. Improvement in village communications and rural water supply was demanded.

MADRAS

In addition to the above demands or suggestions, a proposal was put forward repeatedly that there should be a permanent Rayalaseema Economic Development Board.

2. Among the mineral resources in Rayalaseema were mentioned mica, gold, iron, berytes, asbestos and slate manganese.

3. Contour bunding was suggested.

4. Repeated stress was laid on the importance of the high level canal from the Tungabhadra.³ This was said to be necessary both to increase agricultural production over a large area and to give employment to a large number of persons.

5. Among the other projects mentioned were Bairadevi Theppa, Mid-Pennar, Chennarayaswami Reservoir. A number of others were also mentioned.

MYSORE

A number of short distance railways were required both to give employment, and for more permanent use. Among these were suggested a line from Chitaldrug to Bellary via Challakere and Molakalmuru and a line from Tumkur to Challakere. Also a number of railway lines for connecting Y.N. Hosakota line to surrounding villages.

2. The Bhadra project, which had been sanctioned by the Planning Commission was proceeding very slowly. It was suggested that this should be expedited to give more employment.

In the memoranda given to me there are many other suggestions in regard to minor projects, etc. I have passed on these memoranda to the Chief Minister⁴ of Mysore and the Famine Commissioner⁵ of the Madras Government.

3. The Tungabhadra project had been taken up jointly by Madras and Hyderabad States to tackle the problem of the recurring famines. The dam with a reservoir capacity to irrigate 2.6 million acres of land was estimated to cost Rs 17 crores to Madras and Rs 12.1 crores to Hyderabad and was scheduled to be completed by 1952.

4. K. Hanumaithaiyya.

5. V.S. Hejmadi.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

GENERAL NOTE

In Mysore, there has apparently been no gratuitous relief. The Chief Minister does not like the idea of giving free doles, and so the kind of relief that is given has been through some kind of work. In Madras a large amount has been spent on free relief by distributing gruel or by giving what are called subsistence loans.⁶

2. The figures supplied to me for relief measures in Rayalaseema by the Madras Government are for the four districts of Anantapur, Chittoor, Cuddapah and Kurnool. (In Bellary famine relief operations had not been started, but it is proposed to start them now).

3. In these four districts, the amounts spent on gruel centres are: Rs 39,37,542; subsistence loans: Rs 62,52,362; Total Rs 101,89,904/- Subsistence loans can hardly be considered as returnable loans and hence are, for all practical purposes, grants:

Amount spent on road works:	Rs 10,75,710/-
Amount spent on all other works:	Rs 42,77,542/-
Loans under L.I.L. and A.L. Acts:	Rs 24,72,512/-
Loans for pumping installations:	Rs 3,95,300/-
Loans for deepening of field wells:	Rs 11,38,900/-
Amount spent on distribution of fodder:	Rs 26,600/-

4. Thus, gratuitous relief practically amounts to over a crore of rupees in these four districts and the amount spent on works (apart from loans) is about half this sum, namely, Rs 53,53,252.

5. The Madras Government proposes to spend during the next six months ending 31st March 1953 following sums in the four districts above named plus in Bellary:

On gruel centres:	Rs 75,54,000/-
On loans (These loans presumably includes subsistence loans which are not likely to be returned):	Rs 15,400,000/-
On employment and works:	Rs 48,026,000/-
On fodder depots:	Rs 4,85,000/-
On deepening of wells:	Rs 9,28,750/-
(These figures relate to Rayalaseema only). They do not include Malabar, which has demanded a very large sum for relief etc.)	

6. The Madras Government had been running 2,000 gruel kitchens and organizing relief works to provide work for unemployed agricultural labourers which cost the Government over Rs 5 crores. The Union Government so far had lent Rs 2 crores and been meeting half the cost of gratuitous relief as grant and half the cost of relief works as loan.

6. I confess I do not like the large sums of money, which have already been spent, or are going to be spent, on gruel centres and subsistence loans. In an emergency some such help is perhaps essential. But it only tides over an immediate difficulty without providing for the future. I have no doubt that the gruel supplied has saved innumerable lives, especially of children. The gruel is given only to children, infirm people and expectant mothers. Sometimes it is given to other women also. That has been a great help, although the quantity of gruel given did not appear to me to be enough.

7. The so-called able-bodied men and women do not get gruel. They are supposed to work. But it is obvious that work is not provided for most of them. This seems an unsatisfactory arrangement.

8. Obviously, the better course would be, if finances did not prevent, to provide for work for all able-bodied persons; with their earnings they could keep their dependents. To have spent a crore of rupees and to spend possibly another crore or more on gratuitous relief appears to me to be rather wasteful. That money or perhaps some more money would have not only given relief but helped in public works.

9. It is clear to me that it is the duty of the State, in existing circumstances of famine or semi-famine, to provide other work or food. It is better to provide work and make food available at reasonable prices. Food might also be provided as payment for work.

10. The gruel centres were no doubt useful, but were not very pleasant sights. They depressed me greatly. This kind of dole and charity cannot have a good effect. And yet, it is certainly necessary to keep the children going. I would suggest that children should be given this kind of meal or something else in their schools. Where there are no schools, it would be desirable to have any kind of open air temporary schools, where, apart from some kind of teaching, this gruel or other food could be supplied. These schools could absorb some middle class people as teachers.

11. I have no idea how much all this would cost. But it should not cost very much more than what has actually been spent now. In addition, work would be done and this would be for some permanent public benefit.

12. I was given to understand that the gift of food and milk etc., from the USSR was very helpful.⁷

7. In September 1952, the Russian Trade Union gifted to India 10,000 tons of wheat, 5,000 tons of rice, 500,000 tons of condensed milk and Rs 25,000 for famine relief.

12. Message to Mysore¹

I cannot say much about what I have seen during these two days, because to get at the real facts you should neither underestimate nor exaggerate the realities. I have been stressing the psychology of self-help.

I do not know whether there is a Bharat Sevak Samaj functioning in Mysore. It ought to be able to help the people. The Bharat Sevak Samaj is not a political organization and the members thereof have no reward excepting work. I am quite sure that each village can do something to organize itself and raise itself, and then it would be easy for the Government to help.

The problem of these areas has been aggravated by the failure of rains, but there are deep-rooted causes. Obviously, one ought to get a real grip of it. That is what our Planning Commission is meant to provide.

It is always a pleasure to visit Mysore and I found the areas I have toured very fascinating. For the moment, I hope the present rains will continue and bring great relief.

1. Message issued at Bagapalli for the people of Mysore, 6 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 7 October 1952.

13. The Famine-Stricken Areas¹ (Continued)

II

Today was another very heavy day and I travelled by car over 200 miles from 7 in the morning till 10 at night. I visited a large number of villages in Mysore and Anantapur District in Madras. My Mysore tour ended today.

2. I received, both in Mysore and in Rayalaseema, a very large number of memoranda and addresses. These more or less repeated what had been previously said. Wherever I went, the demand for work was insistent. Many of the village folk, who met me by the roadside or in their villages, asked for work, apart from other demands.

3. Generally speaking, I found conditions today somewhat worse than what I had seen yesterday. I have not heard of any case of death by starvation

1. 6 October 1952. File No. 31(94) 1/50-PMS.

anywhere I visited thus far, and it might be said that I did not see any acute stage of starvation, though of course it is difficult to judge. It is a fact, however, that the general look of the people in the rural areas was one of undernourishment, and sometimes even of hunger.

4. There were no official gruel centres in Mysore. But some private organizations were running some gruel centres. In the Rayalaseema area, there were a number of gruel centres, which I visited. In this area also the Ramakrishna Mission were giving free food. I visited one of the Ramakrishna Mission centres. I had the impression that it was better organized than the official gruel centres. The food given also appeared to be better. Conditions generally were not quite so depressing as in the official centres. I was told that the cost of each meal was 1 anna 6 pies. In the official centres, the cost was computed to be 1 anna 3 pies. The difference thus was of 3 pies per meal. Undoubtedly the better food and the better conditions in the Ramakrishna Mission were worth more than 3 pies per meal. Probably the overhead charges of the Ramakrishna Mission were much less.

5. The visit to all these gruel centres was depressing, more especially to see children and boys and girls mixed up together with the halt and the lame. The whole appearance was of a bad form of charity and this must inevitably produce on the one hand the pauper's mentality and on the other a certain degree of shame, till one becomes accustomed to this state of affairs. Certainly I felt that shame as I stood there.

6. I feel that free doles of food like this are bad except in a brief emergency. It would be far better to devise some method of taking away the sting in this kind of charity by having some kind of work attached to it. Possibly the Central Government's decision to shoulder half the burden of gratuitous relief has been as inducement to the States to give this kind of relief rather than any other connected with some work. If so, then the result has been unfortunate.

7. I quite realize that the gruel centres have been of enormous help at a critical stage and have saved many lives. Nevertheless, I feel that it would have been better to organize this differently.

8. I think that children and young boys and girls should be dealt with separately and not herded together with the infirm and the halt and the lame. The best course appears to me to be, as I have suggested yesterday, to give them a free meal in schools. Where there are no schools, something in the nature of a school should be opened. I am not suggesting that we should go through all the formalities of the educational code in order to open these new schools. I look upon them as part of relief, though undoubtedly they have a certain positive as well as negative value from the point of education.

9. I would suggest that no building and practically no equipment should be provided for these schools. All that is necessary is a fairly competent teacher, and usually the teacher should be a woman, because she will have to deal

largely with children, and a woman can do this better than a man. Her duty should be to collect the children of the village, to give them a meal once a day, to talk to them and look after them for some hours and to teach them what she can, even without equipment. Of course, it would help if some little equipment was given. But this is not absolutely essential. I simply want someone of a social worker type to keep the children with her for some hours a day. She may have two classes, if I may call them so, one of children under 10 and another of those between 10 and 15.

10. The cost of this cannot be very great and is certainly worthwhile. It would give employment to a number of middle class men and women. Some element of basic teaching, that is of simple manual work, might well be introduced.

11. The benefit of this seems to me very great. The mere separation from the charity dole, and from being mixed with the infirm, would itself be good. Some discipline would come in, and a human touch. Some elementary training would also be given. Instead of looking upon themselves as beggars and the children of beggars, the boys and girls would develop some self-respect and feeling of self-reliance.

12. If these children and boys and girls are separated from the others receiving relief, the problem of giving free relief would be very much lessened. Those who are actually infirm, would naturally require this relief. It would be better to ask some charitable organization like the Ramakrishna Mission to take charge of this.

13. The main problem of giving work to the able-bodied remains, and I see no escape from providing this work. The various loans given to these people are likely to be spent as subsistence loans and little will come out of it. In fact, the loans are likely to be irrecoverable from anything from 75 to 90 per cent of the cases. All this money on loans might well have been utilized from productive work. A person earning a normal wage will probably support one or two dependents also. The drain on the free kitchen would lessen.

14. As for productive work, I find that the ideas are generally limited to the old famine code type of work. I confess I do not like this approach at all. Indeed, I do not like the famine code² at all. There was a demand that this should be introduced in all the scarcity areas. I do not like it. But I do think that the State cannot absolve itself of the responsibility to provide work in

2. The Famine Code, drawn up in 1883, stipulated that the State would not undertake to interfere in every individual case of distress, but that it would apply its resources only when a natural calamity affecting a substantial portion of the population of a locality had occurred; and that an Indian famine, being a problem of temporary lack of employment for the agricultural population, the principal forms of relief needed were the opening of relief works and offer of employment to those who needed it.

such cases to all who want work. This work should have to be of various kinds suited for the persons concerned.

15. There may be petty works in the localities concerned. But I feel that at least one major work in Rayalaseema, and one major work in the Mysore areas of scarcity, are highly desirable. This will draw away a fair number of persons who will be doing real productive work which will bear result in the future.

16. What this major work should be, I cannot suggest, and it is for the governments concerned to consider this matter.

17. Much stress has been laid in the Madras areas on the high-level water canal for the Tungabhadra. *Prima facie*, this appears desirable, at any rate, that part of it which is just digging, and there is a great deal of digging involved in this project. The Planning Commission must have considered this from the general point of view and not as a major relief measure in an emergency. If we have to give relief, as indeed we have to, then the approach becomes different and we combine this relief with a major effort at development.

18. In Mysore, possibly the Bhadra project could be expedited to give this kind of relief.

(1) Thus it seems to me that we should try to do away with purely gratuitous relief except in a very limited number of cases of the infirm. These latter cases should preferably be handed over to a private agency which is helped by Government.

(2) Children and young boys and girls should be given a free meal in schools and, wherever schools do not exist, they should be started but in the simplest way without any building at all. One teacher for each school. Methods to approximate, as far as circumstances permit, to the basic way.

(3) One major project in Rayalaseema and one in the Mysore area should be started with the main purpose being to give normal work to a large number of persons in a development scheme of importance.

(4) Minor works should be undertaken in the localities concerned.

19. It seems clear to me that in spite of the present rain, and even presuming that this will continue, relief will have to be given for the next four or five months. Present crops are badly damaged. I saw field after field of *jowar* which was all yellowed and bore no grains at all. *Bajra*, where it occurred, was equally bad. Groundnut, under favourable circumstances, might yield 20 to 25 per cent, that is, if rains continue. In the totality, not more than 10 to 15 per cent yield is likely in the ensuing harvest season and that only if rains continue. Thus, relief must continue and the relief should be to the largest extent possible, in the shape of work.

I have a strong feeling that our general approach to this question of famine, scarcity and relief is not a happy one. Somehow, the human element is not too much in evidence. Most of us think of this unhappy people as a class apart which is used to semi-starvation and which, therefore, need not be considered from any other point of view. We do not think of them as our own children or relatives. I am not criticizing the local officials, because every person, who comes in direct contact with these people, must feel strongly for them. Those who do not come in direct touch think of them as abstract entities who have to be kept just alive, provided even that does not cost too much money. I am giving, of course, an extreme view. Most people will have a middle outlook.

This old famine-code approach cannot be commended now. As a matter of fact, it is not even practical and business-like and ultimately we spend much more and have far less results.

14. To Maharaja Jaya Chamaraja Wadiyar¹

Prime Minister's Camp
Tadpatri, October 6, 1952

My dear Maharaja Saheb,²

Thank you for your letter of October 3, which was handed to me by your Chief Minister.

In the course of twenty four hours or so, I visited a large part of the scarcity areas in Mysore. I need not assure you that the Government of India is anxious to do all that it can to help in relieving distress in these areas. The problem in these parts of Mysore, as well as in Rayalaseema in Madras State, is an old and deep one. While relief should certainly be given where possible, it is far more important to try to tackle the root causes.

I would not have liked to give you the trouble to accompany me in this tour. My tours are very exhausting for anyone taking part in them.

I learnt some time ago that you were thinking of going to Africa. I was glad to learn of this because Africa is becoming increasingly important from our point of view and is often in my thoughts. We have a very able representative at Nairobi and we are now appointing a Consul in West Africa. Your visit there would have done good from many points of view and I have hoped to see you before you went.

Someone told me yesterday that there was a possibility of your going to South Africa. I think this will be unwise for any Indian and, more especially,

1. JN Collection.

2. He was the Rajpramukh of Mysore State.

for you. You know the passive resistance movement going on in South Africa.³ We are naturally sympathizing with it. In these circumstances, any Indian going there is likely to be harassed and treated with discourtesy. I would not like you to give an opportunity for the South Africa Government to be discourteous to you.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. In South Africa, the non-white communities, who formed four-fifths of the Union's population, had launched passive resistance against the Government of Malan and its apartheid policy. Five thousand people had been arrested by the end of August 1952.

15. The Psychology of Self-help¹

No nation can go ahead if it looks to the Government for everything. It is a wrong mentality to make people always look to Government for help and wait for such help to come. This is not the way. Frequent references have been made in the memoranda presented to me about famine conditions. This disease of famine will not be cured by slapdash methods. The disease had to be cured gradually if the health of the patient is to be restored.

You should develop the psychology of self-help. I am quite sure that if the villagers do something to organize themselves and raise their own condition, it will be easy for the Government to help them. I appeal to the people that they should think of India as a whole. The important point is what should be given priority.

You have pointed out that this area has been suffering from an old disease. You have mentioned the period of the disease as 25 years. It may be longer.

In the course of your address, you have asked for my sympathy. You have further asked repeatedly for very large grants and you have stressed the word 'very'. It is rather easy to make requests, but it is much more difficult to fulfil them. If we are mature in our public life and politics, we should not look at only one side of the picture, for looking at just one side of the picture would be wishful thinking. If all that we want could be had, then the world would be a paradise tomorrow. But there are all kinds of difficulties. Even in this

1. Speech at Madhugiri in Mysore State, 6 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 7 October 1952.

particular matter of famine or scarcity, there are large areas of the country, apart from Mysore and Rayalaseema, which are suffering at least as much, if not more, because of famine. Each area wants to have more financial help.

It is a matter of arithmetic to see how far one could do that, even extending one's resources to the utmost. We all know that our country is not rich; we hope to make it rich. Our resources are great, but it takes time to build them up. Taking all these factors into consideration, we are trying to get the best out of them. We have our Planning Commission for the proper utilization of our resources. Every effort at development underlines the need for austerity and economy on items of non-developmental expenditure, i.e., stinting ourselves, so that we could save money for investment and development. It means further taxation, and if there is further taxation, there is an outcry. One cannot have it both ways. You will have money for development schemes because ultimately the money comes either by way of taxation or loans.

Obviously, one cannot go on taxing people. There is a limit beyond which people cannot bear it. One has to look at these two things, balance them, look to priorities, fundamentals and the like, and even be prepared for putting up with sufferings of today, so that tomorrow may be better. Above all, no Government can carry on, however good it may be, if the people do not use their hands and feet.

Supposing people are thrown in a desert island with no government. What will they do? To whom will they send petitions? They will have to use their mental and physical abilities to work and produce wealth.

Labour force, we have in plenty, and we must utilize it in a proper way—how to utilize our manpower in the normal economic sense and see that wealth is created and difficulties overcome? This is the question before us. The Government of India and the Mysore Government will certainly try to help you. But it is a wrong mentality for people to always look for help, and wait for that help to come. That is not the way that strength comes to a people or to a nation ultimately.

16. People's Involvement in Famine Relief¹

I have been going round seeing the conditions here on account of famine. The Madras Government, as well as the Central Government, has been trying to

1. Speech at Kadiri in Anantapur district, 6 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 7 October 1952.

help you in the distress which you have been going through on account of the failure of rain. And, I am sure, what has been done would have provided relief to the people to some extent. But I have come to this place to see things for myself as to how the relief work is progressing, and to exchange ideas with you and see what we can do to provide further relief.

It is sad that small children do not have enough food or clothing. It is our duty to protect the children and give them sufficient opportunity for growth. I do not want to say much to you on this occasion. Whatever we can do—either the Central Government or the State Government—we shall do our best.

Wherever I go people shower affection on me. In every village I have visited, they have come in hundreds to greet me. That has sustained and cheered me. At the same time, I feel sad at their suffering. There are many difficult problems affecting Rayalaseema. We are trying our best to meet them. This want of rain and failure of crops is not a problem which has arisen overnight in Rayalaseema. It has occurred every third or fourth year during the last hundred years. It is our concern, no doubt, to solve the problems created by failure of crops. At the same time, it should be remembered that it is a very great task, and it cannot be carried out by the Government alone without the cooperation of the public.

Therefore, we want your cooperation as far as possible. Whatever the Government can do will certainly be done because it is their duty to do it. But it is the *dharma* of the people also to do their bit; otherwise, the great task cannot be accomplished. The people in the villages and towns must all, therefore, cooperate. They must not indulge in disputes over small matters. There should be mutual understanding and sympathy among the people and an attitude of helping each other should be developed.

You have probably heard about the Bharat Sevak Samaj. It has nothing to do with politics. Its only purpose is to do beneficial work for the people of the country. It is my desire that in Andhra especially in Rayalaseema areas this effort should progress.

But I do not want to elaborate this idea just now. When I see the conditions here, I feel the need for the Government and the people to work in close cooperation. Whatever the Government can do, I once again assure you, will certainly be done. But you should remember that anything which has to be done by the Government will depend largely on the extent to which the people give their cooperation. Then, as we progress, our problems will automatically get solved.

17. The Famine-Stricken Areas¹ (Continued)

III

Again I travelled extensively and visited many villages and saw the relief operations at work. The impression I got today in the course of my journeying through Cuddapah and Chittoor districts was that conditions here had been, and still were, somewhat worse than in the other districts. Stunted and dried up crops stood in the field, bearing practically no grain. The people, either by the roadside or round about the gruel centres, looked somewhat more famished.

2. In one or two of the memoranda presented to me there was reference to starvation deaths. I enquired about these, but could not get any reliable information of any such death. It is clear that normally in India there are a very large number of under-nourished people, and when crops fail, and conditions of acute scarcity or even famine come into existence, the power of resistance of human beings becomes extremely limited. There may be, therefore, a greater tendency to succumb to disease or any other cause. But I think it is clear that it cannot be said that there were starvation deaths on any scale. There might, of course, have been a few.

3. I have no doubt at all that the large number of gruel centres have saved the situation in these areas of Rayalaseema. There may have been some delay in starting many of these centres. But later, the Madras Government went ahead with some speed. Except for Bellary district, the other four districts of Rayalaseema were studded with these gruel centres, more especially Chittoor district. In Chittoor district alone, I am told that 1,50,000 persons are being fed at these centres daily, that is, they are given one meal a day. Probably 75 per cent of these are children. Another 15 per cent would be women, who are expectant or nursing mothers or just accompany their children. The remaining 10 per cent might be classed as old and infirm. To feed 1,50,000 persons a day in one district is a big undertaking, even though the food consists of a single meal of gruel daily. In the four districts probably 5,00,000 persons, chiefly children are being fed daily on gruel now. It is proposed to start these gruel centres in parts of Bellary district also. Thus the number will go up.

4. The fact of recent rains in these areas has certainly brought a tinge of hope. But it makes no difference in the immediate situation or that of the near future. If rains continue they will affect the next harvest, but only very slightly the present one. Thus, the need for assistance for some time to come will remain imperative.

5. Many villagers showed dried roots and leaves which, they said, they were eating. The collector of the district said that this was true in some cases.

1. 7 October 1952. File No. 31(94)1/50-PMS.

It must be remembered that gruel centres do not provide for able-bodied men or even women, unless they are expectant or nursing. Some additional women, no doubt, get into them on some plea or other, and it is right that there should be laxity about this, because anyhow those women are famishing. But, generally speaking, men do not get this gruel, and if they have no work provided for them, they have nothing to fall back upon. During the past three years they have exhausted their resources completely.

6. Some kind of relief work is provided round about where they live. But this is on a small scale, and is of a temporary nature.

7. Any number of people, whom I met by the roadside, asked for work. The Communist slogan is: "Give us food or work", which can hardly be challenged, whatever the motive be. Most people have asked me for work and not for gruel.

8. In the representations given to me, a complaint is sometimes made about the quality of the gruel. Also, that the full ration is not supplied and there is malnutrition, etc. All I can say is that the gruel I saw and tasted repeatedly seemed to be good.

9. Some of the gruel centres I saw today had a better look, organizationally, than the ones I had seen previously. In one or two of them there was, in addition to gruel, some preparation of fish, or of dried egg powder, which has been received from abroad. Part of the objection to the semi-liquid gruel was just due to old habit, and not being accustomed to this kind of thing.

10. Students in their addresses stated that it had become impossible for them to pay fees either of school or examinations and in fact many of them could not even attend school. The figure of attendance had gone down. I do not know what exactly it is.

11. It seems clear to me that relief, in the shape of food or work or both combined, will have to continue for two or three months at least, if not longer, provided the rains continue. If the present monsoon also fails, then the situation will be far worse, and there will be no hope for the next six months or more. Thus far there have been fairly widespread rains. It is a good beginning, which has brought cheer to the people. But they are too frightened and apprehensive to put much faith in these early showers.

12. In this state of affairs, education, primary and secondary, is bound to suffer. What is worse is that children deteriorate in many ways. From the educational point of view, this deterioration should be checked as far as possible. But for the present we have to consider the relief aspect, both temporary and permanent. I believe that the relief aspect and the education aspect should be joined together and looked at as a single problem. In this way one could deal with the children at least.

13. I feel more and more that gratuitous relief, except in the case of the old and infirm, should not continue or should, at any rate, be replaced by

relief through some kind of work. I visited today one of the centres started by Shrimati Durgabai. This is now part of the Madras Women's Welfare Relief Work Centre. In this centre, wages on a small scale were given to women and children, who work there. Work was provided, and many quite useful articles were being produced. I was impressed by this centre and felt that we should proceed on similar lines elsewhere also. Indeed, at this Women's Welfare Centre, something more than mere relief is given. There is some maternity and child care and medical help, and visits to families to help them with advice and comfort them. Some discipline is introduced and the women and children are trained in many small but important ways.

14. Handloom weavers were very much in evidence and gave me some kind of memorandum, wherever I went.

15. Apart from any major work which will absorb a considerable number of the employed, there are many relatively minor works which, I think, could be undertaken. Indeed, much has been done in this respect, but it seemed to me lacking in imagination to proceed only on the old lines of routine and the famine code. Roads have been built and these are useful. Bunds have been prepared, or raised, to enable tanks or small lakes to be formed. Wells have been dug, or deepened, and contour lining is taking place to enable the soil to take full advantage of the little rain that might come. And yet, on the whole, I had an impression that all this was inadequate. If even some little work was taken from many of the persons fed at the gruel centres, the total result would be substantial. Roads are important and should continue to be built. Tanks are equally important, but there are a number of minor irrigation works which should prove helpful.

16. I do see why we should not, as a famine relief measure, construct school buildings or other public buildings which are required.

17. I should like to add that wherever I had been in Mysore or Madras, I have received tumultuous welcome. I have visited a very large number of villages or, at any rate, met the people of those villages near the roadside. Probably, the number of such villages may be anything between eighty and a hundred. In all the crowds that came to see me, there were a number of women, who are obviously famished. Always they asked for work.

18. Cooperation with the Government¹

Chittoor district has not had enough rains. The people depend so much on nature that if it failed, it becomes disastrous. The people should, however, not

1. Speech at Pileru in Chittoor district, 7 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 8 October 1952.

be disheartened on account of the bad season but gain strength through difficulties. It is a challenge to their manhood and resourcefulness. Difficulties are not something before which they should surrender or grow weak.

I have found during my tour that even under adverse circumstances the people are full of good heart and cheer. That is a good sign. If you have that feeling of strength and cheerfulness, you can overcome any difficulty. You should also work in cooperation. It is not by shouting, but through solid, hard work and discipline and determination that the nation can make progress.

The lot of the people has been a hard one. There is no doubt about that. If the Madras Government had not helped the people of the affected areas by opening such large number of gruel centres and fair price shops, their lot would have been infinitely worse. Therefore, they should all cooperate with the Government.

19. Equal Opportunities for Development¹

I have received addresses and memoranda during the last two days of my tour in Rayalaseema and parts of Mysore. In all of them, practically the same grievances have been mentioned. The difficulties in scarcity areas have been pointed out and help sought in the largest measure. The Central and State Governments have many projects and most of them remain to be undertaken.

I want to tell you that if I go to half a dozen places in India at the present moment, I may get the same representations, the same complaints of famine or semi-famine conditions and demands for help, temporary as well as permanent. Therefore, we have to look at the situation with the sympathy and desire to help. It also needs judging the situation in the right perspective. Nothing is as wrong as losing perspective, because loss of perspective is more or less like losing your head for the moment.

In some of the representations given to me, it has been said that the Madras Government should apply the Famine Code in the areas affected. Presumably this suggestion has been made in order that relief may be on as large a scale as possible. I should like to grant relief, anyhow, on as large a scale as possible—Famine Code or no Famine Code. I want to tell you that I dislike intensely and utterly the application of the Famine Code to this problem.

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The conception behind the Famine Code, dating back from the time it was framed by the British rulers, is not the conception I like....

During the last few days, various ideas had been coming to my mind. But they are not definite, they are very vague. It may be that in the course of the next few days, I will put these ideas in some shape. It is our misfortune that though we have many projects and worthwhile ideas, we cannot give effect to them because of our inadequate resources....

So far relief has proceeded, not on the basis of laying the foundation for the future, but as superficial help and temporary relief. It is no doubt necessary to take quick steps to relieve distress by initiating relief measures. But there is need for looking forward to the future. Our ideal is that differences should be bridged between the so-called rich and the poor, apart from production of wealth. Our main object is to ensure equality of opportunity. My main point is that everybody should have equal opportunities for development. There may be some among the famished children of Rayalaseema who may develop into great scientists or engineers. The famine problem cannot be solved without the active and affirmative efforts and enthusiastic cooperation of the people themselves, aided, no doubt, by governmental measures. That does not mean that I want you to abide by the policies of the Government at Delhi or Madras. It means that we should form our own opinion about matters. There is a great deal of activity about which there had been no argument. For instance, there is the question of distress in Rayalaseema. We should not bring in rival political or economic theories into it. As practical men we should try to face it with all our resources.

The community projects have been launched. They contain a great concept. I hope they will really help in changing the face of the country in the next five or ten years. If the scheme proves a success, as we are going to make it a success, then it will benefit a fairly large part of India in the next few years. The whole idea is based on the people cooperating with one another for their own advantage, and not wholly depending on State aid. The Government will no doubt help by sending its trained workers who will be of great help to them. But the Government may not help by pouring down money from above. The community projects idea is based on the idea of self-help.

Further, all villagers should cooperate in the Bharat Sevak Samaj. It is an organization to which all are invited. There are no offices attached to it. There is nothing that one will get in return except rendering manual work. Manual work is the basis of the community, not intellectual speculation alone. It is on that basis that we have to solve our problems. Take it from me that you can overcome the difficulties in Rayalaseema, at least 50 per cent, without aid from the Central or Madras Government, if only you have the will to do it.

20. Appeal for Unity¹

I express my pleasure at the fact that in spite of the difficulties you are going through, you are full of life and vitality. The test of a nation is how much vitality it possesses in spite of difficulties. It does not get depressed or down-hearted. Everywhere, people who always complain, accomplish nothing; everywhere, people who shout, do nothing for themselves. They merely point out the faults in others, and do nothing else. If everybody did his own work, the world will move much faster and better than it did.

Everybody faces great difficulties—scarcity conditions, failure of crops, unemployment and so on. I stress the need for planning and cooperation among the people for bringing about higher standards of living and increasing the production of wealth in the country. I emphasize the need to do work. We should all learn to pull together from the northernmost part of India to the southernmost.

There are many in this country who try to divide the people and weaken India, and create problems among us. The strength of India lies in the unity of the Indian people. Free India must give equal opportunities to all its citizens, it does not matter to which caste or religion a person belongs. They must gradually move forward, remove inequalities between the rich and the poor, and between one section and another. This cannot be done by mere shouting or slogan-raising. It needs solid work. I learn there is no community project in Chittoor district at present. I hope there will be one next year.

1. Speech at Madanapalle in Chittoor district, 7 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 8 October 1952. Extracts.

21. Impressions of Rayalaseema¹

Many of the people, both in Rayalaseema and Mysore, are obviously faced with great hardship and yet I find them remarkably cheerful and even smiling,

1. Talk with newsmen who had accompanied Nehru on his four-day tour of Rayalaseema, Chittoor, 7 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 8 October 1952.

if I may say so. That impressed me because it is a great quality to face one's trials smilingly, and not allow oneself to be submerged in them. I am, therefore, full of admiration for these masses of people whom I have seen in their hundreds and thousands during these two days.

Question: What do you propose to do in regard to the famine in Rayalaseema?

Jawaharlal Nehru: This matter has got to be tackled, and various steps that have got to be taken have to be examined. I am quite sure of one fact that but for the large number of gruel centres started here, there would have been disaster on a big scale. I am not in favour, as I have stated, of gratuitous relief, because I think that it saps the self-respect of the person getting it, and even of the person giving it. I think there should always be some kind of work associated with relief. But, of course, in emergencies one has to give immediate relief, work or no work. But that type of relief should not last for long.

Again, I must say that the large number of gruel centres of Rayalaseema really saved the situation. Some allegations have been made about death due to starvation. I have not heard of a single, more or less, verified case. When there is widespread under-nourishment, people's power of resistance is weak, and some may die of disease or of other reasons. There is no doubt about widespread under-nourishment in these areas—for that matter normally in large parts of India—that is due primarily to lack of resources or poverty but, to some extent also, due to the unbalanced food that the people take. Complaints had been made about the quality of gruel. I can say that the gruel I saw, and tasted repeatedly, seemed to be very good. In fact it tasted like the wheat porridge that I take daily at home, made out of fresh wheat, except that I take it with milk and sugar instead of salt. In some places I noticed that people were given some preparation of fish also, and in one place there was a preparation from dried egg powder.

In Chittoor district, 1,50,000 people were being fed daily at the gruel centres. This is a very large number. Probably taking these four districts, apart from Bellary which has not till recently had any gruel centre, it may well be half a million or even more.

Q: What work connected with the Bharat Sevak Samaj can be done to relieve the situation in Rayalaseema?

JN: There are many kinds of work that the Bharat Sevak Samaj can do. But under the present conditions in Rayalaseema their work should be largely related to the relief work involving manual work. They can give an impetus to that type of work, that is, organizing others to do it. There is

another aspect of relief work which I consider highly important and to which perhaps not enough attention has been paid, that is the children. They are given gruel and all that. But some kind of social approach is necessary apart from food. Their parents, themselves being in distress, cannot give that approach. I think that voluntary workers should take charge of a group of villages and interest themselves in the care of the children.

In North India we are used to very high mountains like the Himalayas, and, generally speaking, a vast flat plain. As soon as one comes to the Deccan the scene changes completely, and there are neither high mountains of that type nor flat plains. Generally speaking, we have undulating land, downs with small hills. This typical Deccan scenery exists in Maharashtra, parts of Central India, Hyderabad, Mysore, Rayalaseema—this undulating land, these extraordinary hillocks standing out like islands, full of curious-shaped boulders sitting on one another. The whole scene appears to me very attractive and impressive. These rock formations denote strength and some kind of permanence. I am always fascinated by them when I see them.

Another rather lovely feature of the scenery of the South is the varying colour and hue of the hills. They seem to change their colour with very slight change in climatic conditions or during the course of the day. Sometimes they are bluish, at other times rather purple. These several colours and ever-changing hues are fascinating to watch. Altogether the scenery in the Deccan with its great variety, and yet with a certain similarity, is very attractive and impressive. It is the kind of country which should produce, as it has done in the past, both a high degree of civilization and hardy men and women. During the last fortnight I have seen a good deal of this scenic beauty in Hyderabad, Rayalaseema and Mysore. And hence my mind is full of them. The one thing I rather miss in the South are snow-covered mountains. Parts of this country are barren certainly, but one does not get a general impression of barrenness.

Q: Its mineral wealth seems to be great.

JN: I do not know about that. There is a great deal of thought about the minerals to be found here. But there is no proof that every soil contains mineral wealth. The point is its quantity. It is well known that large areas of Bastar in Madhya Pradesh are very rich in mineral wealth. So also parts of the Himalayas and Kashmir.

We can first take charge of these children and see they are fed at the gruel centres or elsewhere. We can take some care of the children and look after them. For instance, the relief workers can collect the children together, play with them, tell them stories and develop human interest in them, and be the kind of a private tutor in the wider sense of the term. All this kind of work can certainly be done and it will produce a better psychology in them.

Q: What is your comment about the complaints of migration of people from Rayalaseema into Mysore territory that have recently taken place?

JN: I enquired about that. But I could get no exact information. I was told that some kind of migration normally occurred across the border. In fact, I was told that some people from Mysore were looking out for work in Madras State. It may be possible, of course, that more people have migrated to Mysore. But the numbers cannot be very large. People from Mysore, I understand, have also gone to Tungabhadra in search of work. So far as I can say, there is nothing inherently objectionable in people migrating from one part to any other part of India. Sometimes adjustments of this kind may also be necessary. After all there is no barrier, and people have relations in other States. But if very large numbers should go, and they have to be fed, they become a burden for the other States. Then it becomes a different matter.

Q: What schemes would you like to suggest for tackling the famine in the Rayalaseema area?

JN: I was just reading the Gazetteer of the Anantapur district which was prepared some years ago. It stated that in the last 100 years famine had been a common occurrence in Anantapur district. Therefore, the problem is a deep-seated one. I find all kinds of suggestions and demands in the numerous memoranda given to me. Obviously, the people who have put forward the demands have not given any careful thought to the matter. Anything that occurred to them, they have mentioned. If everything that has been suggested in the memoranda is undertaken in these areas, it will probably cost the entire resources of the Five-Year Plan.

It is true some attempt should be made not only to give relief by work and otherwise, but also to take all possible steps for some permanent cure. Then it becomes a question of finding out various necessary methods. First of all we have to find out a long-term solution—supplying water for irrigation and, secondly, setting up different types of industry.

Q: This subject had become a matter of agitation not only now but during the elections also.

JN: This subject had been there long before the elections. I have been following the graph of the rainfall and it is quite clear that this matter had arisen much earlier than the elections. Of course, during the elections and after, the subject was greatly emphasized, may be partly for political reasons.

Q: The subject of famine seems to provide a happy hunting ground for agitators.

JN: I can understand that. Take for instance hunger marches. What exactly is the good of that, I do not understand.

There were reports some time back of death by starvation in Gorakhpur district in UP. You can take it from me that in Gorakhpur district, although it is not a famine area like Rayalaseema, at present its position is much worse. Conditions are bad there. It is a heavily populated area, and when the monsoon fails for two consecutive years, a large part of the population is affected. However, about these reports of starvation deaths there was some controversy.² There could be no final answer to that kind of controversy because many people anyhow die, and when they are under-nourished they might die earlier. Some cases of death were actually investigated. One particular case was brought to notice. A post-mortem was done, and it was found that the stomach was full of a heavy meal. Further, it was found that the man had some money which he had recently received from the Government as some kind of a loan. The fact was that he died because of eating too much on a hungry stomach.

2. On 7 September 1952, J.C. Kumarappa stated that after an inquiry he had found that there had been eight starvation deaths between June and September 1952 in Gorakhpur district. The next day, the UP Government denied that any death due to starvation had taken place.

22. The Famine-Stricken Areas¹ (Continued)

IV

I returned to Madras this afternoon after completing my tour in Rayalaseema and parts of Mysore State. On my way back I passed through North Arcot district. There were some complaints there of scarcity conditions in some areas, and that while these were as bad as Rayalaseema, all attention was directed to the latter.

2. I have noted down my reactions from day to day. I give below a brief summary of them. Inevitably there has been repetition in what I had said.

1. 8 October 1952. File No. 31(94)/50-PMS.

(i) There has undoubtedly been, and there is, acute scarcity in large areas of Rayalaseema and parts of Mysore. A very considerable proportion of the population, which is mainly agricultural, has suffered greatly. While there has been some improvement owing to recent rains, these rains do not affect the current crop very much. At the best, if they continue, there might be a fifteen per cent crop. If they do not continue, then the loss will be even greater.

(ii) In any event, and even in favourable circumstances in the next few months, assistance will have to be given in these areas for many people. It is possible that, with the monsoon functioning properly during the next few months, the extent of relief might be capable of reduction. But as relief itself has not reached all the people affected, or especially men, this will not make much difference.

(iii) Food in gruel centres will have to be continued to a very large number of persons for some months even if the rains continue. If the rains do not continue, the period would be longer.

(iv) I think that gratuitous relief should be avoided except in cases of infirmity. Even in these cases it is desirable to give some kind of petty work, which does not require much energy.

(v) Food should be given to children through their schools. Where there are no schools, simple schools should be started without caring for equipment or building.

(vi) One major work should be started in the Rayalaseema area or nearby; another major work in the affected Mysore district. This will attract a number of able-bodied men who have no work today. Relief will then be tagged on for development also. It is possible that, looked at from the development point of view, no major work in Andhra or Mysore could easily be given high priority even if it was approved. But where development is combined with relief, then a somewhat different standard will apply in giving priorities.

(vii) In addition, small works should be started all over these affected areas.

3. I have only considered these questions from the point of view of what should be done. As to the responsibility for doing these, it will have to be decided in consultation with the Central Government and the Madras State.

23. Work Hard¹

When I come to a new area and meet all kinds of people, I wish to be receptive to what they say. During my tour, I received numerous memoranda, representations and addresses which made all kinds of demands. Often, there are repetitions of one another. Sometimes, it creates in me a feeling that each person wants to go a step further and demands more than the others did in order to show how much more he wants. Whenever people come and meet me, I try to understand what they want, even though I may not understand their language. In this I can claim to have succeeded, though on a number of occasions I might not have met with the same success. Not that I possess any special virtues. I feel it is due to the affection they show me. When they meet me they feel that they are bound by a common bond and that they are going together on the same journey. That helps me to understand their feelings. It does not matter much if I do not understand this or that particular demand or scheme, for I am keen on understanding their unspoken demands and unspoken wishes and urges.

Two things have greatly moved me. One is the affection and kindness the people show me and the other is that, in spite of the great difficulties and distress they are experiencing, the people of Rayalaseema, more especially those in the villages, have not lost their cheerfulness, their capacity to smile and laugh in the face of difficulty, and that there had often been even a touch of humour in what they do or say. That is a great quality, not to lose one's balance in a crisis but to retain good humour, patience and steadiness of mind. The people who can do that can go a long way. A people cannot go ahead merely because of Government decrees, grants or assistance and the like. A people can progress if they have the necessary stuff in them to do so. A government, after all, is made by the people, it does not make the people. So, if I come to Rayalaseema, it is for the opportunity it gives me of seeing how strong they are. If I had merely wanted to know about the conditions, I could have got all the facts and figures while staying in Delhi itself: but then I would never have developed the psychological understanding and feeling that come out of personal contact.

As a people, we respond to kindness and affection. At the same time, I would like them to develop a certain sternness and strength also. They should develop not only the kindness of the good earth but the sternness and hardness of the rocks and hills that surrounded them. Wherever I went in

1. Speech at Chittoor, 8 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 9 October 1952.

Rayalaseema I found huge areas of rocky mountains, appearing suddenly, offering a challenge. They are fascinating. Whenever I look at mountains I feel reassured. The hills look beautiful from a distance.

The petitions and addresses I have received tell the same tale of woe, and put forward, more or less, the same demands, such as that the Central Government should do this or that. But what exactly is the Central Government? It is not something which hangs in the air by itself. It is an entity which derives its authority and revenue from the people. It may be right and justifiable for you to look for help from the Central Government, but you must also realize that our resources are limited at present. You desire, no doubt, to increase the wealth of the country and its potential in order to raise the standard of living of the people, and put an end to poverty that has been crushing them. You should ponder as to how you are to do it. Obviously, you are not going to do that by addresses, representations, and demands strung together. Such magic happens only in stories like the Arabian Nights. If you want to increase the country's wealth, you have to do it by hard work. It cannot be achieved through jugglery or magic.

You hear a lot about capitalism, socialism and communism. It is good you discuss and understand them, but you should always remember that there are certain basic fundamental principles which apply to all 'isms'. These are that you cannot become wealthy except through hard work. Whatever ideology is followed, hard work alone can help one to earn wealth. The people are the architects of the country. If they want money from the Central Government, it can come only from the revenue which is got from the people by taxation. If the people want more aid from the Central Government it can come through more taxation only.

You will, therefore, have to choose whether you will do without Government help or submit to further taxation. That is the difficulty in a country like India. Our resources are limited, we have little surpluses left. All the money raised is spent. If we spend more, then we will become bankrupt. We have to earn more in order that surpluses can be diverted to constructive schemes, and then we can go ahead and our income will also increase. We have to stint and save so that we can have something to invest on development schemes. I am saying all this because I want to appeal to your hearts and your minds. Difficulties should not make you feel disheartened. You should accept them as a challenge to your manhood.

Problems cannot be faced, much less solved, by shouting slogans. While you have a right to expect help from the Centre, and you will certainly get such help from the Central or State Government as far as their resources permit, you should understand that ultimately you should depend not on external help, but on your own efforts, your own imagination and determination. You should not succumb to despair or disappointments. Why should you go down even

under the thunderbolt and storms? You should be strong enough to challenge even the lightning and the tempest. Perhaps you may think this to be an exaggeration. But what I want is that you should not develop a mood or a habit of merely complaining, or of thinking that your duty has been done by raising slogans, arranging some kind of a hunger march or carrying some placards demanding this or that. That offends all sense of self-respect. I have seen some placards yesterday on which were written: "Hunger Marches: Give us food or work." The demand for work is by itself a legitimate demand. I will accept in principle the demand for food or work. But I will suggest to the persons who use their time marching up and down the country with such placards to come individually or severally and ask for work. I hope you will be given adequate work or food. It is the duty of the State, subject to its capacity, to provide work or food. But there are circumstances in which I cannot do all that you want me to do. It is the duty of the State to provide work and employment for able-bodied men and women who want work. But it may not always be possible for the State to do so because of the lack of resources. For instance, in regard to Rayalaseema, we have to find out how best we can do things which are necessary. So, the question is, apart from what the Central or State Government can do, what you, the people, are going to do about it. You have presented sheafs of papers containing representations. I wonder how you expect me to carry them all with me. You give me beautiful garlands. If you give a hundred garlands to a person he cannot wear them all. He has necessarily to give them away. It is just waste to give so many garlands to one person. I hope you will remember to give me, when I come again in your midst, just one single garland or flower. I will treasure it all the more.

People have told me what I should do; and I am thankful to them for the advice. But the question is what are they going to do about it themselves? Are the people who have presented memoranda, etc., going to consider that their duty has been fully done after they have demanded something from Delhi or Madras? Let them for the moment forget both the Governments and sit down with their committees, associations or groups and see what they are going to do about the situation themselves. If they are students, let them ask themselves what they can do about it. They can form themselves into a group, adopt a village, may be their own village, and see what they can do in that village. For instance, they can attend to the children, wash them, clothe them, play with them, and teach them. Children are the future of India. Nothing pains me so much as to see little children not being properly fed or looked after. Students can go to villages on weekends and holidays and do what they can to help children. Where a job is shared among the people and the Government, it can be more easily done.

I have talked to you as a comrade and as one facing a common task with you. I want you to be imbued with the spirit of thinking over problems and

cooperating with the Government in solving them. For we have all to function together. The use of the phraseology, official and non-official, is a relic of the British days, when there was a barrier between the official and non-official world. The officials now are all our own people and not the people who have come from some foreign land. You should consider officials as your comrades trying to carry out the common task so that the happiness of the millions would be assured.

24. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
October 13th, 1952

My dear Deshmukh,

I have sent you odd notes and papers conveying the impression gathered by me during my recent tours. I should like to supplement those notes perhaps in a more concise way.

In the areas I have visited recently, i.e., some districts of Madhya Bharat (Alirajpur, etc), Hyderabad State, some parts of Mysore State, and Rayalaseema and one or two other districts of Madras State, I carried away a powerful impression of distress among the people. There could be no doubt that a large number of them were at the end of their tether. This was immediately caused by failure of the rains (in Hyderabad there were other causes at work), but it meant that those people had exhausted such reserves as they might have had. They had had to face often two or three or even more bad seasons. The distress was obvious.

There was enough food in the country or even in the State, but most people could not buy it or buy enough. They had been reduced to destitution. There might be some difference of opinion as to the number who more or less were destitute, but undoubtedly a very large number were reduced to this condition. Even those who were not destitutes appeared to be hard-hit and to have lost their former buying capacity.

Merely to see them, without any further enquiry, was enough to convince one of their famished condition. Their clothes were in tatters, exceedingly dirty and often partly not there at all. The lower middle class folk, who had to keep up some appearances, though not in that semi-starved condition, were obviously in considerable distress.

1. File No. 31(94)/50-PMS. Extracts.

It seemed clear that this deterioration had been a fairly long drawn out process and was not the result of a single bad season. Many of these people had thus arrived at rock bottom level so far as resources were concerned.

Something had to be done and has to be done. We can keep them alive by giving them free food and some kind of loans to carry on. The loans are eaten up soon enough, and they remain where they were, incapable of repaying the loans as well as of continuing without further help. Obviously these remedies are extremely temporary and do not rehabilitate the person concerned. They may be necessary in an emergency.

The only other way to help is to give work which is productive. This work can be organized in many ways—some large-scale work which employs thousands or even tens of thousands, small-scale work, or cottage industries. The type of work which is usually associated with famine is sometimes useful, but generally rather wasteful. The whole conception of the famine code appears to me highly objectionable. The work often consists of some temporary expedient which has no permanent value and which is often washed away if the rains come. Those *kutchra* roads are built and they are completely spoiled soon after. I have been and continue to be opposed to gratuitous relief, except in any emergency and for a short period. Our methods of giving relief have been two-fold: (i) gratuitous relief, (ii) and some kind of famine relief work. It seems to me that neither of these is satisfactory and certainly they only tide over a present difficulty without providing for the future. I think that we should think of relief definitely in terms of development schemes. This may be costly compared to the other kinds of relief, but it is undoubtedly cheaper in the end and helps to maintain some respect.

Our Planning Commission has considered various development schemes from the point of view of general planning and priorities. That was as it should be. But where there are famine or near-famine conditions, the question of relief through work becomes paramount. Therefore, the development schemes there should be viewed not only from the larger point of view of planning, but also of relief. In effect, this might mean some variation in the order of priorities and, to some extent, a greater burden to be borne in the near future. But anyhow, the burden has to be borne in some form or other of relief.

What major development scheme can be taken up or expedited from this point of view, it is for the Planning Commission to determine. My point is that they should take into consideration the urgent necessity of relief also. In the Rayalaseema area, it seemed to me that the Tungabhadra scheme might well give work to a large number of persons and at the same time be of permanent advantage. We are of course proceeding with this scheme, but it might be possible to go faster so as to employ more people now. I was told that there was a likelihood of slowing down of the main scheme for lack of funds. They can finish it by June if they can get the funds both from Madras and

Hyderabad. In Hyderabad, canals have to be dug and this would give employment to many. On the Madras side, apart from the main scheme, there is the high water canal, which is entirely a question of digging.

If we can proceed swiftly with the Tungabhadra both in Madras and Hyderabad, by next summer or the monsoon season, we would be able to carry water into many of the areas of distress through canals.

I mention the Tungabhadra as an example only. There may be better and more suitable schemes in that area. I have not gone into this matter. But I am convinced that some large-scale work must be done there for relief and that this work should be part of our major development schemes.

This would apply to every area of great scarcity. Apart from this, it is inevitable in Rayalaseema at least to feed a large number of children. As I have suggested, this should be done through schools and even the children ought to do some work according to the basic method.

For the rest, there can be minor local schemes as well as cottage industries.

I should like the Central Government not to encourage gratuitous relief by giving help for it, but rather to help in schemes of work, even though they might have uneconomic, such as hand-spinning or other cottage industries apart from large schemes.

What I had seen in the areas I visited might well apply to a number of areas I have not visited. This produced a feeling in my mind that, while we might have done well generally in the economic front, a very large section of our population is going downhill. In other words, we are not levelling up people, but perhaps even increasing certain disparities. I suppose the most feasible way to lessen them is to give purchasing power through work on a fairly wide scale....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

STATE ISSUES**1. Formation of Andhra State**

1. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
July 18, 1952

My dear Rajaji,

You must have followed our debates on the linguistic provinces and specially Andhra.² I have promised to help in arriving at a settlement. I have little doubt that this Andhra matter will continue worrying us till something is done. How am I to proceed about it?

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. On 7 July 1952, Tushar Chatterjee, a Communist member, moved in the House of the People a resolution that immediate steps should be taken to redistribute the States on a linguistic basis and that the boundaries of the existing States should be readjusted accordingly. The resolution was rejected on 12 July after Nehru's reply to the debate. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, pp. 260-272.

2. The Formation of an Andhra State¹

I venture to intervene in this debate, though with a great deal of diffidence, because there has been so much argument on this subject that no one can say anything new or worthwhile. In fact, I find that in this matter, as in other matters that we debate them so much, that perhaps we forget what the matter is, what the basic matter is, what we are asking, as we all get lost in this flow of words.

Now, this Resolution² talks about the Government taking speedy steps regarding the formation of an Andhra province. May I point out that this

1. Nehru's intervention in the debate on a resolution for the immediate formation of Andhra State, 21 July 1952. *Parliamentary Debates, Council of States Debates*, Vol. 1, No. 14-23, 14 to 25 July 1952, cols. 1583-1593: Extracts.
2. The resolution in favour of the creation of an Andhra State was moved in the Council of States by Venkata Narayanan, a member from the Andhra region.

Resolution is rather out of date? We took speedy steps two and a half years back and more.³ It is not a question of taking them now. In regard to this Andhra province, this Government, or the one that preceded it, took speedy steps two years and eight or nine months ago, in the year 1949, October, November or thereabouts. We decided to have it and we took every step that we could take. We referred the matter to the Madras State Assembly. That is what the Resolution wants us to do. We appointed a Partition Committee.⁴ We did everything. What more could we do? Why did we not succeed? Something happened. Something came in the way.⁵ We took the speedy steps asked for by the Resolution but something came in the way, in Madras or roundabout. We wanted to do it not only in words but, I submit, in action. The previous Government showed that they wanted to do it, but something came in the way, some difficulties came in the way, and other things happened. The new Constitution came into effect. Our object then was to begin this change before the new Constitution came into effect, and in the new Constitution to put Andhra as a separate province, but it could not be done. But that does not matter. It can be done later. There is no essential difficulty about it, but the point that this House has to consider is that there is no difficulty, no obstruction or lack of goodwill in the mind of the Government on this or any other like matter. Some of us may give greater emphasis to it. Others may give less emphasis to it. It is a matter, if you like, of emphasis on priorities.

I do think that every subject in India should be viewed from the point of view of, I may call priorities or what is the most important thing for us to do,

3. A three-man committee comprising Nehru, Patel and Sitaramayya appointed by the Jaipur session of the Congress in December 1948, recommended in its report in April 1949 the postponement of linguistic provinces by a few years, but said that the case of Andhra could be isolated from others as there was a large measure of agreement behind it. The report also laid down that the protagonists of separate State for the Andhras would have to abandon their claim to Madras city.
4. An eight-member Partition Committee, set up in November 1949 by the Central Government, recommended that an Andhra State be formed before the Constitution of India came into force in January 1950. On 4 January 1950, the Madras Cabinet approved the recommendation. The main points were: (i) no delay in creation of an Andhra province in the larger interests of administration; (ii) precise formulae for the allocation of the assets and liabilities of the undivided province; (iii) single chamber for the new province; and (iv) a separate High Court for Andhras.
5. T. Prakasam, one of its members, had not accepted the Partition Committee's recommendation making agreement over Madras city and allied matters between the Tamils and the Telugus a condition precedent for the separation of Andhra State. While the people of Tamilnadu would not give up Madras city in favour of an Andhra State, the people of Rayalaseema were opposed to the formation of such a State unless Madras city was included in it. Meanwhile, the Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee, urging the Government of India to form the Andhra State with the undisputed twelve districts of the Telugu region, wanted Madras city to be made a separate city-State.

even though it is difficult to say what is the most important thing. One may say it is the economic problem; undoubtedly it is. You may call it the food problem, you may call it, politically speaking, the problem of the consolidation of India. All these are very important. They go together really, and every question should be viewed in that light and having viewed it, one may say this is good and should be given effect to immediately or it is good but it should be given effect to, day after tomorrow or the next year. It all depends on how one relates to the relative priorities, and the emphasis one gives to the various immediate demands of the situation.

But again if I may repeat, so far as our Government is concerned, we not only made our position in regard to the linguistic provinces clear on several occasions but in this particular matter of the Andhra Province, we actually went ahead and took some steps to give effect to it, but there was lack of agreement among the various major interests concerned. One should not expect agreement about everything—it will be an impossible thing to expect—but one does expect in a matter of this kind a large measure of agreement, because the alternative is that if we take some steps which involve some measure of compulsion or coercion, well, I submit we have failed, whether we have got it or not, we have failed because the coercion, the compulsion used will not only come in the way of the future progress of the new province or the old one but even the process of the formation of the new province will be delayed. That will be obstructed because you are doing it against the will of a large number of people, the important interests, and inevitably there will be obstruction about so many things even after you decide that it should be done, because it should always be remembered that this business of formation of new provinces and dividing up existing provinces is a complicated business. I accept it. For me, I don't want any other argument. One argument is quite adequate for me that the people of Andhra want it, and I can understand their wanting it and, if I may say so with all respect, they want it not so much because of the language but because—whether they are right or wrong I don't say—because they have a feeling that they don't get a square deal otherwise. It may be true or may not be true....⁶

I say they want it and that is sufficient for me. Some people say: "Go and take a plebiscite". I accept the fact that the people of Andhra want it and there the matter ends....⁷

I am speaking about Andhra. You cannot obviously apply it to every area;

6. P.V. Narayana interrupted here to remark that these were the real conditions in the Andhra region.

7. H.D. Rajah asked whether the principle of plebiscite applied to other areas in the country.

even in regard to Andhra. If you ask me about Rayalaseema, it is very difficult to say. It will be difficult to give a straight answer.⁸

My general feeling is that the people of Andhra want it and we are generally in favour of it. There is no question of consulting them as to whether they want it or not. But what I was submitting was that the process of formation, with the best will in the world, is a somewhat complicated one. The process of division, the process of dividing so many things, whether it is from the financial point of view, administrative or any other point of view, apart from some other major points of view, with consent, with agreement, and with goodwill, is a complicated business. It takes a little time. But if that consent is not freely obtainable from both sides, and goodwill is lacking, that process becomes still more complicated, and creates more and more bitterness. In fact, one does not quite know what ultimately it leads to in point of time or in point of result.

Therefore, I do submit that whenever we take such a step, apart from other considerations, it is of the first importance that there should be this large measure of agreement between the parties concerned. The parties concerned—I do not mean the Government of India, it is the other parties concerned—should agree on a clearly thought-out process about it. For instance, supposing we give a general consent, then we try to think it out, and in thinking it out we have to decide about the finances involved, the results, etc. Let us think it out.

One thing would be unfortunate if you take one or two steps and then get held up because we have not thought about the third or fourth step. If we start a new province and thereby give a great deal of satisfaction—psychological, sentimental and practical satisfaction—to a large number of people, well and good. I am all for it. But that psychological and sentimental satisfaction, if it comes up a little later against difficulties, against financial, economic and other difficulties, then you solve one problem and you face another and a more difficult problem. What I am suggesting is that all these matters are not matters of just a resolution, but of clear working out, thinking and by general consent doing it. The only thing is: Can you really go ahead? Otherwise, you will be held up at every step by obstruction from groups, etc.

For my part I think the most important thing for India today is economic resources. Our resources are limited. We try to make the best of it. We try to

8. The people of the Rayalaseema region wanted that in an Andhra province, every region should have equal representation in the Cabinet, the legislatures and the services. Rayalaseema should have its due share in professional and educational institutions and in the establishment of radio stations, hospitals and courts. They also demanded the inclusion of Madras city. Later they demanded a separate Rayalaseema province with Madras as its capital.

have certain priorities. Now if we indulge in large-scale divisions and partitions and redistribution of India, administrative and otherwise, let us have it by all means if people desire it, because people's psychology is important, but let us remember that each such process is a costly process. It is a delaying process—delaying in the sense that you have to delay other projects, and apart from the ultimate cost of it, I may say, whether it involves more expenditure or not, it is a process which is itself so costly, and it must involve delay. Those economic projects, etc., those development projects, to which we want to give first place—these will be delayed. These are the various considerations which I put before this House, not to raise any objection to such a demand.

I have already indicated that so far as Government is concerned, we are not prepared to accept, as the Resolution in the other House demanded, a general redistribution of the whole of India into a large number of new provinces. Logically that might be justified because the present provinces and States are not quite logical. They have grown historically and administratively and in various ways.

But, if I may say so, this business of talking logically is about the most illogical thing I know of, as if you might talk logically and say you take off a man's nose because logically his nose should be of a particular pattern or that his body is not as good as it should be and therefore you cut off one chunk and put it somewhere else. One cannot deal with historical developments which involve all manner of things in this way.

I don't say you should keep them like this, but what I ventured to say in the other House was this,⁹ that if you ask us to take the whole of India and cut the country into new provinces it is plain to me that that means doing nothing for the next ten years or so except just arguing and quarrelling and appointing commissions and, meanwhile, of course the persons who argue and who quarrel and the commissions who function will probably be swept away by other events.

Therefore, any such proposition of cutting up the whole of India, we cannot possibly accept, as nobody could accept it, I submit. But it is a completely different proposition to take up a particular proposal—I can understand that—examine the proposal and give effect to it if you can give effect to it. Therefore, in regard to this particular proposal let us take the present position about Andhra province. We are entirely agreeable to give effect to it subject to this that it should be done with as large a measure of agreement as possible.

Now, everybody knows that our friends, the Tamils, are not opposed to the formation of an Andhra Province. I have no doubt many people have said so there. Naturally they will not want this argument to continue. But then we come back to the argument being limited to certain specific points, whether it

9. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, pp. 260-272.

relates to the city of Madras or Rayalaseema or any other place. Now the city of Madras is not something which can be disposed of by tossing for it. One has to decide about it by agreement.¹⁰

I cannot see myself how the Central Government here can impose its will on either party in this matter, and compel a decision. Nor do I see how we can appoint somebody, a Supreme Court Judge or somebody else, to decide the question. This is not a high judicial matter for decision by a high judicial authority. It is a matter which has to be decided on practical authority. It is a matter which has to be decided on practical grounds, having regard to the wishes of the people concerned. Therefore we come back to this position. As I have said, those who want the Andhra province can get it, so far as we are concerned, without the least delay, provided they get over this hurdle which has stuck up before us on several occasions and which practically stopped the actual formation of the Andhra province two and a half years ago.

I accept what my honourable friend has said....¹¹ But the fact remains that some important representative people voicing the Andhra claim did not accept that decision. Should we have ignored their voice and gone ahead? But how that was possible, it is difficult for me to say. And we were rather in a hurry as we had to complete the Constitution in another two months' time. We consider that this question—whether it be the Andhra question or some other question—should be examined. Let us examine it calmly. There is no conflict about it. We have only to find a way. Let no one imagine that we want to come in the way. But we do not want to take a step which will lead the Central Government and the State Government concerned into all kinds of difficulties, without working it out carefully or getting their general consent. And so, this Resolution, if I may say so, is first of all as I said, completely out of date. We had this some two years ago.

Secondly, in the form it is, asking as it does for something immediately, it forgets that certain prerequisites, that certain things, have to happen before that. I am not suggesting that we as a Government should remain passive spectators, waiting for things to happen. I am prepared to help things to happen, and I am prepared to use, well, such good offices as I have, to that end. But ultimately I cannot decide without the goodwill of the others who are concerned. Therefore, I submit, Sir, that the passing of this particular Resolution as it is at present, would not be helpful at all.¹²

10. In Madras city 68 per cent of the people were Tamils, while Telugus constituted 16 per cent.

11. N.G. Ranga interrupted to say that those who wanted an Andhra province were prepared to accept the recommendation of the 'three-man committee' that the Andhra province might be created without the city of Madras.

12. The Resolution was rejected in the Council of States.

3. To Ramananda Tirtha¹

August 18, 1952

My dear Swamiji,

I have just read a report of your speech in which you have supported the disintegration of Hyderabad State.² I am sorry you have done so. As you know, I have publicly opposed it and I intend to continue opposing it, because I am convinced that it is bad for the State as well as for India. I am not talking about the distant future, but today this question is, I think, most undesirable.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 7(98)/48-PMS.
2. In a speech on 16 August 1952, Ramananda Tritha contended that the concept of the reorganization of States on linguistic basis allowed the division of Hyderabad State in three linguistic regions and their consequent merger with their parental fold.

4. Attitude to Linguistic States¹

No special significance is to be attached to my visit to Hyderabad. It has nothing to do with the events that have taken place here prior to my arrival. It is a routine visit which I had planned earlier and having come, I wanted to acquaint myself with the various problems of the State.

I have never been an advocate of the formation of linguistic States and the disintegration of Hyderabad. But, if, however, there is a strong demand for the same, and the rival claims of adjacent areas are settled by mutual adjustment, I would agree to it. The Central Government will not come in the way of the creation of linguistic States if particular areas affected by such a step adjusted their claims amicably.

Question: Would the Central Government arbitrate in the event of disputes between adjacent areas?

1. Report of the press conference, Hyderabad, 28 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 29 September 1952. Extracts.

Jawaharlal Nehru: I am personally reluctant to do that. The Central Government can arbitrate only by mutual consent of the areas affected. The case of Madras city is not a question which can be settled without goodwill. Any decision regarding Madras city without the general consent of Andhras and Tamilians will not be good and the city will suffer.

I am not for cutting up Hyderabad. That will be a retrograde step, and affect the progress of the State. Besides, Hyderabad being a centrally situated place, its division will upset the balance of southern India, economically and otherwise.

Q: There has been a persistent demand for the disintegration of the State and opposition to the Centre taking over the Osmania University.

JN: I am not worried. So far as the university question is concerned, I do not think it worries the people either. The opposition to the Osmania University proposal appears to me to be fantastic nonsense, and motivated by political considerations. I will oppose both agitations tooth and nail. It is for the people to decide, but I will go to them and use my influence against demands which are not in the interests of the country.

I am never neutral in a matter I believe to be right. I feel that by raising such minor problems the real advancement of the country will be postponed. One should not attach too much importance to minor issues.

I do not attach much importance to the *mulki* agitation though it might be important to the people of Hyderabad. It is parochial in outlook. I think the question has been given more importance than it deserves. I am really far more concerned with the basic economic and other questions that affect Hyderabad and the rest of India than these.

Q: What would happen to the community projects after five years when the US aid is stopped?

JN: Why five years? It may happen earlier. Obviously the programme and plan of the projects may be affected and it is possible we will not be able to advance, but we will find the resources, and what we intend to complete in five years may be spread over seven years. We are not going to stop our plans because external aid is not coming.

Q: Why don't you visit Telengana during your stay in the State?

JN: The time at my disposal is short, and I cannot afford to be away from Delhi for long. I hope Telengana will be my first choice when I come to Hyderabad again.

Q: Do you think Telengana is a problem place?

JN: For that matter every place is a problem place.

Q: Will the situation in Telengana affect the foreign policy of the Government of India?

JN: I should think the foreign policy is more dependent on the situation in the frontiers than in a central area like Telengana.

There is no problem in Telengana at present as far as I know, though there was some problem two or three years ago.

There has been some speculation here about my visit to the State and, according to some papers, Maulana Azad and I have come to investigate what is happening in the Congress and the Government here. That is completely wrong.

As Congress President, I am interested in the affairs of the Congress and I discuss them with the Congress workers and the Ministers. I am going to Madras shortly and it is not to investigate anything but only to understand the position there.

Q: Would you tell us of your impressions of your visit to Bidar and Osmanabad?

JN: I went there to see for myself what has taken place there after the police action. There are few things anywhere in India which satisfy me completely. I find something substantial is being done by the local administration in Bidar and Osmanabad to help the minority community who have suffered after police action.²

But I feel much more should be done. While, no doubt, the Government should help those who stand in need, it is also the duty of non-official bodies to do their bit. The Government agencies alone cannot tackle all the problems. I hope, therefore, this problem will be tackled by non-official and Government organizations jointly as speedily as possible.

Q: Will there be a Cabinet reshuffle or reduction in the number of Ministers in Hyderabad?

2. After the police action in September 1948 in Hyderabad State, till the setting up of martial law administration, there were reports of widespread incidents of murder, loot, rape, arson and expropriation involving the Muslim community. It was alleged that in some places even the armed personnel looked on while such atrocities were being committed.

JN: I do not think so at present. I have generally expressed my opinion that in several States in India there are larger Ministries and in others smaller ones. But that is not a recent issue.

The Hyderabad Ministry is fairly large. But the question of reducing the number of Ministers does not arise before me. The Hyderabad Ministry has done well in many ways since it assumed office.

5. Assurance on the Formation of Andhra State¹

Question: Would you spell out the Government of India's stand on the formation of Anadhra State?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The Government of India will act on any generally accepted plan for the formation of a separate State for Andhras, subject to financial and other considerations, which are important.

I have conferred, corresponded and talked to people about it and I have also stated the most feasible way of achieving it. I cannot be expected to issue a decree like a Grand Moghul sitting in Delhi, because I am not a Grand Moghul.

Q: May I draw your attention to statements made by you recently at Hyderabad regarding linguistic States?²

JN: What I said was that I was strongly of the opinion that disintegration of Hyderabad would be bad, not only for Hyderabad, but for the surrounding States. It will create a large number of problems for the whole of South India and thus delay any kind of real economic progress. The question of redistribution of States is linked with other problems of which the economic problem is very important. What might happen twenty five years hence, I cannot say.

1. Report of the press conference, Madras, 4 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 5 October 1952. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference, see pp. 138-139, 153, 342-343, 431, 510-511, 553-554, 648-649 and 674.

2. See the preceding item.

STATE ISSUES

II. Redistribution of State Boundaries

1. The Reshaping of State Boundaries¹

My colleague, the Minister of Health, has sent a note² for the Cabinet. I am having this circulated. This note deals with a variety of problems apart from the major question of so-called linguistic provinces. A great deal has been said in recent weeks about linguistic States, and I rather doubt if we can say much more about them at the present moment. I do not mind, however, having a discussion of this subject in a rather general way, so as to clear our minds, apart from having to meet any resolution in Parliament.

2. I feel, as I have said, that any large-scale approach for reshaping the States of India as a whole, however logical it might appear to be, is likely to raise innumerable controversies and to divert attention from most of our major problems, like planning and development. Disputed areas or areas which might be transferred to some other State will be neglected because the existing State will not want to do much to them or develop them.

3. There are some cases, however, which do require fairly early attention. Pepsu is almost a jig-saw puzzle with islands here and there cut off from each other.³ But if we take action now in regard to Pepsu, it might be interpreted as being due to political animus against a non-Congress Ministry. I rather doubt if that Ministry will last long. Probably as soon as the Legislature meets the Ministry will be defeated.⁴ There is at present a considerable agitation among Punjabis and the Pepsu Hindus, chiefly living in the plains part of the State, for a merger with the Punjab. But any attempt to have this merger would

1. Note for the Cabinet, 21 July 1952. JN Collection.

2. Amrit Kaur had written that the formation of linguistic States, which had been advocated by the Congress Party for years, would affect the unity of the country. The practice of having hereditary Rajpramukhs and formation of Part C States were irrational. She suggested the appointment of a commission to go into the redistribution of States, though the case of a separate State for Andhras had been granted, not purely on a linguistic basis, but for reconstituting them as smaller units to ensure good administration and economic efficiency.

3. The seven princely States—Patiala, Nabha, Jind, Faridkot, Malerkotla, Kalsia and Kapurthala—were integrated into a single political entity in May 1948 called Patiala and East Punjab States Union (Pepsu). Excepting Malerkotla, which had a Muslim prince, all other components of Pepsu had been Sikh domains.

4. In Pepsu, though the Congress did not succeed in obtaining a clear majority in the election, it managed to form a Ministry on 19 March 1952 with the support of a few Independents. However, on 18 April 1952, the Ministry was defeated because of defections from the party. An opposition coalition, called the United Front Party, led by Gian Singh Rarewala, formed a government, which was surviving with the conditional support of three Communist members. At this time, the Ministry was facing a no-confidence motion in the Assembly.

immediately raise another problem, that of the Sikhs. Pepsu is the only State in India with a Sikh majority. If we merge it with another State, it will be said that we could not tolerate even one State with a Sikh majority. It would be unwise, for obvious political reasons, to create this impression.

4. Logically, a great part of Pepsu should go to the Punjab, a bit of it might come to Delhi, and a part of it, namely the mountainous part, might go to Himachal Pradesh.

5. I think that the mountainous areas of India have a very definite cultural content which is distinct from that of the plains. Himachal Pradesh, therefore, though small, represents a distinct entity. Some other adjoining mountain areas might well go with it.

6. But, as I have said above, I do not think this is the time to raise these problems.

7. The question of Rajpramukhs has also been troubling me greatly. This question inevitably assumes some importance because of certain proposed changes in Kashmir, whatever final shape they might take.⁵ The whole idea of a Rajpramukh for life is difficult to assimilate. The Rajpramukh is supposed to take the place of a Governor. In fact, he does very little indeed, far less than a Governor is supposed to do. Probably he signs some papers occasionally. Probably also, he indulges in intrigues, and he has considerable opportunities to do so because of the old princely traditions in those areas.⁶ He does not even trouble to send a fortnightly report which the Governors do.

8. For this responsibility with no work, he is given special allowances, which are heavy. These are in addition to the very handsome privy purses they get. I confess I do not understand the reason or logic behind this. What we can do in this matter, and how we can do it, is not clear to me. But it certainly deserves consideration.

9. As it might be worthwhile to have some general discussion about these matters in Cabinet, I am having these papers circulated to Cabinet Ministers.

5. In India, the princes agreed to give up their sovereignty and the rulership on the basis of negotiated agreements while in Kashmir the rulership of Hari Singh and his successors was being abolished by the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir.

6. Princes' participation in the general elections led to complications in several States. In Saurashtra, for example, the Congress Ministry had to carry out investigations into the manner in which some members of royal families had supported opponents of the Congress. It was alleged that these princes had helped and supported notorious dacoits of the State in launching a campaign of terrorism against the voters in a desperate effort to dislodge the Congress Ministry. Several princes and members of royal families were arrested. In Rajasthan, the Congress suffered reverses at the hands of princes and other royal candidates. The Maharaja of Jodhpur led the opposition in the elections and the former Chief Minister of Rajasthan, Jai Narain Vyas, was defeated by the Maharaja in two constituencies. This provoked an agitation by Congressmen who alleged that the princes had exploited their power, prestige and position to political advantage during the elections.

2. To Pratap Singh Kairon¹

New Delhi
July 21, 1952

My dear Pratap Singh,²

I have been informed of the excitement at Bhatinda when the question of merger of Pepsu with Punjab was brought up.³ Much can be said for this merger and perhaps ultimately it will have to take place. But, in the immediate present, it seems to me an unwise step and likely to play into the hands of Master Tara Singh.

There has been much talk of linguistic provinces and the like recently.⁴ Any attempt at provincial redistribution in the near future is likely to raise a storm in many parts of India. Hence I think that we should be rather cautious about this matter. I do not mind the matter being discussed quietly, and public opinion being gradually brought round. But any aggressive attempts and too much shouting may well injure us.⁵

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No P-16/1952, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. A Minister in the Government of Punjab.
3. The Pepsu Congress Workers' Convention, which met on 20 July 1952 at Bhatinda, was attended by prominent Congress leaders including Pratap Singh Kairon, Swaran Singh, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Balvantray Mehta. It passed a resolution demanding the abolition of the institution of Rajpramukh and the stoppage of the privy purses. Another resolution for the merger of Pepsu with Punjab was disallowed by the President of the convention "in the broader interests of the country and the organization."
4. The Akali Dal which had been demanding a Punjabi Suba on communal considerations since February 1948, had shifted its stand and pleaded its case on linguistic rather than religious lines. Master Tara Singh urged the formation of a Punjabi-speaking state by joining together the Punjabi-speaking areas of Punjab, Pepsu and Rajasthan.
5. A similar letter was sent to Brish Bhan of the Pepsu Congress Committee, Patiala.

3. To Balvantray Mehta¹

New Delhi
July 21, 1952

My dear Balvantray,

Your letter of July 22nd about Pepsu.²

This question of the merger of Pepsu with the Punjab is not quite so simple as it looks. I suppose ultimately a good part of Pepsu should go to the Punjab, but a part of it, namely the hilly areas, would be much better off with Himachal Pradesh.

The Punjab people, of course, want this merger, and so do the Hindu plains people of Pepsu. Apart from other reasons, they want to get rid of the Rajpramukh.³

The real difficulty is that Pepsu today is the only province with a Sikh majority. To put an end to it would become a matter for considerable agitation among the Sikhs and would give a handle to Master Tara Singh. Therefore we should proceed rather cautiously.

This applies to the PCCs also. If you like you can put this matter up before the Working Committee.

I am writing on this subject to Pratap Singh Kairon⁴ and Brish Bhan.⁵ I enclose copies of these letters.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No P-16/1952, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. Balvantray Mehta, who attended the Bhatinda convention, conveyed to Nehru the sentiments of the Congressmen in Pepsu on the merger issue.
3. The Congress leaders in Pepsu charged the Rajpramukh, the Maharaja of Patiala, with involvement in communal politics and demanded the abolition of the office of Rajpramukh.
4. See the preceding item.
5. He was a leader of the Congress Party in Pepsu and the Deputy Chief Minister from May 1951 to April 1952.

4. To Atulya Ghosh¹

New Delhi
17th August, 1952

My dear Atulya Babu,²

During the last few days I have read with mounting surprise the challenges

1. JN Collection.
2. (1904-1986); a prominent Congress leader of West Bengal; Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-67; President, West Bengal PCC at this time.

thrown out from Bengal to Bihar and Bihar to Bengal about the transfer of some territory to Bengal.³ First of all the Bengal Assembly passes a resolution, and strong speeches are delivered; then Dr Roy reiterates his stand at a press conference. Immediately the Bihar leaders issue a public statement strongly condemning this demand made in Bengal. And now I find that you have delivered a speech at an Independence Day meeting in Calcutta. Referring to Bihar leaders, statement you are reported to have said:

“The statement contained a threat of violent agitation against West Bengal’s demand. I respectfully remind the Bihar leaders that the youths of West Bengal faced British bullets and oppression and were not afraid of any power on earth provided the cause they were to fight for was based upon truth and justice. I say that if Bihar leaders refuse to consider West Bengal’s claims for some living space sympathetically, thousands and thousands of Bengalis would march into Manbhum, Singhbhum and other parts of Bihar and settle there. I would like to see the prowess of the Bihar leaders to stop this march of Bengalis.”⁴

I really do not know what to say about this extraordinary argument that is going on. One might almost think that two independent countries were on the verge of war. We seem to have lost all sense of proportion. If one thing is dead certain it is this that such questions cannot be settled by threats. They can only be settled in a friendly way. Sometime ago, about a year or two ago, I discussed this matter with Dr Roy and other friends in Bengal. They agreed with me that it was a totally wrong approach for British tactics to be exercised as they could only defeat their own purpose and yet suddenly I find this new move initiated by the Bengal Assembly with all the consequences that have followed.

I fear that we are losing all sense of proportion, and, instead of solving our problems, we have got into the habit of creating new problems. It was

3. A resolution of the West Bengal Assembly which sought the amalgamation of certain portions of Bihar with West Bengal started a controversy. This was followed by a public speech by, Atulya Ghosh, which evoked a reply from the Chief Minister of Bihar, Sri Krishna Sinha, who likened West Bengal’s demand for a corridor with Hitler’s demand for a Polish corridor. The contention that the Bengali-speaking areas in Bihar, where West Bengal’s rivers originated, should be included in West Bengal, was likened to the “illegitimate claim of Pakistan over Kashmir.”
4. In his reply of 19 August 1952, Ghosh clarified his position by quoting the report of his speech from *Hindusthan Standard* of 16 August: “Bengal had fought when other Indian States had not been conversant even with the alphabets of politics and Bengal knew how to fight.... for the sake of justice, for humanitarian reasons, give us land, give us living space.... If they did not give it, Bengalis would trek to reach there and stay there. They would endure sufferings and harassments, but they would live there.”

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

possible for us to try patiently, and in a friendly way, to have adjustments of boundaries, but even this is made impossible by the approaches and speeches made.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To B.C. Roy¹

New Delhi
August 17, 1952

My dear Bidhan,

You have left for Europe. But before you left you started or rather gave a kick to a controversy which I can only consider as most unfortunate. I have today written to Atulya Ghosh.² I enclose a copy of the letter.

Love,
Jawahar

1. *With B.C. Roy and Other Chief Ministers* by Saroj Chakrabarty (Calcutta, 1974), p. 208.
2. See the preceding item.

6. To Y.S. Parmar¹

New Delhi
October 14, 1952

My dear Parmar,²

Being away in the South of India. I was rather cut off from news of happenings in the North. On return here I have learnt that the Himachal Pradesh Assembly has passed some resolution recommending to the Government of India to take appropriate steps to integrate certain regions of Kulu, Dalhousie, Bakloh, Bilaspur, Nalagarh, hilly tracts of Ambala district and of Pepsu State, Sanjauli, Kasumpti, Chakkar and Barasi in Simla, with Himachal Pradesh.

1. JN Collection. A copy was sent to the Minister of States.
2. Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh.

I am really surprised that such a resolution should have been brought forward and passed by your Assembly. Quite apart from such merits as it might possess, it is something which will give rise to a great deal of trouble and will encourage all kinds of wrong elements. Thus it will give a great deal of strength to Master Tara Singh, who has just scored a victory in the SGPC elections.³ The demand for a Punjabi-speaking province will become stronger. Altogether, it is a move which will help the Akalis.

It is patent that this is no time for us to consider any such proposition, whatever their merits may be. Once we start this kind of linguistic division and re-partition, we shall be dragged into a turmoil all over India. It is difficult enough to deal with the agitation in the South of India. Now you want to add to it in the North. I could not imagine anything more ill-timed. If the Government and the people in the Punjab start talking against your resolution, there will be a heated controversy, and attention will be drawn to it instead of to work. We have just seen such a bitter controversy between Bihar and Bengal about certain border areas. The obvious course was to remain silent about such matters at this stage. Even if your Opposition brought forward a resolution, you should have been strong enough to say that this is no time to consider such matters.

We have been discussing the question of Bilaspur joining Himachal Pradesh.⁴ As you know, there has been opposition in the Punjab. Nevertheless, we were in favour of Bilaspur going to Himachal Pradesh. Your recent resolution, to which I have referred above, will now create grave difficulties even about Bilaspur. You see how thoughtless acts have far-reaching consequences.

In any event, I hope there will not be much talk about this resolution or about the subject matter of it. I can inform you straightaway that the Government of India is not going to take up any step at all on the basis of your resolution.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. In October 1952, in the annual election of the office-bearers of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, which controlled the administration and finances of all Gurdwaras in Punjab, Udham Singh Nagoke and Pritam Singh Khuranj, pro-Congress Akali leaders, were defeated.
4. Punjab and Himachal Pradesh had claimed the integration of the territory of Bilaspur, a Part C State, with theirs. The Government of Himachal Pradesh argued its case for merger on ethnic and linguistic grounds. Punjab sought the merger on the ground that it had a very large stake in the Bhakra Dam which it could safeguard if it was allowed to hold Bilaspur. It also argued that the Bhakra Dam would bring prosperity to Bilaspur as well.

7. To Pratap Singh Kairon¹

New Delhi
October 14, 1952

My dear Pratap Singh,

I was sorry to learn on my return from Madras that the joint efforts of you and Jathedar Nagoke did not succeed in the SGPC elections. This is unfortunate, of course. But we need not take this too tragically. Such things happen and we take them in our stride....

Your Governor has drawn my attention to a resolution passed by the Himachal Pradesh Assembly about the incorporation of some parts of the Punjab into Himachal Pradesh. I think this resolution was most inadvisable and can only lead to trouble. It will probably strengthen Master Tata Singh's hands. I am writing to the Himachal Pradesh people about it...²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. See the preceding item.

STATE ISSUES
III. Part B States

1. The Question of Privy Purses¹

Some five years ago, nearly all the old Indian states acceded to the then Dominion of India and various covenants and agreements were arrived at between the Government of India and the rulers of those states. Those accessions, at that vital period of transition in India's history, demonstrated the wisdom of the parties concerned, and the change-over was brought about peacefully and cooperatively.

2. Five years have since passed and many changes have taken place in India during this period. India has become a Republic and a new Constitution of the Republic has been adopted and given effect to. The political revolution in India having thus been completed, the attention of the country has naturally been directed towards economic problems and the vital and urgent necessity of increasing the well-being of the people of India. The Constitution itself lays down certain basic principles of social justice and directive principles of policy. The economic programme which India has to follow must keep those basic principles in view, and endeavour to realize them in practice.

3. Indeed, it is not merely because the Constitution demands these economic changes and progress, but because of the facts of the situation in India and the world, that it has become incumbent on us to take these steps. All kinds of social and economic forces are at work in the world producing crisis after crisis and, though we are fortunate in many ways in India, our country is feeling the impact of these forces also. The nationalist movement in India itself for long represented not only the urge to independence, but also the urge to social justice. One of the most important steps taken by our Governments has been in respect of land reform and the abolition of the *zamindari* and *jagirdari* systems and the like. Indeed, we have given, and are giving, the most earnest consideration to further steps in land reform.

4. The Planning Commission, which was constituted some two years ago, produced a draft outline Five-Year Plan last year. The Commission is now finalizing the revised plan which they hope to issue in the course of a month or so. As this Commission has discussed this Five-Year Plan, they have had to consider almost every aspect of our national life. Planning means not only a definite objective and targets in future, but also a coordination of the various activities of the nation in order to achieve that objective and those targets. Our objectives are the growth of the nation and the advancement of our people

1. Note for Rajpramukhs and former rulers of states, Camp Sonamarg, Kashmir, 25 August 1952. JN Collection.

socially, economically and culturally. Today, in spite of such progress as we have made, the spectre of poverty haunts us in great parts of India and vast numbers of our people are deprived of the opportunity to grow to their full stature. Indeed, famine or acute conditions of scarcity occur in some part or other of the country. We fight these conditions of scarcity with all our strength, for it is intolerable that our people anywhere should die of starvation. While we are preventing actual deaths by starvation, under-nutrition continues to darken the lives of vast numbers of our countrymen.

5. We have not only to meet the crisis of the moment, but also to lay firm foundations for preventing such crises of hunger to occur in our country. We have, in fact, to produce greater wealth and to see that it is properly distributed among our people. Both greater production and a more equitable distribution are essential. We have to meet at the same time the problem of an ever-increasing population which demands the necessities of life.

6. With our meagre resources, it is difficult enough to deal with the day to day crises that occur. It is still more difficult to produce the surplus which is necessary for future advance. It is only by large scale investment in schemes of national development that we can advance. That advance, therefore, depends upon that surplus for investment. That is the problem which our Planning Commission has faced, and the conclusions that force themselves upon their attention are not pleasing. We cannot expect miracles to happen, or great progress to be attained suddenly. But the pace cannot be too slow either, for then events might well overwhelm us.

7. All this leads to serious thinking about the economic structure in which we function. Are there any impediments in that structure which come in the way of progress? Can we move faster by removing those impediments or by changing that economic structure here and there? We have, of course, to proceed on democratic lines not only because of our Constitution, but because we value the essential features and basis of democracy and have faith in them. How can we, within that democratic structure, achieve the best and quickest results in regard to social and economic progress?

8. All over the world, similar problems are facing Governments and people. They are being tackled in different ways. We can learn from the successes and failures of others, but we have finally to determine what we should do keeping in view our own ideals and the conditions that exist in this country. We cannot, however, ignore what happens elsewhere, for the world, in spite of its rivalries and conflicts, becomes ever closer knit together.

9. Apart from the actual economic and social changes that might be brought about, there is the psychological aspect of these problems which cannot be ignored. If we aim at social justice and equality of opportunity, as we do and as we have solemnly declared so often, then we must aim at the removal or a lessening of flagrant inequalities. That applies to every phase of our national

life. Such flagrant inequalities are a constant irritant to the people, and therefore tend to produce discontent and sometimes even conflict.

10. I have stated this larger background because it is only when we keep this in view that we get the right perspective to consider any problem by itself. The immediate problem that is progressively coming into prominence is the position of the old princes and rulers in our country. As I have said above, it was an act of wisdom and statesmanship on their part to help by accession to produce an integrated and unified India. They deserve credit for that. The Government of India entered into certain covenants with them and any such agreement arrived at by the Government must not be lightly reviewed. Whether I like that agreement or not, I would hesitate to go behind it merely because it was an agreement. But, at the same time, we cannot ignore the rapid pace of events in the country and in the world and the demands of the situation. There is no doubt that some of these covenants fixing very large sums of money as privy purses are totally out of keeping with the directive principles of our Constitution and the demands of the time. The provision to have Rajpramukhs for life is also inconsistent with the spirit and practice of our Constitution. We have Governors in our Part A States and they perform an important function. Rajpramukhs take the place of Governors in Part B States.² As a matter of fact, the functions they perform are, on the whole, far less than those of the Governors in Part A States. But, apart from this, Governors function for a fixed period, Rajpramukhs for life. The question of competence or function, however, hardly arises; some principle of heredity is followed, though that principle has been given up elsewhere in the Constitution and in our political structure.

11. How long can we continue this anachronism? How long can we justify to our people the payment of large sums of money for the discharge of no function at all? Moral, political and social theory does not justify this and in the context of India today, with famine and scarcity and the country struggling hard to progress, this anachronism becomes all the more glaring.

12. It is right that the old rulers should live in dignity. We want our President, the Head of our Republic, to live and function in that dignity that is appropriate for the Head of the State. We have provided for that. Can it be said that others in India want to maintain some higher standard of dignity than even the President of India?

2. Eight former Indian states had been listed as Part B States.

13. Many of our princes have, apart from their privy purses, considerable private fortunes invested in India or abroad. Even apart from these, as a result of certain developments, they are entitled to a privy purse. But is it right or proper from any point of view for those privy purses to be out of proportion when compared with conditions in India?

14. I should like the princes to give consideration to what I have said, because events move fast in this world of ours and we ought to keep pace with those events. What might have been good yesterday may be wholly out of place today. I should like them, willingly and voluntarily, to surrender a large part of their privy purses which can then be applied for the development of their State which needs money for development purposes so badly. I should like them not only to do this, but to line up with their people in other ways also and help the great tasks which demand all our strength and energy today.

2. The Institution of Rajpramukhs¹

The problem of the abolition of the institution of Rajpramukhs has to be solved, but by methods of consultations and settlements in keeping with the dignity of the Government of India and not by methods of campaigns or movements.

During the discussion on the resolution, the question of the integrity of India had been raised. For this, we have to take into account the background of the institution of Rajpramukhs during the critical days of July and August 1947 preceding the transfer of power to India. Hundreds of princely States thereafter acceded to the Union.

We have to consider how all this happened. There were two methods of achieving it; firstly, by revolution or military pressure; secondly, by a compromise based on mutual settlement. A compromise in such circumstances was based on pressure of public opinion and events.

When the British left India, there was apprehension that the princely States might hamper the process of unity. It was also supported by certain instances in which some princes helped the trouble-makers in those critical days. Nevertheless, there were also many who came forward to help the Government of India.

1. Speech on a non-official resolution, later withdrawn, on the abolition of the institution of Rajpramukhs, AICC meeting, Indore, 14 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 15 September 1952.

Those were the critical days of July and August 1947 and if Sardar Patel's efforts to persuade the princes to come to terms with the new Government of India had not succeeded, the consequences would have been unimaginable. There was a storm blowing over entire northern India. If the issue of the States had not been solved earlier, it would have complicated the situation.

The Residents and the Agents to the Governor-General in the former princely states as a class had during those days done their best to isolate the princes from the rest of India. That class, which had predicted trouble for the India Government after the departure of the British, was astonished to find that there were peaceful settlements and that the princes had acceded to the Indian Union.

We took a decision in those days and paid the price for the settlement with the princes. Whether the price was big or small, I do not know. In a sense, the price was not big as the integrity of the country was achieved. In another sense it was a high price, as so much money was being given to some individuals.²

The settlement had been achieved at whatever cost, and now after the covenants had become a part of the Constitution, the Government of India cannot tear to pieces the covenants simply because certain things are not to their liking.

As far as the question of Rajpramukhs is concerned it would concern only seven or eight persons. The question can be solved by consultations. After all it would be too unequal a fight, if the Government of India, the Congress and the people were to be ranged against the Rajpramukhs who are not even capable of defending their position. It will be against the dignity of the Congress, or the Government of India, to indulge in such a fight or to go back on the pledges given to them by the late Sardar Patel.

I would like to solve the problem, but not by methods of campaigns or movements. If the question is to be raised in the form of resolutions, I would have no alternative but to oppose them. I cannot accept such resolutions and therefore request the House not to press the matter.

2. The total amount of the privy purses drawn by all the rulers, together with the additional amounts spent by them on themselves and their families before integration was assessed to be approximately Rs 20 crores a year. After integration the ruler of a state with an average annual revenue of Rs 15 lakhs got an annual privy purse of Rs 1,30,000. Out of 554 states, over 450 had an annual revenue of less than Rs 15 lakhs. The total of the privy purses amounted to Rs 580 lakhs at this time.

3. Activities of the Nizam¹

Maulana Azad and I went this afternoon to call on the Nizam at tea time. Nawab Zain Yar Jung² was also present. We had some general conversation about various matters, including the changes that were taking place in the world such as in Egypt. Towards the end of our visit, I mentioned to the Nizam that I had heard that he was meeting some prominent people who had been specially associated with the troubles in 1948 and who had been released some months ago. I mentioned particularly Deen Yar Jung's³ name. Later, I mentioned the name of General Edroos⁴ also. I said that such contacts would create needless suspicion in the minds of the people and it was best to avoid them.

2. The Nizam was slightly taken aback by what I said. He said that he had only met these people during prayers at the mosque, or some other like place, and it was open to anyone to go to the house of God. Government had released these people and they were free to go wherever they liked. How could he prevent them from coming to the mosque? During the last four years, had he, the Nizam, done anything to merit criticism or suspicion?

3. I told him that so far as he was concerned, I was not blaming him for anything, nor was I concerned very much with Deen Yar Jung's or other people's activities. We could deal with them if they did anything wrong. The fact that these people had been released did not mean that their record was clear in our minds. In the balance we thought we ought to release them and we did so. Some of the people released had gone to Pakistan. If others also went, I would not worry at all. Why I had mentioned this matter to the Nizam was because it might affect his own reputation and standing with the people. He must know that there was a good deal of talk against Rajpramukhs and their privy purses all over India. There was the case of Kashmir too which had encouraged this talk. It was unwise, therefore, to do anything which might give a handle to these critics or to mischief-mongers.

1. Note to the Minister of States, Camp Hyderabad, 24 September 1952. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Minister for PWD and Railways in the Military Government of Hyderabad and leader of the Majlis-e-Itehad-e-Baimul Muslemeen—the League for the Unity of Muslims.
3. Nawab Deen Yar Jung was the Commissioner of Police in Hyderabad before the police action.
4. Major-General El Edroos, Commander-in-Chief of the Hyderabad State Force before the police action.

4. The Nizam went on protesting his own innocence and grew rather excited. His voice rose. He said that he could understand people coming to him asking for favours or trying to influence him when he had power, but now he was bereft of power, why should anyone expect anything from him or try to influence him? Hyderabad was no longer an independent country and he had no power at all.

5. I said that was so, but people, nevertheless, acted unwisely through frustration. Anyhow I had mentioned this matter to him in his own interest because I did not wish anything to happen to give a handle or an additional reason to his critics. He went on repeating that he had only met Deen Yar Jung, etc. in the house of God and how could he prevent that? He asked me for any specific thing to which I objected. I said that I had no specific instance in my mind, but my attention had been drawn to such talks in Hyderabad, and I had therefore mentioned the matter to him. I added that Zain Yar Jung could enquire further into the matter and let him know...

4. The Future of the Rajpramukhs¹

Question: Would you clarify the attitude of the Government of India towards the continuance of Rajpramukhs?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The Government does not, and should not, upset its own assurances even though it might want to do so. The question of Rajpramukhs can hardly be considered permanently settled. I presume that some changes will have to be made. But we want to do all these things cooperatively as far as we can, because we do not wish to break the pledges or assurances we have given. Therefore, we want to proceed in the matter, after full consultations, if larger agreement is possible.

1. Report of the press conference, Madras, 4 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 5 October 1952. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference, see pp. 138-139, 153, 342-343, 412, 510-511, 553-554, 648-649 and 674.

5. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
October 15, 1952

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Some days ago you sent me a note in which a complaint was made about the deterioration of conditions in Baroda. I replied to you briefly, and said that I was sending that note on to the Ministry of States as well as to the Bombay Government. I have had no reply from the Bombay Government yet. But the Minister of States, Dr Katju, sent me a brief reply, a copy of which I enclose.

2. Dr Katju has dealt with the broader question of the old states, which have either been merged in our A States, or have become Unions and are now called Part B States. Generally speaking, I agree with what he says, and I feel that there has been a certain deterioration in some respects, though there might have been an improvement in some other respects at the same time. But from the point of view of the public, they have not generally benefited and a certain feeling of dissatisfaction has spread amongst them.

3. This is particularly so in the unions of states, where a number of separate state entities have been brought together. In such cases these separate entities have lost not only their separateness and distinctiveness but have been relegated to a very subordinate position under usually some junior officer. Previously each State had a certain distinctiveness, sometimes some pride, and the Ruler tried to embellish his capital, even though that was at the expense of the rural areas. Now, these states have no importance left and their capital cities are at best district headquarters or sometime *tehsil* headquarters. In the various States of Rajasthan, this is particularly noticeable, apart from Jaipur, which is now the Capital. Justice becomes distant and more expensive.

4. In our reorganizing the Services, we have raised the scales of pay and often discharged some of the older civil servants, who were not considered competent. The result has been unemployment on the one hand, and much more expenditure on the Services on the other. In the long run, probably, this will have a good effect, as the Services might be presumed to be better. But in the short run, it has added the burden of much greater expenditure at the cost of development. Thus some Service men have profited, while nothing much has been done for the people generally. Also, Government has become impersonal and more bureaucratic. There has been a slight tendency in the past few years for the officers of the Central Government sent down to these B States to function as rather superior persons looking down upon others.

5. Then again, the armies of some of these states were largely demobilized. This created a problem of unemployment and, to some extent, made the law

1. JN Collection.

and order position difficult. The average Rajput or Jat, who was in the army, did not take to any other occupation, and sometimes joined a gang of dacoits.

6. The main thing has been that we have made the whole administrative structure there more expensive without giving any countervailing advantages in the present.

7. In regard to financial integration of these Part B States, I have a general impression that the balance was tilted in favour of the Central Government. In the early years after merger, the Central Government exercised a dominating influence over many of these Part B States and had its own officers there as Advisers, Counsellors, etc.

8. The case of Hyderabad appears to me to be a particularly serious one and injustice on our part. Without going into any specific details, it seems to me obvious that Hyderabad State got a raw deal from us in regard to financial integration. First of all, the Government of Hyderabad, at the time of these integration talks, was really a branch of the Central Government or rather of the States Ministry. Thus, in effect, one part of the States Ministry dealt with another part of it and arrived at an agreement. This, surely, was not a fair approach to the problem. Then they had to choose two normal years from which to judge the revenue and expenditure of the State. In regard to other states, there was not much abnormality in the previous few years. In Hyderabad, everything was completely abnormal both in the period from 1946 to 1948, when the Nizam functioned, and in the subsequent years when the States Ministry functioned there. During the previous period the army expenditure had gone up, the Razakars were functioning and altogether there was a kind of war background. In the later period, there was extreme abnormality also and very large expenditure on the Military Governor's establishments, the Services imported from outside, and the inflated police force to deal with Telengana. During the earlier period, customs revenue had gone down very much because of partial blockade by the Indian Union.

9. For these and many other reasons, these years previous to financial integration were completely abnormal and yet they were taken as the basis for a calculation. Going broadly into the figures, it seems to me that the result arrived at was grossly unfair to the Hyderabad Government and had no relation to the real facts. It was, I believe, out by several crores of rupees per annum.

10. In addition to this, the disbandment of the Hyderabad Army and the compulsory retirement of large numbers of persons belonging to the old Services as well as the result of the change in the *jagirdari* systems, brought about large-scale unemployment in the middle classes and the lower middle classes. To this was added, of course, the grave consequences of the events that followed the police action. These events were far more serious than most people had imagined. In Osmanabad and some other areas, there are a large number of Muslim widows and children. There is practically no Muslim male left in

these areas because they were all killed soon after the police action. That event itself was rather horrible, but the consequences pursued us still, and not much has been done even yet to try to help and rehabilitate these poor sufferers.

11. Meanwhile, the police budget of Hyderabad has grown and grown, chiefly on account of the Communist revolt in Telengana. It consumes a large part of the State's revenue.

12. It is not surprising that the State has very little left for any productive enterprise or development, and it cannot deal as it should with the difficult problem of unemployment, etc.

13. The more I have looked into this matter, and I took some care to go into it in Hyderabad as well as here, the more I have felt that Hyderabad has had a very raw deal from the Central Government. We cannot undo the past, but the effects of financial integration on a completely wrong basis are continuing and are very injurious to the State.

14. In casual talks with the Chairman² of the Finance Commission, I gathered that he was more or less of this opinion. But he felt this was rather outside the scope of the Finance Commission. Technically he was correct, and we can hardly expect him to go deeply into this question at this stage. But if the wrong is patent and obvious and is a continuing wrong, I do not see why we should not try to fight it as early as possible. Normally, we would wait for five years for another commission to examine this matter. I think to wait that long would be unfair and wrong. If we recognize that a wrong has been committed, we should try to right it.

15. The initiative in this matter must come from the President. I think we shall have to go into this very thoroughly, and we should not wait for too long. I should like, however, the Finance Commission, if it so chooses, to express itself generally on this subject relating to Hyderabad. That general expression of opinion would enable us, and you, to take further steps to go more deeply into this matter in order to right it. I am sure we can do it before the five years are out and we ought to do it.

16. The Chairman of the Finance Commission would naturally hesitate to go outside his strict scope of enquiry, but if a hint was conveyed to him that it was open to him, and right for him and his Commission, to deal broadly with this issue, he would have no difficulty. I would suggest to you, therefore, that you might give this indication to the Chairman of the Finance Commission. That would make it easier for us to act in the future.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. In November 1951, a Finance Commission with K.C. Neogy as Chairman was appointed by the President under Article 280(1) of the Indian Constitution.

6. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi

October 17, 1952

My dear Mr. President,

I sent you a letter two days ago in which, *inter alia*, I mentioned the objections raised in certain Part B States in regard to financial integration. I mentioned the case of Hyderabad in particular....

The Governments of Saurashtra and Hyderabad have asked us in their official representations² to request you to have an enquiry made either by a body specially appointed or by the Finance Commission on specific reference made in Article 280(1) (d) of the Constitution.

In my last letter to you, I ventured to suggest that the Finance Commission might be instructed by you to give their general opinion on this subject. I do not know if, at this late stage in their enquiry, they can go deeply into this matter. But even a general opinion given by them would be helpful in further considering this and in enabling us to take other steps.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 208/52, President's Secretariat. Extracts.
2. In their representations, the states of Hyderabad and Saurashtra demanded that the agreements for financial integration made with the states should be reopened and the whole scheme of financial integration in so far as it affected them be reconsidered. Under the Finance Commission's recommendations, Hyderabad was, on an average, to get Rs 359 lakhs and Saurashtra Rs 302 lakhs per annum. The two states considered the allocations far below their requirements.
3. Replying to Nehru's letters of 15 and 17 October 1952, Rajendra Prasad stated on 24 October: "Unless I am advised that the Commission is competent under the relevant provisions of the Constitution to reopen agreements arrived at between the Government of India and the various Part B States, it would not obviously be proper for me to issue such a directive." The Government of India might set up an *ad hoc* body to enquire into the question as such questions fell outside the competence of the Finance Commission. He added that this would undoubtedly raise many wider issues with extensive financial implications.

STATE ISSUES

IV. The Cauvery Waters

1. Telegram to K. Hanumanthaiya¹

The controversy between the Mysore and Madras Governments regarding the sharing of the Cauvery waters in terms of the 1924 agreement has been referred to me as a matter of great urgency.² I have read all the correspondence³ that has passed between you and Rajaji on this subject beginning with your letter to Rajaji dated 12th August 1952 and including Rajaji's letter to you dated 3rd September.

It is clear that both your Government and Rajaji's Government have to face great difficulties owing to the unkind vagaries of nature. Both of you have our fullest sympathy in this matter. While I realize your difficulties, I appreciate also the critical condition which Rajaji has to face in the Cauvery delta in the Trichinopoly and Tanjore districts. Indeed information received by telephone today is to the effect that crops in the delta are already drying up.⁴ This will have very serious consequences as you can well realize. The only way to meet this common difficulty is to show mutual accommodation to the utmost extent and to follow the precise terms of the Agreement of 1924. If that Agreement is not in your opinion a fair or good one, you may consider its revision later on with the concurrence of the Madras Government.⁵ But if there is any breach of that agreement now, whatever the justification might appear to be, this will lead not only to disastrous results but also to unnecessary illwill and bitterness.

1. New Delhi, 20 September 1952. JN Collection.
2. Under the 1924 Agreement between the Madras and Mysore Governments, Mysore was obliged to release ten thousand million cubic feet of the Cauvery waters to Madras and could store water at the Krishnarajasagara dam of about a fifth of the flow to fill its reservoir. But since 1952 a dispute ensued between the two States each alleging breach of the Agreement by the other.
3. In his letters of 18 and 25 August 1952 to Hanumanthaiya, the Chief Minister of Mysore, Rajagopalachari stated that Mysore had stored Cauvery waters in the Krishnarajasagara dam much in excess of the agreed limit. He argued that if the waters due to Madras were released, it would cause no harm to the crops in Mysore State. But he also understood "how difficult you will find it to release any portion of your storage, against the protests of your *ryots*, once the water is stored in your reservoir." Hanumanthaiya replied that he was too small a man to cope with the situation that would arise out of his letting out waters from the Krishnarajasagara dam. He could not face public opinion in Mysore and would rather have the Central Government settle the issue.
4. The rice crops in a vast area in the Cauvery delta of Tanjore and Tiruchirapalli districts were feared to go dry if the waters impounded by Mysore were not released immediately.
5. The 1924 Agreement provided that the terms might be reconsidered in the light of experience gained at the end of fifty years.

It appears to me from your letters to Rajaji that there has been a breach of the terms of the Agreement and Rajaji is, therefore, justified in requesting you not to do so and to allow the full flow of water as laid down in the Agreement. I would request you to take the earliest steps in this matter.

If dispute continues the only course left open in terms of Agreement is to refer it to arbitration or to Government of India. But this course will take time and, anyhow, should be avoided if possible. I would like you to meet Rajaji and discuss this matter in a friendly way with him. I am sure that will lead to an arrangement satisfactory to both parties. But, meanwhile, the flow of water should continue according to terms of Agreement so as not to cause irreparable damage to the lands in the Cauvery delta.

2. To K. Hanumanthaiya¹

New Delhi
September 20, 1952

My dear Hanumanthaiya,

I have just sent you a long telegram,² a copy of which I enclose. This relates to the argument that has been going on between you and Rajaji about the flow of water in accordance with the Agreement of 1924 between the Mysore and Madras Governments regarding the sharing of the Cauvery waters.

I did not know anything about this till today. But the matter has been referred to me, and I have been able to obtain from the Ministry of States the file on this subject which contains all the correspondence that has passed between you and Rajaji. I have read through this carefully.

My telegram to you is long enough and I need not repeat it here. But I should like to say that, while I fully appreciate your difficulty and your apprehension, I do feel that it would be very wrong on your part not to allow the full flow of water to the Cauvery delta as laid down in the Agreement. It is clear from your own letters that your Government has impounded a certain quantity of this water which, in terms of the Agreement, should have gone to the Madras State. It is not possible for me, without much fuller enquiry, to judge between the desperate needs of Madras and Mysore. The impression I gather from the correspondence, however, is that the present need of Madras is greater, and if it is not met, the consequences will also be much more

1. JN Collection.

2. See the preceding item.

serious. But, where the need is patent on both sides, the only course to adopt is to abide strictly by the terms of the Agreement of 1924. Any breach of it would be, both legally and morally, wrong.

But surely, as between two friendly States, it is unbecoming and improper for a controversy of this kind to be carried on. I am sure that if you had met Rajaji and discussed this with him, a satisfactory solution would have followed. Even now I have suggested that you should do so. But the need is urgent, and I would urge you to issue orders that the normal flow of water should continue in terms of the Agreement.

In view of the desperate situation in the Cauvery delta, if there is any further delay in supplying this water, then probably the Government of Madras will have to appeal to the President to refer this matter, in terms of the Constitution,³ to the Supreme Court for an urgent opinion. But I hope this will not be necessary and that you will agree to the request made by Rajaji.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The Constitution of India provides under Article 262(1) that "Parliament may by law provide for the adjudication of any dispute or complaint with respect to the use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in, any inter-State river or river valley."

3. To K. Hanumanthaiya¹

Hyderabad
September 25, 1952

My dear Hanumanthaiya,

Before leaving Delhi I sent you a telegram and wrote to you also, about the release of water to Madras. I have had no reply from you. Meanwhile, I am getting reports of the very critical situation in Madras. From all the reports I have had I feel that, even apart from the terms of the Agreement, which are obviously in favour of Madras, there is no grave risk of Mysore suffering if you agree to abide by the Agreement in this matter. In any event, it is clear that the greatest damage will be done to Madras with far-reaching consequences.

It may be that some people in Mysore might criticize you. I think that if the facts are placed before them and the terms of the Agreement, nobody can rightly criticize you in acting upto it. But I am perfectly prepared to take the responsibility for this decision if that helps you. You can take this action and say that you are doing it on my advice.

1. JN Collection.

I do hope that you will take immediate action in this matter. Indeed, the difficulty would have been less if you had acted previously. By any further delay the difficulty will not disappear, but serious consequences will, no doubt, follow.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To K. Hanumanthaiya¹

New Delhi
October 2, 1952

My dear Hanumanthaiya,

Thank you for your letter of September 27.

I had no desire to interfere in regard to the water supply to Madras and indeed, you will remember that I suggested your dealing with Rajaji directly. But the possibility, as pointed out by Rajaji, of a vast area drying up completely even before the expected rains come, was a terrible one to contemplate. I hope that matters have been settled satisfactorily now. I understand that you have had some rains recently. They must have brought some relief at least...

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

1. To G.V. Mavalankar¹

New Delhi
July 18, 1952

My dear Mr Speaker,

Thank you for your letter of 16th July.

My colleagues and I are anxious to give the fullest information in reply to questions. They make every effort to be present themselves when questions relating to them are asked. It is only when they are indisposed or have to be present in the Council of States or are on tour outside Delhi that they have been unable to be present. As you will no doubt appreciate, the sittings of the Council of States at the same time as those of the House of the People produce some difficulties for Ministers who have to attend sometimes in both places.

So far as touring is concerned, we have reduced that to a minimum during the sessions of Parliament but sometimes this becomes inevitable. The Food Minister, more especially, has to visit a number of places in India in order to discuss the urgent food situation there.

The strain on Ministers since the present session of Parliament began has been very great. Apart from the heavy work in Parliament itself, they have to deal with a multitude of problems and to interview many people. The only way out appears to be to increase the number of Ministers or Parliamentary Secretaries, though even then the main burden will continue to fall on some of the senior Ministers. I have personally decided not to attend any of the large number of diplomatic functions that take place frequently in Delhi and otherwise, as far as possible, also not to accept any engagements.

I am sending a copy of your letter to my colleagues.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 32(47)/48-PMS.

2. To G.V. Mavalankar¹

New Delhi
July 20, 1952

My dear Mr Speaker,

The Chairman of the Council of States wrote to me conveying the desire of the Council to be associated with the House of the People in the Estimates

1. File No. 32(10)/57-PMS.

Committee and the Public Accounts Committee; also to be associated in select committees. He pointed out the provision under rules framed for the House of the People for joint select committees.

A large number of the Members of the Council of States also saw me on the subject and pressed for these suggestions to be given effect to.

While the House of the People has framed its rules for the conduct of business, I understand that the Council of States has not done this so far. They will, no doubt, be framing their rules for the future. Probably, those rules would be affected by any decision arrived at in regard to the proposals mentioned above.

According to the rules of the House of the People, joint select committees on Bills are provided for.

This matter was referred by us to the Law Ministry for examination. The Minister of Law, after giving careful consideration, advised us that it was possible and desirable to have such joint select committees for Bills and also to associate the Council of States in the Estimates Committee and the Public Accounts Committee. My colleagues and I discussed these matters at some length and considered various aspects. We agreed that it would be desirable to have joint select committees for both Houses of Parliament for major Bills. This would facilitate their passage through both Houses. This was not, however, considered necessary for every Bill.

In regard to the Estimates Committee and the Public Accounts Committee, many viewpoints were expressed and it was pointed out that the House of the People had special powers in regard to grants and some other financial matters. Nevertheless, the Appropriation Bill did go up to the Council of States for their consideration and comments.

I need not give any details here of the long discussion we had. As a result of this discussion, my colleagues and I were of opinion that it would be desirable to associate the Council of States in the Public Accounts Committee, though this was not necessary in so far as the Estimates Committee was concerned. I was asked by them to forward this recommendation to you.

Apart from what might be called legal and constitutional aspects of this question, the practical aspect seemed to us to be important. It is desirable to have full cooperation between the two Houses. If such cooperation is lacking, then there would be long delays and much overlapping in work. Thus, it is presumably open to the Council of States to form their own committees corresponding with the Estimates Committee and the Public Accounts Committee. If this is done, two separate investigations would take place into the working of various Ministries, etc., and separate reports might be produced. This would involve a great burden on a considerable number of our senior officers who would have to be present at the hearings of these committees. As it is, many of our senior officers have to give a good deal of their time to the

work of these committees of the House of the People.

These and various other considerations led my colleagues to make the suggestion which I have indicated above.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
July 28, 1952

My dear Mr President,

When the Vice President was appointed, there was no provision, so far as I remember, for his salary. We suggested therefore that he should get the salary of a Cabinet Minister, that is, Rs 3,000/- plus Rs 500/- entertainment allowance. We are now revising salaries of Cabinet Ministers and bringing them down to Rs 2,225/- plus entertainment allowance.

I think that this revision of Cabinet Ministers' salaries should not apply to the Vice President and that he should get the same salary as the Speaker, that is to say, what he is getting now. The Chairman of the Council of States and the Speaker should be equated.

There is another aspect of this question which I should like to put to you for your consideration. I think that the Vice President, for purposes of entertainment etc., should be included in the Government Hospitality Organization, just as the Prime Minister is. That would be more fitting and he could draw upon the Government House Staff when necessary. If that is so, then there should be no question of his getting an entertainment allowance. I have just referred to the Constitution. This says that the Chairman of the Council of States shall be paid the same salary etc., as the Speaker. So this is fixed. Nevertheless, it would be desirable I think for the Vice President's official entertainments to be dealt with by the Government Hospitality Organization.

I should like your views on this subject before I take it up further.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 165/52, President's Secretariat. Also available in Rajendra Prasad Papers, NAI.

4. Revision of Salaries of Central Ministers¹

May I for a moment speak not as Prime Minister but as a person who a little over twenty-one years ago proposed a resolution² at the Karachi Session of the Indian National Congress, in which there was a part which suggested that normally the salaries to be paid should not exceed Rs 500 a month. That resolution has often been pointed out to me and to many of my colleagues in recent months. I believe a great many references were made to it during the election campaign. I am perfectly prepared to admit that those references and criticisms were *prima facie* justified. That resolution said that as a rule Rs 500 should be the maximum salary, except in the case of experts etc.

Well, a great deal has happened since then and even taking that resolution which we put into practice largely when some of our colleagues became Ministers in Provincial Governments in the mid thirties. They took Rs 500 as salary, but they took—and it was inevitable—certain other privileges like a State car etc., and a house too. That was in a sense inherent in that Karachi resolution too. Actually therefore, if you work it out, it works out to much more than Rs 500 if you give a car and a house etc. But apart from other things, the House knows very well how things have changed and five hundred rupees of those days are not worth so much today in regard to both the value of the money and its purchasing power due to devaluation and the much higher taxes than one has to pay. If any kind of rough and ready calculation is made it will be found that there is very little difference between Rs 500 then plus the privileges attached to them and what we suggest should be paid to Ministers now.³ It is difficult to be accurate about these calculations, but

1. Speech during the debate on the Salaries and Allowances of Ministers Bill in the House of the People, 31 July 1952. *Parliamentary Debates, (House of the People), (Official Report)*, Vol IV, Part II, cols. 4956-4961.
2. The Karachi Congress Resolution on Fundamental Rights adopted on 31 March 1931 laid down that "no servant of the State, other than specially employed experts and the like to be paid above a certain fixed figure which should not ordinarily exceed Rs 500 per month." See *Selected Works* (First Series), Vol. 4, p. 512.
3. The Salaries and Allowances of Ministers Bill laid down that a Minister of the Central Government, other than a Deputy Minister, would get a monthly salary of Rs 2,250, a rent-free furnished house, free medical treatment for himself and his family in Government hospitals, sumptuary allowance upto Rs 500 a month and a repayable advance for the purchase of a car. A Deputy Minister would get a monthly salary of Rs 1,750 and residential, medical and other facilities enjoyed by a Minister or Minister of State with no sumptuary allowance.

I do submit that there is no major difference and we have tried our best to follow, generally speaking, that policy that was laid down then.

Of course, I am for the moment talking about the salaries of Ministers and not about the other salaries that are paid, and that are governed by all kinds of rules, laws, assurances and the like. That is a separate matter. All that took place four or five years ago at the time of the change-over in the Government. All kinds of assurances were given and naturally those people who have given those assurances want to abide by them. It is not good for assurances to be given and not to be kept, unless there is a *force majeure* or something else that happens. Sometimes I think it may be said rightly that many of the assurances that were given were not justifiable or right in the larger scheme of things. That is a matter which we can examine.

For the moment we are dealing with Ministers' salaries and we in the Cabinet gave a great deal of thought to this matter. We all of us had personal experience of it during the last few years. On the other hand, we wanted to reduce the salaries to the lowest possible scale, not merely to save a little money for the Government, but because we realized that after all Ministers of the Central Government should set an example to others. It is more from that point of view that we do this, in that it will have a certain sobering effect on others too, if not immediately, well, gradually.

Now most of us calculate, I suppose, our expenditure on various necessities, etc. Inevitably a Minister, I think, ought to have what I consider certain facilities for work, if you want good work from him—a quiet place to work in. He cannot work if he is surrounded all the time. You should give him those facilities whether it is a house, or wherever it may be, and certain other conveniences so as to get the best work out of him. They cost a little in the shape of the residence you provide. My honourable colleague, Dr Katju, said that he would gladly live at Okhla or some distant village near Delhi and come here. It is not convenient either to him or to the work or to those who have to deal with him.

Then, we have to deal—all of us here, not only Ministers, but Members also—with this extraordinary city of New Delhi which is situated quite near one of the most ancient cities in the world, that is Old Delhi, and yet is so different from it, so mixed with it and yet so different, where standards of living or expenditure are so very heavy, that I may say they are heavier than in most capitals in the world. It is extremely difficult. I wish that all of us really gave thought to it as to how to control New Delhi. Each honourable Member here has to face the situation. I think the average rent in Delhi is amazingly high. If a person wants to build a house in Delhi, my honourable colleague, the Minister of Works, in that particular New Delhi area, charges a premium, which is colossal, apart from the rent and other things.

The market here is governed by a few millionaires and others. The result

is that other people do not have chance. I do not know how to get over the difficulty, but there it is.

Anyhow we gave a great deal of thought to this matter and I do submit, speaking from a good deal of experience, that the figures we have given are about the lowest that could possibly be given, if you want those minimum facilities, etc., that have been mentioned.

My honourable colleagues and I may carry on work to the liking or not of some honourable Members. Our policies may be objected to or criticized. But one fact, I think, is very clear, that we in this Government are terribly handworked. We may work foolishly or wisely, but we are hardworked and the strain on us is tremendous, the strain of actual work, the strain of Parliament, the strain of interviews. We do not even have what other countries normally have, some off-days, Sundays or Saturdays. It is a continuous strain and in that strain it becomes necessary to organize one's life carefully so as to get the best out of it in the shape of work and not to collapse. That fact also might be borne in mind.

Now, if I may speak just for a moment personally, the honorable Home Minister said that one test should be, and it is a good test, you must not take into consideration the personal income of a Minister, because if you do it, then you may get only persons who have personal income. Suppose there are some Ministers who can afford to augment their salary with their personal income. Then there is an invidious distinction, and difficulties. One tries to keep up standards which the others cannot keep up, and it is not fair. Therefore, while having a salary as low as possible, it should be enough for him to do his work and keep up such dignity, etc., as a person should keep up in such a position, without any addition from his personal income. I know that many of my colleagues have been hard put to it to do this and have had to resort to such personal resources as they possessed.

The House will forgive me for being rather personal. My own income, the only income, practically speaking, that I have, apart from the salary, has been the author's income. Those royalties from books stopped practically when I became a Minister, because I could not write books. Some of them overflowed from past periods; some royalties continue to come, but naturally they shrink and gradually disappear after a few years. I am a little fortunate that if I am hard put to it. I can earn by writing again. So, I have no fear from that point of view.

When I first joined Government, I was not used to salary, having never received any salary in my life, and it was a kind of extra to me—I felt and I was rather lavish with it. I did not possess a motor car when I joined Government. The previous time I had a car was fifteen years back when it was taken by the police and I thought it was not necessary to purchase a car. I did not possess a car for many years. So I bought a car. I felt I had plenty

of money; I did not realize that I was spending far above my means, although in those days we used to get double the salary we are getting now.

So, we came down in the scale of things. I am fortunate or unfortunate, as you like, in that I have no family to support. I am a widower; I have no children to educate and I have relatively simple habits. Now, one thing I should like to make clear. An honourable Member has put in an amendment about the Prime Minister getting a sumptuary allowance of Rs 1,000 a month, while the other Ministers get nothing at all. Well, the Prime Minister—I want to be quite frank with the House—is a favoured individual in this respect. He does not draw the Rs 500 allowance. But he is connected with what is called the Government Hospitality Organization of Rashtrapati Bhavan, so that all his official hospitality automatically goes to the Government Hospitality Organization. The result is that there is no point in the Prime Minister drawing an allowance. He does not draw the Rs 500; possibly he spends much more than Rs 500: it varies of course, but it all goes automatically to the Government Hospitality Organization so that in future too if this arrangement continues, he will not draw this sumptuary allowance; his establishment is a part of the Government Hospitality Organization. So far as other Ministers are concerned, of course, it depends on the Ministers but inevitably all of them certainly—some a little more than others—have to indulge in some hospitality. People may think that hospitality means ‘feasting’. It is not. It is really an occasion to meet people, not only people from our own country; foreigners may come here. Each Minister has to deal with all kinds of delegations, deputations, conferences and the like, and New Delhi becomes more and more an important centre of international and national conferences. One has to meet them, one has to ask them to meals, parties, small or big, and that is a costly business. I doubt very much if any Minister spends even his sumptuary allowance. He oversteps it. He cannot help it. Perhaps occasionally he might. Normally he goes beyond it because he cannot help it.

I just heard a reference was made to Parliamentary Secretaries. Parliamentary Secretaries were started in the Provincial Governments some years back. The Parliamentary Secretary here is different from the Parliamentary Secretaries in the States as they were. The Parliamentary Secretaries in the States really corresponded to some extent with the Deputy Ministers that we have here now. They ought to have corresponded with them, but in actual fact, perhaps they did not.

So when we have Deputy Ministers here it seemed to me that there was no point in having that type of Parliamentary Secretary here. It is just having more people, and there is no point in it. Therefore, last year when I started this system of Parliamentary Secretaries, there were honorary Parliamentary Secretaries getting no payment at all of any kind except when they were called upon to do some official work in between session times; it may be that if they

are summoned—they were not supposed to do regular work—they came or they were sent for two or three days somewhere to enquire into a particular matter, and normally Member's daily allowance for these days was allowed to them. They are honorary Parliamentary Secretaries, and personally I think that that should not be changed. It is a good practice. I should like to have a number of Parliamentary Secretaries in this way, each Minister to have one or two to help him. That is no additional burden on the Exchequer and it gives some training also and employs a number of usually younger Members in the House in certain Government work; that gives them an insight into it also. Therefore, I would suggest that Parliamentary Secretaries should not be brought into this paid grade, and they were deliberately kept out of it. After all if a person is to be paid, there is the Minister, there is the Deputy Minister. It is not quite clear to me why you should have another grade for the Parliamentary Secretary. That, of course, is for the House to consider. It is a matter of principle. I am merely giving my own opinion about it.

Then there is this question of residence and, as I said, a residence should be a place where a person, a Minister, can do work quietly and efficiently. As to the old so-called Ministers' houses, or the old Executive Councillors' houses, I dislike them intensely from every point of view, whether it is the external appearance or the internal layout or the furniture there or the darkness that surrounds them inside and outside. It is an extraordinary place there, and yet they are big, costly to keep up and a nuisance. I would much prefer convenient and smaller houses. The burden of rent will be less and the burden of upkeep will be less too. In fact, in future, I suppose, and I hope, that no big houses would be built in Delhi at all. The foreign missions may build them if they like. One of the reasons why New Delhi is so expensive is because of these big houses with large compounds. If you have to go to your next door neighbour, it is half a mile away practically. It is not a city; it is a spread out place. So we have to fill that in and make it more like a city so that one can walk across or bicycle across and do things, instead of being forced to maintain a standard, which very few people can afford to maintain. I submit that the Bill as placed by my colleague has taken into consideration all these matters and I commend it for the approval of the House.

5. Preventive Detention¹

We have listened to a large number of speeches in this debate.² Many of them have been eloquent. Many have been full of individual instances and, sometimes, personal autobiography. Many have referred to democratic principles, and how this Bill is a breach of those principles.³ I confess, Sir, that I have had a feeling during this debate, a feeling of unreality as if—I say so with all respect to the House—we were discussing something that is not this particular Bill before the House, but something entirely different which we had in our minds, our own personal experiences may be, or our future hopes of what we should do or should not do, and we have by-passed this Bill, the context of this Bill in the country, and even the language of this Bill. We have discussed these high concepts of democracy and I claim I have some feeling for democracy.

Democracy as I know it is not merely a certain structure of government—though that is important of course—it is not merely certain laws and the rest of it, though they are important also, but it is essentially a sense of values and standards in life. It is an organic growth, it is how you act, how you think, whether as an individual or a group or a nation. I do not mean to say everybody thinks alike or should think alike. But I do mean to say that there is a fundamental approach to political and other problems which may be called the democratic approach, and there are other approaches which are not democratic. Now if that is the test, let us examine not only this Bill, but the context of things in India from that point of view. That might lead us to some results and if there is anything basically wrong in the Bill, let us scrap it by all means.

So far as I am concerned, and so far as all my colleagues in the Cabinet are concerned, we gave the most earnest consideration to this measure as we have had to, because such a measure which apparently, or really, limits in a measure the normal freedom which the citizen enjoys must be looked at with

1. Speech on 2 August 1952 during the debate on the Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Bill, moved in the House of the People on 9 July 1952 to extend the life of the Detention Act till 31 December 1954. *Parliamentary Debates, (House of the People) (Official Report)*, Vol IV, Part II, cols. 5186-5204.
2. Opposition members questioned the necessity for the extension of the Preventive Detention Act when the subversive or anti-social acts were not of such magnitude that the normal process of the law could not suffice. They saw in it an "authoritarian tendency" and denounced as "vicious", "brutal", "a stinking piece of legislation", and a "black Act". A section of the Opposition walked out when the Bill was introduced.
3. Opposing the motion for the extension of the Preventive Detention Act, S.P. Mookerjee said on 9 July that the principle of detention without trial was inconsistent with and repugnant to the principles of democracy.

the greatest care, and it is right that this House should look upon it with the greatest care and vigilance. So we in the Cabinet considered it very carefully, considered the old Act⁴ as it was, considered the amendments that we wanted to bring in and finally came to certain conclusions. We came to the conclusion that it is necessary, not only desirable but necessary to have some such measure at the present moment in India, or if you like, to continue the old measure with certain important and basic changes in it.

Now, if that was once agreed to or understood, then the other question remains as to what the changes should be, and how far we should go in ensuring that this Act or legislation was not misused. Honourable Members have pointed many cases where according to them it was misused.⁵ I have no doubt—I do not know of those individual cases—that in many cases it may have been misused. I agree and I accept that for the moment without going into details. Let us again consider whether it is possible to prevent any such misuse in so far as we can assure that. Nobody can be absolutely certain, but we can have safeguards to prevent such misuse. But when one talks about misuse of a measure, one must not think in *vacuo*. One must always think of the particular set of circumstances when that act was used. An honourable Member has pointed out 'Let us see what happened in Hyderabad and in the Telengana'.⁶

4. The Preventive Detention Act was passed by Parliament on 25 February 1950 to prevent secret and subversive activities and to safeguard the security of the public and the State. The Act also empowered the Governments of the States to detain persons who endangered the maintenance of essential supplies to the community. This power might be exercised by District Magistrates or Additional District Magistrates especially empowered by the State Governments to act on its behalf and by the Commissioners of Police in Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Hyderabad. An amended form of the Act to remain in force until April 1952 was adopted by Parliament early in 1951.
5. For example, N.C. Chatterjee, the Hindu Mahasabha leader, said during the debate on the Bill that in the cases of Ram Singh and Asutosh Lahiry, the Supreme Court judgments proved that the detentions were *mala fide*. The day V.G. Deshpande was detained for presiding over a meeting, the District Magistrate had signed the detention order of four persons for having presided over the same meeting.
6. N.M. Jaisooriya of the People's Democratic Front said, referring to the charges of violence in Telengana: "I have also to give you a bill. According to conservative figures, 2,000 were killed, not less than 50 died in jails and concentration camps, 50,000 people were arrested and subjected to torture and indignities, property worth lakhs was destroyed by the police. One thousand raids were made on villages and I do not know the number of women raped."

I accept that for the moment without analysing each case and, as I said, there were a number of cases of misuse, or if you like, of grave misuse.⁷

But I should like the House to remember again the context of this—the context of the greatest misuse of any kind of liberty that an individual achieved in this country. The context was something near approaching war and challenges to the authority of the State, the context was civil war....⁸

I do not wish to import any heat or passion in this debate. If they do not like the word 'war' I would not use it. The context was armed fight, with arms on both sides....⁹

I am putting it to the House. When arms are used on two sides by troops, that is normally called war, it may be civil war, it may be international war, or it may be a private war, if you like. Whatever that may be, arms were used and deliberately used, and if I may remind the House, up to this day there is a refusal to give up those arms.¹⁰ Is that not a very extraordinary thing? I accept that those arms are not used at the present moment. I accept that there is a great change for the better. Undoubtedly so. And if there is a great change for the better, I should like the House to consider how far the Government, which I have the honour to represent, is to be given credit for that change for the better and the policy they have proceeded with. The change for the better has not come off by itself, but because a certain policy was pursued by this Government month after month and year after year under circumstances of great strain and stress.

So it is better, but even so the fact remains—and it is a large fact—that groups of persons in this country, who are known to have arms, want to lay down conditions before they lay down these arms. I have heard, and the House also knows, that there are all kinds of truce parleys in Panmunjon.¹¹ Are we supposed to be dealing with independent entities or independent nations here having arms, fighting the Republic of India and dealing with the Republic of India who say "on this condition we lay down arms only if you do this or that." Sir, it is an amazing conception. And honourable Members come here and talk of democratic principles and the freedom of speech and all that, when they possess arms. If you possess arms, and you do not give them up, why do

7. T.B. Vittal Rao of the People's Democratic Front here remarked : "What action has been taken against those who have misused it?"

8. Vittal Rao said : "Nothing of that kind".

9. Vittal Rao interrupted : "What is there? It was armed self-defence." Thereupon the Deputy Speaker said: "I would not allow this kind of interruptions any more."

10. The Communists in Hyderabad had arms captured from Razakars and offered to surrender them if an assurance was given that they would not be prosecuted and that all warrants against them would be withdrawn.

11. The United Nations and Communist armistice delegations had been meeting at Panmunjon at this time and holding secret talks on the exchange of prisoners of the Korean war.

you not give them up? It is because at the back of your mind you want to use them at some time or other. Why else? You want to use them under certain circumstances. Whatever that may be, I do not mean to say that honourable Members who have changed¹² their policy recently do not mean to abide by that change. I accept that change, I welcome it, and I am glad of it, and I welcome them here, but I do say that undoubtedly at the back of their minds, there must be that thought. Otherwise why not deliver up those arms? I do not wish to lay any great stress on this matter, but I merely mentioned it in passing.

The point is that we are discussing this question in rather academic terms of—if I may call it so—the British nineteenth century democracy. We are in the middle of the 20th century and in the territory of India. How far those terms are applicable *in vacuo* to any situation, I do not know. I accept hundred per cent. The basic principles of that democratic approach to life, that is a sense of democratic values and standards, and I hope that this Government which I have the honour to serve will always accept those principles, and I hope other Governments that come will also agree with them, but that does not mean that we should merely think in terms of phrases and clichés forgetting those very principles which are represented by those terms and phrases. I ask, not only the Members of the Opposition but even my colleagues on this side of the House, how many of us accept those basic values in life which are termed ‘democracy’? And in the present moment especially when we talk of democracy, this structure of democracy, this spirit of democracy and this approach of democracy, how far and in what continents of this wide world how many countries do that? I put it to this House to look at it and say how many countries in this wide continent of Asia do that or in Europe, for the matter of that? There are some, undoubtedly. But this whole concept is coming up against all kinds of inner difficulties. My honourable friends opposite or at least some of them, will call it “inner contradictions”. Well, I admit that whatever it is. Let us examine it. Let us not use a certain phrase in one context and act in a completely different way in another context. Here I am, Prime Minister of this great country with a tremendous responsibility to shoulder, and with my colleagues sharing that responsibility. Are we merely to appease somebody to forget that responsibility?

• The House knows very well that any Government that brings forward a Bill of this kind which can easily be attacked and which can easily be criticized,

12. On 17 September 1951, the Communist Party of India declared that it would give up violence and participate in the democratic process of the country, if the Preventive Detention Act and the repressive policy against the party were withdrawn. Soon after the ban on the Communist Party was lifted.

can make the Government unpopular and it is a matter, if I may say so, with all respect, of courage for a Government to bring forward such a Bill.¹³

Honourable Members laugh. Their laughter, I am sorry to say, is rather cheap. One should not laugh too soon. Here, a Bill like this could only be brought forward by a Government that feels an utter responsibility for the burden it shoulders. It may err, it may make mistakes; that is a different matter, we are all liable to err. But it can only do so if it feels that responsibility and wishes to discharge that responsibility, come what may. If the people of India do not want us, well they can push us out. It is all very well for an honourable Member here or there to issue challenges about the elections and the like. Surely we have had the elections only a little while ago; it is not so long. Surely this very Detention Act was very much harder than the one we are now proposing; it was talked about and criticized by Members of the Opposition in this election campaign all the time....¹⁴

Was this an issue? There were a hundred issues in the election. If you want one, in my city of Allahabad the major issue was the Hindu Code Bill.¹⁵

Where is it now? Honourable Members know that it is in the programme of Government, and Government is going through with it. So in another place there was some other issue. In this great country, normally elections were governed by local issues, but this broad fact, the record of this Government generally and the record of this Government in regard to this particular Bill was talked *ad nauseam* in many places in this election. And yet the result of the election was what you see.

Honourable Members talk glibly about a police State.¹⁶ I put it to them, to think a little more calmly in their calmer moments, if there is the remotest justification for the use of that word in regard to the present structure of the Government of India. I put it to them to compare the structure with many other structures. It is not my function, nor do I like to criticize any other country; they are not my responsibility and it is unbecoming for me to criticize the ways or structure of a Government or the policies pursued by any other country, big or small. I do not know what their problems are. It may be that their way is right for their country; I cannot judge for them. I know what my

13. Applause and laughter from the members in the House.

14. H.N. Mukerjee raised a question: "Was that an issue in the election? Did any Congressman anywhere defend the Detention Act?"

15. Thakur Das Bhargava said: "In the whole country it was" and Harendranath Chattopadhyaya asked: "What is it now?"

16. N.M. Jaisoorya said that under the Bill "arbitrary power is given to our police, whose veracity, mentality, truthfulness, is not of a very high standard, because we have inherited it from the British to judge what is going on in men's minds." Another member said that "the State will be nothing but a police State, because people will be arrested and detained on police information and reports whose testimony could not be subject to cross-examination."

problems are; I judge about it, and I shall certainly refuse to submit to anyone imposing his way on me. That is a different matter. Therefore, I do not criticize, but I do submit, when you talk about a police State, look around all the countries in Asia, look around the countries of Europe. I do not say there are not some countries that have in a good measure this democratic set-up that we are following; nevertheless, compare what India is and compare the functioning and the authoritarian ways—I am not saying it from the point of view of criticism, but mere comparison—of some countries, and what I object to, if I may say so, with all respect, is the use of this loose language. Was it a police State which had an election in which the honourable Members opposite came in? So it is in this context that I should like this House to consider this.

Now, when you consider this Bill with a large number of individual cases or instances, good, bad or indifferent—let us treat them separately if you like, let us give punishment where that is due, that is a separate thing entirely—but we have to consider this fact, whether, in the totality of circumstances in India today, it is desirable to have some measure like this in the armoury of the State's laws? If so, then the other question arises, how far we should try and safeguard the rights of the individual citizen, so that, as far as human ingenuity can devise, he should not be subjected to harassment and injustice. Those are the two major questions to be considered.

Now, somehow or other this question has been dealt with rather as if this Bill was aimed at the activities or the future activities, if I may say so, of a certain group or party. Well, I think that is a wrong view to take of it. I am perfectly straight about what I say. We have had in India, broadly speaking, four types of what I call anti-social activities. There is the communal activity—I am only referring to activities indulged in with violence, for the moment, not expressions of views. Then there is the Communist activity—and when I say Communist I am not confining my words to the Communist Party's activities; it is a loose word I have used because there are so many groups and parties separate from one another, I do not know all their names, we can make a long list of them such as, RSP etc., any number of groups which float in and out of the scene of action, which are under no discipline, not even their own discipline, and which create an enormous amount of trouble. Thirdly there are what I may call purely terrorist activities. And, lastly there are what I would call—broadly speaking again—the *jagirdari* activities. These are the four main, violent approaches....¹⁷

The honourable Member can also make a long list of violent activities if he reads the reports in the courts everyday of cases going on. We are not talking of individual misdeeds. There may be—the honourable Member may be right—some cases of misbehaviour on the part of Congressmen. He may be

17. Harendranath Chattopadhyaya interrupted: "What about Congress activities?"

right. Obviously, in the very nature of things, the Congress cannot live apart from its training and principles, cannot live differently and indulge in mass violence. It is patent, on the face of it. It may indulge in wrong activity, it may indulge in occasional suppression of an individual. I mean the Government party. But let us examine it. These are the four heads and—I repeat them—communal, then Communist—but as I said it goes beyond the Communist Party and the Communist Party is not responsible for all those marginal groups which function in this way—then terrorist and lastly *jagirdari*.

Now, the other day an honourable Member opposite, referring to what happened, I think, in Calcutta, mentioned those “broad masses in action”, “the sweep of history putting the masses in action!”¹⁸ Well, broad masses have been in action and have brought about big changes for good or bad. But to call the kind of thing we have seen in Calcutta or elsewhere occasionally as the broad masses in action, seems to me not only a complete misjudgment of what is happening, but a complete misuse of words. Let us take this Calcutta incident, that very thing to which my honourable friend referred. It was a most amazing thing. The demand was that a certain assurance given by the Government of India and the Government of West Bengal in regard to a food problem in Calcutta and West Bengal had not been fulfilled. Now, on analysis we found that the question of fulfilment—if you like—or part of it would have come six months later. At that time every single part of that programme had been fulfilled by the Government of India and the West Bengal Government. Calcutta had plenty of wheat—not only wheat but rice. The question arose as to whether six months later a certain part of the programme would be fulfilled or not, and, if I may say so, a notice was issued that marches would take place to demonstrate.

I was amazed, because the reason for it was that the assurance of the Government of India had not been fulfilled. I was astounded because we had fulfilled it. The leaders of those people who had issued notices were sent for by the Chief Minister of West Bengal. He gave them facts and figures. They said, “You are right, you have fulfilled it.” They agreed to it. They saw that their position was wrong. They went back and next day came back with that procession and there was this trouble. In a city like Calcutta, honourable Members can well imagine that it is very easy for a hundred or two hundred or five hundred persons to create trouble, if they are so inclined. If that is called the broad masses in action, I do not know the meaning of that phrase. I remember, two or three years ago, when, again, in Calcutta city—this great

18. H.N. Mukerjee had interrupted when K.N. Katju welcomed the Communists’ decision to abjure violence. He said that during the three-day agitation in Calcutta for more food, the demonstrators, “the peaceful masses”, resorted to violence only after having been provoked by police action.

city of three or four million people, facing grave difficulties, terrible difficulties, because of the large influx from East Bengal, because of the housing problem, because of so many other difficulties—there was a state of semi-terror because every day some odd bomb would be thrown at somebody, at a policeman, at a shop, at a tram-car; tram-cars would be burnt.

An extraordinary state of affairs that, in a great city, life should be interfered with and should be held up—the broad masses were functioning by occasionally throwing a bomb here or there or at a policeman! Just about that time I went to Calcutta and I saw the broad masses. They came to my meeting, a million of them, and at that very meeting a bomb was thrown, a live bomb, which resulted in the killing of a police inspector and two or three others, as well as wounding the man who threw it. But that vast audience that was there behaved with discipline. I had told them beforehand: "It does not matter if there is murder or if anything happens, you must not move, you must behave with discipline, we will deal with the situation." And they behaved with discipline. And I spoke to them, and after that the broad masses began to take action against the bomb-throwers. They did not like them at all, they said: "We are not going to be imposed upon by these individual terrorists", and all this stopped. That is what I call the broad masses in action against those elements who create trouble.

Now, are you going to have the city of Calcutta or the city of Delhi or the city of Bombay held up by one hundred people or by five hundred or one thousand, and thus hold up the life of millions? I submit life would be impossible in these cities if that happens. Here in the city of Delhi the other day—was it two or three weeks ago or a month ago—there was an incident, an entirely private affair, of some proposed marriage,¹⁹ in which nobody was greatly interested—whether it was right or wrong it was none of our concern. I never heard of it till these incidents occurred. Now, I observed certain elements in the city immediately go and start breaking the windows of the court-house, hitting people in Chandni Chowk and generally creating trouble. If the Delhi police had relaxed on that occasion, no doubt, disturbances would have spread and you would have found in large parts of Delhi this kind of thing happening. We had not forgotten yet what happened from Delhi up to East Punjab and in the Pakistan areas from August to September and October 1947. I shall never forget it, the horror of it which I saw whether it was in Pakistan, whether it was in East Punjab or whether it was in Delhi. People were incited to do this, even good people incited to do this kind of inhuman things, barbarities. It is easy to incite them, and it is easy to do all these kinds of things. And if in the name of democracy you want to undermine all the structure, this proud structure of the democratic State we

19. The proposed marriage of Sikander Bakht and Raj Sharma, both Congress workers, was exploited by communal elements and there was some rioting in Delhi.

have built up, you are welcome to it, but that is not my conception of democracy.

Therefore, we have to look at these things in this context of India as it is. Let us examine. It is our duty to protect the liberty of the individual to see that there is no misuse of the law, to see that there is every safeguard that we can think of provided, but let us also at the same time remember that the major safeguard that we have to think of is the safety of the country and the community. And it is that major responsibility that this Government has to shoulder, and to the best of its ability it is going to shoulder it. Unless the State is perfect, and every individual is perfect, there is always some conflict between the freedom of the individual and the needs and the security of the State. You have extreme cases, as you have in some countries, of the State being put above everything, above every single individual freedom—the State becomes the God there.

We have in great countries those cases—it is not for me to criticize them. For my part I cherish the freedom of the individual. I do not want even in the name of the State the freedom of the individual to be crushed. But undoubtedly the freedom of certain individuals has to be curbed for the safety of the State, if occasion arises. After all in time of war every democratic country curbs the freedom of the individual because the State is in danger. I do not mean to say that we are living in times of war in India. Undoubtedly, we have progressed a great deal—and many honourable Members of the Opposition have stated how greatly we have progressed in this respect and how stable our country is compared to many other countries. Probably, if they had been speaking in some other context they would have said that we have made no progress at all. In fact, they do say that, but in this particular context we get quite a number of bouquets about the progress we have made in stability and security.

Well, I am grateful for those bouquets and we hope that we shall go further in that direction. But the essential question remains about the conflict between the security of the State and the liberty of the individual and the line to be drawn varies according to circumstances. In war it goes far towards the State, in peace time it should go far towards the individual, the State always being there—you cannot ignore the State or endanger the State.

Now, we have taken a good part of our Parliament, and many of our laws too from the practice which has long prevailed in the United Kingdom.²⁰ Honourable Members opposite refer to the practice in the United Kingdom in this matter or in any other, and rightly—they are perfectly entitled to do so.

20. During the debate a reference was made to the provisions that existed in the British detention law during the war in respect of facilities for the detenu to cross-examine evidence and engage a solicitor. A demand was made for similar provisions "at least in peace time in India."

Yet, I do submit that there is an essential difference between our country and that compact little island called England and Scotland, with a long background of disciplined behaviour, a long background of following certain conventions and laws and practices and imposing self-discipline, which I admire. Only in the last few years has our great country emerged from a state of servitude, struggling hard to make good, making good certainly here and there, advancing, sometimes stumbling, still picking itself up and going forward amidst all kinds of forces, all kinds of disruptive tendencies, whether they are provincial, State, or communal, religious, social, or economic. We have to hold together, and as I have stated before in this House, the basic thing that this House, this Parliament and this Government have to keep before them always is the integration of India—not geographically, not politically, the map is there, but an integration of minds and hearts, the psychological integration of the people of India. We have to consider the various problems in their particular context, whether it is linguistic provinces, or whether it is something else. But behind these problems you see these different pulls; you see these disruptive forces and so long as you do not get over these pulls, and until all of us begin to think more and more in a unified way, there is always danger of perhaps, sometimes, the disruptive influences overcoming the country.

Therefore, it becomes necessary for us to look at this broad picture, and looking at that broad picture, I came to the conclusion that some such measure is essential at the present moment. Having done so we gave serious thought to this measure before placing it before this Parliament. It is another matter as to how the details are worked out by this House; but even in regard to those details we considered them with the greatest care. Maybe, of course, that something escaped our minds: other suggestions if they had been made we might have accepted them. Anyhow, it is not like some Bills which are occasionally passed by us in a hurry. It is a very serious measure for us to rush through the House.

Honourable Members, some of them, said that in the Joint Committee²¹ not many changes have been made. It is true some important ones have been made. In the Joint Committee many changes have not been made, because before the Bill went to the Joint Committee many an informal Committee thought about it, and talked about it, and discussed it, and looked at it from many aspects. Because it had passed through so many sieves of thought, it represented the concentrated effort of ours. Of course, that does not mean that

21. On 23 July 1952, following a statement by Nehru agreeing to S.P. Mookerjee's request to him on the floor of the House, a Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament was formed to consider the present Bill and other clauses in the parent Act. All parties were represented on the 42-member Committee which included A.K. Gopalan of the CPI, Sarangdhar Das of the Praja Socialist group, and S.S. More of the Peasants and Workers Group.

it cannot be changed or improved. That is a different matter. But it does show that it was a carefully thought-out measure that was placed before this House and placed before the Joint Committee.

About one matter greater stress has been laid—about lawyers and legal advice being available.²² I am afraid I am getting a bad reputation in that large and very estimable community of lawyers in India, because estimable as they are, I do not admire their profession. It is not their fault, of course. It is the structure, the judicial structure that we have inherited from the British, which encourages inordinate delay, inordinate expense, and anything however good it is, if it means delay and expense means injustice in the end. But I shall not go into that matter.

I would submit to the House that if you like to have a full-fledged trial have it by all means; but do not mix up these ideas. It is a peculiar mixture. Here you have, as suggested now, three eminent people, Judges of the High Court and the like, and the House knows very well that the Judges of the High Court and the Judges of the Supreme Court are not in the slightest bit dependent on the executive authority. They have been very critical of the executive authority. Therefore, whatever else might be said about them, they are not likely to favour executive authority in this matter. They will be impartial. They look at cases from their point of view. If you leave the burden on them, and the accused goes before them, and they speak to him, listen to him and get such other information as they can, they are much more likely to be favourably inclined and take a lenient view of the detenu or the proposed detenu. If you convert it into a semi-trial, the Judge, although he is responsible, does not feel that sympathy for the person before him on account of the presence of the counsel on either side. Anyhow, how can you. I do submit, in all cases like this have this semi-trial staged there? If you have lawyers on the one side, there are lawyers on the other too. Then, I submit that the whole purpose of this measure is defeated. Of course, we must give the detenu or the proposed detenu facilities to go there, see them, and see what the charges against them are, and such other facilities that might be possible. That is entirely a different matter.

There is another point which this House should consider. In normal trials the facts are established by evidence of witnesses or documents. Now, in the nature of things, in cases of this kind, and it does not matter in what category the particular detenu falls in the four categories I put to this House....²³

22. The original Bill gave the detenu the right of representation to the Advisory Board but not personal representation which the present Bill gave. But the present Bill did not give the right of personal representation with the help of lawyers. The Home Minister contended that converting the provision for Advisory Board into a judicial trial with lawyers and cross-examination of witnesses would completely change the Bill.
23. One member here remarked: "What about black-marketeers?"

My honourable friend reminds me of black-marketeers. In whatever category he falls the witness stands in danger of his life.

The House will remember that even in the last general elections in Rajasthan²⁴ and Saurashtra²⁵ men were killed, openly killed, so that they might not vote for a particular party, that is the Congress, by the *jagirdar* elements there. It was openly stated in posters—it is not a hint that I am giving that he who votes for the Congress would be killed and many people were killed. Now, if that was so about voting, can you imagine then, if we have an inquiry into the Saurashtra affair in open court, where many *jagirdars* and princes are brought in, what the fate of that unhappy wretch would be who gives evidence against his boss, against the *jagirdar* or the prince? So that, on the face of it, if you start doing this and bringing in this question of evidence, etc., you will either not get that evidence, or you will have to organize an enormous system of protection of individual witnesses and in effect you will have to put in detention practically every witness that you may have, so that the whole conception of this falls to the ground. Here, the sole conception depends on two or three factors. I would beg the House for the moment to forget—for the moment, I say—to forget the past. Look at this Bill as it is, with its various safeguards.²⁶

Much has been said about the district magistrate, about the police. Now, I am not here as an apologist for every district magistrate or every policeman. But I do submit to this House that it is not right and not fair to run down our services *en bloc* like this. There are good, and there may be bad and indifferent people—like all of us anywhere. But this method of running down people who have to shoulder heavy responsibilities and have often to face crises and difficult situations, who may occasionally make a mistake, make an error but who try

24. The threat to law and order came from the activities of dacoits in Rajasthan. The Preventive Detention Act was used against certain persons who were known to have harboured dacoits and supplied them with money, firearms and ammunition. In one encounter with the police three dacoits were killed. The State had kept under detention thirteen persons.
25. There had been an organised movement in Saurashtra comprising big *jagirdars* in close alliance with dacoits. On 31 May 1952, the Saurashtra Government had in custody 119 persons under the Preventive Detention Act.
26. The amended Act, which followed the report of the Joint Select Committee, liberalized its provisions in a number of ways against arbitrary action of the executive. A right of personal appearance before the Advisory Board had been given to the detenu. The maximum period for which a person might be detained had been fixed at one year and a person once released could not be detained again on the same grounds.

to function according to the best of their lights. I submit, is not fair to them. They cannot answer back or explain their actions unless privately, if we ask.

Something has been said about our State Governments.²⁷ Our State Governments too have to shoulder directly an immediate responsibility which we of the Government of India sitting in New Delhi do not. We have to shoulder the broad responsibility of India; they have to shoulder the responsibility of the day-to-day life of their people and their problems. And I should like to pay a tribute to our State Governments for the way they have discharged those responsibilities. And may I say specially, because I understand an honourable Member spoke harsh words about the Government of Saurashtra, that the Saurashtra Government is one of the most efficient and able Governments in India? I want to tell this House that the Saurashtra Government was so reluctant to take action in Saurashtra that repeatedly I had to write to the Chief Minister²⁸ and tell him: "You must not allow the situation to develop, you must take action". And now I am told that he goes about arresting people and behaving like some Chengiz Khan or Tamurlane or what not, I do not understand. I do not know how many honourable Members know the Chief Minister of Saurashtra. He is one of the humblest and ablest and quietest of men in India.

So these State Governments and our services have to deal with the situation. They may make mistakes. Let us make a law which will prevent that. Now, whether the district magistrate takes action straight off or not, almost in all cases, except in a case of grave emergency, he does not take action till he refers the matter to his Home Minister. The Home Minister comes into the picture there. Suppose in a case of emergency he does not refer it to the Home Minister. You provide for him to come into the picture in twelve days, or whatever it is. You provide for reference to the Advisory Council. You provide for intimation to be sent to the Government of India. And you provide for the Advisory Council to consist of three eminent judges or persons of judicial experience. I submit that you may vary, add something or not to them. But I do submit that you have given quite enough safeguards to prevent injustice being done. And if injustice is done, even so—as it might be done. I cannot guarantee it—surely, this House is here, the honourable Members of the Opposition are here. They will not let a single case go by without drawing

27. The legislative power to enact law of preventive detention is divided by the Constitution between the Union and the States. The Union has exclusive power only when such law is required in connection with defence, foreign affairs, or the security of the country. A State has power, concurrently with the Union, to provide for preventive detention for reasons connected with security of the State, maintenance of public order, or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.

28. U.N. Dhebar.

the attention of the wide world to it, if injustice is done. And I welcome their drawing attention, our attention, India's attention, to it. So that, it is here. And in State Governments there are Assemblies where attention will be drawn. So that if you analyze it, it becomes an exceedingly difficult thing in this set of circumstances, first of all that injustice will be done, secondly that if any injustice is done it can endure for long. Somebody will have to be pulled up and it will have to be remedied.

I, therefore, submit that subject to such minor amendments and variations as in the judgment and wisdom of the House are to be accepted, the main approach of this Bill is not only right but is fully democratic.²⁹

29. The Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Bill was passed in the House of the People on 6 August 1952 and in the Council of States on 12 August 1952. It was brought into force on 30 September 1952.

6. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
August 3, 1952

My dear T.T.,

Your letter of August 2nd about the Estimates Committee etc.

As you know, we have practically decided that the Council of States Members should not join the Estimates Committee, but that they might be invited to join the Public Accounts Committee. Even the Speaker has, though somewhat reluctantly, agreed to this. It is rather difficult to go behind this decision now. Anyhow, nothing is happening now, and we might as well remain silent about it for the present.

Your proposal to have three major joint standing committees appears to me to be full of risks. I do not mind a committee on Foreign Affairs, though a formal committee is hardly necessary. But a kind of Economic Standing Committee dealing with the vast scope of economic affairs and planning might become quite a nuisance. So also perhaps the third committee you have suggested. I think we had better stick to our present position, that is, to invite people, including, Opposition Members, for occasional discussions on specific subjects or in regard to the work of specific Ministries.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 32(10)/56-57-PMS.

7. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
August 10, 1952

My dear Mr President,

As I have already informed you, I should like some additional Ministers to be appointed. The work of Government has grown and become very heavy and Ministers have to carry a great burden. During the sessions of Parliament, more particularly, Ministers have to attend both Houses of Parliament, apart from doing their normal work.

It is also desirable. I think, that some of the younger Members of Parliament should have opportunities of being associated with the work of administration as well as with Parliamentary duties.

I have, therefore, after consulting my colleagues, selected a number of Members of Parliament for appointment as Ministers and as Deputy Ministers. I might mention that in future it is proposed to call "Ministers of State" as "Ministers". Thus, there will be Cabinet Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers. There will also be Parliamentary Secretaries, who will be honorary and whose work will largely be confined to parliamentary duties....

Shri Keshava Deva Malaviya and Shri M.V. Krishnappa² are at present Parliamentary Secretaries. They will now become Deputy Ministers.

I should be grateful if you will kindly direct that necessary steps should be taken for the announcement of these appointments. I suggest that an announcement might be made on Monday evening, August 11th.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. (1918-1980); participated in Quit India Movement, 1942; Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-62; 1967-77; Parliamentary Secretary to Union Minister of Food and Agriculture. July-August 1952; Minister of Revenue, Food and Animal Husbandry, Government of Mysore after resigning membership of third Lok Sabha; Chief Whip of the Congress Party in Lok Sabha, 1977; Deputy Minister, Food and Agriculture, Government of India, August 1952-March 1962.

MATTERS OF ADMINISTRATION

1. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
July 23, 1952

My dear Rajaji,

Your letter of the 21st July about land reforms.² All that you have said in this letter has been very much before us. We have been discussing this subject at great length not only in the Planning Commission but with other groups, including the Congress Working Committee at which several Chief Ministers were present. It was as a result of this discussion that I sent out my letter inviting opinion in some detail.

The subject is undoubtedly of great importance, but I rather doubt that a conference of Chief Ministers at this stage will be of much help.³ We shall probably talk round and round the subject as is done at conferences. I have had long replies from most Chief Ministers giving their views in full and we are giving them careful consideration.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.
2. Rajagopalachari pointed out several difficulties that the proposed ceiling on agricultural holdings with retrospective effect would create. Among others, he mentioned the problem of the huge compensation for acquisition of surplus land; distribution of that land among numerous applicants who may or may not possess the requisite ability and resources for its utilization; and above all finding employment for a very large number of hired agricultural labourers who normally got work during agricultural seasons.
3. Rajagopalachari had suggested a high-level conference of Chief Ministers to discuss all aspects of the subject.

2. Nirad C. Chaudhuri¹

I think that the Secretary, Information and Broadcasting, should be asked to enquire from Shri Nirad Chaudhuri² why he serves a Government which he

1. Note to PPS, New Delhi, 23 July 1952. JN Collection.
2. Nirad Chandra Chaudhuri (b. 1897); Indian writer, commentator, All India Radio at this time; author of *The Autobiography of An Unknown Indian* (1951), *A Passage to England* (1959), *The Continent of Circe* (1965) and *Thy Hand Great Anarch* (1987).

thoroughly dislikes and for which he appears to have some contempt. If he is such an admirer of the old British days and British ways, he might find a more congenial atmosphere elsewhere.³

I do not suggest that he should be given notice to depart. But I do think that we require some kind of an explanation from him.⁴

3. Nirad Chaudhuri's book, *The Autobiography of An Unknown Indian* (1951), had attracted attention for its anti-Indian outlook and praise of the British empire in India.
4. In the three notices served on Nirad Chaudhuri on 5, 12 and 29 August, he was asked to let the Director-General of the All India Radio know about his total income and the income at the time of his present appointment, about surrendering to the Government one-third of the income from his book, and its publication without Government's permission.

3. To U.S. Malliah¹

New Delhi
July 25, 1952

My dear Malliah,²

I enclose a letter from one of our MPs.³ Please explain to him that a Bill of this type should not be introduced till it has been considered by the Congress Party or its Executive. This matter has been discussed in Parliament on several occasions. A special committee was appointed for it, the committee has reported and other steps have been taken. The committee is against the prohibition of the manufacture of *vanaspati*. In the circumstances, Government cannot possibly support this Bill.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 31(53)/49-PMS.
2. General Secretary and Chief Whip of the Congress Parliamentary Party in the House of the People.
3. On 25 July, Jhulan Sinha, a Member of Parliament, had suggested the introduction of a Bill in Parliament for prohibiting the manufacture and sale of *vanaspati*.

4. To C.D. Deshmukh¹

New Delhi
July 28, 1952

My dear Deshmukh,

Your letter of July 20th about the Income-tax (Amendment) Bill.²

I am seeing Members of Parliament as well as others daily, either singly or in groups. I do not know beforehand what they come to see me about. When they put forward any suggestion, I pass it on to the Minister concerned, if it appears to me more or less reasonable. I can hardly sit down to hold an enquiry into every matter before I pass it on.

I do not quite know what you mean by 'simultaneous deputations'. One has to see people when they come, without enquiring whether they have been to others or not. Sometimes they are bound to overlap. Time is precious, and so is energy. But the normal course of public life demands this expenditure of both time and energy.

This is a small matter. But I think you are not right in your decision. There is no reason why CBR or any other authority should not exercise discretion or should not refuse exemption. There is very little chance of such trusts in the future. Perhaps some small trust may be created. I was thinking more of the Sikh Gurdwaras in Pakistan than of the Muslim trusts.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. The Indian Income-tax (Amendment) Bill was introduced in the House of the People on 26 May 1952.

5. Merit in Appointments and Promotions¹

...There is far too much laxity about appointments and promotions which apparently occur automatically on the basis of seniority. I think we should try

1. Note, 29 July 1952. Nehru had in an earlier note (not printed) agreed with the Minister for Commerce and Industry over the latter's taking strong exception to the appointment of a Deputy Secretary whose work had been found "to be definitely unsatisfactory." JN Collection. Extracts.

to forget seniority and think in terms of merit a little more. In any event, I think it was improper not to mention a major fact of the Minister's disapproval when the proposal was put forward. I am unable to agree to this appointment unless some additional facts are placed before me which justify it.

6. To Mahavir Tyagi¹

New Delhi
July 29, 1952

My dear Mahavir,

Your letter of the 22nd July in connection with economies on development schemes. You can certainly discuss any matter with the Secretaries of my Ministry. External Affairs do not have anything to do with development as such, unless an extra foreign mission is involved.

... I might inform you that I have come to the conclusion that we are grossly understaffed at Headquarters, that is, in the higher grades. At the present moment, of course, we are specially suffering in this matter, because Bajpai is gone and K.P.S. Menon is on leave. But, even apart from this, we cannot look after the world, if I may say so, by asking two or three Joint Secretaries to spread themselves out. The only result is that our work becomes very second-rate...

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

7. To Balakrishna Kaul¹

New Delhi
August 1, 1952

My dear Balakrishna,²

...The manner of work in Ajmer thus far appears to me that each Minister does what he likes with his Department. This is completely wrong anywhere,

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. A Minister in the Government of Ajmer.

more so in a place where there is a small Ministry. A Ministry is a unit, not a set of individuals. Therefore, there should be full consultation at every stage in regard to every important matter. Each Minister is responsible for what the other Ministers do. This is what is called joint responsibility. Therefore, there must be continuous joint consultations.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. To N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar¹

New Delhi
August 3, 1952

My dear Gopalaswami,

...I have often raised the question of these unused air-fields with the Defence Ministry. Vast areas of land cannot be used for any beneficial purpose simply because Defence wants to hold on to them without using them. This is not a question of an air strip but sometimes of miles and miles round it. During my election tour, I must have landed and taken off from scores of air-fields all over India and I was astonished to find how much land was included in the area belonging to the air-field, in Assam specially. Presumably this was done in war time for the special purpose connected with a possible invasion of India by the Japanese army. It has no relevance today and it is just waste to hold on to this land. I have written repeatedly about this and I have been told that all these areas have been carefully inspected. But no adequate reason has been given to me for this continuing national waste.

Here is this case of Assam being stricken by another calamity and large numbers of people wandering about seeking shelter for themselves and their cattle. Defence, however, are obdurate and then are kind enough to allow two months' use at a heavy rent.² I just do not understand this. Defence should have rushed to the rescue of these people and offered every bit of land that they possessed as well as other kinds of help. In any event, Defence has absolutely no right to hold on to any land which it is not using or is not likely to use in the near future.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. The Ministry of Defence had agreed to give shelter to flood-affected people of Assam in the unused air-field for two months against a rent of Rs 37,000.

Since I have failed to get anything done by Defence in the matter of these unused air-fields, I think the matter should be put up before the Cabinet for some final decision. The Government of India is surely meant for the well-being of the people of India as a whole and everything else is subordinate to this.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. To Swaran Singh¹

New Delhi
August 3, 1952

My dear Swaran Singh,²

I am sending you a letter I received from M. Corbusier,³ whom you must know. He is the famous architect who is employed for Chandigarh. I had a talk with him when he was here and I sent him to the Planning Commission. He is full of ideas and I think we should profit by those ideas. We have got into a complete rut in our building activity and our ideas are still those of British engineers of the nineteenth century.

I am quite sure that houses can be made better and cheaper. Take for instance Corbusier's idea that roofs should be lower and walls thinner. This itself would save some money.

Following British practice to some extent, we forget India is a different country. The climate is different, social customs are different and the material at hand is different.

I would particularly draw your attention to what Corbusier says: "The first thing to consider in town planning was not architecture but taps or wells and conditions for bathing in hot or cold water. Essential services must take precedence over all other issues." I have long been convinced that in India the problem is not firstly of building houses, but of providing essential services. It is much better to have an open space with proper water supply, drainage, bathing facilities and lighting, than to have just roofs over slum dwellings. Unfortunately we think here only of providing some shelter without those facilities which are more important than shelter.

1. File No 28(72)/52-PMS.

2. Minister of Works, Housing and Supply.

3. French architect and town planner.

Separately I have written to you about Patel Nagar⁴ today which is a singular example of housing without any facility whatever, with the result that we created slums of the worst type. The ordinary Indian village with all its evils and poverty is better than town slums that we create.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. A refugee resettlement colony in west Delhi. The letter not printed.

10. Preservation of Statues and Paintings¹

I have no objection to the circulation of this paper. I feel however that a conference for this purpose is hardly needed, at any rate to begin with. The first thing to be done is to collect information. Probably, apart from a few exceptions, only some big cities are concerned — Calcutta most of all. I think that the first step should be for us to ask the Governments to send us information about statues, paintings, etc. The second step should be for us to consult the Chief Ministers as to what their views are on this subject. Having got this information, we might formulate some general views of our own which can then be circulated to various State Governments.

2. In such matters while some general rule might be helpful, no rigid rule need be applied. We do not want our public places and public halls cluttered with unseemly statues and paintings. At the same time, we need not try to wash out past history. Some of the paintings in various old Government Houses are of undoubted value. Generally speaking, it would be desirable perhaps to have a museum of the British period where many of these statues and paintings can be collected. But to transport statuary from Bombay and Madras to Calcutta is a costly business and we should avoid any expenditure of this kind now. Calcutta being most affected by this disease can consider it as the West Bengal Government propose to do. We might ask similarly other Governments to consider it too. But I would suggest that before they finalize their conclusions, they should send them here for our consideration and advice.

1. Note to the Cabinet Secretary, 7 August 1952. File No 26/15/56-Public-1, MHA.

3. In regard to Indianization of roads, highways, parks, institutions, etc., I do not quite know how a conference is going to decide this. I do not normally like changes of well established names, unless there is something objectionable about them. Normally, roads are named by municipalities and the like. We can deal with big public institutions. It seems to me desirable that we might here also, gather some information first and views of State Governments.

4. The convening of a conference at this stage would not yield any useful results and would involve some expenditure and the drawing away of some public servants from their normal duties.

5. A copy of this should be sent to the Minister of Education.

11. To Morarji Desai¹

New Delhi

August 9, 1952

My dear Morarji Desai,²

...The President received a telegram from your Governor about delaying assent to the Essential Supplies Bill passed by Parliament.³ To do this would have been very extraordinary procedure for us and a bad precedent which would have been criticized. But, as the President has said in his reply, we shall give the most careful consideration to your Bill when it is passed and I hope that we might be able to meet your viewpoint.

This question is indeed a much bigger one and in a sense affects all States. The resources of our States are limited and their responsibilities are great. How to meet this situation? Rajaji and Pantji have both raised this question. We shall have to consider it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Chief Minister of Bombay at this time.

3. The Governor of Bombay had written that if the exemption of items, included in the Essential Goods Bill as passed by Parliament, from Bombay Sales Tax Bill was insisted upon it would involve a loss of about Rs 2.5 crores and affect Bombay Government's major irrigation works, power projects and social welfare programme. If this was not possible, the President should consider the Bombay Sales Tax Bill entirely on its own merits.

12. To B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya¹

New Delhi
August 9, 1952

My dear Pattabhi,²

A number of reports of your occasional speeches have embarrassed us considerably and, no doubt, embarrassed many of our Governors also. Those speeches were presumably made in a humorous vein, and you discussed a Governor's duties and lunches and dinners, husbands and wives and fortnightly reports to the President of India. Humour is always welcome, but there is a danger of our descending to the ridiculous and thereby affecting the dignity of a high office.

You will remember my writing to you,³ just before you assumed office, of the importance of the post of Governor. It is important from the political point of view as a direct link between the State and the Centre, and for us to receive overall objective reports from a person not concerned in the fray, or involved in internal politics. As a matter of fact, we get some very good reports from the Governors, sometimes much better reports than those that come from Chief Ministers. To say therefore that a Governor's report can only consist of a record of entertainment is to ridicule, to some extent, the office of the Governor.

A Governor is or should be a cementing force. For this purpose he meets people and talks to them informally, asks them to meals, etc., and generally makes friends with them. Raj Bhavan is supposed to set up certain standards. We are awfully lacking in standards in our public or social life. Those standards need not be foreign standards, but they have to be high standards. A certain dignity has to be maintained. Our people are far too apt to forget these standards or to think that the maintenance of standards is somehow snobbish.

I am writing to you because your remarks have occasionally caused many of us a good deal of distress. I am sure that you did not mean this to happen.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Governor of Madhya Pradesh at this time.

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, pp. 152-153.

13. To Swaran Singh¹

New Delhi
August 9, 1952

My dear Swaran Singh,

Kasturbhai Lalbhai² spoke to me about some of the major buildings that we are likely to put up soon, such as the Supreme Court, etc. He was very anxious that we should consult some famous architects before we finalize plans. This is not a question of mere engineering skill but of vision. I entirely agree with him. Some money spent in this way would be worthwhile. I am not in favour of throwing money about. But sometimes it pays to consult a good architect. Kasturbhai has sent me some names of famous architects. I do not know much about this matter. But I do feel that we should go outside our narrow circle to get ideas for great public buildings.

Amrit Kaur tells me that she has got some plans for her Medical Institute from Bajpai³ in Bombay (He is Girija Shankar Bajpai's son) and that these plans show considerable ability and vision. I have not seen them. The point is that we must get out of the old ruts and welcome ideas. I enclose Kasturbhai Lalbhai's letter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Also available in File No 48(10)/56-PMS.
2. (1894-1980); prominent industrialist from Gujarat dealing in multiple enterprises; Director, Reserve Bank of India, 1937-49, 1957-62; Chairman, CPWD Enquiry Committee, 1952; member, Central Advisory Council of Industries, 1958-69; Chairman, National Research Development Corporation, 1954-69.
3. Durga Shankar Bajpai (1924-1969); a renowned architect.

14. Independence Day Ceremony at the Red Fort¹

The ceremony at the Red Fort this morning was well organized, perhaps too well organized. There is always a risk of overdoing the organization and thereby coming in the way of the public.

1. Note to the Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs and External Affairs, 15 August 1952. File No 2(430)/49-PMS.

2. There were large spaces vacant in front and on the sides. The large space in front was no doubt kept open for conveyances. I seem to remember that last year, at my instance, a better arrangement was made to avoid these large spaces. Then there was a big space in what appeared to be an area reserved for women. It was much too large an area and with the result it was largely empty. While it is often desirable to keep an area reserved for women, I rather doubt if, in the balance, this should be done on such occasions. Families come together and there is no point in separating them. In any event, such a large area should not be kept apart and unoccupied.

3. I noticed that there was a little bit too much of the police in this particular area reserved for women. Women police were pushing about people too much. When some women wanted to go forward, they were pushed and even fell.

4. We must try to reduce as far as possible this organization, so far as the crowd is concerned. Care should be taken of course about the arrangements on the ramparts and about those particular blocks where MPs and invited guests are asked to sit. For the rest, people should be allowed to go where they choose. Above all, this wide open space between the Fort and Chandni Chowk should be avoided.

5. I understand that there was some resentment among pressmen about the place allotted to them or where they were not allowed to go. This is unfortunate. We need not be too strict about the recognized newspaper correspondents.

6. Although the time fixed today was half an hour earlier than during the previous years, even so it was very hot. It is to be considered whether even an earlier time is not desirable.

15. Sub-letting of Government Accommodation¹

I attach a copy of an anonymous letter that I have received.²

1. Note to the Cabinet Secretary, 17 August 1952. File No 45(22)/51-PMS.
2. A junior officer, who had no Government accommodation in Delhi, wrote to Nehru on 4 August about a racket of subletting a portion of the Government bungalows by senior officials at Rs 100 to 150 per room and even servants' quarters at Rs 15 to 25 per month. The complainant demanded that the Government should ask for a detailed information every month about (a) rooms sublet, (b) rent received, and (c) extra services provided to the allottee by his subtenant.

Some time ago I raised this question and wanted information about Government officials sub-letting their houses. That information has not reached me yet and I get continuous complaints on this subject. Government officials get their houses at a reduced rent and they should not take advantage of this fact. A house can be shared. In fact, it is desirable to share a house. But that must not be at the cost of Government and to the advantage of the officer concerned.

I should like you, therefore, to arrange to get full information about:

- (1) the sub-letting of rooms or parts of houses,
- (2) the rent recovered, and
- (3) the extra services rendered.

The Ministry of WHS is reported to have issued a circular on this subject last year. If so, then they must have some kind of a record of sub-letting, as their permission must have been taken.

I take particular objection to any officer of a foreign embassy being accommodated in this way.

16. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Camp : Srinagar
August 28, 1952

My dear Krishna,

Your letter² of the 20th August has reached me here in Srinagar. In this you say that you would like to meet Gopalaswami Ayyanger. I do not think there is any chance of his going to London, and indeed his going there might well be misunderstood. A Minister of Defence going to London would probably have to meet some Ministers there and people would draw all kinds of inferences. I do not myself see how he can casually go to London. He was also anxious to return to India as soon as possible after the Geneva talks. Indeed, he went to Geneva at my earnest request, because we thought that this would involve only a short absence.

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Krishna Menon had requested that Gopalaswami Ayyanger, who was going to Geneva for the Kashmir negotiations, should also come to London so that he could see him "with a view to seeking some finality and some clearer statement in regard to the various allegations and insinuations made" about the purchase of jeeps.

I am, however, sending him a copy of your letter.

I do not see of what particular use his visit to London would be in regard to the matters mentioned by you. So far as we are concerned, those matters have been disposed of and Gopalaswami Ayyangar has made the clearest of statements in Parliament about the future of the jeep transaction, that is being dealt with on a new basis by the Defence Ministry. I am not aware of the latest developments.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

17. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
August 31, 1952

My dear Rajaji,

...I see some reference in the newspapers to a new ordinance about land that you have issued and which has been applied specially to Tanjore.² I do not know much about this. But it appears that, according to this, the land-owner is to get three-fifths of the produce and the tenant, who is the tiller, two-fifths. I do not know about conditions in the South. But this proportion is something which few persons in the North would accept, certainly not our cultivators. Our general policy declared for many years has been to remove intermediaries. It is sometimes difficult to do so immediately. But to give an intermediary, who has no function except to draw rents, more than half the produce, seems rather excessive generosity. Of course, I do not know the real facts and I am just giving you my impressions derived from brief newspaper reports.³

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Following differences between landlords and tenants in Tanjore district, many evictions had been ordered. The new ordinance, later replaced by an act, prohibited evictions, enabled restoration if eviction had taken place, and raised the wages.

3. Rajagopalachari, on 3 September 1952, clarified that the *mirasdars* of Tanjore district were not zamindars or intermediaries. The land they owned was "alienable, partible and is as good as house property owned by urban gentlemen" and represented investment of money as it could be bought and sold. He referred to *The Hindu's* objection to this increase and added that those recently evicted were being restored by statutory obligation, and farm labourers were also given a guarantee of employment and much better wages.

18. To Chief Ministers¹

New Delhi
September 2, 1952

My dear Chief Minister,

The ending of the Criminal Tribes Act has given me much pleasure.² I think that this Act was a blot on our administration and it indicated an approach to this question which was completely wrong. Even in countries abroad this step has been commented upon and welcomed.

Quite a number of our States, though not all, have had these so-called criminal tribes and the old Act was applied to them.³ I do not know what is proposed to be done now in regard to these tribes. Merely to allow them to shift for themselves is not desirable or wise. Left to themselves suddenly, they might drift into wrong courses. Some assistance, therefore, should be given to them to rehabilitate themselves in a new way. I do not suggest any elaborate machinery should be put up, but it would be wrong not to do anything at all. Even a little help just at this stage would go a long way.⁴

Wherever the Criminal Tribes Act was being applied, the State was spending some money. If we could continue to spend even half that amount for a while for rehabilitation, that would have a very good effect. Otherwise we might have to deal with this problem in a different way involving questions of law and order.

In some States there is, I believe, an organization to help criminal tribes. This organization could be asked to assist in this matter. Where there is no such organization, the State could deal with it through its own officials.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Under the Criminal Tribes Act passed by the British Government in 1871, surveillance was kept on some aboriginal tribes, castes and groups of the Indian population believed to be having proclivity towards acts of violence and crime. In 1949 a committee appointed to examine this issue recommended repeal of the Act. As a result, more than 153 communities were declared "denotified communities", when the Criminal Tribes Laws (Repeal) Act 1952 became effective from 6 March 1952.

3. The Criminal Tribes Act was repealed by the Government of Madras in 1947, by the Government of Bombay in 1949, and by the Government of UP in August 1952. The Government of Madhya Pradesh had also repealed the Act freeing sixty lakhs of tribal people.

4. Later, the Backward Classes Commission had also suggested that these "denotified communities" should be resettled in small segments so as to gradually integrate themselves with the rest of the society. Reform measures, education, and employment for their children and economic rehabilitation were the other main suggestions.

19. To Gulzarilal Nanda¹

New Delhi
September 3, 1952

My dear Gulzarilal,
Sriman Narayan Agarwal² was speaking to me this morning. He suggested (he had discussions on this subject in Sewagram and with Vinoba Bhave) that we might help financially and otherwise the Sewagram people in developing that area as a project according to their own methods. I think this is a good idea. It is right that we should give them this opportunity of experimenting fully on their own lines. We could profit by that experiment. Also it would employ a considerable number of constructive workers who are at present feeling rather frustrated and critical. That means telling them that we shall gladly consider any project which they can send with a view to their working out their projects themselves.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. (1912-1978); worked for many years at Wardha and Sewagram and took part in Quit India Movement; Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-57; General Secretary of the Congress Party, 1952-58; Member, Planning Commission, 1958-64; Ambassador to Nepal, 1964-67; Governor of Gujarat, December 1967-March 1973; Chairman, Gandhi Smarak Nidhi; author of many books on Gandhian economics and education.

20. To K.D. Malaviya¹

New Delhi
September 5, 1952

My dear Keshav Dev,
Your letter of the 4th September about Everest.² I confess that I am not at all anxious to go about changing well-known names simply because they happen to be foreign. Why should we go out of our way to change the name of Everest which is known all over the world now. All this seems too artificial

1. File No 2(393)/49-PMS.
2. Malaviya had suggested that Mount Everest should be renamed as Gandhi Shikhar or Gandhi Peak and this announcement should be made during Gandhi Jayanti week.

and too narrowly nationalistic. I do not think this will advance our credit in the world.

Apart from this, I do not like to associate Gandhi's name with it. Then again what right have you to change the name of Everest? Everest is not fully in India.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

21. To B.R. Medhi¹

New Delhi
September 10, 1952

My dear Medhi,

I enclose an issue of the *Assam Tribune* dated 15th August. This gives the Indian National Anthem and the Assamese National Anthem. This is rather extraordinary. I do not know that Assam called itself a nation or that its "National Anthem" was put on a par with the country's National Anthem. Surely this is not right.

I am told also that a practice has grown up for this so-called Assamese National Anthem to be played on ceremonial occasions and for people to stand up for it. That also is improper. We decided long ago to make *Jana Gana Mana* our National Anthem. At the same time we decided that for historical and other important reasons, *Bande Mataram* should also be honoured and people should stand up when it is sung. Apart from these two, there should be no other song for which people stand up.

Of course what you call your National Anthem is a good song and there is no reason why you should not make it popular. But it should not be treated as if it was a National Anthem.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 2(61)/47-PMS.

22. To Brahm Perkash¹

New Delhi

September 20, 1952

My dear Brahm Perkash,²

My PPS wrote to you yesterday on the subject of the acquisition of land by a cooperative society³ in the village Basaidarapur. I had written to you previously on this subject on August 17th.⁴ This matter has been coming up before me for a long time past. Some two years or more ago, Bakshi Tek Chand⁵ came to see me and spoke to me about this cooperative housing society. I liked the idea and encouraged him. Indeed I appointed a special committee for the selection of a suitable site. Subsequently the matter came up before me repeatedly. On two or three occasions, I asked for reports and they were sent to me by the Chief Commissioner. I thought that the matter had been finally settled. I was surprised, therefore, to learn last month from a letter you had sent to Rafi Ahmed Kidwai that there was still some kind of a dispute going on in regard to this land. I wrote to you then.

Our Home Ministry has now received a representation from the Refugees Cooperative Housing Society Limited. This representation gives the history of this case and how the land was acquired and the price of the land, i.e., Rs 5 lakhs, was paid by the Society as long ago as November 1951. The possession of the land was given to the Society very soon after in the same month. An area of 116 acres was under crops at the time and two months' time was allowed for the removal of the crops.

After that apparently trouble arose and resistance was offered. This was in May last.

This resistance, after all these steps had been taken, was odd, but what I am worried about is the allegation that you have played an important part in this matter and have actually instigated this opposition and resistance. It is stated that one of the villages in the land acquired belongs to you or to some of your relatives. Further that you yourself have not vacated this land belonging to you, in spite of notices issued by the Collector in the normal course....

This matter which, in my eyes had no special significance except in so far as a great deal has been done and I thought that the transaction must be

1. File No 29(2)/56-PMS.

2. (1918-1993); participated in the freedom struggle and imprisoned four times during 1941-45; President, Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee, 1951-52, 1966-67; Chief Minister, Delhi State, 1952-55; Member, Lok Sabha, 1957-70, 1977-79; Minister for Agriculture and Irrigation, Government of India, 1979-80; joined Janata Party, April 1977.

3. Refugees Cooperative Housing Society near Shakur Basti, Delhi.

4. Not printed.

5. He was a Member of Parliament at this time.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

completed, has now become important because of these allegations made against you. Nothing can be worse for a Minister than to be told that personal considerations are influencing his action.

I am greatly troubled about this matter, and so is Dr Katju who passed on the papers to me.

As I have stated above, I have been concerned with these proceedings for more than two years now and it seems to me very extraordinary indeed that in spite of repeated consideration and decision by Government, difficulties should continue to be raised. This does not do any credit to Government in the eyes of the public. I should like to have your reply very soon.⁶

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Brahm Perkash replied on 23 September that earlier he had tried to impress upon the revenue authorities that agricultural land should not be used for house building purposes. He could not pursue the matter because of the general elections. In the meantime, at the time of actual possession, villagers became agitated and protested to the Government. After becoming the Chief Minister, he had tried unsuccessfully for a fair compromise. Allegations against him were baseless as most of his personal land was excluded from acquisitioning. Nehru replied on 23 September (not printed) that even if there were no personal considerations for Brahm Perkash's involvement in the matter, the fact of his owning some land there was bound to make people say that he was somehow personally involved. "One must not only do right, but make people think that one is doing so. A Chief Minister can take no risks in such matters."

23. To J.B. Kripalani¹

New Delhi
September 22, 1952

My dear Jivat,

You will remember writing to me about an incident when a railway ticket collector asked you for your ticket to note down your number. I was greatly surprised to learn of this because we are entirely against this kind of thing. However, I did not wish to write to you more about it before I had made enquiries.

I have now enquired into the matter both from the Central Intelligence and from the provinces concerned. They tell me that there is absolutely no

1. JN Collection.

such system anywhere and for any person. It was unthinkable for any kind of watch being kept on your movements. In fact, they showed considerable distress at the fact that you should have gathered this impression.

They said that whether in regard to railway tickets or mail or telephone there was no practice of censoring or interfering with anyone with the exception of some rather special cases. These special cases are related directly or indirectly to suspected espionage or sabotage or some criminal investigation. Usually they affect foreigners or people coming from other countries. Such cases are few. They assured me that in domestic politics no such thing is done, unless in a particular case there is some suspicion of connection with espionage or sabotage or the like.

It is rather difficult to say definitely what some foolish junior police official might do somewhere. But I was assured that it was unlikely that even a junior police official would be so foolish as to indulge in any activity which was disapproved. It is possible, of course, that some ticket collector did something to show that he was clever.

Anyhow, our Intelligence people exhibited a great deal of distress to me at the thought that a person in your position should suspect them of such activities which were not only not indulged in but were patently foolish.

As regards telephones, I might mention that I have myself often had some difficulty because in the course of a conversation people break in and it appears that they are trying to overhear. This has nothing to do with our Intelligence. It is often the curiosity of the Telephone Exchange people to find out what important people are saying.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

24. To B. Ramakrishna Rao¹

Camp: Munirabad
September 28, 1952

My dear Ramakrishna Rao,

...I am very grateful to you and all the Ministers and officers who have taken so much trouble over my tour. I realize that this kind of touring takes a lot of organizing, and this is no easy matter.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

While I greatly appreciate what all of you have done, you will permit me to offer some criticism and even some advice.

I have a strong impression that the arrangements almost everywhere were overdone. If this is what happens when I come, presumably, when the President comes, there is even more of this. I am sure the President would not like it even as I do not like it.

First of all, there is the question of expense...Now, with all our repeated wish to economize and with so much of our work suffering for lack of money, any extravagance in reception of guests has to be avoided. I realize that some arrangements have to be made and they should be on a dignified scale. But dignity does not come through extravagance. In Hyderabad, traditions are those of great extravagance in this respect. You should reorganize this and check every unnecessary item of expenditure...

I think that there are far too many servants about, some of them apparently specially engaged. There is far too much food, far too many courses. All this does not fit in with the severe directions we issue from time to time about limitation of courses etc. Indeed, in Delhi this would be an offence against the regulations. Good food does not mean a great variety of courses.

I have also found, to my surprise, that large quantities of furniture and other equipment have been sent ahead of me to the various places I have visited. This, in addition to a complete staff. I really do not understand why chairs and tables, etc., should be carted about in this way. Nobody wants these extra chairs or tables and the normal furniture of a place should be considered adequate. If any staff has to be sent, it should be the minimum required and certainly not nearly as many people as appear to have been sent.

I am greatly distressed by the way traffic is held up for long periods in streets when I am supposed to pass. Presumably, this is under instructions from the Home Ministry. I agree that traffic has to be stopped on occasions, but this can be done a little more intelligently. Sometimes, when I was delayed, traffic was held up for hours on end, and this must cause great inconvenience to large numbers of people, to business, to students going to their schools or colleges and to others... Surely, this kind of hold-up is very improper and some way should be devised to avoid this. I shall be writing to the Home Ministry about it also.²

As I repeatedly wrote to you from Delhi, I think that anything in the way of feasting during such visits, or for the matter of that at other times, is undesirable and unbecoming. If a dinner or a lunch is to be given, it should be confined to a very few. If it is necessary to meet a considerable number, they should be invited to some kind of a party where drinks only are provided, apart from nuts, etc. We should follow the rules we lay down for others and

2. See the next item.

make no exception in our own cases. Indeed, we should make a point of adhering to these rules when a VIP comes. He has to set standards to others and not disregard the rules he helps in making.

Personally, there are very few things which exhaust and upset me more than banquets or an abundance of food. I am not used to it. In Delhi I have given up completely going out to meals or even parties at other places, except when some official function takes place at Rashtrapati Bhavan.

I am writing this to you because I think these matters have a certain importance and produce reactions in the public. Also if I think that my visit to Hyderabad is a burden to the State, and a nuisance to the public, I would hesitate to come there.

There is one other matter. There are far too many cars moving me about. These long processions do not look nice at all and there is no reason why so many people should go about with me.

You will not mind my pointing out these matters to you because we have to get out of the old ruts and Hyderabad is more in those ruts than other places.

Thanking you and your colleagues again,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

25. Avoidance of Elaborate Arrangements during Tours¹

Last night at Tungabhadra in Hyderabad State, I dictated a note about the arrangements made for me by State Governments when I went on tour. A copy of this note is being sent to the Home Ministry separately. I was greatly disturbed by the elaborate nature of these arrangements and the unnecessary expense involved in them.

Among other things, I referred to the security arrangements which seemed to me overdone in every way. I am not criticizing the necessity for proper security arrangements, but rather the way things are done and the heavy expenditure incurred, apart from very great inconvenience to the public. I was told in Hyderabad that, during a brief visit of Sardar Patel there, Rs 60,000/- were spent on the police alone. I have no idea how much money was spent on

1. Note to Minister for Home Affairs, New Delhi, 29 September 1952. JN Collection.

my recent visit which was much longer and which involved a good deal of touring in the districts. I came to know that there was much dissatisfaction with this heavy expenditure and I can well understand this. I saw also for myself the great inconvenience caused to the public by roads being stopped for traffic for long periods. For the police force it is a great strain. I saw today, as I was going to the Begumpet Aerodrome, a policeman fainted and dropped down through sheer strain.

When I spoke to the Chief Minister of Hyderabad, he said that he was powerless in the matter, as instructions from the Home Ministry here had to be carried out. He added that this involved a large number of the police being shifted from one place to another in the State, and complicated arrangements for them involving much expense.

Whenever I went out in Hyderabad city or Secunderabad, the whole route was lined up by the police. This route was often seven or eight miles in length, and much of it was through more or less uninhabited areas, where there was no question of crowding. Along this entire route, traffic would be suspended for long periods. All this means that a visit from a VIP is something much more than a nuisance. It upsets the life of numerous individuals, irritates them and causes loss and even suffering.

I am quite sure that all this can be improved very greatly without taking any real risks in regard to security. Indeed I think that this method of lining up the entire route is wholly unwise from the point of view of security. It means advertising the route beforehand. Security demands that there should be no such publicity of the route, except when this is unavoidable in a very limited area where the engagement might take place.

I suggest, therefore, that immediate instructions should be issued to State Governments about these security arrangements. In particular, that the Madras Government should be informed, as I am reaching Madras on the 4th October. I recommend the following changes:

- (1) The routes should not be lined up by the police or the military, except to some extent in crowded localities and usually near the place of engagement, which is of course known. No announcement should be made about the route.
- (2) Traffic should not be held up at all except for a brief while near the place of engagement, if that is a crowded locality. About five minutes before the VIP starts for his engagement, a motor cycle or a jeep can go through that route and, where necessary, traffic might be stopped for a few minutes. This means that normal traffic is not stopped over the route. Only in very small parts of it, it is stopped and that only for about ten minutes at the most. At the place of engagement, where presumably large crowds gather, special arrangements can be made.

- (3) There should be no guards of honour at the aerodromes, etc. These should be reserved for the President when he goes on a formal visit.
- (4) The number of cars accompanying the VIP should be limited to as small a number as possible. Other people going to the function, including some members of the VIP's party, should normally precede him, if they have to attend that function.

These relatively simple changes would greatly reduce the number of policemen employed for the occasion and lessen the inconvenience to the public. Expenditure would also go down considerably.

Whenever I go on tour, almost always a senior officer of Intelligence accompanies me. On arrival he can discuss the matter with the local police chiefs and finalize arrangements, keeping in view the directions indicated above. At present there is a certain rigidity about the instructions issued from the Home Ministry with the result that even if local conditions require some other arrangement, no change is made.

I might mention that during my visit to Hyderabad, even members of our own party were being held up because traffic had been suspended.

I shall be grateful if very early instructions are issued to the various States and, more particularly, to Madras. I am sending a copy of this note to the Chief Minister of Madras for his information.

26. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
September 29, 1952

My dear Rajaji,

I have just been looking through the programme sent by your Government for my visit to Madras. I have nothing to say about the programme for the Rayalaseema as well as the Mysore area included in this programme.

I have already pointed out that I do not understand why an hour and a quarter have been provided on the morning of the 10th October for the National Girls High School in Triplicane. I would like to go there, but I should have thought that fifteen minutes was quite enough, or perhaps a little more. It is just a friendly visit and I do not propose to deliver an address there.

I find that there is a request made by Shri K. Kauruvila Jacob² on behalf

1. JN Collection.

2. Headmaster of the Madras Christian School.

of the Headmasters' Conference of Madras city, asking me to attend a mass rally high school pupils of the city.³ He says that about 30,000 would gather together in the Corporation Stadium. I rather like this idea. Perhaps it overlaps somewhat with the address to students fixed for the 8th October afternoon.⁴ It might be a good thing to separate the college students from the high school students. They have to be approached to some extent differently.

If there is this mass rally of high school children, the necessity for going to the National High School for girls becomes much less, because those girls can presumably go to the rally. Or, I could just pay a brief formal visit to the National Girls School without saying anything there and just having a look at the students.

Anyway, I shall abide by your decision in these matters.

In one of the letters received here, it is stated that catering arrangements for me in the train have been made through Spencers.⁵ I have no objection of course, but I find that all these catering arrangements are on much too sumptuous a scale and do not suit my mood or habits. I hope they are very simple.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

3. See *ante*, pp. 69-72

4. See *ante*, pp. 39-47

5. A departmental store in Madras.

27. To Swaran Singh¹

New Delhi

September 30, 1952

My dear Swaran Singh,

I wrote to you today about changing the rules governing the allotment of houses.² The more I think of it, the more necessary this appears to be. Our old rules were made to suit Government servants only. In those days, Government servants occupied a very special position and were in fact the rulers of the country. Delhi was an official city. Conditions are completely different now and it seems to me very improper that Members of Parliament should, in the matter of normal amenities, be placed below Government servants. The legislature is at least as important an organ of Government as the executive and the judiciary.

1. File No 45(22)/51-PMS.

2. Not printed.

MATTERS OF ADMINISTRATION

It must be remembered that in the Warrant of Precedence, Members of Parliament are much higher than practically all Government servants.

I realize that we cannot, for lack of accommodation, etc., give adequate facilities to all MPs, but such as we can give, we should give.

Apart from all MPs, there are some who should obviously be treated in a special way in this respect. These might be:

- (1) Former Ministers of the Central Government.
- (2) Members of Parliament who have been Ambassadors and Heads of Missions abroad.
- (3) Leaders of recognized Opposition groups.
- (4) Such other MPs whose need might be determined by the Speaker or the Chairman of the Council of States, in consultation with the Prime Minister.

This is just an indication of how the classification might be made.

It may be possible to place some such houses at the disposal of the Housing Committee of Parliament.

I understand that the rules governing allotment of houses etc., were framed long ago, before such things as Parliament came into existence. Obviously, they are out of date and must be revised completely. Amenities cannot be reserved solely for Government servants.

Apart from those rules, the so-called "economic rent" for quarters allotted to Members of Parliament and other non-officials is really outrageous. Some new rules should be evolved which at least apply to all Members of Parliament.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

28. To Mahavir Tyagi¹

New Delhi
October 2, 1952

My dear Mahavir,

... I have no doubt that the Finance Ministry have succeeded in preventing waste in many cases and, further, that you personally have done so. Indeed,

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

many such cases have come to my personal knowledge previously even without your having to draw my attention to them. I think I wrote to you in an earlier letter that I want the strictest scrutiny by Finance.² Nor do I agree with any proposal to the effect that money has been provided in the budget for a particular scheme and therefore that scheme should not be further examined in detail. Any scheme which has not been fully prepared by the Ministry concerned should not be sanctioned. I thought that it was the Financial Adviser's particular business to see that schemes were properly prepared in the Ministry and that he checked them. Otherwise his presence in the Ministry is not of much use. The Minister of Finance has always the right and the duty to look at these schemes at any time.

What I wanted to point out was that after a scheme has been provided for in the budget and it has been fully prepared by the Ministry concerned and checked and passed by the Financial Adviser, then it should not go through the whole process of a new scheme in the Finance Ministry from the Under Secretary upwards. It should go straight to the Minister. If the Minister wants further information, he can ask for it. If he does not agree with any part of it, he should deal directly with the other Minister in the Ministry concerned.

For a Financial Adviser, who is presumably one of the senior officials of the Finance Ministry, to check carefully a scheme and pass it and then for this process to be repeated in the Finance Ministry by officers of a lower rank even seems to me unnecessary and wasteful of time. That makes the position of the Financial Adviser superfluous.

I see from your letter that you have adopted the practice of dealing with these matters by personal talks. I entirely agree that this is the right practice.

Some difference, I think, should be made in the approach to regular schemes, which involve a considerable sum of money and relatively small items of expenditure. If the small items of expenditure are passed by the Ministry concerned, as well as the Financial Adviser, then normally there should be no further delay. As I have pointed out above, delay itself is costly, more costly than almost anything, apart from hanging up work and producing irritation.

I have found references being made for the most trivial matters to the Finance Ministry and these being held up for a long time. I am sure the time spent on them was a much more costly affair than the possible gain. All these trivial matters would of course be again examined and audited, and that is a further check.

The long list you have sent to me is interesting and impressive. But all the instances given are not of the same importance. For instance, you refer to the proposal to import aluminium components for the Government Housing Factory. I have little doubt that these aluminium components would have been utilized very soon in the Housing Factory and produced dividends. That in

2. See *ante*, pp. 134-135.

itself was not enough to accept that proposal, because in the long run we might not have been able to get the aluminium components. But there is no doubt that given the aluminium, money could be made in the Housing Factory.

I mentioned to you another type of case where money was given to the Rehabilitation Minister to be spent on relief at his discretion. The sum was not a big one. I cannot understand how his discretion in this matter can be or should be checked by some official of the Finance Ministry. The usual grants run into hundreds and not more. Nobody but the Rehabilitation Minister can judge of the necessity for an urgent grant of this type. It is unbecoming for an official of the Finance Ministry to say no to a petty grant like this when the Minister concerned is of opinion that it should be given.

Quite apart from this, another matter came up to my notice the other day in a letter that Ajit Prasad wrote to Deshmukh. He pointed out that Rs 50,000 a day were being spent on unproductive relief in the Bengal camps for refugees. That is a large sum and totally wasted in the long run. It would be a saving somehow to rehabilitate these people. Of course, the matter has to be gone into carefully. But delay costs Rs 50,000 a day.

I have no doubt, I repeat, that financial control must be as strict as possible. But there is always a danger that in being strict about trivial matters, you may be less strict about the big things. You may save the pennies and lose the pound.

Your papers are being returned to you,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

29. To K.M. Cariappa¹

New Delhi
October 2, 1952

My dear Cariappa,²

I wrote about the report³ that had appeared in the *Organiser* about a speech

1. JN Collection.

2. Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army.

3. Not printed.

you had delivered somewhere.⁴ That report was so amazing and so harmful both to Government and to you that it seemed to me essential that immediate action should be taken and a criminal case started. I wrote to you accordingly and suggested this and informed the Defence Ministry also. I was surprised to learn today that there had been some suggestion that an apology might be enough. I am quite sure that this will not be enough. In such a serious case, an apology has no meaning. The matter affects your honour and reputation and it is absolutely essential that you should pin the falsehood down in a court of law.

Recently we considered those cases, where newspapers make false and defamatory statements. Previously we had been rather slack about them and tended to ignore them. We came to the conclusion that this policy must change and in every single case the matter should be taken to a law court, even where, from a strictly legal point of view, a conviction was doubtful. Instructions have been issued by the Home Ministry accordingly to all State Governments and Ministries of the Government of India.

This particular instance of *Organiser* is a flagrant one and cannot be allowed to pass.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. On 22 September 1952, the *Organiser* carried a version of a report of Cariappa's speech at a Rotary Club meeting in Madras on 17 August, published in the *Trilinga*, a Telugu weekly. It alluded to Cariappa the view that "patriots like Veer Savarkar and Dr Khare had been thrown aside", while "those Congressmen who had the good fortune to be jailed for six months or so receive bouquets and laurels. These very same people had accepted the Partition of the Motherland which led to huge bloodshed, and yet they proudly declare to the world that they achieved independence by a bloodless revolution.... Mahatma Gandhi unfortunately did not endeavour to create true national heroes and wise statesmen. He did create a few *chhota* Mahatmas, but after attaining power they have all sunk to the meanest level."

30. To K. Hanumanthaiya¹

New Delhi
October 3, 1952

My dear Hanumanthaiya,

As you know, one of the major problems before us is that of housing. In this connection, we have been greatly interested in Kamesam's² methods for treating wood which can be used in place of steel. The Planning Commission has consulted him and, I believe, is having another meeting soon with him.

Because of our interest in this, we wanted to know what kind of buildings he had put up of this wood. Among these buildings, a major one is apparently the cinema house that he has built in Bangalore. We have had reports from several responsible sources, including our Minister for Labour and our Commander-in-Chief, expressing great appreciation of this cinema building in Bangalore and strongly recommending that we should utilize this process in a large way for building houses. We propose to experiment with this.

Meanwhile, I find that a controversy is going on between your Government and Kamesam about the use, or rather the licence, of this cinema house. We are informed that the licence was given in May 1951 and was renewed in April 1952, but some additional formality has not been complied with and, therefore, the building cannot be used.

The matter was referred to me some time ago and my PPS wrote to your Government about it. No answer has come in spite of a reminder. Could you please look into this matter and have it disposed of as early as possible? It does seem odd that some misunderstanding should delay our larger consideration of this work.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 17(65)/48-PMS.
2. S. Kamesam.

31. To Amrit Kaur¹

New Delhi
October 12, 1952

My dear Amrit,

Your letter of October 9th about discriminatory treatment meted out to Christians. I think there is some truth in this and I have an idea that the

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to K.N. Katju.

Madhya Pradesh Government or the officials there are often to blame. I shall write to them again and I might even mention this in my fortnightly letter, as you suggest.

I am really sorry to learn that the Gandhi Memorial Trust Leprosy Committee refused to give a grant to the Lepers Home in Kalimpong.

About what the Home Ministry wrote, I had a talk with Dr Katju. I suggest that you might discuss this matter with him also. He told me that he had no objection at all to: (1) foreign missionaries coming here for any kind of social work, and (2) for any evangelical work carried on by Indians in India. What he did not like was for foreigners to come here for purely evangelical work. This had little or nothing to do with Christianity but rather with the idea that foreigners come here and collect money in their own country for converting the savage heathen. I think there is something in that. Political difficulties arise. They have arisen in many countries in Asia and it would be unwise to do something now, which might create difficulties in future. Katju's whole point is that work done in India, whatever the nature of it might be, should be from a nationalist point of view and not from a foreign superior point of view, which is irritating and creates a bad psychology. Therefore there should be no difficulty where a foreign worker comes for social work.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

32. To K.M. Cariappa¹

New Delhi
October 17, 1952

My dear Cariappa,

Thank you for your letter of the 16th October.

There is nothing in your speech² which can be called disloyal or what

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. According to *The Hindu's* report of 18 August 1952, Cariappa said that the Indian Army could not be used in the same manner as the Chinese Liberation Army for the development of the country as its size was very small compared to that country's size and its main goal was to defend the country from external aggression and to maintain law and order if any help was sought by the Government. He said that to ensure security, the people should have a high morale, the country should be economically stable and industrially self-sufficient. Cariappa declared that the Army disliked war because they knew its utter futility in solving international problems. It was the statesmen and politicians who made wars.

might be called contrary to any specific policy. I did not suggest anything of this kind. But you have often touched upon various subjects, even economic subjects, in a manner which was sometimes not too happy. I am quite sure that there was no intention on your part to say anything that did not completely fit in with our policy. But it is always a risky business to stray into fields which are not too well-known. As a matter of fact, I am having some trouble with my colleagues occasionally when they talk about subjects outside their portfolio. Economics and some other subjects are very complicated and intricate and unless one knows them thoroughly, it is not safe to refer to them.

Of course I wanted you to do everything to identify the Army with the people. So far as that is concerned, I think you have succeeded and fortunately the relations of the Army and the people are exceedingly good...³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Nehru wired again to Cariappa on 14 October 1952 (not printed) saying that the issue of the report in the *Organiser* was not a personal matter, but the Government's and the Army's prestige was involved in it. The Cabinet had also considered it and had decided that an apology by the *Organiser* was not enough and legal action should be taken without delay. In fact, a suit against the paper was filed on 23 October by Cariappa.

CONGRESS PRESIDENCY

I. Congress Organization

1. The Value of Mass Contact¹

I deprecate the idea held in certain quarters that the Congress has two wings, one to function in the parliamentary sphere and the other discharging extra-parliamentary functions. Each is complementary to the other, and the party must function as a whole.

Every Member of Parliament or of State Assemblies must function in his respective sphere; even more important, he has to function in his constituency. If he forgets the constituency, he is doomed because he gradually becomes rootless.

Your main sanction today is that you stand as Congress candidates. The Congress has functioned among the people and so you too must continue this work and increase the strength of the Congress.

Despite the achievements of the Congress the organization is today facing a great trial. You must keep pace with a fast-moving world or else you will be left behind. The Congress contested the elections not to secure power and offices for its members, but to implement the pledges it had given to the people.

Speaking more as a Congressman than as Prime Minister or Member of Parliament, I would like to tell the legislators that Congressmen should hold together and pull together.

It has been proposed in the amendments to the Congress Constitution, which the Working Committee has earlier in the day finalized, that members of the Congress parties in Parliament or in the Assemblies should become ex-officio associate members of Congress committees.² I think that this is a proper approach to the problem because it gives you better opportunities of working together, and staying together, instead of bringing about conflicts between those holding office and the others controlling committees.

Associate membership meant membership in every sense except in the sense of voting or standing for office. It is, of course, open to anyone to go through the normal process of election and become a full member.

1. Speech at a convention of Congress legislators, Indore, 12 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 13 September 1952.
2. The Working Committee had suggested that Executive Committee members of the Congress Parliamentary Party should become associate members of the AICC, while executive members of the State legislative parties should become associate members of the Pradesh Congress Committees. In addition, members of the Congress Parliamentary Party should become ex-officio members of their respective Pradesh Congress Committees, while members of the State legislative parties should become ex-officio members of the District Congress Committees.

The Congress gets its sanction from the people at the grassroot level, the people in factories and in the fields. In the measure Congressmen add to that sanction, by virtue of their work in the constituencies as Congressmen, they will add to their own strength and to the strength of the organization. Theirs is a dual function to perform. However, some people say, and used to say, that the Congress has two wings, the Parliamentary wing and the wing for constructive and other work.³ I do not think that is a correct description. There might have been some truth in this kind of description in the old days when the Swaraj Party functioned.⁴ The Congress then performed certain duties in the Assemblies which were mainly those of the Opposition. They were trying to carry on the fight for freedom in the Assemblies while the main fight lay outside. But the situation has now changed completely as the Congress has to run the Government.

The present task of the Congress is how to canalize its various activities. We have to remember that our primary sanction comes from the people, from the service Congressmen render, and the confidence they inspire among the people. All this depends on the results which the Congressmen produce. Every party is judged by the results, and not by the long manifestoes and tall promises it makes.

I warn the Congressmen that nothing is more dangerous than to make tall promises, and not be in a position to keep those promises. Only very immature, nascent and adventurous parties indulge in saying things which may bring them temporary gains. But in an old organization like the Congress, members should not talk tall and make false promises. They should say exactly what they intend doing, and what they hope to do, and no more. That is why even in the Five-Year Plan, the Government has endeavoured not to talk tall.

The Opposition groups can afford to talk tall because, among other reasons, there is no chance of their having to give effect to their promises. I am sure such parties or groups, indulging in tall talk, will gradually be exposed. I personally think that certain parties, opposed to the Congress, would have done better in the elections had they not made exaggerated promises. The Congressmen must act big but not talk tall.

3. S.K. Patil, President of the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee, wanted full control over the Parliamentary wing of the Congress to be vested in the organizational wing. K. Hanumanthaiya, the Chief Minister of Mysore, had come out in support of the merger of the two wings and the combination of the two posts of Prime Minister and Congress President.
4. For some years after the suspension of the non-cooperation movement in February 1922, when the Congress was split into two groups viz., the Pro-changers or the Swarajists and the No-changers, the Swaraj Party under the leadership of C.R. Das and Motilal Nehru was formed within the Congress to carry forward the freedom struggle on the parliamentary plane. It contested the elections in 1924 and became the main opposition in the Central Legislative Assembly.

It is no good justifying one's mediocre performance. The Congressmen have to think and act as to how they can increase the pace of India's progress. I always feel that the present pace is not fast enough. We can increase the pace not by mere talking. We must also remember that we have to start with relatively small resources.

It is always necessary that Congressmen should hold and pull together in their respective Assemblies and in Parliament. That does not mean that they should not have the complete freedom of internal discussions. We want democracy in the Congress, in the organization, and we must discuss these matters fully. There is no reason why there should be any suppression of internal arguments, though the party must firmly hold together. Otherwise, it will be shattered to pieces by various opposition forces that are raising their heads.

We have to hold together in Parliament and elsewhere, and more so in the whole of the Congress organization, inside and outside, and function as a dynamic body and not as a passive force. We have to devise measures for doing Parliamentary work effectively, unitedly, and progressively, and profit by each other's experience. We have to do all this within the organizational framework and not as a separate entity.

The proposal to be placed before the AICC envisages a closer association of Congress legislators with the organization by means of associate membership. Besides this suggestion of associate membership, other steps also might be considered as occasions arise.⁵ Our first task is to build up the organization. But it will be a wrong step to build up an altogether new organization. The existing practice of members of the Congress legislature parties coming together will itself help in the building up of the organization. It has been suggested that, from time to time, the leaders, the secretaries, and the chief whips might meet together to consider common problems and find out ways and means of resolving difficulties.

5. Some amendments to the Congress Constitution moved were: (1) one-third or more of the personnel of the Working Committee should consist, as at present, of ministers; (2) the election to any office in the Congress for a third consecutive term be prohibited; (3) the parliamentary wing should assume a superior role and relegate the organization to a subordinate position; and (4) there should be an effective liaison between the State Congress and the State Government.

2. Resolution on Salaries of Civil Servants¹

I am amused that a member of the AICC is falling into the trap of the Government. Usually committees are appointed which go all over the country for six months and produce nothing. In regard to the particular question of pay of the civil servants, the Government has all the facts with it, and no commission or committee is required.

Whether the guarantees given to the civil services in the Constitution were right or wrong is a different matter.² Personally, I think the guarantees in the Constitution are totally unnecessary and undesirable. But we must remember that the assurances were given under peculiar conditions. There were a number of foreigners, Britishers, in the Indian Civil Service. In that context, the assurances were given if they were prepared to stay on. Such an assurance could not be limited only to Europeans. At present, there are not very many senior men in the ICS. While I am not justifying the assurance on its merits, once an assurance has been given by me, or by my Government, I feel bound by it unless there is some special occasion.

The assurances given covered only a relatively small number of persons. In regard to other civil servants, they are governed by the Pay Commission's Report. I do not think the time, or the necessity, has arisen to revise the Pay Commission's scales. Nor do I think that the Pay Commission's recommendations are by any means extravagant.

The pay of civil servants has to some extent to be related to the general level of income which is much higher. A successful lawyer, or one engaged in trade or any other profession, earns more than a civil servant. If the income of a civil servant is lower than the general income, then the Government will get into difficulties, and it will get only third rate people and the whole arrangement will become unsatisfactory. There should not be a big disparity in the pay of civil servants and the personnel of other services. Thus the problem is one of

1. Speech on a non-official resolution moved by K.P. Tripathi for the appointment of a commission to fix a ceiling on salaries of civil servants, AICC meeting, Indore, 14 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 15 September 1952.
2. Article 314 of the Constitution guarantees to persons, who were members of the Secretary of State's services in India, the same terms and conditions of service as they were entitled to before the commencement of the Constitution.

equalizing all over, whether it is in professions, trade or in the industries. It is an economic question affecting the whole social structure.

The problem has to be tackled, but I do not know what a commission can do. The Government is in possession of all the facts. It is not a question which can be solved piecemeal. The Government does not want, first of all, to go behind any definite guarantee which it has given even though it may feel that guarantee is not justified, unless other circumstances arose by way of consultation and the rest. While I am opposed to the appointment of a commission, because it is totally unnecessary, I am glad the resolution has been discussed. This would give an opportunity to the Government and the public and the civil services also to think about it.³

3. After Nehru's speech the resolution was put to vote and lost.

3. Rights and Duties¹

Friends and comrades,

I have long wished to come to Hyderabad, and at last that wish has been fulfilled. But I have come under strange circumstances, when we have had to face in India both success and a measure of failure: success in our achieving independence, failure in what happened afterwards.

In Hyderabad also there has been trouble during the past year and many ups and downs. This trouble brought suffering to many and conflict with the Indian Union. Fortunately that conflict is over and we have now to face the tasks of peace and reconstruction. My special purpose in coming here is not only to bring the greetings of my Government and the people of the rest of India to all the people of Hyderabad but also more specially to give a touch of healing if I can to the people here.

We have peace, but what we want even more is peace in men's minds and the ending of hatred and conflict which have marred our lives during the past year and more. The new year is coming soon. Let us start this new year, not only in Hyderabad but all over India with peace and friendship in our minds and hearts and with a spirit of cooperation among all those who inhabit this great land of India. Let us contend with each other to render service in a

1. Message to the Nation from AIR, Hyderabad, 24 September 1952. AIR tapes, NMML.

spirit of goodwill. Let each one of us think more of his duty and obligation to another than of his rights. Rights flow from duties discharged and obligations fulfilled. Above all, let us remember the message of the Father of the Nation, the message of peace and friendship between the various communities that inhabit India and of even thinking in terms of those who suffer and are downtrodden and who must be raised to their proper level.

In Hyderabad, the first duty of everyone is to help all those who may be in distress and all those who may have suffered. With this duty discharged, other great problems will be faced and solved with friendship and cooperation. Among these great problems is the future set-up of the Government of Hyderabad in accordance with the wishes of the people.

Another urgent problem is that of the land and the agrarian system which is obsolete and feudal. This must be changed so that the agriculturist and the worker on the land might have his rightful due. The feudal system must go. I trust that this will be done cooperatively. The administration should initiate preliminary measures for the reform of the agrarian system as soon as possible. The rest will follow. I am deeply grateful for the love and affection that the people of Hyderabad, of all kinds and classes, have showered upon me during my brief visit. I shall treasure this and it will give me further strength for the great cause for which we all stand.

4. Merger of the KMPP and the Socialist Party¹

Question: Would you comment on the Kisan Mazdoor Party-Socialist Party merger?

Jawaharlal Nehru: Generally speaking, I would say, I welcome the merger. It is not for me to criticize their policy or the contradiction in that policy.² It is

1. Remarks at a press conference, Madras, 4 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 5 October 1952. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference, see pp. 138-139, 153, 342-343, 412, 431, 553-554, 648-649 and 674.

2. The contradiction lay in the incompatibility of the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party-Communist alliance in the United Democratic Front led by T. Prakasam, which functioned as the main opposition group in the Madras Assembly.

for them to decide. But I welcome any lessening of a large number of groups. Many people in the erstwhile Praja Party and the Socialist Party were colleagues of ours in the Congress. There is much in common between us. I should like to have as much cooperation as possible with them. I do not mind their criticizing the Government. But, surely, there is a large field of cooperation in relation to the Five-Year Plan and other plans, and opposition does not mean opposing good things.

5. Revitalizing the Congress¹

The gathering, I am told, is a meeting of Congress legislators. They have been elected. But I have not been able to define who is a Congress worker and who is not. Sometimes when I go to places, thousands and thousands of persons come to what is called a Congress workers' meeting, and yet not much of Congress work is in evidence there, but Congressmen are in evidence on such occasions. So, how to define a Congress worker is not clear to me.

In the last few months, since the general elections, we have certainly learnt many lessons. First of all, they gave me a new opportunity of coming in contact with the Indian masses and forming opinion about their moods. From the varying results of the elections in the various parts of the country, you can know as to what your successes or failures in the elections are due to. I want to say straightaway that I am glad that there was a good number of failures for the Congress Party in Madras State.² Nothing is so good for an organization as to be knocked on the head. Nothing is so bad as to have an easy time, and no challenge being thrown out. The great difficulty of the Congress in the last five or six years has been that the organization has succeeded in its objective. The reason why the Congress had been formed was to achieve the independence of India. Having achieved it, immediately, a kind of

1. Address to Congress legislators and workers of Madras State, Madras, 10 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 11 October 1952.
2. In the general elections of 1951-52, the Congress Party in Madras State did not secure a clear majority. Six of its ministers, including the Chief Minister, Kumaraswami Raja, were defeated. Its strength was reduced from 165 out of 205 seats in 1946 to 152 seats in a House of 375 in 1952.

reaction set in when we, in the organization, felt that we had done our job and could rest and take it easy. We thought that now was the time to receive rewards for our past labours and sacrifices. So, everybody looked forward to a reward, and hardly thought of work. Those who had worked for the Congress in early days hardly thought of any reward; work itself was a reward which gave a sense of exhilaration and which made them happy.

But now we have to meet this dangerous situation which comes from success. Nothing is more dangerous than success for the individual, organization or the nation, because success makes one mentally and physically flabby. It is not good for an individual or organization to be flabby. The Congress began to suffer from mental and physical flabbiness. It is inevitable that the consequences of this would not be good.

One major lesson of the elections was that, where the Congress was a functioning organization, functioning not only at the top level, but was a living organization in the villages and in the hearths and homes of the people, there the Congress succeeded, and succeeded well. Where the Congress was not a functioning organization in that way, and where it consisted of some top committees, passing occasional resolutions and a few people at the top usually busy in electing themselves to office or quarrelling among themselves as to who should be elected to which office, there the Congress lost. I was amazed to see how powerful, in spite of the fact that we had not been working hard enough for some time at all, was the hold of the Congress on the people of India. That was a major lesson.

The Punjab is a very difficult province, where the consequences of Partition have been terrible. All kinds of communal questions still arise there, and I am told that the Communists are also busy there wandering about and upsetting things. Here is a border province with all sorts of problems, communal and otherwise, including problems created by spies from the other side. Before the elections, this was one of the weakest Congress provinces in India but here the Congress won a resounding victory in the elections.³ All kinds of powerful organizations, Sikh, Hindu and Muslim communal organizations, with tons of money behind them—all rich folks were giving money to them—all of them were completely floored. Some of the people who spent lakhs and lakhs of rupees, lost their deposits, and Congress candidates who were not even well known, but who had done some active work, won. So, we find that because the Congress people in the Punjab worked hard, at any rate for some months before the elections, we won.

One other curious situation also arose. The Congress Government there at that time was not, in our opinion, and the Congress Parliamentary Board's

3. In the general elections, the Punjab Congress won 97 out of 126 seats for the State Assembly and 16 out of 18 seats for the House of the People.

opinion, functioning satisfactorily. We tried to advise it to change itself. It did not do so. Ultimately, we advised it to resign and it resigned, and Governor's rule was imposed for a period.⁴ It was our own Government, and to ask our own Government to resign is, normally speaking, to injure our own cause, the Congress cause. Governor's rule, normally speaking, is a retrograde step. But looking at the entire picture, we decided on it. I am quite sure, we did the right thing. One of the results of that decision was—the decision was welcomed by the people of the Punjab—the people felt that the Congress, at any rate, the higher ranks of the Congress, was a straightforward honest body. They did not hesitate to punish their own Government and their own men when they went wrong. I have no doubt that was the major result. Why we got a majority in the Punjab in the elections was, firstly, because our people worked there hard and secondly, because of this feeling, that whatever may be the local troubles, the Congress stood for straightforward honest government.

In a large constituency, where there were hardly a hundred Muslim voters, we had set up a Muslim candidate. His opponent was the President of the Hindu Mahasabha. Putting up a Muslim there was a fantastic gamble, and yet the Muslim candidate won.⁵ That shows not only the strength of the Congress, but also a certain political consciousness of the people. The Congress policy, or the lack of policy, was justifiably criticized. Really speaking, it was not the policy, or lack of it, that came up against them in the elections, but it was the lack of touch with the masses and lack of work among the masses, so far as the Congress was concerned. So far as the Punjab Government was concerned, there was a feeling, rightly or wrongly, that they were not giving the people a square deal. This feeling was naturally exploited by the opponents of the Congress.

Now, speaking for a moment as Congress President, I would say that the most important thing for Congressmen, and Congress committees, is to work in their local areas, and not mind their opponents. It does not matter if we are a minority or a small group. It does not matter even if the public is opposed to us for the moment. That was how the Congress started work years ago and gradually brought round the public to their point of view. A passive, inactive

4. The Congress Party in Punjab had split into two, with one group led by Gopichand Bhargava and the other by Bhimsen Sachar. In 1949, the Government with Gopichand Bhargava as its leader had to resign and Bhimsen Sachar became the Chief Minister. But after six months, Bhargava, in alliance with Giani Kartar Singh, overthrew the Sachar Ministry. As the performance of his government was unsatisfactory the Congress High Command directed Bhargava to resign. This led to the President's rule in the State under Article 356 of the Constitution.
5. In fact, it was Mulraj, the Jan Sangh candidate, who was defeated by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the Congress candidate, by more than three thousand votes in the contest for the Ambala city seat in the Punjab Assembly.

organization deserves to fade away. The result of the elections in the Madras State can be directly attributed to the lack of work by Congressmen, quarrels among Congressmen, and certain differences at the top in the district committees at a few places.

It is better to wind up the Congress than to allow such a show continuing. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that Congressmen should work and not mind facing difficulties and opposition. The way to achieve success is by meeting difficulties. It is clear that the electorate could not be misled. It is an intelligent, discriminating electorate.

It is surprising that in the city of Delhi, the Congress got a majority.⁶ The Congress candidates who lost there, I am personally of the opinion, almost without doubt, deserved to lose, in the sense they were not a good choice. The local committee had chosen them, and we accepted their choice, and they were not a good choice, not from the point of view of policy, but from the point of view of popularity with the people. People even told me: 'We will vote for the Congress, but not for a particular Congress candidate.' So the Congressmen we set up were not good enough. That is what I call discriminating exercise of the right to vote. I admire them for it. I like people for it. I almost applaud them.

We do not want people who are like dumb sheep. Speaking metaphorically, it is a great advantage for Madras that the Congress received some knocks on the head in the last elections. I am sure you have, to a large extent, profited by it. I am not quite sure how far the Congress organization has profited by it. It is for you to know, because, if it has not profited by it, the next knock will be harder and more upsetting.

I emphasize the need for working together, and not turning ourselves into a Liberal Party. I do not mean any disrespect to the Liberal Party of India. They were very intelligent and very good people, but ineffective and totally useless, politically. I want the Congress to be a vital organization, an active and youthful organization. It must be vital and dynamic. We are, as individuals, not important. We are important as Congressmen. We have to remember that we belong to a great organization, a historic organization, an organization which has made history in India by what it has done. We have been agents of a historic change. Therefore, we are important.

I wonder what has come over Congressmen so as to make them turn pale and be afraid of Communists. I am not afraid of Communists. I can face all the Communists in India and outside put together. Wherever I go, I welcome

6. In the general elections held on 14 January 1952 in Delhi State, the Congress secured 39 out of the 48 seats for the State Assembly polling nearly 53 per cent of the votes and won three out of the four seats to the House of the People polling 50 per cent of the votes.

being put face to face with Communist crowds, because I know I am the stronger person. If I am not, well and good, let the other fellow have a chance. You must approach this problem in this strong confident way. When you feel you are doing the right thing, you should have no doubts in your mind. If you have doubts in your mind, you will not have strength. I am not talking about high policy, though high policy is also important. A dynamic movement must be in touch with reality and reflect the needs of the moment and the problems of the moment. It must not be rigid, it must be flexible.

The Communists or the Socialists represent, in a measure, certain ideas which are progressive in the domain of economic theory, and a certain change which is gradually coming all over the world. For example, England is not a Communist country. But new ways of life and a socialistic basis of society are being adopted there peacefully and gradually. Economic changes are accepted and adjustments are made. Where changes take place swiftly, you have to adjust yourself or else you are left behind and the changes overwhelm you.

Now, communism as such, and for that matter socialism also—I am talking about the ideologies of these—have today a powerful appeal in many parts of the world, because of certain ideological and economic concepts which these have as their integral part, apart from certain other dogmas and ideals these concepts give rise to. But, on the other hand, the very followers and adherents of these isms have become so narrow and rigid and dogmatic in outlook that they have lost touch with all reality. They depend on slogans. The result is that the very strength they might have possessed, they miss. It escapes them.

The success of the Communist Party in the election is a negative one.⁷ The electorate might have voted against some Congress candidates because they wanted to teach a lesson to the Government. It does not mean they liked the opposition. Communism as such contains certain progressive ideas. It appeals to the average intelligent person. But that very communism has bred a certain rigidity of thought which cannot adapt itself to changing conditions. Therefore, communism which is supposed to be a very revolutionary force, tends to become counter-revolutionary.

Apart from that, the methods adopted by the Communist Party, the violent and the disruptive forces which they encouraged, brought them condemnation of their activities in India. I do not mind the communist economic theory. But I will not accept the rigidity and the dogma that goes with it. In actual practice, the Communist Party has become completely opportunist with no basis and no principle. That is why here in Madras they are functioning in a curious way

7. In the general election, the Communist Party and its allies gained 181 out of 587 seats they contested for the Assemblies and 23 out of 70 seats they contested for the House of the People. Their success came mainly from Madras, Travancore-Cochin, West Bengal, Hyderabad and Tripura.

and having an opportunist alliance, with no principles,⁸ except to slight the Congress and to oppose it.

In a sense, the activities of the Communist Party of India are very harmful, because behind the slogans, they aim against something which is of the greatest importance, namely, the unity of India. Communist activities are disruptive and harmful to India like those of the communalists. Their manner of thinking does not concern itself with what is good or bad for India. But even in the difficult circumstances that surrounded us soon after the elections, I was not alarmed, because I did not experience any sense of weakness inside me to face any situation.

In the confused situation that prevailed here soon after the elections, Rajaji was good enough to take over the helm and guide you all, and guide the destiny of the State and the result of it all is there for you to see.⁹ You know better than I, how public opinion is veering round. Public opinion in the State is gradually changing, both negatively and positively, negatively in the sense that it is moving away from the Communist Party, and positively in the sense, that it is moving towards the Congress.

So, I would put it to you to face the situation here with courage and discipline, and not at all be put down by the shouting of others. In the ultimate analysis what counts in a democratic structure is the general reaction of the people. It is partly caused by the policies we pursue and much more so by their belief that the Government is an honest, straightforward government doing its best. People want some kind of a good government. Nothing is so harmful to a government as a reputation of lack of integrity. Even a bad policy can be put up with. But the reputation of lack of integrity in a government or an organization is fatal anywhere in the world, and even more so in India. Therefore, as a government one has to do the straight thing in a straight way, taking people into confidence confessing errors where necessary. People like that. Let us be human enough to confess our mistakes and set them right. Take people into

8. A KMPP-Communist alliance came into being in Madras State when there was a possibility of a non-Congress Government being set up. This alliance was considered as an alliance of opportunism rather than one based on identity of aims, for the only thing they had really in common was their opposition to the Congress. In fact, the Communists watered down their programmes to make common cause with the KMPP and had to accept a reformist rather than a revolutionary programme because they stood to gain political advantage by such an arrangement.
9. C. Rajagopalachari, who had just then retired from active politics, was persuaded, in the interests of the Congress Party and of a stable government in the State, to take up the leadership of the State legislature and form the Government. He accepted the offer, not without hesitation, when the Congress Party in the legislature unanimously elected him its leader on 31 March 1952.

confidence, be in touch with them, not minding being repulsed or repudiated occasionally.

I wish to speak a few words on the duty of Congressmen with regard to the movement for merger of the foreign pockets in India, namely, Pondicherry, Mahe, etc. At a public meeting yesterday, I have expressed myself most clearly and fairly strongly on that subject.¹⁰ The point is, what is the Congressmen's duty in regard to this matter. Our Government has been trying to follow a policy in this matter, as in others, which is unyielding in matters of high principle, but which is nevertheless a friendly approach to solve the problem in a peaceful way. Now, in French India, it is clear that goonda elements almost rule the place¹¹ and presumably are backed by the Government of these territories, or if not backed up, they are not controlled. Whatever it is, I feel Congress organizations, more specially those round about these areas, should deliberately, definitely, and openly express themselves, peacefully of course, in public meetings, and otherwise, in sympathy with the large number of people who have been driven out as emigres from French territory, and in favour of merger. We cannot take things lying down. It is better to solve the matter peacefully than to create new problems. It does not matter if it takes two or three years.

I am told that in the internal Congress elections for Congress Committees, etc., there were very few Muslim representatives. I am against the system of nomination and the rest. Nor do I wish to suggest any change in the Congress Constitution in that way. But I would suggest informally to the *taluk*, district and pradesh committees to invite some leading Congress Muslims and associate them in the consideration of matters before them. These invitees need not have voting powers. They are there for consultation. In that way you encourage them, get their viewpoints and generally keep in touch with them. But, on no account, should you encourage, directly or indirectly, communal and Muslim League elements here.

10. See *ante*, pp. 133-134.

11. About 50 families of French Indian nationals had, in recent weeks, migrated to the Indian Union from French Indian settlements because some gangsters had made life impossible for them. These gangsters operated with the connivance of the French India police.

CONGRESS PRESIDENCY

II. Party Matters

1. To Jai Narain Vyas¹

New Delhi
July 25, 1952

My dear Vyasji,

Now that you are standing as Congress candidate for the Kishangarh vacancy, I hope that the whole election campaign on your behalf will be conducted on a high level and in accordance with our principles.² This election will naturally draw a good deal of attention not only in Rajasthan, but also in other parts of India. We have therefore to set an example and, in particular, to avoid doing anything which might be liable to criticism or which might have an adverse effect on the public mind.

I am saying this because I think that the recent election campaign of Takhtmal Jain³ was, in my opinion, not properly conducted. I have a high opinion of Takhtmal Jain and I wanted very much that he should succeed. Indeed, I had no doubt that he would succeed and his failure came to me as a surprise. Plenty of people worked for him and I understand that a fair amount of money was spent on the election. Nevertheless he lost. I have a feeling that he never got into touch with the public and relied on some individuals too much. The whole object of our elections, apart from winning, is to get in touch with the public and to make them feel that we are one of them. If we function from the top and use a number of paid workers and others like them, that object is frustrated and people think that we are outsiders imposing ourselves on them with the help of money, etc. The one big lesson of the general elections was that money does not go far, indeed that it is often a handicap. Some of the candidates who opposed us in the Punjab and elsewhere were very rich men and they spent lakhs of rupees and yet they forfeited their security. The very fact that they represented much money went against them, and our poor candidates got through.

Every by-election is now a test for us and how we conducted and in what manner we approached the people, who are our principal supporters and are we standing for principles. The chief workers should therefore be carefully chosen because they will represent the candidate. If they are unpopular, the reaction will be against the candidate.

1. JN Collection.

2. In the general election for the Rajasthan Assembly, Jai Narain Vyas, the Chief Minister, was defeated in both the constituencies from where he contested. In the by-election in Kishangarh on 26 August 1952, he won.

3. Takhtmal Jain was till recently the leader of the Madhya Bharat Congress Legislature Party and the Chief Minister. He resigned on 1 July 1952 following his defeat in the Mandasaur by-election.

Jagannath⁴ gave us a long report after his visit to Kishangarh and Jaipur. It was a good report. He pointed out that while you personally were popular, there was, among certain circles like merchants and labour, a definite feeling against the millowner there named Patni.⁵ I do not know Patni, and so I can express no opinion about him. But Jagannath wrote that many people told him that they would gladly help you if Patni was not closely associated with your election because they have a grievance against Patni. I do not know if this grievance was justified or not, but it is clear to me that Patni is likely to be a liability in the election. So also some others may be a liability.

I am anxious, of course, that you should win this election. I am equally anxious that you should win it on the basis of our principles and in such a way as to consolidate the Congress position in Rajasthan.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Lala Jagannath was a representative of the AICC deputed to study the situation in the Kishangarh constituency of Rajasthan from where Vyas was contesting a by-election to the Rajasthan Assembly. He stated in his report that the withdrawal of some independent candidates alone would ensure the success of Vyas.
5. Jamna Lal Patni of Jaipur was a Congress leader.

2. To Balvantray Mehta¹

New Delhi
July 25, 1952

My dear Balvantray,²

We have convened the meeting of the Working Committee for Sunday the 10th August. I do not want this meeting to be a very large one as we have been having recently. It is difficult to do any solid work with too many people present. Therefore, I should like to restrict the meeting to the members and to a very few invitees who are really wanted by us. I should like to see the list of invitees.

The agenda for the meeting should be:

- 1) Amendment of the Congress Constitution
- 2) Land reform policy
- 3) Resolutions for the AICC

1. File No G-1/1952, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. General Secretary of the AICC at this time.

We need not finalize our resolutions for the AICC then but it is desirable to discuss them.

I have included land reform policy because some developments³ have taken place since we discussed this matter last. The Hyderabad problem is before us and the Planning Commission is going to finalize its report soon. It would be desirable for us therefore to discuss this. In discussing it, I think it would be better for some few of us to discuss it on the previous day, i.e. Saturday, the 9th August. This will not be a formal meeting of the Working Committee but some members of the Committee and a few others, who are interested in this problem, could be invited on the 9th afternoon. As to who should be invited, I should like to discuss with you. I could send them letters myself. I think Rajaji should be invited to this meeting as well as the Working Committee meeting.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Progress in land reform during 1951-52 had been made in two directions: (i) abolition of intermediaries and special tenures and; (ii) enhanced rights for tenants. The AICC on 8 July 1952, had sent a circular to the leaders of the Congress legislative parties in the States asking them to collect data about land reforms in their regions.

3. To P. Subbarayan¹

New Delhi
July 30, 1952

My dear Subbarayan,
Your letter of the 26th July.²

It is rather difficult for me to advise about the municipal elections. But *prima facie*, it would appear that when two PCCs are concerned, they should cooperate. If there had been no particular trouble, the obvious course was for a Joint Election Committee to be constituted. In the alternative, for both the PCCs to elect their Election Committee members and for these to function together jointly. The whole question is one of friendly discussion to find out

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Balvantray Mehta.
2. P. Subbarayan. President of the Tamil Nad Congress Committee, expressed his difficulties in forming a joint selection committee to select the Congress candidates for the municipal elections in Madras State. The selection of candidates was later made by two ad hoc committees, formed by the Tamil Nad and Andhra Pradesh Committees for their respective regions.

some cooperative course of action. While on the one hand you mention that to allow the Andhras to have a voice in the matter might strengthen their claim to Madras city, on the other hand, it does seem odd to ignore the Andhra Committee.

All I can really advise you is to try your best to come to an understanding. You can consult Rajaji about it.

About new persons in your Working Committee, this can be done, though it is normally avoided. Of course, you should get those people elected to the PCC as soon as possible. Any step that you take in this matter should have the general approval of your Committee.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Balvantray Mehta¹

New Delhi
31st July 1952

My dear Balvantray,

Your letter of today's date about approving Sanjiva Reddi² for the vacancy caused by Dr Pattabhi Sitaramayya's resignation.³ As you have agreed to it, there is nothing more to be said. But I must say that this is not a happy choice. It goes against the rule⁴ we laid down previously that in these elections for the Assembly, candidates who have been defeated in the general elections should not be put up. I am sure this will be criticized as trying to get a person in by a back door.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. PEC-11/1, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. (1913-1996); Congress leader from Andhra; Member, Madras Assembly, 1937-39, Constituent Assembly, 1947-48; Minister, Madras Government, 1947-51; Deputy Chief Minister, 1955-56 and Chief Minister, Andhra Pradesh, 1956-57 and 1962-64; President, Indian National Congress, 1960-62; Union Minister, 1964-67; Speaker, Lok Sabha, 1967-69; President of India, 1977-82.
3. N. Sanjiva Reddy who headed the Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee had lost by 12,000 votes to his Communist brother-in-law, T. Nagi Reddy, who had filed his nomination from a jail. He was included as a member of the Congress Working Committee in the vacancy caused by the resignation of Pattabhi Sitaramayya who had been appointed Governor of Madhya Pradesh.
4. After the general elections, the Congress Party had decided that no Chief Minister or Minister defeated in the elections would be allowed to continue in office.

5. To Balvantray Mehta¹

New Delhi
August 3, 1952

My dear Balvantray,

I enclose a letter from Awadesh Pratap Singh² of Vindhya Pradesh. He has been carrying on an agitation against the present Ministry of Vindhya Pradesh and especially the Chief Minister.³ I cannot say much about some points mentioned by him in his letter. But I made an enquiry in Vindhya Pradesh, and the report I got was that the present Government there and especially the Chief Minister were doing good work.

Awadesh Pratap Singh is a very irresponsible person and I am not prepared to accept his word. He feels rather frustrated that he is not a Minister there. As a matter of fact, he never expected the Congress to win there and so did not stand for the local legislature.

In regard to any specific matter in this letter, an enquiry might be made.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No P-23/1952, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. Awadesh Pratap Singh was the Chief Minister of a caretaker Cabinet from 1948 to April 1949 in Vindhya Pradesh.
3. Shambhoo Nath Shukla.

6. To Manakya Lal Varma¹

New Delhi
10th August, 1952

Dear friend,²

I understand that some talks are in progress between some members of the Rajasthan Assembly Congress Party and some representatives of the *jagirdars* about coming to some kind of an agreement with them. I should like to be informed what these talks are and who is conducting them. In this matter we have to be very careful and no step should be taken without informing us. Will you please find out and report to me?

1. JN Collection. A copy was sent to the AICC office.
2. (1897-1969); worked for the welfare of tribals and removal of forced labour in Rajasthan; founder-president, Mewar Praja Mandal; prime minister of Rajasthan, 1948; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1952-67. He was President of the Rajasthan Pradesh Congress Committee at this time.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

I also understand that one of your MLAs has sent you his resignation from the Assembly.³ No such resignation should be accepted without reference to us. The position in Rajasthan is a difficult one and no Congress Member should make it more difficult by the action that he takes.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. In fact, two Congress members of the Rajasthan Assembly, Virendra Singh and Mukhilal Modi, resigned their membership of the Rajasthan Pradesh Congress Committee alleging predominance of party politics in the PCC.

7. To Lal Bahadur Shastri¹

New Delhi
August 16, 1952

My dear Lal Bahadur,²

I have been thinking a lot about the next Congress President.³ I feel that we must not allow this matter to remain suspended in the air till the last moment. We should be clear in our minds at an early stage and let others know about it.

The more I think of it, the more I feel that Maulana Azad should be elected.⁴ I need not go into the reasons, as they are many. I can think of no other person for the moment who would be suitable.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. General Secretary of the AICC.

3. The next presidential election of the Indian National Congress was to be held on 22 December 1952, according to the decision of the election sub-committee of the Congress Working Committee.

4. The Congress Working Committee requested Nehru to continue as the Congress President.

8. To S.K. Patil¹

New Delhi
August 18, 1952

My dear Patil,

Today's papers contained a report of your speech at a meeting of the Girgaum District Congress Committee, in which you denounced Congress Government.² I have read this speech with amazement. I shall not refer to that speech in detail here. But it is obvious to me that if such speeches are delivered by prominent Congressmen, then the matter must be considered by the Working Committee or, if necessary, by the AICC.

Presumably, you have made this speech because of your opposition to the Bombay sales tax. You wrote to me on this issue some little time ago.³ The matter, of course, has come up to me in other ways also, and is likely to come up again. I do not propose to discuss that matter here. What you said in your speech yesterday was, however, something much more far-reaching and completely subversive of any kind of discipline. I am for the moment having this matter included in the agenda of the next Working Committee meeting, which will be held at Indore. I propose, however, to refer to it at the AICC also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No P-5/1953, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. On 17 August 1952, S.K. Patil, President of the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee, attributed to the "administrative inefficiency" of the Congress Governments the unpopularity of the organization. He said that not a single Minister of the Bombay Government had come out to explain to the public why the multi-point sales tax was necessary. Though the BPCC was expected to convince the public of the need for the tax, it was never consulted by the Government.
3. In early August 1952, S.K. Patil had written to Nehru that the feeling of Congressmen of Bombay was against the new taxation proposals of the State Government. He described the multi-point sales tax as "untimely" and "bound to affect the party's popularity." He asked whether the State Government was right in imposing new taxes without consulting the party executive which "helped the Congress to get a majority."

9. To C.M. Poonacha¹

New Delhi
September 1, 1952

My dear Poonacha,²

I have written to you previously about the Belliappa³ group in your Assembly and you sent me a reply. I am not very happy about this situation.⁴ It should be our endeavour not to keep past conflicts and rivalries going, but, wherever the possibility occurs to win over people, even those who are opposed to us. That has always been the Congress policy. I should therefore like you to keep this in mind.

Some little time ago, I received a letter from P.I. Belliappa in which he said that in spite of every effort of his to offer his cooperation, the response was humiliating. He further said that prominent workers of his group were being watched and shadowed and a number of them had been apparently prosecuted for some kind of a disturbance.

I do not know the facts, but such a feeling itself is bad and I should like you to reconsider the whole situation and accept cooperation wherever it is offered. In particular, we must not keep alive old animosities.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. (1910-1990); Member, Constituent Assembly and Provisional Parliament, 1947-51, and Rajya Sabha, 1964-67; Chief Minister of Coorg, 1952-56; Union Minister of Railways, 1966-67.
3. A journalist and Congress leader of Coorg.
4. An agitation had been going on in Coorg, a Part C State, on the question of merger with one of its neighbouring States. Out of eleven Congress members in the State Assembly, seven members led by C.M. Poonacha were for the merger and four led by P.I. Belliappa favoured non-merger.

10. To B. Ramakrishna Rao¹

New Delhi
September 6, 1952

My dear Ramakrishna Rao,

I have just received your letter of the 5th September. I have, of course, been

1. JN Collection.

following events in Hyderabad during the last few days. It is significant how very small matters lead to big and dangerous developments. This shows how very careful we must be in dealing with even small matters.

It is obvious that when huge unruly mobs go about the city doing violence and committing arson, a government must take stern action or abdicate. It is fantastic for people to complain of Government action after they themselves have created the kind of situation that existed in Hyderabad for these days. No government can remain supine in these circumstances.

I did not receive many representations, as you imagine. But I did receive one telegram to which I paid not the slightest attention.

I cannot judge of the exact situation there and what force was necessary. From your account it would appear that Government was slightly slow in taking action. I should have thought that the Army should have been utilized at an earlier stage.

As for a judicial inquiry.² I think you have done the right thing to order it. But the inquiry, surely, must not be limited just to firing. It must go into the causes of this rioting and indicate what kind of elements were responsible for it.

When such violent developments take place, we have, of course, to remain perfectly calm. But we must be firm also. A government which cannot make up its mind in an emergency loses credit. A government which exceeds the necessities of the situation and indulges in reprisals becomes unpopular and is disliked. We have to avoid both and proceed calmly and firmly.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. A Court of Inquiry was appointed by the State Government into the circumstances that led to the police firing on *mulki* demonstrators in Hyderabad on 3 and 4 September.

11. To Ramananda Tirtha¹

New Delhi
September 10, 1952

My dear Swamiji,

I have received from Padmaja Naidu a copy of a letter dated 8th September

1. JN Collection.

which she has already sent you.² I have read this letter with great distress. I can well imagine that any sensitive person, and specially a woman, might take an exaggerated view of the events that took place in Hyderabad a few days ago. I do not accept every single statement she has made in this letter, because she was undoubtedly suffering under a great emotional strain.

Nevertheless, the total effect of reading her letter has been painful to me. I do not agree with her about the Congress session being held in Hyderabad. There is some justification for what she says, but in the balance I think we did right in deciding to hold the session there. But that is a minor matter. What I am concerned with is the sorry story that is unfolded in her letter to you. I am quite convinced that the Congress cannot prosper by pursuing a wrong path or by shielding persons who pursue a wrong path. I have never been afraid of any opposition, but what has distressed and disturbed me is the weakness or the wrong-doing in our own ranks. That has weakened the Congress in the past and if we do not put that down, the sooner the Congress is wound up, the better.

We talk of communalism and yet we shelter it in our own ranks. We are trying to cast the blame on others. Of course, others are communalists or wrong-doers, if you like. But this business of blaming others and not taking responsibility ourselves is not becoming of us or any great organization or government.

If such a big upheaval takes place as the one in Hyderabad, it just doesn't matter who is to blame (that can be ascertained and steps taken later); the first blame attaches to the governing party and its government. Why could they not control the situation?

I have no doubt that mischief-mongers were about in Hyderabad, whether they were Razakars or Communists or others. But is that a sufficient explanation for all these things to happen and for us not to be able to control them? The students have gone to pieces and have no discipline or good sense left. All this is true. But again what I am concerned with is how our people behaved.

2. In her letter of 8 September to Ramananda Tirtha, President, Hyderabad Pradesh Congress Committee, Padmaja Naidu stated that she had decided to resign from the Reception Committee which had been set up in connection with the holding of the annual session of the Congress in Hyderabad. She criticized the queer behaviour of the State Congress leaders in Hyderabad on 3 and 4 September 1952 when the *mulki* agitation sparked off violence leading to seven deaths. She felt that the decision to hold the annual session in Hyderabad, where the Congress Government was unstable and depended for its existence on a narrow majority, was wrong. It was also "wrong for local Congressmen to be wasting their time and energy in collecting funds and making arrangements for the Congress session when they should dedicate themselves to revitalizing the State Congress."

I hope that there will be no pity shown to those Congressmen who may have misbehaved in this matter and that the strictest action will be taken against them. I am more concerned with this than with punishing others. Padmaja Naidu refers to a committee consisting of two discredited Arya Samajists, a shady journalist and a veteran Congressman (ex-MP and ex-MLA). Who are these people? An enquiry should be made into their activities as well as of others.

Perhaps I shall meet you in Indore. Anyhow I am sending this letter to Hyderabad, and I am sending a copy of this letter as well as Padmaja's letter to the Chief Minister also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

12. To the Chief Ministers and Presidents of PCCs¹

My dear Chief Minister and President, PCC,

Ever since the Congress took office in 1937 in the provinces, the question of the relationship of the Government with the Provincial Congress organization has often been discussed. Since 1946, when again we took office not only in the provinces, but also in the Centre, this question has arisen again and again. The matter was considered at the Working Committee meeting in Indore recently.

It is clear that there must be cooperation between the Ministry and the Congress organization in the provinces as well as in the Centre. Without the sanction which that organization gives, the Ministry would have little strength. At the same time, it is equally clear that it is neither desirable nor feasible for the organization to interfere in the activities of Government.

The general principle laid down in the past has been that, while matters of principle and high policy should be discussed, as far as possible, between ministers and those representing the organization, in regard to other matters the organization should not interfere. In fact, high policy is usually the concern of the Congress Working Committee or the AICC or the full session of the Congress.

1. File No PG-33/1954, AICC Papers, NMML. This letter drafted on or before 20 September, was sent on 22 September to the Presidents of the PCCs and Chief Ministers of all the provinces except Jammu and Kashmir and Pepsu.

But, apart from discussing any particular matter of policy, it is obviously desirable for close contacts to be maintained between the Governments and the organization. For this purpose, some kind of conventions have grown up in some of the States.

We discussed this matter at some length at Indore. It was the general opinion that this should be dealt with by convention and not by rigid rule. It was not considered proper to have any article in the Congress Constitution about it or even to pass a precise resolution on the subject. I was asked to communicate with Chief Ministers and Presidents of Pradesh Congress Committees, and to suggest the kind of conventions that should be followed.

In accordance with this direction, I am writing to you and seeking your help and advice. I shall be grateful to you if you will kindly let me know what practice or convention, if any, has grown up in your State on this subject. Do you consider that satisfactory or have you any other suggestions to make? Conditions differ in various States. In some there is only one Pradesh Congress Committee; in others there are more than one.

May I request you, therefore, to be good enough to send me your views on this subject?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. To K.N. Katju¹

New Delhi
October 2nd, 1952

My dear Kailas Nath,

...The position in Rajasthan is that it is quite essential that Jai Narain and Tikaram pull together. If either of them drops out, there will be trouble. I am not merely referring to the Government or even to the Congress Party in the Legislature there, but to Rajasthan as a whole as things are. Therefore, it is very important for the two not only to pull together, but to function in close cooperation. Unfortunately, there has been a measure of suspicion and distrust. They used to get on well together, but the mere fact of Tikaram becoming Chief Minister for these few months, and certain other developments gave rise

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

to this feeling of distrust in both.² As a matter of fact, neither of them expresses any personal criticism of the other. The criticism is about the associates.

You know Tikaram, and so I need not say anything about him. He is a good man and has done fairly well since he became Chief Minister.³ He gets on with the Services and, I think, possesses integrity and a measure of competence. But his political position in the party or in Rajasthan is not very strong. He cannot stand by himself.

Jai Narain is, I believe, personally a man of integrity and has been the leading political figure in Rajasthan for many years. Because he was the leading figure, he has had to face a good deal of jealousy. I do not think he is a good administrator though he is a good popular leader of a party. His chief weakness is his association with some people who are not very desirable. To mention two of them, Mathur and Kumbharam. Mathur is clever and even impresses, but I have doubts about his integrity. Kumbharam has been quite an effective Congress worker and is a man with some dynamism. But his education has been strictly limited and he is not capable of holding effectively any responsible post. I would not personally accuse him of real lack of integrity. At any rate, I know nothing to that effect. But there are many small things where he would function without strict scruples about their propriety. Thus, he got a Government servant, who had been appointed as an election officer, in trouble by using him for his own purposes in the election. Probably it never struck him that this was improper.

Ever since the last general election, we made it clear that neither Mathur nor Kumbharam should be taken into the Cabinet. We knew that Jai Narain relied upon them greatly or, to put it differently, they were in a position to exercise considerable pressure on him.

I need not go into details. After some preliminary talks, Jai Narain Vyas said that he would abide by my decision. My own idea was that the present

2. The Congress High Command decided that Vyas, who had been defeated in the general elections, should seek re-election from some safe constituency and that meanwhile the Revenue Minister, Tikaram Paliwal, should take over as Chief Minister. When Paliwal formed his Cabinet on 3 March 1952 he did not include in his Cabinet Kumbharam Arya and Mathuradas Mathur who were ministers in Vyas's Cabinet. By mid-September 1952, a group of dissidents who opposed Vyas's reinstatement had emerged.
3. Paliwal speeded up the integration of Services, revamped the administration, introduced land reforms to provide security of tenure to the tillers, and abolished the jagirs with a land revenue of Rs 5000 and above.

Cabinet should continue there with the addition of Vyas, that Tikaram Paliwal should become Deputy Chief Minister and should retain control of the Home portfolio. I thought that any other change at this stage was on the whole undesirable, even though some of the present members were not up to the mark. If a change was attempted, other complications would come. If necessary, the change could be thought of some months later.

To my surprise, Tikaram refused to play because he felt that he would not be trusted, and he did not like one or two of his existing colleagues. I had a long talk with Tikaram today and ultimately he agreed. His standing out now would have been bad from every point of view and more especially from his own point of view. People would have said, quite wrongly I think, that he had all along been intriguing against Jai Narain, and that he even encouraged the recent attempt at rebellion there.⁴ However, he agreed ultimately.

I met all the four of them later and laid stress on the closest understanding and cooperation between Jai Narain and Tikaram. Jai Narain gave his word for it and said that he could not think of carrying on without Tikaram. Tikaram assented, though less enthusiastically. I left further details to them, and said that if they thought it necessary, they could come to me again for my advice, but I would much rather if they settled these details amongst themselves in consultation with Balvantray Mehta.

I laid a great deal of stress on the treatment of the Services and pointed out how many difficulties had arisen in the past because of the wrong attitude to the Services. (I might add that the previous Inspector-General of Police in Rajasthan, who had been thrust upon Vyas, was about the feeblest person for a difficult situation that I could imagine).

This is the position. One never knows what further developments might take place, but I hope that things will work relatively smoothly.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Eight members of the Congress Assembly Party in Rajasthan had seceded from the Congress and formed themselves into a new group, thus turning the slender Congress majority in the Assembly into a minority, with only 76 seats in a House of 160. The Opposition tabled a motion of no-confidence against the Congress Government, which was to come up for consideration on 17 October 1952.

14. To Bhimsen Sachar¹

New Delhi
October 3, 1952

My dear Sachar,

Some days ago I received a message that you had left for me. This related to a report of talks between Pratap Singh Kairon and Master Tara Singh. I was rather surprised to read this report and I wrote to Pratap Singh about it. I did not mention any report, I merely said that I had learnt that he had met Tara Singh and wanted to know what it was all about. I further pointed out that it was not a safe business even having talks with Tara Singh because he would exploit them to his advantage. Also that our definite policy was not to have dealings with communal groups. I have had no reply yet, and I am going to Madras tomorrow morning for a week.

I am inclined to think that the report that you received must have been exaggerated. Anyhow, my mind is quite clear about these matters. Recently there was a faint attempt in Madras and talks with the Muslim League there. I objected to this very strongly.

This is just to inform you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Bhimsen Sachar Papers, NMML.

15. To Subhadra Joshi¹

New Delhi
October 14, 1952

My dear Subhadra,²

I have glanced through the cutting from the *Milap* dated 12th October 1952, which you sent me. I was surprised to read it. It is quite extraordinary how some newspapers, and the Delhi *Milap* is notorious for this, give completely perverted accounts of speeches or other matters. I do not know if their

1. JN Collection.

2. (b. 1919); Congress leader of Delhi, Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-67 and 1971-77.

correspondents are thoroughly incompetent or these are deliberate perversions, or both.

The reference to the Delhi Municipal Elections and Khub Ram Jajoriya³ and what I am supposed to have said in this connection is pure invention. No mention was made by me of this election or of Dr Khub Ram Jajoriya's name. In fact, I knew nothing about it.

What I said to a group of Congress workers in Madras, referring to our successes and defeats in the general election, more particularly in parts of South India, was that these elections had shown that where Congress candidates were in touch with the masses and worked for them they succeeded. Where the Congress organization was not functioning properly or the candidates were not well chosen, they generally were defeated, that is, the voters exercised their discretion in the matter and did not like to vote for persons who had not worked. My whole emphasis was on Congressmen being in touch with the people and working for them and not taking things easy.⁴

I said that many good Congress candidates had been defeated and I was sorry for that: some others had been defeated because either they were not well chosen or because they did not work with the people. I referred vaguely to Punjab, Delhi and other parts of the country both to show our general success and our occasional failure. I referred to Andhra and Tamil Nad also in this connection.

All this was in relation to the general elections and was a particular analysis of the general elections without going into any particulars or mentioning any individuals.

I have been surprised to learn that some people are trying to misinterpret my remarks in regard to individual Congress candidates who might have been defeated in the elections and who as a matter of fact I considered very good candidates. It is still more surprising to learn that this is applied to the Delhi Municipal Elections about which I know nothing.

You may use this letter as you like to clear up any misunderstanding that may have arisen and certainly to correct distortions of my statement which might have been made.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Member of Delhi Chief Commissioner's Advisory Council for sometime; secretary, Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee at this time.

4. See *ante*, pp. 511-517.

16. To Ramananda Tirtha¹

New Delhi
October 14, 1952

My dear Swamiji,

I have your letter of the 9th October about revitalizing the Congress organization. Also your letter about land reforms in Hyderabad, which I have passed on to Nandaji. Gulzari Lal Nanda and R.K. Patil are thoroughly seized of this matter and will no doubt deal with it satisfactorily. Ramakrishna Rao saw me yesterday and discussed various financial and other matters. There was no reference in our talk then to the land question.

The question you raise about Congress reorganization and an improvement in the choice of Congressmen for responsible positions, is a question which affects every organization in every country. This identical question has arisen in communist countries also, where one group purges the other. It does not follow that the dominant group is the right group.

Any selective process tends to make the organization not only narrow but the very danger we wish to avoid is likely to creep in from another direction. We get then what might be called 'boss politics'. Ultimately public life depends not so much on certain rules and regulations or organizations as on the general standard of public opinion. In Gandhiji's life time it was not rules that made the Congress what it was but a certain atmosphere which was created by a set of circumstances and more especially by Gandhiji's leadership. Ultimately the public life of a country, where there is democracy, cannot rise too far above the level of general conduct. One can try to raise small groups. This can be done in two ways. One is the authoritarian way, which is entirely opposed to democracy, and the other is the sectarian way i.e., a group tries to keep up certain standards and gradually becomes almost a sect. A great and dominating personality, like Gandhiji, influences not only individuals but masses and raises them up to a certain level.

All we can do is to try to function in both planes, the individual plane of individual conduct for responsible persons and the wider plane of the people in trying to keep them upto a certain mark. Rules may be made, but they do not go far.

Look at the Socialist Party, which has not had to suffer the grave disability of being responsible for government, yet it has suffered from the same type of problems which the Congress has and has become rather frustrated. This applies to the old KMP also. The Communists, to some extent, have gone through the same process, although they function in an authoritarian way and have tied this up to distant leadership which saved them from the trouble to think.

1. File No P-25/1952, AICC Paper, NMML.

The problem you pose is not a new one. We have discussed it innumerable times, at least for the last fifteen years. We shall no doubt continue considering it. It is the problem inherent in any democracy or indeed any functioning of large masses of people.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

17. To Bhimsen Sachar¹

New Delhi
October 16, 1952

My dear Sachar,

Dev Raj Sethi, MLA, has written² to the General Secretary of the AICC, enclosing a letter³ received by him from you, together with a copy of a resolution⁴ passed by the Executive Committee of the Punjab Legislature Party. He states that prior to this letter he had received no communication from you, nor was any charge made, nor any specific acts of his pointed out to him. I remember your telling me that some of the members of your party, including Dev Raj Sethi, were intriguing and giving a lot of trouble inside and outside the Assembly. I told you that you were at perfect liberty to take disciplinary action.

You have of course this liberty and, as leader, your discretion in this matter has to be accepted.

But in taking any action, some procedure should be followed and some opportunity given to the person concerned. It should be pointed out to him in what he has erred. According to Dev Raj Sethi, no such opportunity was given. May I suggest that you might point out to him how and when he has acted

1. File No PB-15(A)/1952, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. Dev Raj Sethi wrote to Balvantray Mehta on 15 October 1952 that he had been punished without being given a reasonable opportunity to explain his actions. No charge sheet or specific acts of his "deemed objectionable by the leader" were mentioned in Sachar's letter to him.
3. Sachar wrote to Sethi on 8 October 1952 that in his view, there was "good ground for the view that you should be removed from the membership of the party" and had asked for explanation. Pending this, Sethi was informed that he would not be permitted to take part either in the party meetings or in the legislature.
4. The Executive Committee of the Punjab Legislature Party resolved on 30 July 1952 authorizing its leader to take any action against dissident members.

improperly and give him a chance to explain. You can then warn him to take such other action as your Executive may consider necessary.

I see from your letter that your direction to him is pending the receipt of his explanation. But what is he to explain unless you give some specific points?

The directions further state that he shall not take part in any of the proceedings of the legislature or speak even at the meetings of the party. So long as he is a member of the party, he should be allowed to speak at the party. You can of course take steps very soon after, if you like. I do not quite understand what is meant by not taking part in the proceedings of the legislature. Does that mean that he should not attend the Assembly? That, I think, would be going a little far and might not be considered proper.

I suggest that you expedite this and give him a chance of giving an explanation to specific charges made.

I have no sympathy for Dev Raj Sethi, but I would like proper procedure to be followed.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

18. To Ram Sahai Tiwari¹

New Delhi
October 17, 1952

Dear friend,²

Some reports have reached me that there has been an enrolment of bogus names on the Congress membership registers. I need not tell you that this kind of thing, if and where it takes place, is highly objectionable and may lead to special enquiries and action following them.

I would therefore request you to inform all your district and subordinate committees that every step should be taken to prevent the enrolment of such members and, where this has taken place, it should be reported to you, so that you may take the necessary action in the matter immediately. It will be unfortunate if at a later stage we have to take action that might well upset an election.

I attach considerable importance to this matter and I have no doubt that you do also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No P-30/1948, AICC Papers, NMML. Copies of this letter were sent to the Presidents of all Pradesh Congress Committees.
2. President, Vindhya Pradesh Congress Committee at this time.

1. Communal Propaganda¹

Please write to Maulana Hifzur Rahman² on my behalf and tell him that we have repeatedly drawn his attention to the writings in the *Al Jamiat* which have been objectionable.³ We understand that Maulana Azad has also pointed this out on several occasions. In spite of this, however, the objectionable nature of articles continues. We are fully aware of the activities of the Hindu Mahasabha and like communal organizations and the type of objectionable speeches that are delivered there. Under our law and Constitution we cannot normally take action. Where we can take action, we are fully prepared to do so. But to use these Hindu Mahasabha speeches as a basis for communal propaganda on the part of the *Al Jamiat* does not help the cause it is supposed to advance. To make comparisons with conditions in Pakistan and India in regard to minorities indicates either a strange ignorance of these conditions or deliberate perversion of facts.

2. Say that the Prime Minister is greatly distressed at this and has come to the conclusion that the *Al Jamiat* is carrying on objectionable communal propaganda which does considerable harm. If the *Al Jamiat* is the organ of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema⁴, then the responsibility for this must be shouldered by the Jamiat-ul-Ulema. It is the policy of Government not to encourage, in any way, communal organizations. In future, therefore, it will not be possible for the Prime Minister to deal with any communications from the Jamiat-ul-Ulema.

1. Note to PPS, New Delhi, 9 August 1952. JN Collection.
2. General Secretary of the All India Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind and a Member of the House of the People at this time.
3. *Al Jamiat*, the Urdu organ of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, the All India Council of the Ulama, published from Delhi, articulated the bitterness of the Muslims due to the depressed economic condition in the new order in Hyderabad State. It criticized the retrenchment and retirement of Muslims in State Service and sundry other matters.
4. Founded in 1919 by orthodox Muslim divines, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind, exercised considerable influence on nationalist Muslims and worked in close association with the Congress during the freedom struggle. In April 1947, at the Lucknow session, the Jamiat decided to abjure politics and to confine itself to the religious and cultural uplift of the Muslims.

2. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
August 11, 1952

My dear Rajaji,

...I have received information about a communal Hindu-Muslim clash at Calicut on the 3rd August.² My PPS is writing to your Chief Secretary about it. I understand that the RSS is functioning rather aggressively at Calicut and that some Government officers are encouraging it. Muslims were attacked and beaten. The incident itself may not be very important. But the RSS, if permitted to function, is likely to do much mischief, as it has done in the past. They are trying their utmost to revive their old position. In North India they got a beating both in the elections and otherwise. Recently the story of a Hindu-Muslim marriage here in Delhi gave them an opportunity to give trouble which they did.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. A communal clash occurred at Calicut on 3 August 1952 when a procession passed in front of a place of worship shouting slogans. The members of the community to whom the place of worship belonged objected to the slogans, thereby precipitating a conflict.

3. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
August 11, 1952

My dear Maulana,

Friends in Hyderabad are very anxious that you should pay them a visit. Of course you will be going there for the next Congress session, but that is too far off. I would like you to go there if possible in the course of the next

1. JN Collection.

month or two. Muslims in Hyderabad are drifting away in wrong directions.² Some of them, under the leadership of the local Jamiat, are becoming definitely communal as of old; others, through sheer frustration, are supporting the Communists. I am sure your visit there will do a lot of good.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Muslims of Hyderabad, after 1948, were suspicious of the State Congress not only because of the spirit of vengeance in its ranks, but also because of its domination by the Arya Samaj elements. Often the Hyderabad Jamiat-ul-Ulema used to bypass the State Congress, and make representations to the Congress High Command in Delhi. Muslims, in the political field, began to affiliate themselves with the Socialist and Communist parties. In the 1952 assembly elections, the Congress lost two seats in the Muslim majority constituencies and could win two other seats defeating rival Muslim candidates by a narrow margin. The People's Democratic Front, a coalition of left and independent groups, drew large Muslim support.

4. To B. Ramakrishna Rao¹

New Delhi
August 16, 1952

My dear Ramakrishna Rao,

I have had a report of some communal disturbances at Kalyani in Bidar district.² The matter was trivial enough, but apparently it was given great publicity not only in Hyderabad but in Pakistan. This shows how careful we must be about these matters and about communal propaganda being indulged in. Hyderabad is, in a sense, far from normal and the memory of past occurrences and their consequences still lingers.³ I receive reports of increasing lawlessness even in Hyderabad city. I learn also that Muslims have often turned towards the Communists in sheer frustration.

1. JN Collection.
2. At Kalyani, a communal clash took place following the occupation of a mosque by the Hindus.
3. In the post-Police Action period, the members of the majority community, committed many unwarrantable acts, possibly because of the indignity and worse heaped upon them in the earlier regime. One Urdu daily commented that the Hindus "have committed more atrocities in just fifteen days than the atrocities committed by the Razakars during the fifteen months in Hyderabad."

I think that we have been very slow in taking up the work of rehabilitation⁴ in Hyderabad of those Muslims who suffered so much after the Police Action, more especially in Bidar, Gulbarga and Osmanabad. There was a proposal to have a Rehabilitation Bill which I believe Bindu⁵ had drawn up. What has happened to it? I think some such step is necessary and we should not be afraid of criticism in doing the right thing.

The machinery for the maintenance of law and order should also be tightened up. I refer particularly to the chief officers charged with this work. If they are not functioning properly or are suspect, they should be removed. There should be a definite feeling created that Government will not tolerate slackness or partiality among its officers in this respect. I say so because complaints come about the police being inactive even in Hyderabad city.

One of the most objectionable newspapers in Delhi, from the communal point of view, is the Urdu *Milap*. I have learnt to my surprise and regret that this *Milap* has started an edition in Hyderabad and that the kind of articles it is publishing are provocative and mischievous. I can well believe that, because that is exactly what it does here. I am told that the Hyderabad Government has helped the *Milap* there greatly by allowing it to have some good machinery or press. Apparently the *Milap* has been treated as some refugee from Pakistan to whom favour should be shown. Is this true? If so, I am surprised.

As at Kalyani, trouble sometimes arises about disputes over mosques and temples. The dispute often is as to whether a place is or has been a mosque or not. In Hyderabad there used to be a Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs, which has kept a full list of places of worship of all communities in the State. Could not this list be used to settle these disputes about mosques and temples? This would avoid litigation and other troubles.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Hyderabad had 17 rehabilitation centres with 15,000 refugees.

5. D.G. Bindu, was the Home Minister of Hyderabad State at this time. Earlier he was the President of the Hyderabad State Congress.

5. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi

August 16, 1952

My dear Maulana,

The recent incident of the publication of an offensive paragraph in the Hindi *Amrit Patrika* of Allahabad and its consequences has rather worried me.² That particular paragraph was specially objectionable and it is quite understandable that it caused resentment among large numbers of people. The moment our attention was drawn to it, I took steps and the UP Government took steps. The paper published an unqualified apology and withdrawal. Later, Tushar Kanti Ghosh³ separately apologized for it. In spite of this, quite rightly, the UP Government are prosecuting the paper.⁴ More we cannot do.

In spite of this, however, and although this was known, strong agitation was carried on for non-participation in the 15th August celebrations. In Allahabad and Lucknow, and perhaps elsewhere, black flags were put up and processions in defiance of ban were taken out. Arrests were made. In Delhi also a notice was put up everywhere, without signature, that black flags should be put up on 15th August by Muslims.

This is disturbing because an individual's offence was made into a demonstration against Independence Day. In Allahabad I know that some old Muslim Leaguers took prominent part in this. But what was distressing me was that the Jamiat also took prominent part in many places. To begin with it was largely the Jamiat that asked people to organize demonstrations. Later perhaps it went out of their hands.

All this shows how we live on the verge of communal conflicts. Responsible people at least should not encourage them. This action of some Jamiat people and some of the old Muslim Leaguers against the observances on the 15th August is bound to create reactions in the minds of many people and gives them a handle to say that many Muslims are anti-national.

1. JN Collection.

2. An objectionable article in a Allahabad Hindi daily, *Amrit Patrika*, on 5 August, gave offence to the religious feelings of Muslims. In spite of apology tendered by the journal and the prosecution ordered by the Government, certain elements in the Muslim community created a grave situation leading to disturbances and clashes in different places in UP. They asked their followers not to participate in the Independence Day celebrations and to take out black flag processions on that day.

3. He was editor of the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* published from Calcutta.

4. Action was taken against Vidya Bhaskar, editor of the Allahabad Hindi daily, *Amrit Patrika*, and Bholanath Biswas, printer and publisher of the paper, by the UP Government for the article published in its issue of 5 August.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

From Hyderabad I have had news for some time through some of the Muslim members of the Assembly, that the old Muslim League and Razakar elements are coming to the front again with their communal outlook. No doubt they have provocation from certain communal Hindu elements.

I mentioned to you the other day that the whole tone of the newspaper *Al Jamiat* was often very wrong and objectionable. The Pakistan papers are continually quoting from it.⁵ The Jamiat-ul-Ulema appears to me to be following a wrong policy which is likely to lead to trouble.

I am merely writing this to you, although I know that you must be aware of these developments.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. The *Dawn*, for example, published an editorial on the *Amrit Patrika*'s article, suggesting that the Muslim countries "should urge the UN to order a probe into the destruction of Muslim culture and religion and violation of Muslim rights in India." The daily reported the meetings held in Karachi and Lahore on 23 August which adopted resolutions expressing grave concern at the publication of the article.

6. To Sri Prakasa¹

New Delhi
August 17, 1952

My dear Prakasa,²

I have just read your letter of August 15th addressed to the President.

You refer to the Muslim League members who met you. I am afraid they would have had a very different reception from me if they came to see me. I have no patience with this crowd. I have expressed myself forcibly in the past, and if I come to Madras I shall do so again. They will have no quarter from me, whether we lose their votes or not. This applies to the Dravida Kazhagam folks also, who have been misbehaving as usual....

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. He was Governor, Madras State at this time.

7. Cable to Commisssloner for Indla In Aden¹

Your telegram 182(a) dated 16th September.²

Passage quoted did appear in children's corner of fantasies in *Amrita Bazar Patrika*. As soon as Government saw it they took strong exception to it. Editor apologized and dismissed writer of passage. Chief Editor in Calcutta also published deepest regret and apology. These apologies appeared repeatedly in the newspaper. Government however decided to start legal proceedings against editor. These proceedings are continuing.

You may explain this and point out that some irresponsible person put in this paragraph to which Government took strongest objection, and it was generally condemned here. Every possible action was taken immediately.

1. New Delhi, 17 September 1952. JN Collection.
2. India's Commissioner at Aden, A.B. Thadani, reported to Nehru that the religious head of Aden had brought to his notice that the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* had published an item which contained an objectionable passage.

8. To P. Subbarayan¹

New Delhi
September 17, 1952

My dear Subbarayan,

Almost the first thing I learnt on my return to Delhi yesterday evening was of some election pact between the Congress and the Muslim League in Madras to fight the municipal elections.² I read the statement issued by Mohammed Ismail, President of the Muslim League. In this he refers to talks having been carried on with you and other Congress leaders and to the allotment of certain seats to the Muslim League in various parts of the State.

1. JN Collection.
2. The Madras Congress had held talks with the Muslim League for an alliance during the forthcoming municipal elections in the State. The main object of the alliance, it was claimed, was "to meet the menace of communism". As per this understanding, the Muslim League was to be allowed to contest seats in proportion to the numerical strength of the Muslims in the State, and the Congress would not nominate candidates for such seats.

This news has upset me greatly. It is completely opposed to our policy. Indeed, when something like this was rather privately arranged in Bombay early this year, there was an uproar and I demanded an explanation. The AICC considered it and passed a strong resolution in Calcutta in March last.³

After all this for any such arrangement to be arrived at in Madras is a flagrant violation of what the Congress stands for and what it has declared. Possibly, this has been done to get some seats. Possibly it is supposed to be some kind of a front against the Communists. Whatever it is, I am quite certain that it is utterly wrong, and will bring great discredit on us. This will present a handle to the Communists and to our opposition groups, and they will say that we are pure opportunists and have no principles at all. Throughout the general elections we avoided this kind of thing and in subsequent municipal elections we have also avoided it. In Madras the situation may be difficult or peculiar, but surely no difficulty can be got over by taking an utterly wrong step.

I am afraid that this step, if it has been taken, will do us great harm. You can hardly expect me to approve of it. Indeed, I shall have to express myself against it.

What surprises me still more is that this should have been done without the slightest reference to us, although it must have been known that strong views are held on this subject and have been expressed in the past by me and others. As a matter of fact, I am already receiving protests from various parts of the country. Maulana Azad is greatly distressed at all this.

Will you please let me know immediately what the position is so that I can decide what to do?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The AICC, at its session in Calcutta on 22 March 1952, warned its members against the prevailing communal and separatist tendencies in some parts of the country and declared that "there should be no alliance, cooperation or understanding, explicit or implicit, between the Congress and any organization which is essentially communal in character and functions, whatever its designations might be."

9. To P. Subbarayan¹

New Delhi
September 19, 1952

My dear Subbarayan,
Thank you for your telegram and your letter.²

I realize the difficult situation in Madras and also the great improvement that has taken place since Rajaji took up the Chief Ministership. But about the Muslim League in Madras, I hold the strongest opinion. I think it is a pernicious organization, and whenever I have gone to Madras, I have spoken strongly about it. I wish to give it no quarter. Nowhere in India, except in Madras, has the Muslim League as such any influence left. In fact, it does not exist. I do not mean to say that there are not many Muslims who may not think that way. But we have created such a strong atmosphere against the Muslim League that hardly anyone dare confess to belonging to it or favouring it. Why have we failed in Madras in regard to the Muslims? I think that a wrong policy is being pursued, and there has been too much softness shown to them. On principle, it was a bad thing; in practice, it has harmed us. It may, of course, be possible to win a few seats with their help. But I would sooner lose those seats than seek their help.

All these matters have widespread repercussions. Thus any vague hint of an arrangement with the Muslim League immediately creates consternation all over India.³ We are put in a difficult position. If any arrangement is possible with the Muslim League, why not with the Hindu Mahasabha or the RSS or the Jana Sangh or any other communal organization? For our part, we have kept Congress absolutely and severely aloof from every communal organization. That strict attitude paid us in the general elections. We succeeded in getting quite a number of Muslims returned, even from predominantly Hindu constituencies. In one case in the Punjab, our Muslim candidate won against a

1. JN Collection.
2. Subbarayan denied that any agreement had been reached between the Congress and the Muslim League for contesting the municipal elections in Madras State. He, however, admitted that talks were held between him and Mohammed Ismail, President of the League, but said that no definite understanding was arrived at. He added that while he intended to conclude the talks after his return from Indore where he had gone to attend the AICC meeting, Ismail during his absence made a statement, without consulting him, based on those talks.
3. The alliance proposal between the State Congress and the Muslim League for contesting the forthcoming municipal elections on the basis of mutual support was criticized as a compromise with communalism, violating the declared Congress aims, by Asoka Mehta, Secretary-General of the Indian Socialist Party, Mushtaq Ahmad, Socialist Member of the Delhi Assembly, and Kamaraj Nadar, till recently President of the Tamilnad Congress.

shining light of the Hindu Mahasabha, even though there were practically no Muslim voters in that constituency.

If you will read our AICC Resolution passed in March last, you will see how strong it is and how it rules out even an implied understanding with a communal organization. This was passed because a vague attempt had been made in Bombay. We scotched that. Otherwise it would have had bad consequences all over the country.

We have the misfortune to have one Muslim League Member in Parliament here.⁴ I believe he comes from Malabar. He is now an outlandish figure. He does not fit in anywhere at all. He is generally ignored by everyone. Indeed, Muslims in Madras, if I may say so with all respect, are singularly ignorant of what goes by the name Muslim culture. Why people in Madras go about calling them 'Janab', I do not know. It would be perfectly absurd to use that appellation in North India.

I am glad that you had no pact with the Muslim League. But I think you were wrong in having any dealings with them at all. Ismail's statement in the press itself shows how unfair advantage is taken of any step.

It is open to you not to run a candidate, if you feel like it, in a particular constituency, although that should be avoided.⁵ But even a vague understanding with the Muslim League is detrimental.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. B. Pocker was the Muslim League Member of the House of the People from the Malabar region.
5. Nevertheless, when the municipal elections took place the mutual understanding between the State Congress and the Muslim League, led to the success of the candidates of both the parties in their respective constituencies.

10. Communal Unity Vital¹

Three or four years ago certain unfortunate occurrences had taken place in Bidar district. Atrocities had been committed. A number of persons had been subjected to suffering. I am sorry for what had taken place, but, instead of idly deploring the past, something constructive should be done to rehabilitate the affected people.

1. Speech at a public meeting, Bidar, 26 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 27 September 1952.

After Independence the States were integrated with India, as the cutting-up of the country into several States was not desirable. The Partition of the country was followed by serious events. Even now many are suffering on account of the Partition. The Government is doing its best for their rehabilitation.

Though the country has achieved freedom, many economic problems remain to be solved. The fight against poverty and illiteracy is being pursued. The benefits of all the measures adopted by the Government will be enjoyed by all irrespective of considerations of caste or creed. India's Independence has not been won by any one community. The Congress belongs to all the communities in India. The Indian Government is secular, and labour for the welfare of all.

While I wish to lay stress on the need for unity in the country, I also wish to caution you against trouble-makers, whose profession is the exploitation of the grievances of the people. Let not the people be carried away by their specious utterances. On the other hand, they should cultivate mutual love and mutual respect, and follow the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, who had advocated non-violence as a method to get grievances redressed. People should put forth their needs in a constitutional manner. The Government is always willing to listen to their grievances.

It is not possible to solve the problem of unemployment by providing people with Government jobs. People must learn to work hard and earn their living. Incidentally, they would increase the national wealth also. The Government will not be able to find money for nation-building activities unless wealth is increased.

I appeal to the Hindus and Muslims alike to take an equal share in the building-up of a new India of peace and prosperity. They should galvanize the villages into fresh life and activity. Let them remember that Hyderabad is part and parcel of India, and that the greatness and prosperity of Hyderabad would contribute to the greatness and prosperity of India.

11. Talks with the Muslim League in Madras¹

Question: Would you comment on the recent talks between the President of the Tamilnadu Congress Committee and the President of the All India Muslim League?

1. Remarks at a press conference, Madras, 4 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 5 October 1952. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference, see pp. 138-139, 153, 342-343, 412, 431, 510-511, 648-649 and 674

Jawaharlal Nehru: When I first heard of this, I was surprised and immediately communicated with the President of the TNCC. He informed me that there had been no regular negotiations or agreement but there were certainly some talks. The statement made by the Muslim League leader generally went far beyond anything that had happened. The TNCC President further said that he realized that what he did informally was liable to be misunderstood and in fact had been misunderstood by the Muslim League group here.

In such matters the AICC has passed a very clear and emphatic resolution which not only refers to any explicit attempts at understanding with communal bodies but even implied attempts. I have made it perfectly clear to our Pradesh Congress Committees that there should be no approach of any kind even of implied nature, because it is not a local matter. We have an all-India policy whether it applies to Muslim, Hindu groups or Sikh group. Once you weaken it in one place, others are also affected.

The so-called Muslim League in Madras is rather a peculiar relic of a period that belongs to history and not to the present. I think they call themselves the All-India Muslim League. So far as I know, they have absolutely no place anywhere else in India. Probably, the State which nursed the Muslim League most is my own State, the Uttar Pradesh, and many of the Pakistan leaders come from that State. There is absolutely no Muslim League of any kind in UP. This fact applies to other States also. Perhaps, some of the old members of the Muslim League in Madras have not quite realized the changes that have taken place in the last five or six years.

We are not opposed to any social or religious organization of communities. But we are definitely opposed to any political-communal organization, because it strikes at the root of our Constitution and our policy. It does not mean that we ban any such organization unless it misbehaves. But, we, as Government, do not deal with them or encourage them in any way.

1. Cable to C.P.N. Singh¹

Your telegram 263 dated July 22nd.²

Please convey to Nepal Government our feeling of grave apprehension at developments in the Terai region near our border.³ These are having serious consequences on our side and refugees from Nepal side are coming over to India with stories of looting and anarchic conditions. Public feeling here is disturbed and questions are being asked in Parliament. We expect Nepal Government to take swift and effective action to stop this rapid deterioration.

I realize that present Government in Nepal is hardly in a position to take effective steps. Nevertheless, you should give our message.

We are following closely developments in Nepal.⁴ I feel that the general line we have adopted is correct and is already bearing fruit in the sense that Ministers and others have to stand on their own feet, and now realize how much India means to them.

I sympathize with the King and you can assure him of our advice and such help as we can give when occasion arises.⁵ But he must also take his position seriously and not convey impression to others that he is chiefly interested in visits abroad and lighter side of life. He is the one stabilizing factor in Nepal provided he acts wisely. Our previous advice holds, that is, King must make clear to all these warring factions in the Ministry and Nepali Congress that they must produce a stable and effective Ministry which can put

1. New Delhi, 23 July 1952. JN Collection.
2. C.P.N. Singh, the Indian Ambassador in Nepal, reported that the public opinion in Nepal favoured strong Indian interference to set matters right in the conflict between M.P. Koirala, the Prime Minister, and the Nepali Congress headed by B.P. Koirala. The Government was at a standstill.
3. In the Terai and the eastern hills, political turmoil led to agrarian unrest and further exacerbated the disorderly conditions facing the country. It was feared that the conditions on the Indo-Nepalese border on the Nepal side might encourage similar tendencies among the landless on the Indian side.
4. The Nepali Congress Working Committee decided on 19 July 1952 to reduce the strength of the Cabinet from eleven to seven to make it homogeneous. The proposal was not accepted by M.P. Koirala who questioned the decision of the executive committee, which according to him had no *locus standi* because it had been nominated. The Nepali Congress, on the other hand, insisted that as the executive of the party in power it had the right to decide on the composition of the ministry.
5. C.P.N. Singh had stated: "The King is inexperienced as he finds himself unable to give any lead in the matter. The King does not like Bisheshwar Prasad's group. On the other hand, Maitrika Prasad's group has lost support of the Congress on whose strength he formed the ministry. If the King supports Maitrika Prasad he becomes the target of attack by the Nepali Congress."

out nepotism, corruption, etc. and work harmoniously. If they are unable to do so, then only course left open to the King is to take charge of the administration himself and function with some advisers till such time as stable Ministry can be formed. King should make it clear to Prime Minister and other Ministers that present stalemate is most harmful and cannot continue.

2. Cable to C.P.N. Singh¹

Your telegram 267 dated July 24th.²

In view of Ministers resigning and even Prime Minister thinking of resigning, there appears no alternative to King taking charge of Administration for such period at least as may intervene before new Cabinet is formed. This period would presumably be at least till Nepali Congress Mahasamittee meets. It may be longer. It does not necessarily follow that Mahasamittee's decisions should be accepted, though no doubt weight will be attached to them.

If King takes over, then question of his Advisers is important. We might be able to send one or two persons temporarily to function as informal advisers if King so wishes. But he should have formal Nepalese advisers. It is difficult for us to suggest who these should be. But preferably they should not be from among contesting claimants for leadership from Nepali Congress.

King's role, if he takes over, cannot be wholly that of caretaker government though he should avoid controversial matters as far as possible. He should concentrate on:

- (1) Law and order situation.
- (2) Appointment of competent senior officers in districts and elsewhere. They must be experienced and have reputation for integrity. Nepotism and corruption must be put down.
- (3) Efficient functioning of judiciary. Generally speaking, attention should be paid to efficient administration.

1. New Delhi, 25 July 1952. JN Collection.

2. C.P.N. Singh reported to Nehru that warring factions in the Nepali Congress in their separate meetings with him had sought India's intervention to resolve the Cabinet crisis. Maitrika Prasad told him that the decision of the Nepali Congress Working Committee to expel him from the party for three years, if he did not abide by its instructions, was meant to prevent him from participating in the deliberations of the Mahasamittee. He was going to meet the King to be able to resign his office.

If King decides to take over, it would be better if this was done on advice of retiring Prime Minister. King could state that his Prime Minister had offered his own and his Government's resignation. King had asked him to form another Ministry, but Prime Minister had expressed his inability at present to do so. Owing to difficulty of forming another Ministry immediately, he had accepted retiring Prime Minister's advice and was himself taking charge of administration till such time as another Ministry is formed, which he hopes will not be long delayed. During this interval he will himself carry on the Administration with the help of such Advisers as he might choose.

He should appeal to public for their cooperation and lay stress on peace and order in the country and the carrying on of an efficient administration and putting down corruption. He should especially address Civil and Military personnel of Government and ask them to perform their loyal duty to the country.

This is only to give rough idea of what might be said.

It might be advisable for King to address Advisory Council³ and make his statement or declaration there asking for the loyal cooperation of the Council. There should be no discussion or voting.

The above is merely by way of suggestion, and is dependent on circumstances prevailing in Kathmandu. Necessary adaptations would no doubt be made to fit in with King's wishes and prevailing circumstances.

3. First formed in October 1951, with 35 nominated members, the Advisory Council was intended to advise and assist the Government by providing a restricted debating forum until an elected Parliament was summoned. In 1952, it was reconstituted to increase its strength to 56.

3. Cable to C.P.N. Singh¹

Your telegram 271 dated 30th July.²

I am sending you by airmail cover which contains letters for King and Prime Minister.³

1. New Delhi, 31 July 1952. JN Collection.
2. Singh informed Nehru of the demonstrations, clashes, and provocative statements by the rival factions of the Nepali Congress which had created a situation of confusion and chaos.
3. See the next two items.

It seems to me that any further delay in dealing with fast deteriorating situation will lead to utter chaos and confusion. It would appear that Prime Minister has lost all grip and is unlikely to regain it or form stable Ministry with popular sanction. Merely to continue this drift will be disastrous; only alternative appears to be, what I indicated previously, that for a period there should be no Ministry and King should be in direct charge. I have written accordingly to both Prime Minister and King.

It must be remembered however that if King takes over charge, he must function effectively and swiftly. People will look up to him for action, and if he fails to take necessary action, he will also lose esteem and credit in the public eye.

On receipt of my letters you should, if necessary, explain situation fully to Prime Minister and King. I should like you, as far as possible, to keep out of these internal troubles.

4. To M.P. Koirala¹

New Delhi
July 31, 1952

My dear Prime Minister,

I have received two or three letters from you, the last being at the end of June 1952.² I have not sent a written answer to these letters, though I acknowledged them by a telegraphic message sent through our Ambassador.

I have not written to you earlier because the situation in Nepal seemed to me a changing one, and it was difficult for me to intervene in this situation. Indeed, I felt that it would not be right for us in the Government of India to intervene in a domestic situation, unless something happened which made it necessary for us to do so. It has been our practice, as you know, to offer our advice when needed and when asked for. That advice has always been based on our desire to see an independent and prosperous Nepal, progressing towards democratic form of Government. It was to our interest, of course, to have

1. JN Collection.

2. In his letters of 4 and 20 April 1952, M.P. Koirala had asked for the services of a large number of civilian officials from India to help the Government of Nepal reorganize the Administration. The second letter mentioned about the talks he and B.P. Koirala, the leader of the Nepali Congress, held with Jayaprakash Narayan in Calcutta a few days earlier which had led to an agreement that his Government would adhere to the ideology and programme of the party.

stability and progress in Nepal. But, apart from this, the intimate relationship between the two countries naturally led us to hope for progress in Nepal.

In recent months, however, certain developments took place in Nepal which led me to write to you at some length.³ I was not only concerned with the progressive deterioration of the situation in Nepal, but also with the fact that in the minds of some people this was somehow related to India. As you know, this charge was completely untrue. What distressed me most was that even some responsible persons in Nepal encouraged this wrong belief.⁴ If India's desire to help Nepal was misinterpreted and actually described as undue interference in the domestic affairs of Nepal, then we had to be careful as to when and how we should help.

Another matter, to which I drew your attention, was the new contacts that Nepal was developing with other foreign countries without any reference to us. This seemed to me contrary to our agreements and to the policy which the Nepalese Government had assured us would be followed in regard to foreign affairs and foreign contacts.⁵

You were good enough to reply to that letter of mine. But I confess that my apprehensions were not removed by your reply. Meanwhile, conditions in Nepal have obviously deteriorated, and it has become more and more difficult for me to give any advice at all. The very basis of any kind of a sound government is that a stable Ministry should function and that Ministry should command the goodwill of the people or a large section of them at least. The Nepali Congress was an organization which had not only played a leading part in the struggle for free institutions in Nepal, but was also, so far as we know, the only organization which could shoulder the burden of keeping the various

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, pp. 486-487, 492-495 and 497-498.

4. The presence of Indian officers in Cabinet meetings, the visit of an Indian military mission and the activities of C.P.N. Singh, the Indian Ambassador, gave rise to misgivings that Nepal was being controlled by India and that there was excessive interference in her affairs. B.P. Koirala, in an article in his party organ, *Nepal Pukar*, in late November 1951, charged the Indian Ambassador with taking undue interest in the domestic affairs of Nepal. Some other leftist sections accused India of designs against the sovereignty and independence of Nepal. The critics of the Kosi project agreement accused the Nepal Government of bartering away the country's future.

5. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded between India and Nepal on 31 July 1950 prohibited each country from employing any foreigners whose activities might be prejudicial to the security of the other. During the visit of M.P. Koirala to New Delhi from 6 to 9 January 1952, it was agreed that the defence and foreign policies of India and Nepal should be closely coordinated. However, at this time, three foreigners had been employed by the Nepalese Government without reference to the Government of India. C.P.N. Singh reported on 3 May 1952 that M.P. Koirala had told him that one of the foreigners was sent by Bijaya Shumsher, the Nepalese Ambassador in India, without consulting him. Besides he had also been sending many foreign visitors which Koirala did not like.

elements in the country together and leading them to progress. The two principal stabilizing factors in Nepal appeared to us, as I have often stated previously, the King and the Nepali Congress. Because of this, we all advised that the Nepali Congress should be encouraged and should give popular sanction to the Government.

I find now that your Government itself has not been functioning as a homogeneous Cabinet and in fact has split up into groups, some important members resigning from it. I find also that the Nepali Congress has undergone the same fate and is divided up. Further, that there is some conflict between the Government and the Nepali Congress.⁶

All these are highly disturbing factors, because they undermine the very basis of a stable Government or an effective popular movement. The result appears to be that the functioning of Government has practically ceased and in certain areas, notably the Terai areas, lawlessness prevails. This lawlessness affects us, particularly because it comes right up to our borders.

In these circumstances it is exceedingly difficult for me to give advice. The Government of India cannot intervene in domestic conflicts between personalities or groups. We are only concerned with a stable Ministry and Government being formed, which is progressive and efficient and which has a certain popular sanction behind it. If it becomes impossible to form such a Government in the near future, then the only alternative appears to be for the King to take charge temporarily, with the help of Advisers pending the formation of a stable Ministry. I see no other alternative. What course is to be adopted must depend on the judgment of the situation by the King and by his Prime Minister.

If I may say so, as Prime Minister, you will have to keep this larger viewpoint before you. The country is more important than any individual or group, and it would be a tragedy if, because of group or individual conflicts, the country suffers. The Prime Minister has a great responsibility and he must always have this larger viewpoint before him so that he can advise the King accordingly.

So far as I can judge, a policy of drift at this stage is likely to be harmful. Early and effective decisions have to be taken as to what should be done, and these decisions should be implemented.

Our Ambassador in Kathmandu has been instructed by us not to intervene in this domestic situation in Nepal, but he is always available to convey any message to us or to interpret any advice that we may give.

6. The ministerial and non-ministerial groups in the Nepali Congress fell out with each other. Some Ministers also opposed the Prime Minister and showed sympathy with the non-ministerial wing. Moreover, the non-Congress Ministers, representing powerful interests in the Cabinet, began to pull the Government in different directions.

Your Ambassador in Delhi called on me some days ago and told me that you had asked him to remind us about two letters that you had sent me through him. I presume these two letters were the ones dated June 24th. I gave him an oral reply to both these then. One of these letters dealt with the INA incident.⁷ That matter has been disposed of. I have enquired from the INA authorities here what action they have taken to deal with one of their officers who was discourteous to you.

In regard to the other letter of June 24th, I am writing to you separately to confirm what I told your Ambassador.⁸

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. The Nepal Government ordered on 21 June 1952 the suspension of Indian National Airways flights to and from Kathmandu because of alleged misbehaviour of a ground engineer and of violation of various regulations. As a sequel to this action of the Nepal Government, the Indian Government banned flights to Kathmandu by other companies.
8. Not available.

5. To King of Nepal¹

New Delhi
July 31, 1952

My dear Friend,

When Your Majesty came to Delhi last, we discussed many matters relating to Nepal.² Since then grave developments have taken place in Nepal and I have followed them with anxiety. I have not written to you about them directly, but I have written to your Prime Minister, and our Ambassador in Kathmandu has been in constant touch with him. I need not, therefore, recapitulate what has already been said in regard to these developments.

After very serious thought, I instructed our Ambassador not to intervene in any way in the domestic disputes and conflicts that were going on in Nepal.³ But he was always available to Your Majesty for any consultation or advice. I had hoped that the situation would improve, but I find that it continues to

1. JN Collection.

2. King Tribhuvan was in India on a two-week private visit in June 1952.

3. See *ante*, pp. 559-560.

deteriorate and the present state of affairs is very serious. In effect, Government is not functioning and rival groups⁴ are coming into conflict with each other.

Some time ago I informed our Ambassador, and I believe he communicated this to Your Majesty, that it would be very harmful if this state of affairs was to continue. Every effort should, therefore, be made to have a stable and homogeneous Cabinet which could function effectively and with popular sanction behind it. If this was not possible, then the only alternative was for Your Majesty to take charge of the Administration yourself for the time being. I did not envisage this direct charge of the King to last long, though I could not suggest a period for it. Much would inevitably depend upon developments and circumstances. I hope that even so it would be possible for a proper Cabinet to be formed and thus the period of direct charge would be limited. But a Cabinet so formed must be such as to give an assurance of stability. It would be unfortunate to revert to a situation from which escape is sought.

I have today addressed two letters to your Prime Minister.⁵ I enclose copies of them for Your Majesty's information.

One of these letters relates to our Ambassador, Shri C.P.N. Singh. You will remember that when you were in Delhi last, you spoke to me about him and expressed your wish that he should continue to remain in charge of our Embassy at Kathmandu. I agreed to Your Majesty's request for a brief period. That period is now over, though the situation in Nepal has, instead of improving, deteriorated. Your Prime Minister has, however, intimated to me that he was agreeable to a change in our ambassadorship in Kathmandu. I am, therefore, taking steps to this end and we hope to intimate soon to Your Majesty's Government the name of the new Ambassador.⁶

I can assure you that you will have every help from us in the future as Your Majesty has had in the past. We are fully aware of our responsibilities, and we hope to discharge them. The new Ambassador whom we may send will be instructed to place himself at Your Majesty's disposal in this matter.

4. The Nepali Congress was split into four groups, one led by B.P. Koirala who was the President of the party since May 1952, the second by M.P. Koirala against whom a resolution was pending for his expulsion from the executive of the party for defying the party's decision to reconstitute his Cabinet, the third, a radical group, led by Vyathith and Bulachandra Sharma who formed a Congress Socialist group, and the fourth by Chandrakali Misra who maintained a separate group called the Jana Congress.

5. See the previous item. Only one letter is available.

6. B.K. Gokhale (1892-1973); joined ICS, 1915; served in Bihar and Orissa; Secretary to President, 1951-52; Ambassador to Nepal, 1952-55; Chairman, Tungabhadra Project, 1956-65.

I have not yet fixed a date for the change in ambassadorship. This may take a little time as I do not wish the post to remain vacant even for a short while. In this matter we shall endeavour, to the best of our ability, to suit Your Majesty's convenience.

With all good wishes,

Your sincere friend,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To C.P.N. Singh¹

New Delhi
July 31, 1952

My dear Chandresvar,

...It is clear to me that matters are growing from bad to worse from day to day in Kathmandu and Nepal. The kind of open personal quarrels between different groups that we see going on is fantastic and can only lead to utter disruption.² So far as I can judge, none of the persons prominent in the public eye, that is the Koirala brothers or their immediate colleagues, is capable of handling this situation satisfactorily. No Prime Minister can continue in this fashion. However, this is for M.P. Koirala to decide as well as the King.

I am not for the moment concerned with the merits of the case and as to which party—M.P. Koirala's or B.P. Koirala's—is in the right. It is clear to me that in the existing situation both are in the wrong and are drifting and bringing their country to this disaster. M.P. Koirala should realize this. He is ruining such future chances that he may have.

I can see no other way out except for the King to intervene; the better course would be for M.P. Koirala to submit his resignation gracefully.

I have already indicated to you some of the steps that might have to be taken by the King in case of need.³ These will have to be adapted to the changing situation.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. A meeting of the Prime Minister's supporters in Kathmandu on 26 July 1952 condemned the expulsion of the Prime Minister from the Party, accusing the Nepali Congress Working Committee of "usurping power through conspiracy and intrigue." On 30 July, B.P. Koirala and three other Ministers were manhandled at a public meeting. Meanwhile, several persons of B.P. Koirala's party, during a demonstration, while shouting anti-B.P. Koirala slogans and showing black flags, were beaten up by M.P. Koirala's supporters.

3. See *post*, pp. 616-618.

You will see that I have written both to the Prime Minister and the King about you. In view of this continuing trouble going on in Nepal, I had hesitated to give effect to our previous decision to withdraw you from Kathmandu. But this trouble continues and I do not wish you to get more entangled in it. As you yourself have pointed out, our attitude of steady neutrality in these domestic troubles has largely put an end to the complaints about India's interference.

I have not fixed a date for your return. Before I do so, I shall await the replies of the King and the Prime Minister. But, I take it that this change-over should take place by the end of August.

I should like your reaction to a somewhat vague proposal I have in mind. I call it vague because the question has not formally arisen yet. This is about our High Commissionership in Ceylon. Ceylon is important for us and has occupied the public mind here greatly because of the conflicts between the Government there and the Indians of Ceylonese nationality or those who want Ceylonese nationality.⁴ We have also a very large labour population there. Our trade and business in Ceylon is also considerable. The post of High Commissioner there is therefore of considerable importance to us.

The present High Commissioner,⁵ who is a good man, has proved wholly ineffective and we propose to terminate his appointment fairly soon. Would you be prepared to accept this appointment if the occasion arises for this?⁶

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. A satyagraha by Ceylon Indian Congress was launched on 28 April 1952 against restrictions on citizenship rights for Indian settlers in Sri Lanka.
5. K.P. Kesava Menon.
6. C.P.N. Singh took over as High Commissioner in Sri Lanka on 25 October 1952.

7. Cable to C.P.N. Singh¹

Your telegram 277 dated 4th August.² I am sorry to learn about the King's

1. New Delhi, 5 August 1952. JN Collection.
2. C.P.N. Singh wrote that M.P. Koirala had formally sent a proposal to King Tribhuvan for approval for the US to open a Consulate in Nepal. Singh sought instructions as to what advice he might give to the King in regard to it in case the latter sought such advice.

illness. Please convey to him my concern and my hope that he will soon be well. If he requires a physician from here, we shall try to send one.

We have not heard from General Bijaya, or any other source, of American Government's desire to open a Consulate in Nepal. There are hardly any American interests in Nepal requiring establishment of a Consulate. This move, therefore, has been obviously made with the intention of stationing an officer of the American Embassy at Kathmandu for diplomatic work. At the present moment, when matters are in a state of complete flux in Nepal, this move is especially inappropriate. If asked by the King, you may advise him accordingly.

8. To C.P.N. Singh¹

New Delhi
August 12, 1952

My dear Chandresvar,

...B.P. Koirala came to see me today with Suraj Prasad Upadhyaya.² He told me that all the steps he had taken recently in Kathmandu had been after consulting you and apparently with your advice. In fact that on one occasion you said that you had referred the matter to me. I was greatly surprised to learn this. I remember that you did tell me that he had asked you for advice. But my attitude has been clear about this matter that we should not get entangled in these internal politics. If the King or the Prime Minister officially asks us, then of course we have to tell them what we feel about it. Even so, I would be chary of my advice. But on no account am I prepared to advise in these internal conflicts of the Nepali Congress....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts. A copy was sent to Foreign Secretary.
2. Home Minister of Nepal who had resigned following the directive of the Nepali Congress Working Committee.

9. To King of Nepal¹

New Delhi

August 16, 1952

My dear Friend,

I thank you for your letter of August 12th which has just reached me.² I have followed closely the developments in Nepal and the step Your Majesty has taken in accepting personal charge of the Administration. This undoubtedly puts a great responsibility on Your Majesty. But I feel sure that with the help of Advisers, this new arrangement will yield fruitful results and calm down the atmosphere. Above everything, what is necessary is to bring about some normality and efficient Administration. It is only then that other steps can be taken. Naturally this step cannot be a permanent arrangement, but it should continue till a stable Ministry is formed. I need hardly tell you that we shall give you all the help that we can. We are only desirous not to interfere in the internal administration of Nepal, but where our help is needed by Your Majesty, we shall give it to the extent that is possible.

You refer to our Ambassador in Kathmandu. Your Majesty knows how I have appreciated his work there during these critical years. But, I have found from experience that the continuation of the same Ambassador in one place is usually not desirable. It was for this reason that we had proposed that after the completion of our Ambassador's full term in Nepal, he should be transferred to some other important office. At your request, however, I agreed to his continuing for a short while longer. Some months have elapsed since then. It is true that other developments have taken place since then. Nevertheless, I feel that it would be better for the change in the Ambassador to take place soon. The difficulty Your Majesty has suggested will always be there and we shall have to face it some time or the other. It is better to face it now rather than later. I am sure that the new Ambassador who goes there will give Your Majesty every assistance. He may not have such intimate knowledge of developments in Nepal, but he will be experienced and will bring a fresh mind to bear upon the situation.

With all good wishes and regards,

Your sincere friend,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. King Tribhuvan wrote that given the delicate situation in Nepal, he would not wish to be deprived of the valuable and friendly advice of C.P.N. Singh, especially when he had just then taken over the control of the Administration following the resignation of M.P. Koirala.

10. Talks with the King of Nepal¹

...6. I drew the King's attention to the general crisis prevailing in the world and more particularly to the unstable conditions in most Asian countries. Of all the countries of South East, South and West Asia, India was the most stable and yet in India we had to face tremendous problems and we had to be continuously wide awake to them and could not relax at all. We had been fortunate of political experience and even some measure of discipline in the people. Both of these were completely lacking in Nepal as events had shown. Therefore, Nepal required very great care, because any lapse there might have serious results. The Nepali Congress having failed for the moment, the only cementing and stabilizing factor was the King.² If, by some misfortune, the present set-up did not succeed, then there would be nothing to fall back upon. Therefore, the situation had to be watched carefully and every precaution taken to avoid even seeming failure. So far as India was concerned, we had made it clear that we were prepared to help in so far as was possible for us, without any desire to interfere.

7. The King referred to the question of the Gurkha enlistment in the British Army and said that the British Ambassador³ in Kathmandu was very worried about it. I gave him a brief history of what had happened since 1946 when the Tripartite Agreement was signed.⁴ That agreement was with the old Rana regime. So far as we were concerned in India, we could not continue to give facilities for recruitment for the British Army on Indian soil. Presumably in Nepal also there was some feeling against Gurkha enlistment to the British Army. The King agreed that this was so. At the same time it was not our desire to take any action suddenly, which might have an upsetting effect on the UK. The Tripartite Agreement and subsequent agreements on behalf of the Government of India (even though I did not know about these later developments) could not be put an end to suddenly. That would not be fair.

1. Nehru's note on his interview with the King of Nepal, New Delhi, 4 September 1952. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Following the resignation, on 10 August 1952, by M.P. Koirala, the Prime Minister, King Tribhuvan announced on 14 August that he would rule Nepal through an advisory council composed of non-party leaders, till an effective and representative Council of Ministers could be set up.
3. C.H. Summerhayes.
4. A Tripartite Agreement concluded on 9 November 1947 by Britain, Nepal and India allowed India to retain 12 battalions of Gurkha soldiers while eight battalions were transferred to Britain with a condition that Britain would in future recruit Gurkha soldiers, only after India's requirements had been satisfied.

Also Britain's position was a very difficult one in the world today and we did not wish, as far as possible, to make it more difficult. Even though the UK often followed a foreign policy which was not to our liking, the UK on the whole, exercised a restraining influence on the USA and was to some extent a stabilizing factor in Europe still. Therefore, while we had made it clear that we could not allow any recruitment of the British Army in India, we proposed to go slowly in this matter, and not to create any kind of crisis. My general advice to the King was also to make Nepal's position clear, but to go slowly and to take no sudden step. Nepal would have to face a fairly serious problem if the 20,000 Gurkhas in the British Army were suddenly discharged and had to return to Nepal. If this was the result of Nepal's action, then the responsibility for maintaining those 20,000 Gurkhas would have to be borne by the Nepalese Government. This would be a great burden and law and order problems might well arise. In the delicate situation prevailing in Nepal at present, it would not be wise to add to the difficulties. I told him that if it was possible for the Nepal Government, while making it clear that this recruitment cannot continue for long, meanwhile, to agree, as a temporary measure, for recruitment on Nepalese soil, that would be welcomed by us. We would be prepared to allow transit, as now, if the men went in civil attire and without arms.

8. The King complained of the activities of Americans in Nepal as well as of the British Ambassador. In particular, he said that the American librarian functioned more as a kind of political representative than a librarian and often made rather offensive remarks. The British Ambassador appeared to think that we were trying to push him out of Nepal and hence was rather anti-India in his general approach. I suggested to the King that he should explain to the British Ambassador that there was no question of Nepal, or for the matter of that India, wishing to push out the British Embassy from Nepal. Indeed, in the present circumstances, there was no apprehension from the British in Nepal, as they were not in a position to do much. Apprehension came from other quarters. The British Ambassador could be told that Nepal would like to maintain friendly relations with the UK, as of old, but that the King hoped that the British Ambassador would not participate in any activity which was unwelcome to the Nepalese Government. As for the American representatives, they should be told that while American help⁵ was welcome and Nepal was grateful for it, this should not be made the cover of other activities which were disapproved. Further that too many Americans should not be encouraged

5. The United States had established formal diplomatic relations with Nepal during the Rana period. A Point-Four Agreement was signed by the two countries on 23 January 1951. But it was not until 1954 that an American Embassy was finally approved for Kathmandu.

to go to Nepal at the same time, and every single case should be examined. If any misbehaviour occurred, this should be pointed out immediately.

9. Reference was made to the proposed change of the Ambassador. I told the King that I entirely appreciated his viewpoint and we had a high opinion of the very good work done by our present Ambassador during the past critical three years. Indeed, his role had been in some ways a historic one and, undoubtedly, his presence had made a difference. His experience and intimate knowledge of conditions, parties and people in Nepal was and could be, in future, of the greatest help. I realized all that, but after having given the most careful consideration to the matter, I had come to the conclusion that a change was, in the balance, desirable. Normally such changes occurred after three years or so. In the present case it was fairly well-known, though not officially announced yet, that the change would take place. If this did not take place now, it would create comment, and the only answer would be that the Nepal Government expressed a wish for our present Ambassador to continue. The reason for this could only be that the Nepal Government depended upon him so much that they could hardly do without him or that he had become such a dominating figure in Nepal that he could not be dispensed with. Either of these explanations would not be helpful and would be used as a handle by opponents and critics against the King.

10. The very virtues and good qualities of our present Ambassador rather came in the way of his continuing there. He had become a controversial figure and it was not a good thing for an Ambassador to be such. If he continued now, it would be constantly said by many persons, as had sometimes been said in the past, that he was acting as a boss in Nepal and pulling strings from behind. This would be embarrassing to him, to the King, and to India. Indeed it would come in the way somewhat of the help that he might otherwise give, because he would have to take special care in this matter then. A more politically neutral Ambassador, without any background in Nepal, might not be able to give that special help in a crisis which our present experienced Ambassador might give. But such a neutral person would help in bringing about a certain normality and will take away the edge of many of the criticisms that were offered. He would of course be experienced and competent in the ways of administration, and would be able to give just the kind of help that was perhaps the most needed now. If any special difficulty arose, it was easy to refer to us, if so desired.

11. The King said he appreciated what I said, but at least he would like to keep the present Ambassador for a month or twenty days. Finally he said that he might remain there till the end of this month. I agreed. I told him also that we wanted to utilize the talents and experience of our present Ambassador in Kathmandu in other high offices....

13. The King referred rather casually to the loan of fifteen crores that was supposed to be coming from India.⁶ I said that there was a serious misunderstanding somewhere, as no such loan had been promised. It was true that M.P. Koirala and other Ministers who had come here some months ago had mentioned vaguely a loan of this kind. We had told them of our own financial difficulties, but had also said that we would try to help to the best of our ability. But the proper course was for development schemes to be sent to us for us to examine them. As a matter of fact we have already undertaken to build the air field and the road from India to Nepal. We were also considering the major project of the Kosi dam, etc. This will absorb a considerable sum of money.⁷ We would be prepared to consider other minor schemes of development. As far as I could see, these would relate chiefly to communications and roads. If necessary, we could send an officer of the Planning Commission or an engineer to help in drawing up these schemes for consideration.

14. After dinner tonight, I asked the King what his relations were with the Crown Prince. I said that I did so with some hesitation as it was none of my business to refer to personal and domestic matters. But this had a political bearing also.⁸ The King said that the Crown Prince wanted to marry the daughter of one of the Ranas who was not politically desirable and the Crown Prince was also inclining somewhat towards the Gurkha league.⁹ I said that it was important that there was confidence between the King and his son, the Crown Prince, and no barriers arose between them because otherwise the Crown Prince was likely to drift further into wrong directions. It was common experience that intrigues took place and cabals were formed in court circles and these led

6. A Nepali delegation, which held talks on 21 April 1952 with Nehru in Delhi, had sought a loan of Rs 15 crores from the Government of India to finance part of Nepal's development plans.
7. The Government of India had built, at the Nepal Government's request, an air strip near Kathmandu. It had also built a jeepable road from Raxaul on the Indian border to the Nepalese capital. An agreement had been reached to harness the Kosi river so that its waters would not cause loss during the rainy season to Nepal and Bihar. Also, a few specialists had been lent to explore the possibility of further developmental activities.
8. King Tribhuvan had initially opposed Crown Prince Mahendra's proposal to marry his deceased wife's sister, Ratna Rajyalakshmi Devi, for the reason that she belonged to Maharaja Juddha Shumsher's family, who was considered highly reactionary in politics. Though the King later reluctantly permitted this marriage, he personally did not attend the wedding, which was held on 10 December 1952.
9. The Gurkha Dal, which was banned after the attack on Home Minister B.P. Koirala's residence in April 1951, was reorganized as Gurkha Parishad in February 1952. It sought to rally behind it the support of the people in the hills by exploiting their fear and distrust of the non-Gurkha elements in the Terai and the Kathmandu valley. As most of the Gurkha Parishad leaders had been closely associated with the Rana regime, they were necessarily drawn into conflict with the Nepali Congress leaders.

to trouble. If the Crown Prince was really anxious and eager to marry a particular girl, this could not be prevented for long. The only result would be a feeling of frustration and annoyance in the Crown Prince. He might marry secretly or even publicly later and he would incline more towards the opponents of the King. Therefore, the wisest policy was to permit him to marry whom he liked provided this was not a momentary attraction and there was a fairly strong and continuous desire to do so. The King asked me how he could make sure about such a strong and continuous wish. I said there could be no certainty except the lapse of some time. If he continued to feel that way for some months or had done so in the past few months, then that was evidence enough. Indeed the more he was opposed, the more he was likely to want to do so. If he was told that if he really wanted to marry, he could do so, then the burden would be upon him and in any event his relations with the King would improve. I suggested that he might frankly discuss the matter with the Crown Prince and tell him that he did not wish to come in the way of his wishes in this matter if he felt strongly about them. The King said that he would think about it and speak to the Crown Prince on his return.

15. I asked the King what he thought about Govind Narain's¹⁰ work. He said that he was fully satisfied with it.

10. A member of the Indian Civil Service; posted at the Royal Palace as the Principal Secretary to King Tribhuvan with supervisory powers.

11. To C.P.N. Singh¹

New Delhi

September 4, 1952

My dear Chandresvar,

The King arrived at mid-day today. This afternoon I had a long talk with him. I had a brief talk again after dinner. I propose to see him once or twice again while he is here. I feel that these talks strengthened him and helped him to understand the various aspects of the situation. I feel a great responsibility in this matter. That responsibility is of course political, because the relations of India and Nepal are important. It is personal also because he looks up to me so much for advice. I want to help him of course.

I have written a longish note² about my talks with him. I enclose a copy of it for your information. I must say that I was surprised to learn from the

1. JN Collection.

2. See the previous item.

King of the attitude of Suraj Prasad Upadhyaya and the threats which he is said to have held out both to the King and to India. I would not have expected this of him. Not that I relied upon him too much, but I did think that he was a little more sober and sensible person than he had apparently turned out to be. I have no doubt in my mind that for the present, and for some time to come, the present King's regime has to continue. There is no alternative to it. But it must work steadily and effectively, without attempting to show off. There has been quite enough of showing off and fancy promises. The Nepali Congress has thus far failed not only because of its own ineptitude, but also because it talked tall and did practically nothing, if not worse.

You will see in my note what I have said about you and the change of our Ambassador in Kathmandu. I am sure in my mind that your continuance for any length of time now would not be fair to you or to others. That itself will be made an issue in Nepal by certain opposition groups and attention will be diverted from other matters. Therefore, you should come away early in October. The exact date can be fixed later. But I should imagine that it should not be later than the end of the first week of October. I have suggested that Gokhale might go there before you leave. This kind of thing is not normally done, but if there is nothing wrong about it, it may be done in this case. Alternatively, you should see Gokhale in Delhi before he goes and have full talks with him.

I made a suggestion to the King that he should have a private but high level inquiry into the financial transactions and high appointments of the last few months. We have had many complaints as you know, and some rather flagrant cases have been brought to our notice. I think that some really high grade person should privately inquire into this and report to the King. It is not necessary for any other action to be taken. At any rate, this can be considered later. If such an inquiry yields definite results, I think the King should send for the person or the persons concerned and tell them of this and ask them, again privately, for their explanation. He can then consider what to do. In any event, such action would prove a check on the activities of some persons. They can be told that if they so desire, there can be a public inquiry. I doubt if they will express a preference for this.

You will see what I have written in the note about the Crown Prince. I attach some importance to this matter. I feel that unless this is tackled, and the only way to tackle it is to allow him to marry the girl of his choice, then serious results will follow a further estrangement from the King and the Crown Prince inclining towards the Gurkha league. I have vaguely heard, though I do not know if this is true, that the Crown Prince has secretly married the girl. If so, there is all the more reason to take some steps to regularize this business. This rumour of a secret marriage should of course not be mentioned to the King. I suggest that you might follow up my talk with the King as tactfully as possible.


I wrote to you about the High Commissionership of Ceylon and you agreed to accept this. I do not propose to make any announcement about it till you have finally left Nepal and come here. After that we can decide about the dates, etc. There is no hurry about it although the High Commissionership is now vacant. If you would like, as you probably will, some time to go home, etc., this can easily be arranged. I should like you to go to Ceylon because the situation there vis-a-vis people of Indian descent, is unsatisfactory and has reached a stalemate for the present. We should like to go ahead with it in a friendly way. I do not know how long I would like you to stay in Ceylon. I rather doubt if the period will be very long. That depends on other factors.

I should like the Nepalese Government to send us a formal agreement for Gokhale as soon as possible. Also to let us know definitely what type of officers they want us to lend them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru



WITH THE KING OF NEPAL, NEW DELHI, 7 SEPTEMBER 1952



WITH THE NIZAM, BEGUMPET AERODROME, HYDERABAD,
28 SEPTEMBER 1952

1. To Agatha Harrison¹

New Delhi
July 18, 1952

My dear Agatha,²

...I am afraid I cannot give you any details about our efforts to help in bringing about a truce in Korea. We seemed to have come very near success when it slipped away.³ But I still hope that something will be achieved. Anyhow we shall continue our efforts....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. A leading member of the Society of Friends (Quakers) in UK, which appealed for peace in Korea through the use of India's good offices.
3. The one unresolved issue which delayed the Korean armistice for over 15 months was the repatriation of prisoners held by UN forces. On Nehru's advice, Krishna Menon worked out with Anthony Eden a formula for interviews, by an independent body, of all prisoners who did not wish to return voluntarily. This was acceptable, with minor variations, to China, and a scheme was formulated on these lines. But suddenly in July 1952—provoked by the bombing of power plants in North Korea by the United States—the Chinese retracted, denounced voluntary repatriation, and insisted that all prisoners should be returned.

2. Cable to T.N. Kaul¹

Your telegram 255 of July 18.²

While Chinese desire settlement and peace, Chen's talk with you makes

1. New Delhi, 20 July 1952. File No. 12/62/NGO-52-MEA.
2. In his cable of 18 July 1952, T.N. Kaul, Counsellor, Indian Embassy in Peking, informed Nehru of the points Chen Chia-kang, Director, Asian Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made during his discussions with him the previous day. These were: (i) the Chinese Government had always been willing to discuss with the Government of India the question of the settlement of the Korean problem because of its concern for peace in Asia and the world; (ii) the Chinese and the Korean people were opposed to voluntary repatriation and any form of screening; and (iii) all the 20,000 Chinese prisoners should be repatriated.

no advance whatever. Panikkar's personal suggestion does not help in present circumstances.³

I have received personal request from Foreign Secretary Eden expressing his earnest desire for settlement but saying that they cannot compel resisting prisoners of war to return.⁴

Thus the position is that both sides express their desire for settlement but neither is prepared to give in on this question and wants the other to do so. For the present we can make no further suggestion.

3. In May 1952, India's Ambassador, K.M. Panikkar, had suggested to the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, that all prisoners of war, including 20,000 Chinese prisoners, be repatriated while some formula might be devised to allow those Korean prisoners from both sides, not willing to return, to go where they liked since the whole of Korea was their home. This suggestion did not imply acceptance of the principle of voluntary repatriation or screening but rather the application of the principle of "the unity of Korea."
4. Anthony Eden in his cable to Nehru on 15 July 1952, welcomed Chou En-lai's proposal to K.M. Panikkar for the neutral screening of Communist prisoners not willing to return. But he was disturbed to hear that the Chinese had refused to pursue this proposal. Eden felt that they appeared to insist on the return to them of all the Chinese prisoners. He added that "I should be most grateful for any help which you can give to try to persuade the Chinese to consider carefully some solution for screening by neutrals.... The easiest method would be for the camps in which the Chinese are held in some way to be 'neutralized' and for the prisoners then to be re-screened by neutrals."

3. Cable to U Nu¹

Thank you for your message² which your Ambassador³ has sent me. I have been greatly concerned about the situation in Korea and for over two months

1. 20 July 1952. JN Collection. Also available in File No.12/62/NGO-52-MEA.
2. U Nu, the Prime Minister of Burma, expressed his concern at the continued bombing of power plants on the south bank of the Yalu river and appealed to Nehru to try to get it stopped.
3. Maung Kyin, Ambassador of Burma in India.

we have tried our utmost to help in bringing about a settlement there.⁴ We have been in constant touch with the Chinese Government on the one side and the UK Government and to some extent the USA Government on the other. I had hoped that success would attend our efforts soon. Indeed at one time it was almost within our grasp, but the intensified Yalu bombing made a great difference and stiffened the Chinese and North Koreans. We are however continuing our efforts at both ends. I have no doubt that all the parties concerned want a settlement in Korea. Because of that I hope that peace will come. But the situation is difficult and for the present the respective positions taken up by the two parties are almost irreconcilable.⁵ Kind regards.

4. On 17 March 1952, Nehru asked K.M. Panikkar to inform the Chinese leaders of his own conviction that the British and American Governments were anxious for a settlement in the Far East. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 17, pp. 511-513. On 8 May 1952, Nehru sent a message to Anthony Eden, suggesting that the UK Government might use its influence with the US to settle the problem of the prisoners of war. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, p. 534. Eden conveyed to Krishna Menon on 20 June 1952 the acceptance by the UK and the US of the suggestion of Chou-En-lai that he was willing to discuss the Anglo-American proposals if the US agreed that all prisoners must be assumed to desire repatriation and those resisting repatriation might be interviewed in a neutral zone by a committee of four neutral countries and the Red Cross teams of both sides. Menon worked out with Eden a formula for interviews, by an independent body, of all prisoners who did not voluntarily wish to return.
5. Armistice negotiations had reached an impasse in regard to the question of the prisoners of war. The Chinese and the North Korean side insisted that all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side should be released and repatriated in accordance with international practice, the 1919 Geneva Convention, and the provisions of the draft Armistice Agreement. The US maintained the principle of voluntary repatriation and retention of those who refused to be repatriated and were willing to stay with the side in whose custody they were being held.

4. Message to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

I have received your message of 19th July about your interview with Selwyn Lloyd.²

I do not understand to what statement of mine in Parliament you refer.³ We have kept practically silent on these issues in spite of very great public interest and enquiry and increasing resentment at continued bombing by Americans.

We shall continue our efforts of course but how can any efforts for peace be furthered while mass bombing of cities of North Korea continues, killing large number of civilians. No one attaches importance to what some American Generals might say.⁴ But it appears to be forgotten that Chinese are both sensitive and tough and this military action can have only adverse effect on them. Prime Minister of Burma has also conveyed to me his deep distress at continued aerial bombing in Korea and asked me to endeavour to get it stopped.

1. New Delhi, 21 July 1952. It was sent through B.G. Kher, High Commissioner in London. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection.
2. On 19 July 1952, Krishna Menon saw Selwyn Lloyd, Conservative Member of British Parliament and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and explained to him the problem of classification of prisoners according to their nationality and domicile. Selwyn Lloyd understood that what the Chinese were insisting on was the return of all their nationals. The number of prisoners which could be repatriated without interview had become eighty three thousand which was twenty thousand more than previously stated.
3. Nehru expressed concern in the House of the People over the developments in South Korea: "The recent developments connected with the activities of President Syngman Rhee are not only very remarkable, but I think, should make the United Nations and every country connected with them think of the undesirability of any association with a person like President Rhee who functions in that way. Any support of the regime of President Rhee means support of the very thing which the United Nations is supposed to stand against." See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, p. 456.
4. Yalu, Poyang and Antung in North Korea were attacked by the UN Command's fighter bombers in June 1952. The American Generals claimed that the plants situated at these places supplied power to North Korea's military installations and industries.

5. Initiative on Korea¹

Question: Can you give further information about our initiative in the matter of Korean peace talks?

Jawaharlal Nehru : In answer to a question in Parliament, I said something about it.² I would not like to exaggerate this position. There is no question of our being mediator or anything like that, but we want to help, if we can, in finding some way out of the impasse. As is well recognised, we are in a special position because we have friendly contacts with the Governments concerned. And the only offer, to call it an offer, is that we will be very happy to use those contacts in furtherance of the settlement.

Q : What is the response?

JN : The response has always been very friendly. It is quite clear to me, whatever some people may think, there is an extreme desire on the part of every party concerned for a settlement. I have no doubt about that at all in my mind, but certain difficulties or divergence of viewpoints come in, and I believe they are becoming narrower; still some remain, and I hope they will be gradually bridged sometime or other.

Q: Have there been any new contacts recently on this question?

JN : I do not know what you mean by "contact". We are in continuous touch. I doubt if any two days go by without some kind of communication, some information coming, and so in. It may not take matters very much further, but there has been continuous touch.

Q : Has any definite proposal been made to the Indian Government regarding prisoners of war?

JN : Practically speaking, that is the one and the only issue at the present moment at Panmunjon. So, all proposals coming from anywhere relate to that issue.

1. Remarks at a press conference, New Delhi, 24 July 1952. PIB. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference, see pp. 149, 238-253, 617, 637-638, 660-663 and 665-666.
2. Not printed. In fact, Nehru answered a question on the same point at his press conference on 21 June 1952 that "if in any way we could help in finding some way out, we should be very happy to offer our services" to reach a settlement in Korea. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, p. 542.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

Q : Is it a fact that the Chinese Government's views are generally made known verbally rather than in writing?

JN : That is normally the case with every government. That is to say, no government writes formal communications—no government, including our own. The matter is discussed informally. When it reaches a certain stage, then you have it in writing. Even then it is informal writing. At a later stage it becomes a little more formal. That is the usual procedure.

Q : Did you see a newspaper report which appeared about a week ago, that just before the Yalu river power plants were bombed, you had put forward some specific proposals for a ceasefire in Korea, and that those proposals were shelved on account of the bombing of the Yalu river power plants because the situation had changed?

JN : We did not make any specific proposals at any time. Maybe, sometimes vague suggestions were made verbally by our Ambassador. It is really exploring things, without any commitments—discussing things. And we have taken particular care not to make any proposals to anybody, because if we made any proposals, we would get tied up in this business.

Q: Were any proposals made to the Indian Government which the Indian Government accepted in regard to Korea?

JN : Who are we to accept or reject any proposals in regard to Korea? We did not accept or reject anything. And if any suggestion is made which we think worth pursuing, we communicate it to the parties concerned and leave it to them to pursue.

6. On the Truce Talks¹

I have read through all these papers, though not with the care that they deserve. I entirely agree with your comments. It does appear that the Chinese have

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 25 July 1952. JN Collection.

gone back on what they told our Ambassador.² I do not know what more we can do in this matter. It hardly appears necessary for us to send a note on the subject of Korean truce talks. However, Kaul seems to be doubtful about this. Will you discuss this matter with Panikkar when he comes here?

Tibet. I am inclined to think that in our future talks or notes about Tibet, we should mention the frontier. I appreciate the reasons which Panikkar advanced and it is because of these reasons that we have not brought up this subject.³ But I am beginning to feel that our attempt at being clever might overreach itself. I think it is better to be absolutely straight and frank.

You might discuss this matter also with Panikkar and perhaps get notes drafted.

I think that you should send copies of all the papers relating to the Korean truce talks that Kaul has sent to our High Commissioner in London. You might ask him to show them to Krishna Menon.

The Tibet papers need not be sent.

2. On 14 June 1952, K.M. Panikkar discussed with Chou En-lai a proposal for a neutral commission to take charge of the prisoners with an offer to the Chinese and their North Korean allies that their representatives should have the opportunity to freely interview the prisoners. The impression Chou En-lai gave him was that on principle the proposal was acceptable to the Chinese, though there would have to be close negotiations about the modalities of control over prisoners during the period and the method of interview. But suddenly in July 1952, following the bombing of power plants in North Korea by the United States, the Chinese denounced the proposal.
3. In a cable to Nehru on 17 June 1952, K.M. Panikkar argued that India's position on the frontier with Tibet was well known to China, and as Chou En-lai had not raised the border issue in his interviews with him, his silence should be presumed to be acquiescence, if not acceptance, and it was wisest to ignore the subject.

7. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
July 30, 1952

My dear Krishna,

... About Korean talks, I have naturally been giving a good deal of thought to them and have discussed the matter with Panikkar repeatedly. I feel that the present is no time for us to make any fresh advances, however informal and

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.

personal they might be, to Chou En-lai.² If an opportunity presents itself, I shall certainly take advantage of it. The impression I have gathered is that the situation at the China end is more difficult than we have imagined. That does not mean that a truce or a settlement is ruled out. I think there is a possibility still, but that will depend somewhat on future developments. I have no doubt that the Chinese have gone back to some extent on what they said previously to us. What the reason for this is, I do not know.

Probably there will be no great improvement when the American elections are over.³ Anyhow, we shall follow developments closely and make an approach if circumstances indicate it....

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. Krishna Menon, in a cable on 26 July 1952, suggested that Nehru might, by way of a personal message, ask Chou En-lai if India could use her influence with the British towards an arrangement on the basis of which anything short of forcing prisoners back could be arrived at.
3. Krishna Menon wrote: "In an election campaign in the United States, when it gets into swing, internal considerations may have a considerable effect and work against commonsense abroad."

8. Cable to Indian Embassy, Peking¹

Your telegram 271 dated August 2nd. We are conveying gist of Chen Chia-kang's statement to Hicomind, London.²

Apart from desire to keep negotiations open, there is nothing in what Chen has said which indicates an advance on present position. On the other hand, Chinese seem to have gone back on their original suggestion of getting at an agreed figure as near 110,000 as possible by a process of reclassification without any reference to the views of prisoners.³ In the circumstances, you should inform Chen Chia-kang that we appreciate Chinese Government's desire to keep us informed about developments and also welcome their willingness to continue negotiations. You may add that while we are always prepared to

1. New Delhi, 4 August 1952. JN Collection.

2. See the next item.

3. According to the Chinese authorities the original figure of North Korean and Chinese war prisoners was 170,000, but the US claimed the number to be 130,000 and was offering to repatriate only 70,000. China was prepared to compromise but would not accept any figure less than 100,000.

give such help as we can in bringing about a settlement acceptable to both parties, there is nothing new in their suggestions to enable us to take any positive steps.

It is not in our opinion necessary to ask Chen to make specific suggestions. But if on his own he proposes anything new or revives the earlier proposal for "interview in neutral zone" you should ask them to be put in writing unofficially so that there may not be any misunderstanding later.

9. Cable to B.G. Kher¹

We have received message from our Embassy in Peking giving account of interview with Asian Director, Chen Chia-kang. Chen gave Kaul long unofficial note. There is nothing new in the note or suggestions put forward to enable us to take any positive steps. Chen's approach does however indicate Chinese desire to keep negotiations open and to utilize our offices for feelers to the other side.

Following is gist of Chinese note:

It refers to discussions at secret sessions regarding prisoners of war. Americans suggested figure 83,000 which contains only 32 per cent of Chinese and 86 per cent of Korean prisoners of war. This figure is totally unacceptable to the Chinese, firstly, because it is still very far from the figure of approximately 116,000 and, secondly, it is not in accordance with the principle on the basis of nationality and domicile.

While expressing themselves as being resolutely opposed to any form of screening, the Chinese said:

In order to continue the negotiations on the repatriation on the draft Armistice Agreement,² our side proposed that open Plenary Sessions

1. New Delhi, 4 August 1952. File Nos. 12/62/NGO-52, Vols. I-VI, and 12/64/NGO-52, MEA. Also available in JN Collection.
2. In February-March 1952, an armistice agreement between the representatives of the UN Command, and China and North Korea, was reached at Kaesong on the following points: cessation of hostilities within 24 hours after the signing of the armistice agreement; withdrawal of armed forces from coastal islands and territories controlled by the other side; within three months after the armistice became effective; a political conference of both sides to be held to settle the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea; inspection teams to be stationed to investigate and report violations; both sides to cease, after signing the armistice, introduction into Korea of the reinforcement of military personnel; and a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission for supervision and inspection.

should be held from 26th July and further proposed that, at the same time, staff officers of both sides meet to discuss detailed wording of the Armistice Agreement. Now it once again depends upon the attitude of the American side. Since Government of India is concerned about Korean Armistice negotiations, because of its interest in the peace of Asia, I am instructed to inform Mr Kaul on the attitude of the Korean and Chinese side and request that this attitude be conveyed to Prime Minister Nehru.

While you may inform British Foreign Office of the gist of Korean telegram, I do not think any move by us is necessary at this stage, as present approach is vague and indefinite and contains no new point.

10. To B.G. Kher¹

New Delhi
August 15, 1952

My dear Kher,

... I really do not see what we can do at present about the Korean situation. I did not like the obvious change in the Chinese attitude or rather in the messages they have given us. But, generally speaking, the way the Americans have behaved in Korea has been outrageous. Repeatedly when there was some chance of a peaceful settlement, there has been some development there to prevent this. The more one looks back at MacArthur's campaign and even after, the more surprised one is.² While the American people undoubtedly want peace, it is very doubtful how far the Pentagon wants it. The fact is that the settlement in Korea immediately brings up the question of Formosa and Chinese recognition in the UN. The US does not want to face these questions. They have got themselves tied up completely, and therein lies the danger of the situation.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. After crossing the 38th Parallel on 8 October 1950, UN forces, under General MacArthur's Command, reached the northern frontier of Korea right on the borders of Manchuria. This provoked China to participate in the Korean war against UN forces from 11 October. General MacArthur made the grave mistake of underestimating the strength of the Chinese and North Koreans and faced an entirely new war. He told the American Congress early in 1951: "I still believe that the interests of the United States would require our acting alone, if necessary. If the other nations of the world haven't got enough sense to see where appeasement leads... why then we had better protect ourselves and go it alone." He issued a statement on 24 March 1951 advocating an extension of war with China. President Truman relieved him of his Command on 10 April 1951.

I wonder if you have seen two books about Korea. One is called *Cry Korea* by the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent³ there. I think his name is Thompson. The other is by I.F. Stone, called *The Hidden History of the Korean War*.

About Egypt, it appears that the UK Government have arrived at an arrangement with the Egyptian Government about representation. Probably in the course of the next two or three days, we shall ask for an agreement also.

You will soon be receiving from us a note for the UK Government about the recruitment of Gurkha troops by the British in India.⁴ Over five years ago, we arrived at an agreement with the Nepal Government and the UK. The Nepal Government agreed to allow their nationals to be recruited by the UK. This was no business of ours. We came into the picture only because transit facilities were asked for. We agreed to give these facilities, as well as some other facilities—postal, etc. Temporarily we agreed that the existing recruitment depots on the Indian side of the border might be used also.

Later, without my knowledge, this agreement has continued and made almost permanent by our Defence Ministry. There has been some outcry here about this.⁵ It is obvious that we cannot continue to allow any foreign recruitment on Indian soil. Because of this we are informing the Nepal Government and asking you to deal with this matter with the UK Government....⁶

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Reginald Thompson.

4. See *post*, p. 635.

5. For example, five Opposition leaders in the House of the People, on 11 August 1952, demanded the annulment of the tripartite agreement between the Governments of India, Nepal and Britain, enabling recruitment of Gurkhas by Britain on Indian soil.

6. See *ante*, pp. 569-570.

11. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
August 17, 1952

My dear Krishna,

...Your second airgram² of the 7th August in which you discussed our attitude

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.

2. In the first communication of the same date, Krishna Menon criticized the fiscal policy of the Government of India and the development loans that had been floated by some State Governments. In his letter of 7 August 1952, Krishna Menon observed that India's relations with the Communist powers had cooled off and Nehru was moving closer to the United States.

to China and the US. I think that you have taken an exaggerated view of the reactions in India to recent events. There is no cooling off in regard to China so far as the public is concerned. So far as I am concerned, I did feel that the Chinese Government did not deal with us, in this particular matter, in a straight way. But, in the balance, I think that American policy in the Far East has been very much to blame and I have little doubt that it is basically that policy that has come in the way of a peace effort. The UK for all their desire for peace give in in the most vital matters to the US.

But, apart from all this, the question is what we can do in the matter at present. I just do not see what step we can take. It may be that a little later an opportunity might offer itself. I am not aware of Panikkar's views having undergone any change. I have discussed these matters with him on several occasions.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

12. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
September 9, 1952

My dear Krishna,

I received yesterday two letters from you; one dated 2nd September, the other undated, but with a typed note attached.² I shall await the further note you have promised to send.

With much that you say about Korea and the UN, I am largely in agreement. I think that the question should be raised at the UN or, at any rate, we should be fully prepared to do so to help in doing so. There is always the chance of things going wrong at the UN unless the ground is properly prepared previously. Therefore, we have to proceed with caution. Anyhow, we should think out the various possibilities.

I wrote to you inviting you to join our UN delegation. I received your telegram. I have not received the letter to which reference is made in your telegram. The more I think of it, the more I would like you to go there. You are yourself thinking of these vital matters which may come up before the UN and your joining our delegation would be exceedingly helpful....

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. Krishna Menon, in his note, spelt out the steps to be taken by India for a new peace initiative on Korea, in cooperation with the British, to prevent the drift for the worse.

13. The Indian Ambulance Unit in Korea¹

The ambulance unit was sent two years ago and has been there since then. From all accounts it has done extraordinarily good work and, in fact, the United Nations and other countries were eager to give very high awards and medals and the like, but our rule is that we do not want our officers either in the Civil Services or Defence Services to accept any such decorations from foreign countries, including the United Nations.

As a matter of fact, there were remarkable cases of heroism by our ambulance unit and our Government have given them the Mahavir Chakra and some other decorations. They have done exceedingly good work and we have every reason to be proud of their work.

Now, two years are going to expire in the course of the next two months or so since the unit was sent. Normally, after two years they are replaced by a new unit. The question before us is whether we should replace this unit because much depends on the developments in Korea.²

Suppose there is a truce or armistice, then obviously the need for this unit becomes far less. Are we going to send them for two years in the expectation of two years of war? Therefore, we decided we shall not replace this unit for the time being, and we have not decided to withdraw the unit, and we shall take no decision about its replacement or withdrawal till we know the position.

1. Reply to a question from a member asking whether the Government was withdrawing the Indian Ambulance Unit in Korea, AICC meeting, Indore, 14 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 15 September 1952.
2. The Indian Field Ambulance Unit, which was sent to Korea in December 1950, was relieved by another Indian unit by the end of October 1952.

14. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Your² telegram 339 dated 30th September.

There can be no doubt that new proposals made at Panmunjon on behalf

1. New Delhi, 1 October 1952. High Commissioner's Personal File (1952), MEA. Also available in file Nos 12/62/NGO-52, Vol I-VI, and 12/64/NGO-52, MEA.
2. India's Ambassador in China at this time.

of UN are a definite advance on part of America.³ Indeed they approximate closely to certain suggestions that were made by us to Governments concerned some months ago. At that time there appeared to be good chances of agreement on that basis. From such accounts as we receive it appears that there is a real desire for ceasefire and peace in Korea on part of American Government. There can be no doubt about this in so far as UK Government is concerned. It may be that additional reason for this desire is to influence Presidential campaign in America in favour of Democratic candidate who would undoubtedly profit greatly if ceasefire agreement was reached at Panmunjon. Success of Stevenson⁴ in American Presidential election would mean a blow to those groups in America which look and prepare for war.⁵

Whatever the reasons behind this new offer may be, I believe it is a genuine offer and it is not rigid. There is plenty of room in it for improvement and adjustment. It would therefore be very unfortunate if this offer was rejected by Chinese Government or even if response looked like rejection. That would mean a victory for war party in America and they will say that even though UN and US went so far to meet Chinese wishes, China was adamant and therefore China does not want any settlement at all on any basis.

I need not point out again the tremendous importance of ceasefire settlement in Korea which can be followed by larger settlement. That will be time for us and others to take up immediately question of Chinese admission to UN as

3. Lt Gen. William K. Harrison presented three alternative proposals on the repatriation problem on 28 September 1952, "any one of which will lead to an armistice if you truly desire one", as he put it: (1) all non-repatriates after identification in the demilitarized zone should have the right to return to their captors; (2) all non-repatriates would be interviewed by neutral representatives in the zone, and would be free to go to the side of their own choice; and (3) all non-repatriates would be placed in the zone and without any screening would be free to go to the side of their choice.
4. Adlai Stevenson (1905-1965); Assistant Secretary of State, 1945; Governor of Illinois, 1948-52; Democratic Presidential candidate in 1952 and 1956 but lost on both occasions; US Ambassador to UN, 1960-1965. He visited India from 28 April to 14 May 1953.
5. For the November Presidential election, the Republican Party had elected General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who led the Allied armies in Europe to victory in World War II, as their candidate. The Democratic Party had chosen as its candidate Governor Adlai Stevenson. On the eve of the election, the Republican Party charged that the Democrats had whittled away the power and prestige of the United States and that they had made needless concessions to Russia at Yalta, Potsdam and other Big Four Conferences. It also felt that America had lost her power, influence and prestige in South and Far East Asia. It finally accused the Democrats of betraying Chiang Kai-shek and wanted full aid to be given to the Formosa Government. According to the Republicans, the US and the Allies should not allow the Communists to extend their influence in Europe and Asia.

well as other problems.⁶ I feel that atmosphere will be favourable to consideration of these other problems then. Any settlement in Far East would immediately react on European situation as well as entire world situation and tensions would grow less. Thus great opportunity is offered for real peace move which will be welcomed all over world.

I would like you to convey substance of above informally to Chinese Government with our very earnest desire that some settlement may come in Korea and Far East very soon.

Vijayalakshmi is leading our delegation to UN General Assembly. She is leaving tomorrow morning for Paris from where she will proceed to New York. Under our instructions she will work there for peaceful settlement and recognition of China by UN. If any favourable step is taken now considerable effect will be produced at UN General Assembly meeting and favourable atmosphere created for progress towards peace. I attach great importance to this matter and I have no doubt that Chinese Government are equally anxious for peaceful settlement. Present occasion offers opportunity for honourable peace and I earnestly trust that advantage will be taken of it.

Your telegram 333 September 26th.⁷ I would greatly like to visit China, even for brief period, to have opportunity of meeting Chairman Mao, Premier Chou En-lai and other leaders. But opportunity for me to visit China can only come if some settlement is arrived at in Korea.

6. The US Government had held that until the problems arising out of the aggression in Korea were settled, the diplomatic recognition of China and its admission to the UN would be inappropriate.
7. N. Raghavan reported to Nehru on 26 September 1952 that Mao said on the occasion of the presentation of credentials by him that India had nothing to fear from China and China had no fears on her south-west frontier. Mao also said that Nehru would be welcome to visit China following the armistice in Korea.

15. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
October 2, 1952

My dear Krishna,

I have not written to you about Korea and the Far East, because there was nothing very special that I could suggest. But I have been thinking of this a great deal. Yesterday I sent a telegram to Raghavan in Peking. I enclose a

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.

copy of it.² I feel that there is a possibility, however feeble, of something emerging in the near future and I want to exercise such influence as we possess.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. See the preceding item.

16. To B.G. Kher¹

New Delhi
October 13, 1952

My dear Kher,

I have your two letters dated 30th September and 4th October, which I have read with interest.

You ask me whether we were consulted in regard to the proposals for the prisoners of war in Korea. We were not consulted in this matter. In a sense we have not been consulted even previously. But it is true that some months ago, as you know, there was a good deal of correspondence between us and the UK Government on the one hand and the Chinese Government on the other. In the course of that correspondence, certain tentative suggestions were made by one party or the other which we passed on. The present proposals made on behalf of the UN are more or less in line with something that was suggested then. In this sense it may be said that we had been previously kept in touch with developments. But during these last few months even that remaining in touch stopped.

I sent you some days ago a copy of a telegram I had sent to our Ambassador in Peking containing a message for the Prime Minister there.² The reply to that was rather vague. I believe, however, that perhaps our message had some slight effect in the sense that the Chinese Government did not reject the new proposals in an outright manner. They have criticized them of course but left some kind of a door open. It does appear that since this bombing started in Korea, the Chinese Government has stiffened somewhat in its attitude. Probably they are waiting to see what happens in the UN. The Chinese, unlike the Americans, do not act in a hurry. They think for long periods of time.

Personally, I think that the new proposals put forward by General Harrison³ may well serve as a basis for further discussion. But the Chinese appear to be convinced that the Americans are not sincere in what they say and only set out traps for them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 591-593.

3. Lt Gen. William K. Harrison Jr (1895-1987); UN Command representative at the truce negotiations in Panmunjon.

I. BILATERAL RELATIONS

PAKISTAN

1. Cable to Khwaja Nazimuddin¹

I have received your telegram 3148 of the 18th July about the communal disturbance which took place near Agartala few days ago.² When this news reached us, we asked for an immediate report from our Chief Commissioner³ in Tripura. It is evident that the reports which have reached you of this incident are greatly exaggerated. The correct facts are that there was a dispute over land between a local Muslim family and a Hindu refugee which resulted in a minor disturbance, a Hindu refugee being killed. This led to some tension in the area and some 30 small houses or huts belonging to Muslims were burnt. Immediate action was taken by the Chief Commissioner to re-establish law and order, and according to the latest reports about 50 Muslims who had left the area have now returned to their homes. My information is that, apart from the one Hindu refugee, no other person has been killed.

We are giving out a correct version of the incident in the Indian press. I greatly regret that highly exaggerated and misleading reports have appeared in Pakistan newspapers. According to information I have received, anti-Indian propaganda is being carried on in the neighbouring districts of East Pakistan, particularly in Akhora. I entirely agree with you that incidents of this kind which affect the peace and well-being of the minorities in both the countries should be effectively brought to an end. Highly coloured reports appearing in the press, however, tend to defeat this purpose, and create a sense of insecurity among the minority communities. I should be grateful, therefore, if steps could be taken to correct the exaggerated accounts of this minor disturbance which have appeared in the Pakistan press.

The situation is fully under control and we shall continue to take necessary action. I am sorry I cannot send Biswas⁴ now as he is piloting some Bills before Parliament here.⁵

1. New Delhi, 18 July 1952. JN Collection.
2. Nazimuddin had informed Nehru about a communal incident near Singerbeel aerodrome of Tripura in which 54 houses were said to have been burnt down and 500 houses looted. Several hundred families had fled to Akhora in East Bengal.
3. V. Nanjappa, ICS.
4. C.C. Biswas was the Minister for Minorities in the Government of India.
5. Nazimuddin urged Nehru to take effective steps to prevent recurrence of such incidents and to restore confidence in the minority community. He felt that an early joint tour of the affected areas by the two Ministers for Minorities was necessary and hoped Nehru would ask Biswas to immediately undertake this tour.

2. To Swaran Singh¹

New Delhi
July 21, 1952

My dear Swaran Singh,
Thank you for your letter of July 21st.

So long as we can supply electric power to Pakistan,² we should do so because we earn money by it. If we want that power ourselves, it is a different matter. Even so, it is better for us to stop the electric power at Pakistan's request than to be accused of having deprived them of it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. At the time of Partition, West Punjab in Pakistan was consuming 18,000 kW of electricity out of 30,000 kW generated at Joginder Nagar in East Punjab in India. Later power supply to West Punjab was reduced to 9,000 kW and further reduced to 6,000 kW in May 1952. Now the West Punjab Government requested the East Punjab Government to suspend its supply of electricity as soon as possible as West Punjab was understood to have developed its own electricity generating station. Swaran Singh said that power supply to Pakistan would be stopped in six months' time.

3. Cable to Mohan Sinha Mehta¹

On July 27th I sent you a telegram containing a message from me for Prime Minister Nazimuddin.² I presume this was conveyed to him. I have had no answer from him, nor has any acknowledgement come from you about it.

1. New Delhi, 8 August 1952. File No PI/52/6637/201, MEA. Mehta was the High Commissioner for India in Karachi.
2. Nehru sent a message to Nazimuddin on 27 July 1952 (not printed) enquiring about Abdul Ghaffar Khan's health who was arrested by Pakistan Government on 15 June 1948 for demanding Pakhtoonistan and autonomy for all provinces in Pakistan. He remained in Montgomery and Rawalpindi jails where his health deteriorated and he underwent a serious operation in a hospital in Lahore in April 1952. He was released from prison on 5 January 1954 but was interned in the Circuit House at Rawalpindi.

Please let me know what step you took and enquire from Prime Minister on my behalf again about Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's health which is causing us grave anxiety.

4. Passport Regulations¹

...5. I do not know exactly what restrictions Pakistan proposes to impose on the movements of Indians going to Pakistan.² We have every moral right to impose similar restrictions here. But this competition in imposing disabilities has usually worked to our disadvantage, because Pakistan always goes a few steps further or stricter. We have always to remember that in the Eastern Pakistan the minority community is likely to suffer because of this.

6. There is no great hurry about this matter. It is quite possible that the new passport regulations will not come into force for another two months or more. Even if they come into force earlier, no harm is likely to result if we delay any particular action for a short time. I should like to know precisely what the Pakistan restrictions are in East and West and how far we can apply some of them, so as not to come in the way of our own people in the Eastern zone.

7. The Foreigners Act (I write from memory) is an out-of-date and undesirable piece of legislation, which anyhow should be revised.³ What is necessary is that we should have the power under it to expel any foreigner, whoever he might be, and I would be prepared to include all citizens of Commonwealth countries. This cannot be done in the present Foreigners Act. This Act also imposes all kinds of troublesome restrictions on foreigners. I have often had complaints from Americans, who are quite harmless....

1. Note to Minister for Home Affairs, 16 August 1952. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. The Government of Pakistan decided in April 1952 that free movement between India and East Pakistan provided in the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of 1950 and the permit system which was then in force should be discontinued and that the traffic between the two countries should be regulated by a passport-cum-visa system. The Pakistan Government did not accept the suggestion of the Government of India that in the interest of the people of both the countries, the existing system should not be replaced. Renewed discussions took place between the Governments of India and Pakistan and in August 1952 the two Governments announced their passport and visa rules.

3. Under the Foreigners Act of 1946, there was no provision for an unrestricted right to expel a foreigner except on the ground of *mala fide* activities.

5. To Mohan Sinha Mehta¹

New Delhi
August 30, 1952

My dear Mohan Sinhaji,

On my return from Kashmir today I have received and read with interest your two letters dated 25th and 27th August.² Generally speaking, these confirm my own appraisal of the situation.³

In Kashmir there have been several acts of sabotage recently. These were undoubtedly committed or inspired by Pakistani agents. Indeed a number of such agents have been arrested. Our information is that a number of centres have been opened by the Pakistan authorities in West Punjab and the 'Azad Kashmir' areas especially to train people in sabotage. These people are then sent to Kashmir. There is no doubt that organized attempts were made to assassinate Shaikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad.

During the last few months there has been a certain relaxation in allowing people to come across the ceasefire line. Many of these were *bona fide* people, but together with them also came the mischief-makers.

I considered these matters with the civil and military authorities in Kashmir and we have decided to take strong steps to prevent infiltration and for internal security. We are practically going to seal the ceasefire line and special arrangements for internal security are being made.

There is always a danger of a discredited Government taking some military action to divert public attention. From the climatic point of view, however, this is unlikely after October. Anyhow, we should be vigilant.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Nehru sent these letters to Foreign Secretary. One of the letters contained a note on the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case. The note had been sent probably to the *New Statesman and Nation* among other papers. Nehru thought it might be worthwhile if some reference was made to this case in the Indian press and extracts given to the representatives of the Indian press without mentioning the source.

3. Pakistan was facing grave crisis because of political instability, failure of international policy and economic distress. There were reports of party squabbles among the Pakistani leaders in West and East Pakistan and general unrest among people.

6. Facilities for Transient Pakhtoons¹

So far as I can make out, the issue raised has not been fully considered by the Home Ministry. It has got rather mixed up with the larger issue of Pakhtoons in general or with some representation of the Afghan Ambassador.² It is true that all these matters rather overlap.³

2. What we are interested in is the political aspect of certain persons, who call themselves Pakhtoons and who were connected with the Red Shirt Movement in the Frontier and the tribal areas. These persons are in a peculiar position. The Pakistan Government looks upon them with extreme disfavour and in fact persecutes them.⁴ Their prominent leaders are still in prison. Some have died in prison, others are ill there. They have been there now for more than four years. These persons, who are faithful to those leaders, naturally do not have any friendly sentiments towards the Pakistan Government and look more towards India. We cannot help them in their internal affairs. But, if possible, we should facilitate their movements to India and back.

3. Some time ago, instructions were issued to our Deputy High Commissioner⁵ in Lahore to issue permits for India to these persons without requiring all the other formalities to be undergone. I presume this was done. The number thus concerned, I suppose, is fairly small. It would be a great hardship to them to deny them these facilities now, after the passport system comes into operation or to insist upon their taking either a Pakistan passport or an Indian passport. In either event their freedom of movement will be interfered with and they will be liable to much harassment. We owe it to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his old colleagues, who were our colleagues also, to give them such facilities as we can. Therefore, this question was raised some time back and some temporary expedient was found. With the coming of passport system, that particular expedient will not work and some other

1. Note to PPS, New Delhi, 19 September 1952. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Najibullah.

3. The Pakhtoonistan movement drew sympathy from neighbouring Afghanistan. The Afghan Government supported the Pakhtoon cause and in doing so it expected Pakistan to return those areas which the British Government had taken away from Afghanistan. Pakistan had rejected these demands.

4. The Pathans of the North West Frontier Province and tribal areas were restive. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Dr Khan Sahab and thousands of their followers were put behind the bars for having demanded the right of self-determination. Their Red Shirts' organization was disbanded and hundreds of Pathans were massacred near Charsadda in 1948. Despite imprisonments and secret trials, the Pakistan Government failed to subdue the Pathans.

5. S.K. Banerji.

method has to be thought out and given effect to. I am not quite clear what that method should be, but I have no doubt that ways and means could be found and should be found. It should not be difficult to indicate the names of people to whom these facilities should be given.

4. The other question applies to some residents of the Frontier Province or the tribal areas who normally live in India, chiefly in Bombay or Ahmedabad. In regard to them (barring a few who might come in the first category) some different rules might be applied. First of all they can choose Indian nationality, if they so wish and if we have no objection in any particular individual case. Secondly, they can choose Afghan nationality if they happen to be Afghans. Thirdly, they can choose Pakistan nationality.

5. Even so difficulty remains because some of them, who call themselves Pakhtoons, and who consider themselves nationals of what may vaguely be called Pakhtoonistan. Pakhtoonistan has no legal or constitutional existence. But the fact of an area there, chiefly tribal, where people do not consider themselves under Pakistan, remains. Their case certainly offers a difficulty. For the moment all I can suggest is that such cases should be dealt with separately and given some permits of residence, such as is done to Stateless persons.

6. Anyhow, I should like this matter to be considered from the point of view I have indicated. It does not help at all to point out the strictly legal position which is quite clear and is well known. We have to get over it, because of important political and other reasons. After all such things have happened in other countries often enough where people have been pushed out of their own State and have not adopted any other nationality.

7. I should like, therefore, for the Home Minister to consider this matter afresh from this point of view. I might mention that I had a brief talk with him today and he said that he will look into this....

8. This note should be sent to the Home Minister.

9. There is a certain urgency about this as the passport system is being introduced.

7. To Mohan Sinha Mehta¹

New Delhi

September 20, 1952

My dear Mohan Sinhaji,

I am sorry for the delay in answering your letter of the 6th September which

1. JN Collection. A copy was sent to Gopalaswami Ayyangar.

reached me just before I went to Indore. In this letter you refer to your meeting General Ayub Khan,² the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Land Forces.

The question of having a common defence policy between India and Pakistan has often been vaguely referred to. There is, therefore, nothing surprising in the talk you had with the General. Generally speaking, it is an obvious and natural thing for Pakistan and India to have a common defence policy and, if an approach is made to us, our answer can only be that we shall gladly consider this.

But the matter is not quite so simple as that. Defence policy depends very largely on foreign policy and involves, therefore, a common foreign policy. Pakistan's approach to foreign affairs is not very clear, and is very limited in outlook. In essence, Pakistan depends upon help from the UK and USA and occasionally threatens them with flirting with the Soviet. They cannot go very far publicly in their defence associations with the UK and USA because public feeling in Pakistan does not like it, neither does the Army or rather the junior officer element.

Pakistan's policy has largely revolved round Kashmir. For us Kashmir is an issue and nothing more, although it is an important issue. Our foreign policy does not depend upon Kashmir. It is obvious that there can hardly be any effective talk about common defence so long as the Kashmir issue remains unsolved, and in fact so long as there is Indo-Pakistan tension. The Kashmir issue itself is part of that tension and is not sole cause of it.

Thus there are many difficulties in the way. Nevertheless, even an approach of this kind is a hopeful sign and should not be repulsed.

There is another aspect of defence. In effect India is not really threatened by any country, except Pakistan. I am not at all nervous about what Russia or China can do to India. Indeed, Russia cannot act directly and China is hardly in a position to act across Tibet, and Himalayas, apart from our general friendly relations with her. The case of Pakistan is somewhat different. They might legitimately fear trouble on their north west frontier. A common defence policy would, therefore, involve us into underwriting Pakistan.

2. Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan (1907-1974); commissioned, 1928; commanded a battalion of British 14th Punjab Regiment in Burma during World War II and a brigade in NWFP in 1947; C-in-C, Pakistan, 17 January 1951-1954; Minister of Defence, Pakistan Government, 24 October 1954-August 1955; appointed Chief Martial Law Administrator, 8 August 1958; sworn in as Prime Minister on 27 October 1958 and immediately took over as President of Pakistan and Supreme Commander of Armed Forces; became Field Marshal, October 1959; defeated Fatima Jinnah in January 1965 in Presidential elections; led Pakistan in an armed attack on India, 1965; handed over power to Yahya Khan on 25 March 1969; wrote an autobiography entitled *Friends Not Masters* (1967).

Then there is the question of Afghanistan. We are very friendly with Afghanistan and have a good deal of sympathy with the Pakhtoons. Pakistan is on very bad terms with both.³ We would not like to line up against Afghanistan or the Pakhtoons.

I have pointed out to you all these difficulties which, for the moment, appear to me insuperable. I can quite understand the desire of senior Generals in Pakistan to have a common defence policy. I would welcome that chiefly because it means an ending of our various tensions and thus releasing energy in both countries for constructive work. It is not the common defence policy that is so important in my eyes as a real friendly settlement with Pakistan which removes the great burden from both of us and thus strengthens us separately as well as jointly, but the way to that does not appear to be easy at present. Some time or other it will have to come.

If you have the chance, you can certainly talk about these matters informally and without the least commitment. But please remember that if you raise this question, Pakistan is likely to think that we are weakening and are afraid of them and the result might well be a more aggressive attitude than now on the part of Pakistan. You have yourself said that the present Pakistan leaders are not strong enough to show courage. But nothing can be lost in our dealing with this question in a friendly way and showing our interest in it, provided we do not go too far and do not give an impression of overeagerness.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The issues of Afghan boundary and the Pathan right to self-determination became live issues after the birth of Pakistan. In July 1947, the Afghan Government wrote to the British Government demanding that the Pathans and the Baluchis also be given the choice of opting for independence or union with Afghanistan. But the British Government replied that the Frontier question had been settled and the Durand Line was recognized as the international boundary. The plebiscite to ascertain the will of the people gave the Pathans only the choice of voting for union with India or Pakistan. Though a majority voted for Pakistan, a boycott organized by Abdul Ghaffar Khan's followers was responsible for abstention of about forty-five per cent of the electorate. Pakistan-Afghan relations were dominated by the 'Pakhtoonistan' issue, and the agitation by the Pathans to establish a state of their own. In September 1947, when Pakistan became a member of the United Nations, the Afghan delegate cast the solitary vote against Pakistan's admission.

8. Treatment of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan¹

...9. I asked Mohammad Yunus² to give me a brief note about Abdul Ghaffar Khan which might be sent to our missions abroad. He has supplied me with such a note which I attach. This is not as full as I would have liked to have it, but it might serve its purpose for the time being.

10. In this matter I think that we might utilize Mohammad Yunus's services particularly. He is on leave now and is likely to join after a month. He should be attached to Headquarters for a month or so. I should like him to go then, for relatively brief periods, to some of our missions abroad, notably in the Muslim countries. Thus, he could be attached to our Indonesian Embassy for a month or two. He knows Indonesia and its leaders very well and from various other points of view also his visit there would be helpful in developing more intimate contacts.

11. After that he might be attached in the same way, for a couple of months or so, to our Embassy in Cairo. From there he could also visit some roundabout countries.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 22 September 1952. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Member, Indian Foreign Service, 1947-74. He was deputed to open an embassy in Iraq in 1952.

9. Cable to Mohan Sinha Mehta¹

Continuation of our telegram² of yesterday on passports. Rather critical situation has arisen in West Bengal owing to continuing influx of refugees from East

1. New Delhi, 12 October 1952. File No L/52/6568/202, MEA.
2. Not printed. Nehru had cabled on 11 October about seeing the correspondence on the introduction of passport system and Pakistan's request for its postponement by one month. He wrote that there was no delay on India's part, and West Bengal Government was anxious to introduce this system on 15 October as previously fixed. He added that the large influx of refugees had also caused much trouble and anxiety.

Pakistan.³ This is partly due to economic causes. But undoubtedly it is also due to scare caused by proposed introduction of passport system. If enforcement of passport system postponed⁴ now, this will merely prolong period of uncertainty and lead to continuation of large influx and crisis in West Bengal. Therefore the sooner this uncertainty is ended, the better. If the whole idea of passports was given up, uncertainty would end. But this does not appear feasible now at this late stage. Therefore it is better to adhere to date fixed.

Our information is that minority community in East Bengal is being harassed even more than previously and that Army personnel, Police and Ansars are harassing passengers by frequent searches even after checking by customs officials had been completed. Altogether very unsatisfactory situation has been created in East Bengal and mere postponement, for brief period, of introduction of passport system will mean continuation of this unsatisfactory condition and uncertainty. For this reason we are of opinion that passports should be introduced on previously fixed date, unless some major change of policy of giving them up is contemplated. West Bengal Government hold strong opinion on this subject. I propose to visit Calcutta on 18th October on my way to Assam.

3. There had been a heavy increase in the exodus of refugees from East Pakistan, the average being 1,000 a day by rail route alone. The proposed passport system and intimidation of the minorities were said to be the main causes of the new exodus which had been continuing on a large scale since 21 September.
4. Confronted with serious difficulties and developments in East Bengal where Muslim Government servants had threatened to resign as a protest against the introduction of passport system between India and Pakistan, the Pakistan Government had requested, on 11 October 1952, to the Government of India for its postponement by one month.

10. To Kailas Nath Katju¹

New Delhi
October 13, 1952

My dear Kailas Nath,

Your letter of the 13th October about conditions in East and West Bengal.²

1. JN Collection.
2. Katju had stated that due to an undercurrent of hostility towards them, the ten million refugees from East Bengal needed 'looking after'. Calcutta traders did not like their business to be disturbed and the youth of West Bengal thought that the refugees would raise the level of unemployment. He added that some refugees went back because the conditions in West Bengal became too difficult to bear, and not because of the restoration of security and civic rights in East Bengal.

I agree very largely with your analysis. But what exactly do you suggest? You say that we should finally make up our mind on this topic of human welfare. How should we make up our mind? Presumably by saying that we should welcome and provide for ten million people from eastern Pakistan. I am quite sure this is impossible and further that it will bring great misery to those ten million people. In fact we cannot do it, and if we attempt to do it, it would mean an upheaval everywhere and war with Pakistan, which itself will bring further misery on these people.

I do not think sentiment and sympathy by themselves are going to help in solving this problem. We have to face facts. Very often facts are very uncomfortable and ugly. All over Europe, for the last twenty years at least, there have been continuous migrations, vast numbers of displaced persons, Stateless persons, etc. Ultimately this led to a great war. Apart from the terrible destruction and misery caused by that great war, a new lot of displaced persons appeared in large numbers.

The real difficulty is that the Hindus of East Bengal were not and are not tough enough.

We are passing through a difficult period with Pakistan and there is no absolute solution of this problem till the major difficulty of our relations with Pakistan is solved by war or peace. One thing is certain that if there is war, the first sufferers will be these very people, whatever the ultimate outcome may be.

I am quite sure that if people on our side had behaved and calmly faced the situation, we would have been in a position to exercise very great influence in regard to the Hindus in East Bengal. Our own people have misbehaved often enough and it becomes difficult then to exercise the right influence on the other side.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

11. To Mohan Sinha Mehta¹

New Delhi
October 14, 1952

My dear Mohan Sinhaji,

... As for what you have written about the failure of our trade talks with

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

Pakistan,² I am not in a position to judge of them as I do not know all the facts.³ But I agree with you that the approach both of India and Pakistan is so full of fear and suspicion that we are often unable to see where our advantage lies. I am sending a copy of your letter to the Commerce Minister and also to the Finance Minister and I shall await their reactions.

Today the Pakistan High Commissioner⁴ brought me a message from his Prime Minister requesting me to postpone the introduction of the passport system.⁵ It was quite impossible for us to reverse engines at the last moment. If we did that, there would be upheaval in West Bengal with possibly unforeseen consequences. We had to go ahead and I informed Nazimuddin accordingly. But we have agreed to relax many rules for some little time so as to avoid inconvenience as far as possible.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. The Indo-Pakistan Trade Agreement was extended in July for a month. On 5 August a new trade pact between India and Pakistan was signed in Delhi. It did not however cover jute and coal.
3. Mehta had written on 11 October 1952 that the trade talks between India and Pakistan held in July-August were a failure. He felt that though the economies of both the countries were complementary to each other, prejudice, suspicion and perhaps silly notions of prestige often involved them in needless conflict. He cited examples of how trade in jute, coal and sugar was hampered due to the trade policies working against the interests of both the countries. Mehta wrote that, instead of providing markets for each other's produce, both India and Pakistan turned to far-off countries, incurring huge expenses in their times of need, because of wrong policies. He found the whole approach absurd and suicidal and felt that statesmanship on both sides should prevail. He also requested the matter to be discussed with the Commerce Minister on these lines.
4. Mohammed Shuaib Qureshi was the Pakistan's High Commissioner in India.
5. On 11 October 1952, the Government of Pakistan suggested to the Indian High Commissioner in Karachi that the introduction of passport system should be postponed for a month. The Government of India rejected the suggestion and the system came into effect from 15 October 1952.

12. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
October 14, 1952

My dear T.T.,

I am sending you copy of a letter I have received from our High Commissioner

1. JN Collection.



WITH SIR ALEXANDER CLUTTERBUCK, BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, NEW DELHI, 13 OCTOBER 1952



WITH H.C. MUKHERJI AND P.C. SEN AT CALCUTTA AIRPORT, 18 OCTOBER 1952

at Karachi. I have a feeling that there is something in what he says. I am not in a position to judge these matters as I have not got all the data, but I do have a feeling that fear and suspicion play far too great a part in our deals with Pakistan. In the natural course of affairs, we should have a large trade with Pakistan to our mutual advantage.

If you think it worthwhile for our High Commissioner to explore possibilities, please let me know what you would like him to do. He is respected in Karachi and he can probably speak to higher authorities than the representatives of Pakistan who come here.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. Postponement of the Passport System¹

Your High Commissioner has conveyed to me your message of today's date to which I have given careful consideration. As you know, we were not anxious to introduce a passport system between India and Pakistan. It was at the desire of the Pakistan Government that we agreed to do so.² Since then very complicated arrangements have been made and a course of action has been set in motion. Detailed instructions have been sent. The public has also been led to believe that this will begin on a certain specified date. After giving full consideration to this matter we felt that any postponement at this stage would create grave difficulties, far greater than those which we might have to face now, and produce a feeling of uncertainty in the public which itself would have a very bad effect. We felt, therefore, unable to agree to postponement and informed our High Commissioner in Karachi immediately of our decision.

I am sure that our High Commissioner could not have committed our Government in any way before he received our instructions. He may have said

1. Message for Khwaja Nazimuddin, Prime Minister of Pakistan, New Delhi, 14 October 1952. JN Collection.
2. The introduction of a passport-cum-visa system of travel between India and Pakistan was originally pressed for by the Pakistan Government and India was requested to be ready for its introduction by 1 September 1952, but at India's instance Pakistan agreed to put it off to 15 October. Arrangements for the introduction of the system were completed on India's side by 7 October.

that we might be agreeable to accept the proposal for postponement. He was not aware of all the steps that have been taken and the arrangements already made which could not be reversed at this late stage.

We have always been anxious to interpret as liberally as possible the decisions or arrangements arrived at in this connection. I am sure that with the friendly cooperation of both countries there should be no difficulty. Undoubtedly, to begin with there may be some confusion and inconvenience.

So far as the railway steamer and other transport services are concerned, we are issuing specific instructions that greatest care should be taken not to cause dislocation and to permit their personnel free entry and exit even if they do not conform to all the regulations laid down. In regard to the general public also, every attempt will be made to avoid inconvenience, and instructions have been issued accordingly.³

3. Nazimuddin replied to Nehru expressing surprise at India's disinclination to accept postponement of the passport system.

14. Discussions with the Editors¹

N.K. Ghosh: Newspapers in Calcutta are greatly handicapped by the Joint Press Code.² They cannot publish full accounts of oppressions of the Hindus in East Pakistan; whereas the press in East Pakistan carry all sorts of fabricated stories of wholesale massacre of Muslims in India, particularly in West Bengal.

1. Minutes of an informal meeting with the editors in Calcutta, 18 October 1952. File No L/52/6568/202, MEA. The following attended: George Powell (*The Statesman*), N.K. Ghosh (*Amrita Bazar Patrika*), M.N. Roy (*Hindusthan Standard*), Vivekananda Mukherjee (*Jugantar*), C.K. Bhattacharya (*Ananda Bazar Patrika*), B. Sen Gupta (United Press of India), G. Chakravarti (*Lok Sevak*), Sailen Roy (*Advance*), S.K. Mitra (*Janasevak*), B. Ghatak (*Dainik Basumati*), S.K. Chatterjee (*Swadhinata*), J.C. Himkar (*Jagriti*), G. Misra (*Sanmarg*), H.S. Dwivedi (*Nav Bharat Times*), A.S. Mahilabadi (*Rozana Hind*), S.M. Sabri (*Al Huq*) and N.K. Ghosh (Press Trust of India).
2. A joint session of Indian and Pakistani Newspaper Editors' Conference was held in the first week of May 1950 at New Delhi when the editors agreed not to do propaganda against either country or publish stories inciting war or suggesting its inevitability.

Jawaharlal Nehru: The impression that I have gathered is that the Calcutta newspapers are not following any particular code. In fact, they are only inciting the people. I do not ask you to suppress the truth, but even facts should be presented in a way that they assuage and not incite feelings. I have also noticed with some dismay a tendency of describing the entire population of a country as evil-doers and of condemning particular countries *en bloc*. For instance, newspapers in USA regard Russians and Chinese as embodiments of evil. Similarly, Communist countries consider Britain or the US as a devil incarnate. Because some people in Pakistan are behaving badly, it is all wrong to condemn the country as a whole.

C.K. Bhattacharya:³ This renewed exodus of the Hindus from East Pakistan is the outcome of the policy of denuding Pakistan of the Hindus. This policy is being persistently followed by Pakistan ever since she came into being.

JN: I do not know what is Pakistan's policy, but it is a fact that the Hindus are migrating in large numbers from East Pakistan.⁴ That is not disputed. The point is—what is the solution? Some people say that war is the only solution, I do not think so. A responsible person cannot think of a war without thinking of the consequences which follow a war. War does not solve a problem. We have seen in our life-time that only after a few years of the First World War, a Second World War had to be fought, and today when the scars of the Second World War still remain to be healed up there is again talk of an impending third world war. If war is thrust on us by Pakistan, for example, if she attacks in Kashmir or any other part of India, we must fight that out and we are ready for it. But India will not go to war of her own volition, because she does not believe that any problem can be solved by war. Leaving principles apart, even from a commonsense point of view, India should not go to war with Pakistan. India is no doubt stronger than Pakistan—her industrial resources are larger and military strength greater. But she is not so overwhelmingly strong as to finish Pakistan as if by one single stroke or in a trice. In a war

3. (b. 1901); editor, *Ananda Bazar Patrika*, 1944-59, Editor-in-Chief, *Jana-Sevak* (Calcutta), 1961-65; Dean, Faculty of Journalism, Calcutta University, 1954-75; Member, Lok Sabha, 1957- December 1970; member, Press Council of India, 1966-67; author of *Congress in Evolution*, *Radcliffe Award—a case for revision* and a few books in Bengali.

4. In eight days ending 7 October 1952, 72,934 non-Muslims had arrived from East Pakistan into West Bengal by railway through Banagaon-Darsame and Banagaon-Benapore routes as against 56,651 who left, causing a net influx of 16,283. Of the 9,000 odd non-Muslims who had been arriving in West Bengal daily, a substantial portion was migrants. During the first week of October, 22,738 Muslims went to East Bengal and in the same period 25,931 Muslims came into West Bengal.

between India and Pakistan, India will win—I have not the slightest doubt on that point, but it will not be anything like the Hyderabad operation. Victory will be achieved after a lot of destruction and misery, and then new problems will arise out of them. Any sensible person must dismiss the idea of declaring war with Pakistan, or for that matter with any other country.

Two other alternatives have been suggested to me. One is exchange of population between East Bengal and West Bengal.⁵ Assuming that it was possible, I fail to see how that will solve the problem. West Bengal, even after driving all the Muslims away, will not have enough space to absorb all the Hindus coming from across the border. We shall then have to throw out the Muslims from Bihar and possibly from UP and other States also. If the entire Muslim population of India, nearly forty millions, are sent out, Pakistan will raise a claim for adequate territory to rehabilitate these Muslims.

Another suggestion has been made that India should ask for more territory from Pakistan for the Hindus who are now being squeezed out from there.⁶ Many of you are, perhaps, not aware that a constant migration of Muslims from India to West Pakistan through Rajasthan has been taking place for the last two years. On average, nearly five hundred Muslims are leaving India every day through various routes on the western border without any permit, passport or visa. Once we ask for more territory from Pakistan for resettling the Hindus, she, in her turn, will also put forward similar claim for territory from India for these Muslim migrants to West Pakistan.

M.N. Roy:⁷ Can we not apply economic sanctions against Pakistan? That course has been suggested by the united organization of all political parties, excepting the Communists, in West Bengal.

5. The Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha on 13 October 1952 expressed the view that the time had come when the demand for transfer of population between India and Pakistan should be made openly.
6. On 11 October 1952, N.C. Chatterjee, vice-president of the Hindu Mahasabha, in a statement described the grim situation in West Bengal due to the influx from East Pakistan and called upon the Government: "Either our Government should secure that sense of security which will make it possible for the minority community to live in East Pakistan or there should be a demand made for adequate land or transfer of population."
7. Manindra Narayan Roy; was involved in Kakori Conspiracy Case, 1924; Assistant Editor, *Hindusthan Standard* at this time; President, Indian Journalists Association and Indian Federation of Working Journalists for some time.

JN: Yes. A copy of a resolution⁸ adopted in their meeting has been forwarded to me. Of course we can apply economic sanctions. Any nation is entitled to do so without a reference to the UNO. But before applying these sanctions, we must make ourselves sure that these sanctions are going to achieve the desired results. The trade between India and Pakistan is not of such dimension as to justify any hope of putting Pakistan into trouble by the imposition of economic sanctions. Each country is in a position to carry on without depending on the other. The main items of import, as far as India is concerned, are jute and cotton. We are now almost self-sufficient in jute and, as for cotton, though we may have to pay a little more, we can keep our mills running by resorting to imports from Egypt and other places. Pakistan depends on India mainly for coal and cotton textiles. By refusing to export these commodities to Pakistan, in the first instance, we will create some problems for ourselves because there will be accumulation at pit-heads and factory godowns. Withholding our exports will not bring a collapse of Pakistan, for she will be able to get these commodities from outside—textiles from UK and probalby from Japan; fuel from Australia and South Africa—although she may have to pay, comparatively, the highest prices. Economic sanctions therefore will not solve the problem of the Hindus in East Pakistan.

B. Sen Gupta:⁹ When the country was divided, we hoped that there would be no cause of further friction between Hindus and Muslims. But it now seems that Pakistan will continue to be inimical towards India.

JN: I think Pakistan is disintegrating. There is not one single personality there who commands respect and support from all sections. There are intrigues and all sorts of internal dissensions and squabbles. Her economic difficulties are also becoming increasingly acute. A section of the mass has already become critical of the Government. One of the tactics of the leaders of Pakistan is to divert the discontent within the country towards India by raising all sorts of false cries. Sometimes they talk of *jehad* in Kashmir, at another time, they

8. At a public meeting held in Calcutta, under the auspices of eleven opposition parties, a resolution was passed demanding the imposition of economic sanctions and severance of trade relations with East Pakistan. S.P. Mookerjee said at the meeting that a united demand by the people that strong steps be taken to compel Pakistan to look after her minorities properly could not go unheeded.
9. (1889-1967); joined *Bengalee* in 1918 and later *Free Press of India* which in 1933 along with other newspapers like *Servant* formed the United Press of India.

complain of India having stopped their canal waters, etc. We must not play into their hands. If we apply economic sanctions, for example, Pakistan leaders will immediately attribute all the sufferings and miseries of the people in Pakistan to India's hostile action. The wrath of the people which otherwise could have fallen on the Government there would then be directed against us.¹⁰

M.N. Roy: Sir, to whom will the East Bengal Hindus look forward to? Whose responsibility are they?

JN: Technically, it is obvious that they must look forward to the Government of Pakistan. They are citizens of Pakistan and, legally speaking, their welfare cannot be the responsibility of the Government of India. But we do not take that legalistic view. Until recently they had been part and parcel of the Indian nation and we do feel for them and will certainly do whatever we can to help them in their hour of distress.

G. Chakravarti: You must have seen a news item appearing in the newspapers yesterday that a Hindu woman was molested under the pretext of carrying out a search by the Pakistan military personnel. What steps have the Government of West Bengal and the Government of India taken to ensure that similar unfortunate incidents do not recur?

JN: I could not tell you that. In fact, I have not seen any news item to that effect. I do not read all the newspapers. If there has been any incident like that, I am sure the Government of West Bengal would have taken due note of that.

M.N. Roy: We would like to know from the Prime Minister, if we may, what steps does the Government of India propose to take to solve this problem? Has the Government of India any plan?

JN: To think of a remedy, one must have patience. The matter is complicated and cannot be solved by any easy methods. By being impatient and trying to think of a quick and easy solution, we will probably complicate it further and make it beyond redemption. If I may use a metaphor, when the patient is suffering from a serious illness, the wisest course is to go through

10. In fact, the Opposition leader, H.S. Suhrawardy, pointedly asked on 20 February 1953: "Has it become necessary for Mr Nazimuddin once more to excite the people with anti-Indian sentiments in order to bolster up his tottering regime, and divert the attention of the people from the immediate problems?"

the scientific system of medical treatment which may be a dilatory process. In their anxiety for quick results if the relations of the patient go to a quack, chances are that the disease will take a more serious turn and the patient will die.

Vivekananda Mukherjee:¹¹ The general impression in the public mind is that the Government of India always bows down before Pakistan and follows a policy of appeasement.

JN: These are mere strong words which do not signify anything in substance. If you read the newspapers published from West Pakistan, you will see that they accuse their Government of weakness and timidity. They complain that the Pakistan Government yields to the Government of India in every matter.

N.K. Ghosh: Newspapers in Pakistan are on warpath.

JN: I do not know much about the newspapers in East Pakistan. But I see some of the newspapers in West Pakistan and they do really keep on inciting violence.

C.K. Bhattacharya: We are sorry spectators of a grim tragedy in which the Hindus of East Bengal, who have been in the vanguard of all progressive movements, are being gradually exterminated.

JN: I do agree with you that the Hindus of East Bengal have taken prominent part in all progressive movements of their country not only in the political but also in educational and social spheres. Every Indian is proud of them. It is a pity that Pakistan is wasting this valuable material. By squeezing out the Hindus, Pakistani leaders are making their own country poorer. But I do not agree with you that the East Bengal Hindus are being exterminated. Spirit is indestructible. Although individuals may suffer or even die, the outlook and spirit of the people can never perish. As you know, the Industrial Revolution in England was possible mainly because of the refugees from France. I am sure the displaced persons from East Bengal who are coming over to India will also prove an asset to this country.

11. (b. 1904); jointed *Ananda Bazar Patrika*, 1925; Editor, *Jugantar*, 1937-62, *Basumati* (Calcutta), 1963-70; Chief Editor, *Satajug*, 1972, and *Bha Katha* since 1986; was President of Indian Journalists' Association of Calcutta five times; wrote books on international politics and World War II, and also poems; awarded Padma Bhushan, 1970.

B. Sen Gupta: Will you be visiting Calcutta again on your way back from Assam?

JN: I am afraid, not possible. I was too much tied on to my desk in Delhi and immediately after Parliament rose, I decided to go round as many States as possible. My programme at the moment is very tight. On my return from Assam, I will be able to spend only a few days in Delhi after which I will be visiting Madhya Pradesh. With the next session of Parliament almost round the corner, I am afraid it will not be possible for me to be in Calcutta again although I would have loved to do so. But I can assure you, if any emergency arises, I will not hesitate to cancel all other engagements and rush to Calcutta.

C.K. Bhattacharya: It would have been a good thing if you had visited the refugees at Sealdah and other border stations.

JN: I had hardly any time. As you know, the whole of this afternoon, I have been meeting officials, Ministers and prominent political leaders. But I sent my daughter to the Sealdah station.¹² I know the refugees are having a very tough time. I am sorry for them. My sympathies are always with them. I am trying to do whatever I can for them. My friend and colleague, Ajit Prasad Jain, is here and you can depend on him. He will do all that is possible for helping the migrants.

12. At Sealdah station, more than 5,000 refugees were awaiting transit to work centres.

UNITED KINGDOM

1. Proposal for Commonwealth Conference¹

Question: Are you likely to attend the Commonwealth Conference in London, about which there is a newspaper report?²

Jawaharlal Nehru: I do not even know that there is going to be a Commonwealth Conference. When these newspapers carry reports of this kind, I really don't know what to say about them. This report says that Mr Churchill has invited me, and I have declined that invitation. Well, there is just enough truth in them to make it difficult for me to straight off deny them. But these reports, I can say, were incorrect. It has become difficult to go about in these matters. When some proposal is made about a conference to be held some time, it comes to us in the normal course. We say it is not a suitable date. This thing goes on. There is nothing more; there is no question of invitation or acceptance or rejection or anything of that sort.

1. Remarks at a press conference, New Delhi, 24 July 1952. From PIB report. Extracts. For other parts of press conference, see pp. 149, 238-253, 583-584, 637-638, 660-663 and 665-666.
2. A report of 22 July 1952 published in the newspapers stated that Nehru had declined an invitation from the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Economic Conference in November 1952 because of his inability to leave India.

2. Participation in Commonwealth Economic Conference¹

You will remember that nearly a month ago I received a message from Mr Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of the UK, containing a proposal for a Commonwealth Economic Conference in London in the second half of November. You must have seen the message I received from Mr Churchill and my reply to him.²

2. In the second half of November we are bound to have Parliament in session. I could not possibly leave then and I do not think any other Minister could go. Indeed, the only other Minister perhaps who might have gone is the

1. Note for the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Finance Minister, 24 July 1952. JN Collection.
2. See *Selected Works* (second series) Vol. 18, p. 584.

Finance Minister and he has a heavy burden to carry during the sessions of Parliament as well as at other times.

3. But, apart from the question of convenience and timing, I did not like to be associated with this particular type of conference. It was not a normal financial or economic conference of Commonwealth countries, although it is confined to those countries. It seemed to me clearly an extension on the economic front of the Atlantic Pact³ and, to some extent, the cold war that is going on. Another aspect of it appeared to be (a Churchill idea) of an imperial economic policy.⁴ Thus, on the one hand, such a conference might make the cleavages between the so-called East and West sharper and, on the other hand, build up some kind of a Commonwealth (this was called Imperial in the old days of Ottawa) bloc to stand up to some extent to the USA.

4. In terms of UK politics, this would represent not the normal non-partisan attitude which has been taken up at Prime Ministers' Conference but a definite Conservative policy which probably would be opposed by the Labour Opposition in the UK. Because of these and other considerations, I felt that we should keep away from this conference and not get entangled in these international conflicts.

5. In these conferences, Australia and New Zealand function very much in the orbit of the UK. South Africa goes many steps further, while Canada adopts an attitude of benevolent neutrality. Our position does not fit in with any of these. Issues are raised which are controversial issues in our own Parliament.

6. I sent a reply to Mr Winston Churchill expressing my regret to accept the invitation. I laid stress on our Parliament being in session then. I said, however, that we would be glad to send an observer if the conference was held. I used the word "observer" deliberately because I did not wish a Minister to go or anyone else to participate fully in the conference.

7. I have today received another message from Mr Churchill together with a draft statement which he proposes to make in the House of Commons on the 29th of this month. As I am not attending this conference, I can have little to say about his statement. But there is a reference to India in his statement which does not represent our attitude correctly. He has put me in the same category as the Prime Minister of South Africa and said that, because of personal difficulties, we could not attend the conference but that our countries will be

3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization was an alliance formed in 1949 by 12 countries to protect the western world against possible Soviet aggression. It also sought to encourage economic and social cooperation among its member States.
4. An agreement by the dominions of Commonwealth countries was concluded at a conference held at Ottawa in 1932 by which Imperial Preference, i.e., advantages in tariff rates discriminating against non-empire countries, was to be adopted.

represented. In this statement also a reference is made to "the constructive approach to the economic problems of the free world." I feel that this might be misunderstood.

8. It is also suggested that preparatory discussions among officials should take place from the 22nd September onwards, that is, for more than two months before the actual conference begins. I do not think that it is desirable for our officials to be entangled in this business.

9. I am sending you the old and new papers for reference. These include:

- (1) Mr Churchill's original message of the 27th June to me,
- (2) My reply of the 5th July,
- (3) Mr Churchill's brief acknowledgement of the 12th July, and
- (4) the latest message of Mr Churchill to me received today, together with,
- (5) the text of his proposed statement in the House of Commons.

10. I have to send a reply in the course of the next three days at the most. I should like you to give thought to this matter, so that we can have a talk about it later.

3. Cable to Winston Churchill¹

I thank you for your personal message which your Acting High Commissioner² delivered to me on the 24th July. With this message, he also gave me the draft of the statement which you propose to make in the House of Commons on the 29th July.

In my reply dated 5th July to your previous message, I stated that for a number of reasons I regretted that I was unable to accept your invitation to a conference in November next. Those reasons and others would also prevent any other Minister from India from attending the conference. I suggested, however, that we might send an observer to the conference to keep us in touch with the proceedings there so that we might be able to take such action for our mutual good as our Parliament might approve of.

1. New Delhi, 27 July 1952. JN Collection.

2. J.J.S. Garner.

In the statement that you propose to make in the House of Commons, it is stated that the Prime Ministers of South Africa and India would have special difficulty in attending the conference but that their countries would be represented. I am afraid that it will not be possible for us to be represented at the conference, though, as I have said, we shall gladly send an observer. I do not know the reasons which prevent the Prime Minister of South Africa from attending this conference, but I take it that they are different from those that have led us to come to this decision. In many matters, as you know, the outlook and policies of the Government of the Union of South Africa and of India widely differ and for the two countries to be mentioned together in this context might lead to misunderstanding.

In the proposed statement there is reference to the economic problems of the "free world".³ Every constructive approach to economic problems is of course to be welcomed. But may I suggest that the reference to the free world in this connection brings in an approach which might lead to controversy. While it is inevitable that countries which have common policies should cooperate in the largest measure, a larger cooperation might not be ruled out wherever this is possible. It has been our policy, which we have gladly continued, to maintain close trade and economic relations with the United Kingdom and the other countries of the Commonwealth. But we have endeavoured to maintain good relations and contacts with many countries outside the Commonwealth also, including some countries which are supposed to be outside the free world. We have felt that this approach might prove helpful for peace and the other great causes which you and we and the Commonwealth stand for.

I have ventured to mention this aspect because I feel that you will appreciate my telling you of how we feel about these matters. I can assure you that, within the limits of the general policy which we pursue, in accordance with the directions of our Parliament, we shall cooperate to the best of our ability in the solution of financial and economic problems which confront the Commonwealth and the world.

3. This reference was modified in the version of 29 July 1952 which read: "It was our hope that out of such discussions we could work towards a constructive approach to economic problems which beset the world."

4. Cable to B.G. Kher¹

Please refer to my telegram 21333 of 27th July. A copy of my message to Churchill was given to Acting High Commissioner for the UK in Delhi. He has pointed out that the Conference is of such significance for all members of the sterling area that it might give rise to misunderstanding if it were to be announced to the world that one of the most important members would not be represented at the Conference and would merely send an observer. He has suggested that it might be unnecessary at this stage to be precise about the exact form of Indian representation and that it would perhaps meet the case if the announcement were to say something to the effect that "the Indian Government have agreed to make appropriate arrangements for India's participation." We have informed him that in the context of the other suggestions I have made in my message to Churchill, we would have no objection to the form of words he has suggested being used. The Acting High Commissioner is communicating this to his Government. This is for your information.

1. New Delhi, 28 July 1952. JN Collection.

5. Britain's Recruitment of Gurkhas¹

...After going through these papers, it is clear to me that, after the preliminary agreement with the UK Government and Nepal, the matter was never referred to me.² We had agreed, "as a temporary measure", to permit the UK Government to recruit Gurkhas on Indian soil near the border. After that this

1. Note to S.N. Haksar, New Delhi, 5 August 1952. JN Collection. Extracts. S.N. Haksar was Joint Secretary and Controller-General of Emigration in the Ministry of External Affairs.
2. By a Tripartite Agreement, signed on 9 November 1947, Britain, Nepal and India agreed to the continued employment of Gurkha officers and men in the Indian Army and the HMG Gurkha Regiment, subject to the individual wish of each man in service being ascertained through a referendum. After the referendum the British got four regiments of 20,000 Gurkha officers and men, whereas India inherited six regiments of 75,000.

conversion of a temporary measure to something much more permanent, and in fact to leasing out of property for a long period and the construction of buildings on behalf of the UK, was never referred to us. The Defence Ministry should not have agreed to this without reference to External Affairs. It raises important political issues and in fact is opposed to our basic policy.

It is highly likely that the Nepal Government in the near future may denounce the Tripartite Agreement and express their disapproval of any of their nationals joining the British Army. We shall then be put in a difficulty and we cannot possibly permit Nepalese nationals to be recruited in India by the British when the Nepal Government itself has expressed its disapproval of this. Apart from this, recruitment for a foreign army on Indian soil is, on the face of it, objectionable.

Will you please inform me as to whether Gurkhas who are Nepalese nationals are recruited for the Indian Army at these same depots at Jalapahar and Lebra, or elsewhere? If they are recruited in the same places, do we have a completely separate establishment, buildings, etc., there, or do we have some kind of a joint establishment with the UK?

I should like to have some figures from Defence about the recruitment of Gurkhas in the Indian Army during the last five years, if that is possible. Also figures of disbandment of any Gurkha units in the Indian Army during this period. How many units have we got now? We were supposed to have twelve such units or battalions.

Presumably, the British had eight battalions and no more.

6. To Sucheta Kripalani¹

New Delhi

August 7, 1952

My dear Sucheta,²

You will remember that, in the course of the debate on the Demands for External Affairs, you said something about the recruitment of Gurkhas by foreign officers on Indian soil. I interrupted to say that this was not true and something further about Nepal, as an independent country, coming to an agreement with the UK Government.³

1. JN Collection.

2. A KMPP member in the House of the People.

3. On 12 June 1952, Nehru refuted, in the House of the People, Sucheta Kripalani's contention that the Government of India had given facilities to the British Government to recruit eight Gurkha battalions on Indian soil.

I looked into this matter subsequently and found that I had made an incorrect statement. I am very sorry for this. I was not aware at the time of some developments that had taken place subsequently. All I remembered was the original agreement which was principally between the Governments of the UK and Nepal, in which we were concerned in a somewhat minor degree.

Having made these inquiries, I hope to make a statement in the House placing the facts tomorrow morning.⁴ I have informed the Speaker of this.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

4. Not printed. On 8 August 1952, Nehru clarified that an agreement had been made with the British Government in May 1947 to enable them to recruit Gurkhas.

7. To B.G. Kher¹

New Delhi
August 9, 1952

My dear Kher,

...As for the Economic Conference that is proposed to be held in London in November next, we have already taken up a definite stand in regard to it and it is not our intention to send any proper representative. The whole timing and purpose behind this Conference appeared to be wrong from our point of view. It seemed an extension on the economic side of the Atlantic Pact and we want to have nothing to do with the Atlantic Pact on the political, military or economic side. Secondly, this Conference appeared to be some kind of a modern version of the old Ottawa agreements furthering Imperial Preference. With that too we do not wish to get involved. The idea of this Conference appears to have been particularly that of Churchill, probably inspired by the Beaverbrook² clan.

In the Prime Ministers' Conferences, we have thus far played an important part on the political plane and even influenced the other Commonwealth countries. But as things developed, the contrast between our policy and the

1. JN Collection. Extracts. A copy of this letter was sent to the Cabinet Secretary.
2. Maxwell Beaverbrook (1879-1964); British newspaper proprietor and Conservative Party member, he campaigned for free trade within the British empire, and his newspapers, *Daily Express* and *Evening Standard*, were used as propaganda organs in this cause; he was Minister of Information in 1915 and served in Churchill's Coalition Government in 1945-50.

policy laid down more or less by the US becomes more and more marked. It is extraordinary how the US almost orders about European countries now as if they were of some kind of semi-colonial status. However, if and when a Prime Ministers' Conference on the political level is held, I shall certainly try to attend.

The British policy is in a hopeless muddle, both foreign and domestic. But for the bright patch in India, they have made a grievous mess in the Middle East by backing the wrong people always.³ In this matter there has been little to choose between the Labour Government and the present Government. Indeed I am inclined to think that Eden has more understanding than Bevin had.⁴ He inherited a bad situation and cannot easily get out of it.

We have long been thinking that we should not wait much longer before we sent our Ambassador to Egypt. The fall of Farouk made us come to the decision that we should take some immediate steps soon, and not worry too much about the designation of the King of Egypt. Some time previously we had addressed the Egyptian Government on the question of Sudan in a friendly way and made our position quite clear. We informed the Acting UK High Commissioner here about our intention to ask for an agreement from Egypt. He told us that his Government were making some fresh proposals to the Egyptian Government. They would very much like us to hold our hands for the present. We agreed to do so. This was a week ago. I suppose that in the course of another three or four days we shall know finally what the result of the UK approach in Egypt has been.

I am not at all surprised at the cordiality of your reception in London from all kinds of persons. Indeed I was sure of it for two reasons. One is that there is genuine friendliness for India and the second is, well, yourself. It is rather odd that on the whole our relations with the UK are in some ways more friendly than those of almost any other country. They have behaved decently towards us during these past five years and I think they appreciate that we have behaved decently towards them and not tried to take advantage of their difficulties, which are very great. Indeed, I have great sympathy for England in her present plight.

3. The advent of Mossadeq in Iran, who was an anglophobe, after the murder of General Ali Razmara on 7 March 1951; the assassination of the pro-British King Abdullah of Jordan on 20 July 1951; General Nguib's military coup in Egypt on 22 July 1952 and the continued deadlock over the oil nationalization issue in Iran were serious setbacks for Britain in the Middle East.
4. Ernest Bevin was Foreign Secretary in the post-War Labour Government, when he contributed to the formation of the NATO. Anthony Eden succeeded him as Foreign Secretary in a Conservative Government.

You may have learnt about a statement I made in Parliament on the subject of British recruitment of Gurkha soldiers. More than five years ago we came to an agreement called the Tripartite Agreement between the UK, India and Nepal. We made it clear that no Indian nationals could be recruited. Nepal was willing and anxious, for economic reasons, to have her Gurkhas recruited by the British. We did not wish to come in the way. Our part of the business consisted only of allowing free transit and some other ordinary facilities. As a temporary measure, we agreed that this recruitment might take place in the existing depots on Indian soil near the Nepal border. After that, I lost sight of this matter, and I was under the impression that no British recruitment was taking place on Indian soil. To my surprise, I have discovered only now that our Defence Ministry has not only been permitting this but encouraging it. Indeed they leased out some land and put up some building. Their view was that it is better to keep the British Officers on this side of the border and not go to Nepal. There was something in that. On the other hand, it is very extraordinary for any independent country to allow recruitment by a foreign country on its soil, and now that this matter has come out, there will be constant criticism. We shall have to put an end to it. We do not want to do so suddenly, but some hint has to be thrown out to this effect. We shall get in touch with the Nepal Government first.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. Right Ends through Right Means¹

On this fifth anniversary of our Independence we remember the trials and difficulties of these five years, our achievements and our lack of achievement. We remember above all that day, five years ago, when the United Kingdom and India set an example of peaceful and cooperative settlement of a difficult and complicated problem which had previously given rise to long continued conflict and all the unhappiness and bitterness that came in its train, and yet by a stroke of statesmanlike wisdom that conflict was ended without bitterness and in friendship. For that the credit goes to both these great countries. We set

1. Independence Day message cabled to the High Commissioner for India in the UK on 14 August 1952. File No 2(430)/49-PMS.

an example not only of doing the right thing, but doing it in the right way, and thus we followed the great teaching of the founder of our nation, Mahatma Gandhi, who always laid stress on right means.

2. Because both our countries ultimately adopted right means, right results have flowed without giving rise to new problems between us and we have continued as free nations bound together by friendly cooperation in a new type of partnership which is based not on legal or constitutional formulae, but on goodwill and freedom.

3. On this day I send my greeting to our countrymen abroad and to the people of the United Kingdom who have come nearer to us since the old enforced bonds were broken. We have tremendous problems to face in our own country as in the world. Those problems can only be solved by peaceful, constructive and cooperative effort aiming at right ends through right means. We have endeavoured to the best of our ability to follow the path of peace and in this quest of peace we look forward to the full cooperation of the people of the United Kingdom.

9. To T.T. Krishnamachari¹

New Delhi
August 15, 1952

My dear T.T.,

Your letter of the 14th August about the differential duties on machinery etc.²

I have no desire to do anything at the present moment, when the UK is in grave financial difficulties, which might be considered an unfriendly gesture. As a matter of fact, we are raising something entirely different with them, which they are not going to like. This is about the recruitment of Gurkha soldiers.

1. JN Collection.

2. Tracing the background of differential duties on goods imported from the UK, Krishnamachari, the Minister for Commerce, wrote that as a sequel to some report in newspapers, the UK Senior Trade Commissioner had written to him asking for a clarification. A reply was sent indicating that though no immediate change was proposed, much would depend upon other factors. He also mentioned that India had agreed to the re-export of tea from UK to countries other than Eire, the USA and Canada. Now the UK insisted on their right to re-export without agreeing to any conditions as to the destination, Krishnamachari found this attitude wholly unacceptable.

At the same time I think it would be worthwhile for you and Deshmukh to consider all these matters and later to call me in, if you like.

Apart from the whole treaty, is it not possible to take some special articles, like scientific instruments and the like, separately?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
September 2, 1952

My dear Krishna,

Your letter of the 28th August together with a note on Gurkha recruitment. I think I realize the various aspects of this question and the reactions on the British mind. But once the subject assumes importance in India, it is difficult to ignore it. You can understand that a subject of this kind excites the public mind and practically no Indian is prepared to accept recruitment of soldiers on Indian soil for a foreign army, more so for their employment in Malaya at present.²

It is not my intention to allow this to become a major issue or to demand anything to be done suddenly. We have presented a short *aide memoire* informally to the UK Government on this subject.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.

2. The UK had sent the Gurkhas to Malaya to deal with an insurgency in that country.

11. To B.G. Kher¹

New Delhi
September 2, 1952

My dear Kher,

Your letter of the 26th August about the Commonwealth Economic Conference.²

I appreciate all that you have said and indeed we have had all this before us. Nevertheless, after full discussion amongst ourselves, we came to the decision that we should not participate fully in this Conference. The Conference is of Prime Ministers. I could not possibly go in the month of November when our Parliament is meeting. It is almost equally difficult for Deshmukh to go. There is no point in any other Minister going.

But the real reason for our decision was political. This is not merely a matter of Sterling arrangements, etc. As was perfectly clear from certain messages received by me from Winston Churchill, the purpose of this Conference was to extend the Atlantic Treaty in the economic field. All this talk of "Free World", etc., which was contained in the original draft sent to us indicated it, as well as many other phrases. Then again, the whole idea of holding this Conference about the time of the Presidential election in the US was intimately connected with the Anglo-American relations.

In fact it is difficult to isolate this matter in the larger developments in the political field. There was also an element in it of Imperial Preference or something like it, which has been Beaverbrook's pet subject and which Beaverbrook no doubt has been pressing on Churchill.³

Political developments recently have been very unsatisfactory. American foreign policy is, I think, the last word in immaturity and lack of intelligence.

1. JN Collection. A copy of the letter was sent to Commonwealth Secretary.
2. Kher had stated: "Our membership of the Commonwealth implies certain obligations as well as advantages. We have utilized this bond on occasions to our advantage and in return have also assisted and cooperated with the other members of the Commonwealth countries consistent with our national sovereignty and principles.... While members of the Commonwealth confer on matters of common interest there is no corresponding obligation to accept majority decisions, and a member-country has the full right not to accept any decision even if supported by all the other members.... Our participation at only "observer" level is likely to create misunderstanding among the other members of the Commonwealth.... The conference would be attended by the Prime Ministers and senior Cabinet Ministers of other participating countries and the presence of only an observer representing our country is likely to prove most embarrassing to the observer himself as well as to the representatives of the other countries."
3. Later, Nehru decided that India's participation in the Commonwealth Economic Conference should be at a representative rather than "observer" level. India was represented in the Conference by a team of five led by the Union Finance Minister, C.D. Deshmukh.

Unfortunately with this ignorance is allied considerable power, economic and military. The British people had been trying to check the dangerous vagaries of American policy, but had been gradually swept along by it because of their reliance on the US. The question is what we should do in order to help in this larger set-up. I remember when I was at a Prime Ministers' Conference at London early in 1950, very important and leading persons in the UK came to me and asked me to save them from American policy.

One of the wisest things we have done thus far has been our refusal to sign the San Francisco Treaty with Japan.⁴ We annoyed the Americans very much by this refusal, but I have no doubt at all that it had a very sobering effect on the situation and more especially in Asia.

I am just indicating to you some of my reactions which are shared by my colleagues here.

For the present, however, we have to deal with the Officials' Conference this month. I am glad that Raghavan Pillai⁵ has agreed to lead our team in this Conference. Dharma Vira⁶ will be a good second to him. My difficulty in all these rather specialised conferences is that they have a strong political background and our experts are usually not fully aware of that background. Therefore we have to choose men who know something of that political background. Finance is not merely a matter for financiers today, but very much so for persons who understand the political implications.

After we have received the report of the Officials' Conference,⁷ we can give further consideration to this matter if necessary.

I might mention another subject here—that of the recruitment of Gurkhas on Indian soil. I have no desire to embarrass the British Government on this or any other issue. But the subject having come up before us and received wide publicity, it is exceedingly difficult to ignore it. We shall however try to go slowly about this and not create too much of a fuss. We shall await the reactions of the Nepal Government and even after that we propose to avoid, as

4. India's opposition to the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951 was that it included a provision which suggested that the existing occupation forces might stay in Japan as part of a defensive agreement with the UN. The Government of India felt that such an agreement was bound to give the impression that the agreement did not represent a decision taken by Japan in the full enjoyment of her freedom as a sovereign nation. The Government was also of the opinion that a declaration that Taiwan would be returned to China "will help creating conditions for a settlement in the Far East."

5. N.R. Pillai was Secretary to the Cabinet.

6. Dharma Vira was the Commercial Adviser to the Indian High Commissioner in London.

7. Senior Commonwealth officials met in London from 21 September for three weeks to prepare for the ministerial talks. They prepared briefs on the situation in the sterling area, of which Britain was the banker and on the question of sterling convertibility and on the position of gold and dollar reserves.

far as possible, any action which might prove upsetting to the UK Government. But there can be no doubt that we cannot accept the principle of recruitment of foreign soldiers in India. The difficulty, of course, is that the employment of Gurkhas in Malaya is a constant irritant to large sections of Indian opinion.

Anyhow, when opportunity occurs, you may informally tell the UK Government people that we have raised this question with no desire to embarrass them, and we shall try our best to go slow, but they will appreciate that we cannot ignore widespread Indian feeling on this subject.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

12. To B.G. Kher¹

New Delhi
September 9, 1952

My dear Kher,

...I have been thinking a good deal about the coming United Nations meeting. There are some questions which we are going to take up there, like South Africa, but the major question is the general situation and more especially the Far Eastern situation. It is very difficult to decide what exact line we should take up. What I mean is that it is difficult to put forward concrete proposals. It is easy enough to deliver speeches or a homily, but that does not take one very far. The world drifts towards war and one should try one's best to stop that drift.

I have no doubt in my mind that the British Government is very anxious to avoid war and is apprehensive of the policy and activities of the US Government. Indeed when I was there last the normal refrain was "save us from the Pentagon" (the US War Office).

It may be possible, therefore, for some common ground to be found occasionally between us and the UK, though this will not go far. When we were recently discussing truce in Korea, it was not difficult for us and the UK to agree to some approaches. The UK passed these on to the USA and succeeded in pushing them to some extent. But owing to the failure of those attempts, the initiative of the UK in this matter has, for the present, run out.

The odd thing is that while everybody talks of peace, nobody exactly knows what to do, and the people who want war carry on and make it more

1. JN Collection. Extracts. A copy of the letter was sent to Foreign Secretary.

and more difficult for other people to intervene. It becomes a question of prestige, and every country talks of "negotiating from strength". The obvious fact is that this works both ways and both parties increase their strength simultaneously. I should imagine that, in the balance, the Soviet Union becomes relatively stronger as time passes.

It is for us to consider whether we should raise this major issue at the UN or encourage others to do so. It is rather absurd for the UN to remain silent over such a vital matter where a war is being carried on in the name of the UN. There is danger, of course, in raising the issue, because the USA might succeed in getting through some objectionable resolutions with the help of the majority at its command.

We have, therefore, to think of all these possibilities. In the balance, I think the matter should be raised, whether we raise it or somebody else. If it is raised, it should be done, not in a casual way but after full thought has been given to it and various possibilities investigated. It would be wrong, of course, to raise it in an acrimonious way or just to condemn this country or that.

I am writing all this to you because I suggest that you might, quite informally, put this matter before the UK Government and ask them what views they have on this subject. Do they propose to raise the matter in UN or do they expect others to raise it? What in their view are likely to be the developments in the UN Assembly. Obviously the first thing is somehow to get a truce in Korea. Have we got stuck up there, or is there any hope of getting out of the rut? Apart from the truce, many other questions arise, such as the recognition of China by the UN. That perhaps will be stoutly resisted by the USA. And yet, it would appear to be inevitable some time or other.

It appears that the UK want to avoid any important discussion till the American election is over. That might be a matter of tactics. But I should like to know the general reactions of the UK Government as to whether anything should be done or not done in the UN. Our own attitude is, first of all, that we shall resist any attempt to make matters worse by condemnations and vituperations. Secondly, we should like to encourage some constructive approach, really constructive, which might yield results and not merely as a manoeuvre for position.

Of course, in order to make a real constructive approach, one should know something about the minds of other parties, such as the Russians. It is much more difficult to get at that, though, if an occasion offers itself, one may make an informal attempt.

I suggest, therefore, that you might, without any commitments whatever, informally discuss this matter with the UK Government and tell them that we do so because of our extreme anxiety for the preservation of peace and our desire to help in that if possible. Because we know that that is also the wish of the UK Government, we feel that some way out might be found, even though in other matters we might differ.

If the UK Government wants us to approach China on the Korean truce issue, I fear that this is not feasible at present. We have nothing definite to suggest now. If an occasion arises, we shall certainly approach them. For the moment, a recent incident about a gift of theirs from some Communist organizations here which was returned by us, has not improved our relations.² But, on the whole, that is a small matter.

The point is that we should not tamely submit to events going their way, and a wrong way, without some effort to check them and to direct them in the right direction. You will notice that with all my desire to do something, I am, by no means, clear as to what I should do. To some extent it depends on how far the UK Government is prepared to go, and possibly Canada, and some other countries, in order to check the USA.

I should like you to give thought to this matter and, when an opportunity arises, make an informal approach to the UK Government.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. The Government of India had informed the Governments of China and Russia of its general policy that "gifts from abroad for relief of distress in the country should be distributed only through Government or agencies like the Indian Red Cross." This clarification was communicated to the two Governments because trade union organizations in the two countries had made gifts of foodgrains and money for relieving distress in certain districts of Madras and Travancore-Cochin. The Chinese gift was made on the condition that it would be made over to the Andhra Famine Relief Committee which was a Communist-sponsored organization. The Chinese gift of about four lakhs of rupees was first made to the Indian Red Cross but at the request of the Communist Andhra Famine Relief Committee, the Chinese Embassy in Delhi asked that the gift be handed over to that Committee. When the Government of India explained why this could not be done, the donors asked that the money should be returned. The money having been returned to the Chinese Embassy, was later given to the Indian Red Cross Society.

13. To B.G. Kher¹

New Delhi
September 9, 1952

My dear Kher,

...There are two or three things I should like to make perfectly clear.² This

1. JN Collection. Extracts. A copy of the letter was sent to Ministry of Home Affairs.
2. Kher had written to Nehru on 23 August 1952 about the proposal of the Ministry of Home Affairs to establish a Security Liaison Unit attached to the High Commission. Nehru replied on 30 August (not printed) that "my initial reaction is not in favour of any such step. I should require much greater justification than has been given to me so far for the establishment of a Security Unit in London."

Security Liaison Unit has absolutely nothing to do with the staff of our Missions abroad or, in your case, of India House. Indeed, we make a point that nothing pertaining to the Mission should come under the observation of such a Unit. If you or any Head of Mission require to make some enquiry among the members of your own staff, you should have it done separately through some senior members of the staff or in a way you like. This matter should not be referred to the Liaison Unit.

Secondly, the Security Liaison Unit will of course be completely under the Head of the Mission, that is, under you, and every report that they send should be available to you. It may be that you might not care to see many of their rather technical reports, but that is for you to decide. They will not only be functioning under you, but will keep you informed of their activities.

Thirdly, this Unit is not meant to keep watch in any way over our Indian student population as a whole or the Indian community in the UK. Only in case of any particular individual, Indian or foreign, who is connected with some special activity that is being investigated, will the Liaison Unit inquire.

We have at present in Delhi such a Security Liaison Unit attached to the UK High Commission. That is not secret so far as we are concerned, and we were told about it. Other embassies here no doubt have their own Intelligence Agencies. In fact, the US have a very widespread Intelligence net. But they have not told us officially anything about it. In fact, many so-called Attaches in every foreign embassy are really intelligence agents.

We cannot function in a big way so far as Intelligence is concerned. But we have to build up some kind of an Intelligence system even outside India. Not to do so means relying sometimes on foreign Intelligence and that is not satisfactory. Thus, if we want to pursue some line of enquiry in London now, we have to go to British Intelligence. They will no doubt supply us with information, but only such as might suit them.

We have, therefore, decided to have a number, rather few to begin with, of such Liaison Units in some important centres abroad. London is one of them. It is important in many ways to us especially. It is still, to a large extent, a clearing house of communications. It has been, and is, the link between the Cominform and the Far-Eastern countries, including India. The Communist Party of India is largely guided through London. Also the various Communist-sponsored organizations like the WFTU, WIDF, and WFDY.

For us a very important aspect is to know what Pakistan is doing. Much of its activity is in London. Most of its purchases for defence and other like purposes are made in the UK, or through the UK. In fact, Pakistan carries on a great deal of intrigue everywhere and more especially in or via London. It is important for us to have as much information about this as possible.

Then, there is the development of our technical side of Intelligence. Some of our officers have been trained in this technical branch in London, but there

is much more to learn. This is not easily learnt by demanding such information, but if a trained officer is there, he can keep touch with these technical developments and inform us so that our own technique can be improved. There are all kinds of gadgets now which are very useful.

We do not want any tie-up between our Intelligence and any other foreign Intelligence, including UK Intelligence. But a certain association is often helpful, provided we keep wide awake. Thus we have got information from London about British Intelligence functioning in Tibet through India. That kind of information is useful to us. In this matter we have to be careful so as not to get entangled with British Intelligence and be exploited by it. Probably it will be easier to remain apart if we have our separate set-up as the UK have in India.

Such a Liaison Unit cannot possibly function with success unless it is not only under the control of the Head of the Mission, but works in close collaboration with him. Indeed, as you say, it will be impossible to keep this as a kind of secret unit. The senior officers should know something about it so that they can cooperate.

The chief officer of the Unit would have some other function given to him which should not take up too much of his time, but which would nevertheless be some substantial function. His status should correspond with that of a First Secretary. For the present it is not proposed to send any big staff. Only a senior officer, with perhaps a secretary and a stenographer. If necessary, later some additions might be made of junior officers.

This London Security Liaison Unit, at a later stage, is supposed to cover Western Europe also. It is at that stage that some junior officers will be required.

There is a good deal in what you say about a diplomatic mission such as yours not being associated with this kind of business, and yet I do not quite know how to avoid it. I should imagine that the officer of the Liaison Unit might well be attached to your Purchase Mission or Stores Department. In fact, that will be part of his duty anyhow, because he will have to find out other people's purchases.

As the UK informed us of their Liaison Officer here, we should inform them of our officer in London. He will keep in touch with them. It will depend upon his ability as to how he can profit by this contact. Otherwise, no publicity should be given. It is not intended that our Liaison Officer should do any work which might be considered as injurious to British interests. There is thus no obvious conflict and, since we inform them, they have no reason to object or suspect.

Having discussed this matter here, I feel that, in the balance, we should have this officer there. As I have said above, he will be the only officer going to begin with. Probably the facts that I have stated above will meet the objections you have raised and that you will be agreeable to having him....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

14. Recruitment of the Gurkhas by Britain¹

I have already written on this subject, defining our policy, to our High Commissioner in London.² I have also spoken to the King of Nepal when he was here. Our Ambassador in Kathmandu has also been informed. The position is as follows:

- (1) The recruitment of Gurkhas on Indian territory for the British Army cannot be continued, but we are prepared to give some time to the UK Government to make other arrangements. We have no desire to create unnecessary difficulties for them. But the fact that recruitment on Indian territory by the British must not continue has to be recognized and provided for.
- (2) We are prepared to consider the question of transit facilities through India being continued. To some extent this is bound up with the decision of the Nepal Government on the larger issue of recruitment of Gurkhas.
- (3) We cannot influence the Nepal Government on this issue, and it is for them to decide. But we have suggested to them that it would not be desirable, in view of previous commitments, to enforce any decision without giving adequate time to the UK Government.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 22 September 1952. JN Collection.

2. See ante, pp. 629-630.

15. To B.G. Kher¹

New Delhi
September 30, 1952

My dear Kher,

...About Gurkha recruitment, we have recently been approached by the UK Government and asked if we would permit transit facilities, pensions to be paid and some kind of X-ray examinations of recruits etc. in India. That is to say, the actual recruitment will take place in Nepal, but certain other formalities in India. We are informing them that they should accept our basic position. This is as follows: We cannot agree to anything connected with recruitment for armed forces to take place in the territory of India. But we appreciate their

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

difficulties and we are therefore prepared, as a temporary measure, to facilitate any change-over. Therefore, again as a temporary measure, we are prepared to agree to their continuing to have transit facilities, X-ray facilities and pensions, etc.

This would mean that actual recruitment would take place in Nepal. The question is a difficult one because in effect we are trying to get out of an agreement we made with the UK Government, and I do not like breaking agreements. On the other hand, there is no doubt at all about the feeling in India on this subject. It is foolish to think that this feeling is confined to Communists. This is the natural nationalist reaction and it is quite understandable. Anyhow, we are trying to adopt a middle course for the present so as not to embarrass the British Government too much. But this cannot be a permanent arrangement. Of course, to some extent, the Nepal Government's attitude will naturally affect matters. The Nepal Government, as a matter of fact, ask us for advice from time to time; so the question comes back to us.

As you know, I attach the greatest importance to the passive-resistance movement in South Africa.² The importance really comes because the Africans are chiefly carrying it on. The purely Indian question in South Africa has receded into the background because of this larger issue. That is as it should be.

About Attlee telling you that Indians are disliked by both 'whites' and 'blacks' in the Central and East Africa, I think that his views are not quite up-to-date. They are partly true, but the situation has been a changing one there, and certainly in East Africa the Africans have looked more and more towards India. Apa Pant, our Commissioner there, has done a fine job of work and so has his wife. In West Africa, Gold Coast and Nigeria, they are also looking towards India and want to send a large number of students here. We have decided to open a consulate in the Gold Coast and possibly we shall follow it up by another consular to Nigeria....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. The Government of India, on 24 August 1952, announced its decision to bring to the notice of the UN General Assembly the passive resistance campaign in South Africa as "a development of the highest importance from the point of view of the peace of the entire African continent and the world." The issue was to be raised as an independent issue apart from the South African-Indian question which had been before the UN for the past six years. India planned to seek the cooperation of the Asian-African group in the UN to fight the case.

EGYPT AND SUDAN

1. King Farouk's Title¹

Question: Do you propose to recognize King Farouk as the King of the Sudan? What is your policy about the Sudan?

Jawaharlal Nehru: There is no question of recognizing King Farouk.² We have always recognized him. Do you mean describing him in a particular way? We are not interested in any particular description. But we are certainly interested in the people of the Sudan being given the right to decide for themselves about their future. That fact, I believe, has been recognized by the Egyptian Government also. At least one of the recent Prime Ministers, I believe, said so.

Q: Are you going to recognize him as King of the Sudan?

JN: I cannot precisely say now, but, as I told you, we have no objection on that score alone. We want just to be clear about certain matters in regard to the Sudan, because as has been mentioned, and we do not mind saying it, we are interested in the fact that the Sudan should have an opportunity, full freedom, to decide for itself.

Q: In other words, do you mean to say that it does not matter whether you recognize him or not?

JN: Yes. If the other matters are there, it does not matter.

Q: When you send your new Ambassador,³ are you going to accredit him to King Farouk as the King of the Sudan?

1. Remarks at a press conference, New Delhi, 24 July 1952. From PIB report. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference see, pp. 149, 238-253, 583-584, 617, 660-663 and 665-666.
2. On 8 November 1951, the Egyptian Government unilaterally abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 and the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium of 1899 over the Sudan. A few days later, the Egyptian Parliament passed laws proclaiming Farouk as the King of Egypt and the Sudan and granting a constitution to the Sudan. The Sudanese Legislative Assembly had rejected the Egyptian proposal. However, King Farouk insisted on being styled King of Egypt and the Sudan.
3. K.M. Panikkar.

JN: Yes; in the meantime, all kinds of odd things are happening there.⁴

Q: The Egyptian Ambassador⁵ to India has been saying that India will shortly be sending an Ambassador to Egypt and our own prospective Ambassador to Egypt also has been saying that he will be there shortly. But have all the difficulties in the way been cleared?

JN: As a matter of fact, the question hardly arises. The prospective Ambassador was in Peking. He came back only two or three weeks ago and anyhow he has to remain here for some period. The question will really arise when the time comes for him to go.

Q: Have the difficulties been cleared in the way of sending an Ambassador?

JN: There is no particular difficulty. There are various matters still. It is better to have them cleared up.

4. During the last six months King Farouk had dismissed the Cabinet for reasons which had little to do with principles or policies. Hilaly Pasha, for example, was installed as Prime Minister by the King in spite of the fact that he did not enjoy the confidence of the legislature. He was succeeded by another non-party man, Hussein Sirry Pasha, but his disagreement with the King over the choice of General Neguib as War Minister, led to his resignation and the recall of Hilaly Pasha as the Premier. Meanwhile, King Farouk was forced to accept General Neguib as the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Army.
5. Ismail Kamel Bey was the Egyptian Ambassador in New Delhi.

2. India's Accreditation in Cairo¹

I have not seen the note which Mr Garner left with you today about our accreditation in Cairo. I shall see this tomorrow. But, subject to any further idea that might strike me after reading that note, I am putting down what my present views are on this subject. For a variety of reasons, we have long hesitated to acknowledge the King of Egypt as also the King of the Sudan. Our principal reason was that we should not thereby come in the way of any popular movement or sentiment in the Sudan.² It was for the Sudanese people to decide what their relationship with Egypt should be. We would like Egypt and the Sudan to arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement. In any event, we would not like to see any decision imposed upon the people of the Sudan.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 3 August 1952. JN Collection.

2. There were a number of well organized political parties in the Sudan which objected to union with Egypt and stood for the establishment of a sovereign independent state of the Sudan.

2. While we delayed in taking any steps in regard to our accreditation in Cairo, other developments took place in Egypt. The then Prime Minister³ invited Mahdi Pasha⁴ for talks. These talks did not yield any successful result, but it was declared authoritatively on behalf of Egypt that the people of Sudan had the right to decide their future.⁵

3. We had a growing feeling that the absence of a proper representative of ours in Cairo was harmful to our interests in Egypt and the Middle East and prevented us from exercising such friendly influence as we might possess towards the solution of this problem of the Sudan. Meanwhile, some countries recognised the King of Egypt as King of the Sudan also, but they stated publicly that this should not come in the way of the Sudanese people deciding for themselves their future status or relationship with Egypt.

4. After giving full thought to this matter, we decided to adopt a slightly different course and addressed an *aide memoire* to the Government of Egypt. In this we expressed our gratification at the efforts made by the Government of Egypt to bring about an agreed solution of the problem of the Sudan and further expressed our hope that it would be in accordance with the wishes of the people of the Sudan. This *aide memoire* clearly expressed our own wishes in the matter. A reply was not asked for, but we hope to get one which would clarify the situation.

5. No reply has come. This is not surprising because of the constant changes that have taken place in Egypt in recent weeks.⁶ These changes culminated in the military coup d'etat and the abdication of King Farouk. Further changes are taking place from day to day and the situation has not yet been stabilized.

6. In view of these developments, it is for us to consider what policy we should adopt in regard to Egypt. Should we remain passive and wait for other developments? Should we wait for some answer from the Egyptian Government to our *aide memoire*, and do nothing till that answer comes? Or should we decide straightaway to ask for an agreement for our Ambassador-designate? This last course would necessarily lead to our describing the King of Egypt as King of the Sudan.

3. Nahas Pasha.

4. Mahdi Pasha was the leader of the Independent Front in the Sudan.

5. Following talks between the Egyptian Government and a delegation of the pro-independence Sudanese Umma Party at Alexandria in June 1952, Egypt had offered to support the constitutional development in Sudan and to recognize her right to self-determination in return for the Sudanese recognition of King Farouk's nominal title as King of Egypt and the Sudan.

6. The successive independent Prime Ministers who followed Nahas Pasha had failed to effect changes in Egyptian policy to promote the political stability in Egypt. On 22 July 1952, under the leadership of General Nguib and with the help of the Free Officers' Movement led by General Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian Army seized power. On 20 July, King Farouk was forced to abdicate and leave the country and his infant son, Fuad II, was installed as the king.

7. It seems to me that for us to wait passively would be wrong. We were, in fact, coming to this conclusion, even before the coup d'état. King Farouk's abdication and what followed has strengthened our feeling that we should not keep away any longer from having proper representation in Cairo.

8. Events of possibly far-reaching consequence are happening there from day to day and it is far better for us to be in the middle of them than beyond the outer fringe. With King Farouk's abdication, the previous objection to our recognizing him as the King of the Sudan, though still there, is far weaker than it was. General Neguib⁷ has openly declared that the Sudanese will decide for themselves about their future and their relationship with Egypt. In effect, that might be considered a clear reply to our *aide memoire*. The General has also made a feeling reference to Mahatma Gandhi.⁸ This has nothing to do with politics, but it is something obviously which we might appreciate and which indicates a friendly approach to India. It is also said that Prime Minister Aly Maher⁹ is a friend of Mahdi Pasha of the Sudan.

9. Thus the conditions seem propitious for a friendly settlement with the Sudan. Can we help this friendly settlement by keeping away or by being present in Cairo? I feel sure that for us now to hold out and refuse to accept the form of words that the Government of Egypt asked from us in regard to accreditation would be wrong. It would irritate Egyptian opinion and would make them think that we are trying to take advantage of their difficult situation. Even if we had thought of doing this previously, the recent developments in Egypt preclude us from persisting in this policy now.

10. I do not know what steps the UK Government are taking in this matter. If there is any element of compulsion in these steps, they are ill-advised and cannot lead to the result aimed at. The new Government in Egypt, whatever its feelings about the Sudan might be, cannot suddenly reverse the policy of the old Government in regard to the Sudan without becoming very unpopular and even risking their existence as a Government. In the delicate situation of today, they have to move warily. We should not do anything to embarrass them or antagonize them when there is some likelihood of their proceeding on right lines if left to themselves.

11. I feel therefore that any British attempt to utilize the present difficulty of Egypt to get some kind of a decision in their favour in regard to the Sudan,

7. General Muhammad Neguib (1901-1984); Egyptian army officer; Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, July-September 1952; Prime Minister and Minister of War, September 1952-June 1953.

8. General Neguib appealed to the Egyptian armed forces and the people "to emulate Mahatma Gandhi in selfless devotion to the fatherland."

9. (1883-1960); Egyptian politician; Minister for Education, 1925-26, of Finance, 1928-29, of Justice, 1930-32; Head of the Royal Cabinet, 1935-37; Prime Minister, 1937, 1939-40 and 1952.

will not meet with success and might well aggravate the difficulty. We should therefore not be parties to it.

12. Nevertheless, if the UK Government want us to delay accreditation in Cairo, we should agree simply because, in the balance, it is desirable to pull together with them as far as is possible. They have suggested, I think, that we should wait for two weeks. I should have liked to go ahead as soon as possible because I think the sooner our Ambassador functions there the better. But perhaps we had better wait now for a week or a little more and watch developments. If the UK Government have taken any step, it should not be long before we know what the result of it is.

13. Mr Garner might be told accordingly, and our approach to this question, as indicated in this note, might be explained to him. While we are quite clear in our opinion as to what should be done, in deference to the wishes of the UK Government, we are delaying action. We hope that he will keep us informed of the steps taken by the UK Government and the Egyptian Government's reaction to them.¹⁰

14. A copy of this note with such other information as may be necessary, should be sent to our High Commissioner in London for his information. This can be done by air mail.

10. In fact, a press note by the Government of India on 3 September 1952, announcing the appointment of K.M. Panikkar as India's Ambassador to Egypt, stated that the "credentials of the new Ambassador of India to Egypt will be addressed, at the request of the Egyptian Government, to Fuad Ahmed II, the King of Egypt and the Sudan." The note added: "The Government of India have consistently held the view that the future of the Sudan should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the Sudanese people, and that their relations with Egypt should be determined by the agreement between the countries concerned."

3. To G.S. Bajpai¹

New Delhi
August 18, 1952

My dear Bajpai,

....Even before the military coup in Egypt, we had decided to take steps to get an agreement for our new Ambassador in Cairo. Before doing that formally, I had addressed a friendly message² to the Prime Minister there on the subject of the Sudan expressing the hope that the talks he was having with Mahdi would result in a mutually satisfactory agreement. We had no answer to this message and, indeed, none could be expected as the Prime Ministers were

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Not available.

changing every forty-eight hours. Then came the military coup. We wanted to go ahead with our approach for an agreement soon after. The UK Government, however, begged us to delay for a week or two as they were having some talks with the new Prime Minister there. We agreed to do so. Apparently Aly Maher has consented to the Queen of England addressing her letter to King Ahmed Fuad without any titles. In the case of the British Ambassador, he is a continuing one while we have to send a new man. It appears that Aly Maher would still like our letters to be addressed to the King with titles. If he insists, we shall agree and not carry on this argument....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To S. Radhakrishnan¹

New Delhi
September 3, 1952

My dear Radhakrishnan,

It has struck me that it would be a good thing if you could spend three or four days in Cairo on your way to Europe. If you approve of this proposal and it suits you, then please let B.K. Nehru know, so that your programme might be drawn up accordingly.² Panikkar is leaving early tomorrow morning for Cairo and will be there tomorrow night. He liked the idea of your going there. He would like to be informed as soon as possible about your decision and the probable date of your arrival there, so that he can make some arrangements for you to meet people and visit institutions.³

We are treating your visits to these various places as rather informal. Formal visits lead to all kinds of protocol difficulties and waste of time.

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Foreign Secretary.
2. In fact, in a note to Foreign Secretary dated 12 August 1952 (not printed), Nehru had suggested that Radhakrishnan visit Egypt. "With his broad outlook and his general understanding both of the position in India and the world situation, his visit should prove helpful."
3. Radhakrishnan paid an informal visit to Cairo on 27 September 1952. He met General Nguib and, while applauding the absence of violence in changing the regime and assuring the military rulers of India's goodwill, warned against: (i) the violence to which the dispossessed landlords and others might be driven; (ii) the ambitions of politicians; (iii) and the corrupting influence of power.

All over the Middle East there is a strong revival. To some extent mixed with this is a vague Islamic feeling and sometimes an anti-western influence feeling. From a student's point of view, these developments are very interesting.

In Egypt, the organization known as the Muslim Brotherhood (the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimun) is probably the most important at present and General Neguib is supposed to be a member of it. This organization was reported to be very anti-Indian, and yet General Neguib has expressed himself in a friendly way towards India and more especially in regard to Gandhiji. I am expecting Panikkar to send us an appraisal of the situation there. Your visit would be good from many points of view.

Panikkar made a suggestion today which I pass on to you. He thought it would be a good thing if you could write a small book about Hinduism, say about 100 pages, specially for the Islamic countries.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Desire for Closer Indo-Egyptian Ties¹

I am glad to learn that a new and enlarged edition of *Soat el Sharq* will be issued soon. On this occasion I send my greetings and good wishes to the people of Egypt and of the Arabic-speaking countries. Before we attained independence in India, we looked to these countries with friendly eyes and developed bonds of comradeship with them. Since independence has been attained by us, we have endeavoured to strengthen these bonds. All of us have had to face trials and difficulties not only because of political changes but even more so because of social and economic changes that were overdue. We have endeavoured to bring these about in a peaceful and democratic way and we look with friendly interest on similar changes being brought about elsewhere.

We have to understand each other and if we do so, we see often that there is much in common between us and that, in the present-day world, we have to seek peace and progress not only for ourselves but in the interests of the world.

1. Message to *Soat el Sharq* (Voice of the East) a magazine brought out by the Indian Embassy in Cairo, New Delhi, 20 September 1952. JN Collection.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

1. Passive Resistance Movement in South Africa¹

I am afraid, it is not possible to find a day for the discussion of the motion that is suggested. In response to a desire expressed on behalf of the Opposition, a day has been fixed for the discussion of the Kashmir issue. This is Saturday next, August 2nd. There is a very heavy agenda before Parliament and it is hardly possible to find an extra day.

2. Apart from this, I should like to point out that the reference to Indians in South Africa is not strictly accurate.² The movement³ in South Africa is being conducted by South African nationals, some of whom are of Indian descent. This movement is on a much wider scale now comprising a large number of Africans. The question, therefore, is not one of Indian nationals abroad and is a matter affecting foreign affairs generally. While it is certainly open to members to refer to any matter affecting foreign affairs in the course of a discussion, it might not be desirable to have a special discussion of a matter of this kind where Indian nationals are not concerned.

1. Note on a proposal for discussion in the House of the People on the Indian movement in South Africa, 28 July 1952. JN Collection.
2. The South African-Indian question was a separate issue which concerned the treatment of the people of Indian origin in South Africa. It had been before the UN for the past six years. The latest resolution of the UN on this was passed on 12 January 1952 which noted that the Groups Areas Act of the South African Government contravened the earlier resolution of the UN, and, considering that the South African policy of segregation was based on racial discrimination, recommended that a commission of three members be formed to assist the parties—South Africa, India and Pakistan—to carry through the negotiations.
3. The coloured and black communities, who formed four-fifths of the eleven million people in South Africa, were compelled to live in segregated areas, had no voice in the Government, were forced to travel in separate conveyances and were subjected to many other humiliations. On 26 June 1952, they started a passive resistance campaign against the discriminatory laws which the Malan Government had placed on the Statute Book. They courted arrest by riding in "white" railway compartments, sitting on "forbidden" benches in public parks and refusing to exhibit passes. The South African Government used the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950 to arrest and detain hundreds of African and Indian leaders of the campaign.

2. To Balvantray Mehta¹

30th July 1952

My dear Balvantray,

I think it would be a good thing if you sent a circular to our Pradesh Congress Committees drawing their attention to the situation in South Africa. This situation is significant. Africans and Indians have joined hands in a satyagraha movement. As a matter of fact, it is the Africans who are carrying this on and very few Indians have really participated. Thus far, the movement has proceeded peacefully and on, what appears to be, correct lines. I think that we should express our sympathy with this movement and send our good wishes to it. Anyhow, we should express our satisfaction at the cooperation of Africans and Indians in a larger cause.

A suggestion might be made to our Pradesh Congress Committees to this effect.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

3. The Non-Violent Struggle in South Africa¹

The All-India Congress Committee has viewed with the deepest interest and pride the great satyagraha movement against racialism in South Africa² and sends its fraternal greetings and good wishes to all those Africans and Indians who are participating in it, and who have by their discipline, courage and non-violence, shown themselves to be worthy followers of the great leader, who first gave this new message to the world in South Africa forty-five years ago. It is fitting and of historic significance that it should be in South Africa again that Africans and Indians and others should battle non-violently for the

1. Resolution on satyagraha in South Africa drafted by Nehru for the AICC meeting at Indore, 12 September 1952. The resolution was moved by Govind Ballabh Pant and seconded by Morarji Desai. *The Hindu*, 13 September 1952.
2. The struggle against apartheid in South Africa had in September entered its fourth month with the arrests of about 2,500 people.

affirmation of the basic human right of racial equality and against the doctrine of a master race dominating over others.

This challenge of racial arrogance and domination was one of the causes of the last great war. Yet racialism in its most extreme and repugnant form flourishes in South Africa and crushes the great majority of the population there. It is India's basic policy to stand for racial equality and national freedom without which there can be no peace in the world. The great continent of Africa has suffered more than any other part of the earth's surface from the domination of one race over others. Having patiently endured this for generations its people have now shown their strength and wisdom not only in challenging this vicious doctrine but doing so in a civilized and peaceful way. Any other course would lead to widespread bloodshed and terrible bitterness and sorrow. It is for all the peoples of the world to appreciate the significance of this great happening in Africa and to lend the weight of their moral support to this righteous struggle.

In Africa, as elsewhere, it is not by the domination of one racial or religious group or community over another that a peaceful and progressive society can be built up, but by cooperation between the different elements in the population in order to build up a multi-racial society in which all have equal opportunities of growth.

The AICC is particularly gratified at the cooperation of Africans and the people of Indian descent in Africa in this struggle. It reaffirms the policy of the Congress that Indians abroad should demand no special privileges at the expense of the inhabitants of the country in which they live. In Africa, the interests of the Africans must be paramount and it is the duty of Indians there to cooperate with them and help them to the best of their ability.

The basic principles³ of the Charter of the United Nations have been and are being violated in South Africa, and barbarous methods of suppression are being employed against a peaceful population. It is for the conscience of the world to take heed and to prevent this struggle from developing into something which might endanger world peace.

3. Under Article 55 of the Charter, the UN is authorized to promote "higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of social progress and universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."

4. To Balvantray Mehta¹

New Delhi
17 September 1952

My dear Balvantray,

In the course of speeches on the South Africa satyagraha resolution at the AICC, an appeal was made for funds to help. Morarji Bhai specially made that appeal. We must do something about it. I cannot obviously issue an appeal of that kind. I think that you, as General Secretary, might draw attention to that resolution and issue an appeal. Perhaps it would be better for both the General Secretaries, you and Malliah,² to sign it. I enclose a small draft appeal.³ This will be something which would help others to collect money.

In the appeal names of persons who will receive the money should be mentioned. Apart from the AICC office, Morarji Desai's name should be mentioned, and Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant's. If you can think of some other suitable names, they should also be mentioned.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. U.S. Malliah.
3. See the next item.

5. Racial Policy in South Africa¹

The satyagraha campaign in South Africa against racial discrimination and the doctrine of the master race has attracted worldwide attention and sympathy. In India that sympathy has been even more intimate and intense and all shades of opinion share it. The AICC, at its meeting held in Indore recently, passed a resolution on this subject.

While sympathy has undoubtedly considerable value, it would be much better to translate that sympathy into some kind of direct help. This can only be in the nature of financial help. We appeal, therefore, in furtherance of the Congress resolution, for contributions to this fund to help the satyagrahis in South Africa. In this matter we hope that there will be no party divisions and

1. Draft appeal, 17 September 1952. JN Collection

that there will be a widespread response from all who feel, as we do, that a vital struggle affecting human rights and liberty is being carried on by Africans and people of Indian descent in South Africa.

Contributions may be sent to the AICC Office, 7 Jantar Mantar Road, New Delhi, or to Shri Morarji Desai, or Shri Govind Ballabh Pant.

6. Racism in South Africa¹

Question: What is the possible stand India would be taking in the UN when the South African question comes before it?

Jawaharlal Nehru: I want to know which question the pressman has in mind: whether the old question of Indian descendants in South Africa or the new one, the great passive resistance movement by Africans.

Q: Both questions.

JN: First of all, the great passive resistance movement of Africans and Indians in South Africa is something much bigger than the so-called Indian question in South Africa. Indeed, it includes it in its scope. The old question itself was not confined to people of Indian descent there, but was symbolic of the racial inequality and domination that existed in South Africa. This question has been raised now in a broader and a more patent way.² Obviously, the question of racial inequality is even more important for the Africans whose country it is than even for Indians. I am very glad that in this matter Africans and Indians are cooperating.

The question has become one of vital world significance. No amount of repression can suppress this movement. It may have its ups and downs; but, when millions of people are moved, repression cannot put an end to that. It is,

1. Remarks at a press conference, Madras, 4 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 5 October 1952. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference, see pp. 138-139, 153, 342-343, 412, 431, 510-511, 553-554 and 674.
2. The Government of India had announced in August 1952 that it proposed to bring the the issue of passive resistance against the unjust laws in South Africa before the UN, as the South African Government's apartheid policy and repression of the passive resisters constituted a threat to peace. Since its announcement, this move had received support from Indonesia, Burma and Afghanistan.

therefore, not merely a South African issue, but a world issue which will have its repercussions in every continent. I am glad that this is being increasingly recognized everywhere. I cannot say what particular step the United Nations might take. But to ignore or bypass this issue will not be to the credit of the United Nations, for this will mean ignoring and bypassing their own Charter and their own reason for existence.

7. The Awakening in Africa¹

The South African issue is something much bigger than the question of Indians in South Africa. In many ways it is a tremendous thing, a great upheaval, that is happening there. The passive resistance movement may be confined to South Africa, but the whole of Africa is on the move. If this matter is not satisfactorily settled and opportunities of freedom not given to the Africans—the Indians, I am glad, are supporting this great movement—it will be a bad day for the whole of Africa, and for a large part of the world, because you cannot leave a large continent in ferment. Naturally, our entire sympathies are with the African people. The attitude we have taken up, and what we tell our Indian nationals, more especially in Africa, is that they must place the interests of the Africans above their own. We shall fight for Indian interests anywhere to the best of our capacity. But we shall not support the Indian nationals abroad if they come into conflict with the interests of the people of the country they are in. It is rather an unusual thing to say, and I do not know if any other country has told its citizens to adopt this kind of an attitude. But that flows from the policy that we have been pursuing.²

1. Speech at a public meeting, Madras, 9 October 1952. AIR tapes, NMML. Extract. For other parts of the speech, see pp. 51-69, 343-345 and 677-678.
2. Those Indians who were already settled abroad had been advised by the Government of India not to have extra-territorial loyalties, but to identify themselves with the countries of their settlement, and seek local citizenship on a level with other communities without claiming special privileges or suffering disabilities.

8. Loan for South Africa¹

While it is true, as the Finance Minister has said, that extraneous considerations should not be allowed to influence our attitude towards a loan when it comes up for formal decision, I think that Shri B.K. Nehru's expression of his strong opinion to the Directors of the Bank was all for the good. A matter which rouses deep passions cannot be ignored. If two countries are at war, there can be no question of one country giving a loan to the other or helping in such a loan in any way, directly or indirectly. We are not at war with South Africa, but our relations are not only very strained, but are hostile to each other. Apart from this, the racial policy of South Africa has created a big stir in the world and is likely to lead to very serious consequences. Therefore, it is difficult to ignore all this and treat this matter as something which is purely a banking affair.

2. However, it appears to be a right course for the Bank to send an investigating committee to South Africa, as suggested. It further appears that this committee or mission has been instructed to report on the political situation. Even from a purely banking point of view this has to be considered before final decisions are taken.

3. It will be a good thing if the leader of the mission meets Shri Apa Pant or other members of our UN delegation.

4. What attitude the Government of India should take up about a loan to South Africa, will have to be decided after this enquiry is over. Much will depend upon the then existing situation. Unless there is marked improvement, which appears to be exceedingly doubtful, it will be difficult for India to support such a loan. At the most, she can abstain from voting. Support of the loan means inevitably support of a Government which is carrying out policies which are highly objectionable not only to us, but to vast numbers of other people.

5. A copy of this note should be sent to the Department of Economic Affairs of the Finance Ministry.

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, New Delhi, 14 October 1952. JN Collection.

CHINA AND TIBET

1. Border Issue with China¹

On reconsideration, I accept Shri Panikkar's advice² that we should not make specific mention about the frontiers. I think, however, that this point should be made clear to Kaul, so that he may know exactly how our mind is working in regard to it.

I hope that the Bombay Government has been informed about the Chinese proposal to open a Consulate General in Bombay and that we are agreeing to this.³ The position should be explained to them briefly and they should be told that this is part of a larger settlement and it was not feasible for us to reject this claim as this would have affected our position in Tibet....

1. Note to Foreign Secretary and K.M. Panikkar, New Delhi, 29 July 1952. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. See *ante*, p. 585
3. In a letter to Nehru of 28 July, Chou En-lai recognized the legitimacy of India's trade and cultural interests in Tibet and suggested that the political agency at Lhasa should be regularized by its transformation into an Indian Consulate-General in exchange for the opening of a similar Chinese Consulate in Bombay.

2. Cable to Indian Mission, Lhasa¹

Your telegram 90² dated 5th September is rather disturbing as it indicates that our policy is not fully understood. That policy is to recognize that Tibet is

1. New Delhi, 6 September 1952. JN Collection. This cable was repeated to Political Officer, Sikkim.
2. The telegram stated that the Chinese occupation of Tibet had led to the emergence of three political groups—(1) a pro-Chinese group which supported Chinese expansion in Tibet; (2) a neutral group which was not aligned with any major political group nor was it unfriendly to the Chinese; and (3) a third group claiming to be the champions of Tibetan freedom and culture. This group was in need of funds to build up its units in Tibetan villages and amongst the middle classes. Funds were available from foreign countries particularly from the USA, but the group did not wish to receive help from the countries which had nothing in common with Tibet. It looked upon India for help and sought a loan of Rs 2 lakhs.

under Chinese suzerainty and, subject to that, to protect our own interests in Tibet. Otherwise, we do not wish to interfere in internal affairs of Tibet and we can certainly be no parties to any secret or other activities against the Chinese. That would be both practically and morally wrong. It is for Tibetans and Chinese to settle their problems. Our interests now within Tibet are limited and our chief concern is proper maintenance of our frontier line. This we have made quite clear to the Chinese Government and on that there can be no yielding. We have already agreed to convert our representative in Tibet into a Consul General. That itself indicates what future position is going to be. It would be improper and unwise for our representative to get involved in Tibetan domestic affairs or intrigues. We are naturally friendly towards Tibetans, as we have been in the past, but we must not give them any impression of possibility of interference or help. Therefore, any question of loan as suggested is completely out of the question. We have to judge these matters from larger world point of view which probably our Tibetan friends have no means of appreciating.

Any appraisal of Tibetan situation is helpful, but the appraisal by one particular party can hardly be objective. What we would like is objective appraisal having regard not only to internal but also external factors.

Our own appraisal is that owing to geography and climate and other factors, it is difficult for Chinese Government to exercise full control over Tibet. But if any challenge to their authority takes place, they will easily crush it ruthlessly and this will result in ending of such autonomy as Tibet might otherwise have.

We are particularly concerned with our border State like Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal and in no event will we tolerate any intrusion into these States. We can be of greater assistance not only to ourselves but to others by maintaining friendly and straight forward relations with China and, at the same time, showing firmness where our vital interests are concerned. It is necessary, therefore, to avoid any activities which might endanger those friendly relations and embarrass us.

3. Boundary Problem with Tibet¹

... 7 Mr Munshi² points out that the boundary between Tehri and Tibet is not clearly defined. That is perhaps so. The matter might be looked into. My own impression is that we are clear about the boundary. But Tibetans have regularly come across it here as well as in Assam and collected rent or revenue. When news of this has come to us (and it used to take a long time for news to travel), we have taken action. Of course, by that time the Tibetans had usually gone. That is to say, we have never accepted the fact that there is a dispute about the boundary.

8. Some time ago, Shri Sampurnanand, Minister, UP, drew my attention to the possibility of Tibetans coming across the UP border to make some collections in the nearby villages.³ I told him definitely and precisely that they should not be allowed to come and they should be pushed back if they cross over. What happened later, I do not know.

9. Shri Sampurnanand also told me that while they were prepared to keep their armed police at the border there, it was necessary to put up some buildings for them to live in. The climate was inhospitable and it was not fair to expect them to remain in tents or in the open. This was a reasonable suggestion. I do not know what has been done about it.

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 9 September 1952. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. K.M. Munshi, Governor of Uttar Pradesh at this time.
3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 16 Part II, p. 541.

4. To U Nu¹

New Delhi
September 17, 1952

My dear U Nu,

Thank you for your letter of the 6th September.²

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to the Foreign Secretary.
2. In his letter of 6 September, U Nu had informed Nehru that he had, in a conversation with the Chinese Ambassador in Rangoon, suggested a visit by Chou En-lai to Burma. Such a visit would serve two purposes. It would counteract the charge of the opposition in Burma that the Government was aligning itself with the Anglo-Americans. Further, it would discourage extremists among the Communists in Burma from staging an insurrection with Chinese support. U Nu asked Nehru for his reaction to the suggestion he had placed before the Chinese Ambassador.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

If Chou En-lai or the Foreign Minister of China visit India, they would be very welcome here. I rather doubt, however, if they will at this stage agree to visit Burma or India.

Both Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai informally suggested to our Ambassador there and to my sister, when she went there, that I might visit China. I would like to do so. But I have felt that it would be better to go there after a ceasefire in Korea. Unfortunately the ceasefire does not come off at all and is far off now as ever.

Your Ambassador here told me today that there was every chance of your coming here for the Sanchi ceremony at the end of November. I am very happy to learn this.

You write about your visit to the Naga Hill areas.³ As a matter of fact I am thinking of going to some of the Naga areas in India next month. If it is easily possible to go over to the other areas in Burma, I would like to do it. But I fear December and January are terribly heavy months for me.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. U Nu had written about his trip to the Naga Hill areas in Burma and the need for improvement in conditions there and the Burmese Government's scheme called "New Life in Backward Areas" He invited Nehru to accompany him to the Naga Hills in the coming winter.

SRI LANKA

1. To K.P. Kesava Menon¹

New Delhi
September 17, 1952

My dear Kesava Menon,²

...We have followed consistently for a number of years a certain policy in

1. JN Collection. Extracts. A copy of this letter was sent to Foreign Secretary.

2. He was India's High Commissioner in Sri Lanka from June 1951 to September 1952.

regard to Ceylon.³ That policy has certainly aimed at keeping the goodwill of the mass of the Indian residents in Ceylon. For this reason we have kept in touch with them and, whenever I have gone to Ceylon myself I have met them and discussed matters with them. We have not agreed with all the policies or activities of the Ceylon Indian Congress and have often told them so. Where this has happened, we have kept aloof and made it clear to them that the responsibility is entirely theirs. We have certainly avoided, in a matter affecting them, to have any dealings with the Ceylon Government which might be directly opposed to the wishes of the Indians in Ceylon.

The Ceylon Indian Congress is, to some extent, my creation. That is to say, I helped in bringing a number of different groups together to join in this Ceylon Indian Congress many years ago. They have acted foolishly on several occasions and I have criticized them, but I have also given them my advice and my sympathy on many other occasions.⁴

Whenever Indians or people of Indian descent have grievances in any place, and wish to take any action against the Government there, we always make it perfectly clear to them that the responsibility is theirs and they must not rely upon us. If they are strong enough and eager enough to do something, they are at liberty to do so, but we would keep apart. That has been our attitude in South Africa also.

I have been connected with negotiations with the Ceylon Government about this Indian question for the last thirteen years. I went there in 1939 to discuss this matter with the Ceylon Government. I have therefore a good deal of

3. The Government of India had consistently maintained that Indians settled in Sri Lanka had no extra-territorial loyalties. Articles 5 and 8 of the Indian Constitution made it difficult for Indian residents outside India to qualify for Indian citizenship. The Government was interested only in seeing that these people were given citizenship rights and allowed to lead an honourable life. After the visit of the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka to Delhi in December 1947 for discussions with Nehru and the long correspondence on the subject of citizenship rights, the Indian and Pakistan Residents (Citizenship) Act was enacted in August 1948, creating two kinds of citizenship—by descent and by registration, the former reserved only for the Sinhalese. Subsequently the Government of India made it clear that it would not accept responsibility for those Indians whose applications for citizenship were rejected by Sri Lanka.
4. The Ceylon Indian Congress at first boycotted registration under the Act of 1949 on the ground that the Act discriminated against Ceylon Indians. In 1950, however, the Congress changed its stand and about 237,000 applications were filed just before the last date. By the time of the elections of 1950, only 9,000 of the applications submitted had been dealt with. Of these, 8,500 applicants were enrolled as voters. The request of the Ceylon Indian Congress to enrol all the applicants for citizenship in the register of voters by a special ordinance was rejected by the Ceylon Government, and the efforts of the Government of India in this direction were also not successful. The Ceylon Indian Congress therefore launched a satyagraha in April 1952 which lasted 142 days.

personal knowledge of it, as well as of the Ceylon politicians. I do not think they have given us a fair deal. Repeatedly when I thought they had agreed to something, they backed out. I am therefore a little chary of taking the initiative in dealing with them, more especially when some kind of a movement is going on in Ceylon itself. There has been very strong feeling in India over this issue, and as a matter of fact I have tried to check it and tone it down. But I have absolutely no intention of giving in on any vital issue to the Ceylon Government however long this impasse might last.

Your approach to this problem, no doubt, had a certain merit in it, but it was not our Government's approach. Hence difficulties arose and you could not interpret our approach as fully as we would have wished. The various telegrams or letters that were sent to you either by Dutt or by R.K. Nehru, were almost always seen by me and sometimes even drafted by me. This was because I took personal interest in the matter. We had to judge of this situation from a wider point of view and not merely from the local conditions existing in Ceylon.

You will appreciate, I hope, that this was not a personal matter, but a question of certain policy to be pursued which we considered right. Whether the Delhi policy was right or wrong, may be argued, but it was not the policy of a single individual but of the Government of India, consistently followed for a number of years and to which a great deal of thought had been given.

I am sorry that appreciation of your work was not specifically indicated in the letter sent to you towards the end of your stay in Colombo. There was no lack of appreciation of that work, although opinions differed⁵ about the policy which we should pursue....

I have seen some articles in newspapers in which reference is made about your views being different from those of the Government of India. There was an article in the Tamil daily, *Veera Kesari*, on the 1st September. The *Times*

5. Kesava Menon was reluctant to follow the direction of the Government of India to make strong representation to the Government of Sri Lanka on the disfranchisement of Indians in the coming elections and ask for voting rights for all Indians whose names appeared in the 1949 register. He held that the United National Party, which was in power, was bitterly opposed to giving voting rights to Indians. He also advised the Ceylon Indian Congress to temporarily suspend the satyagraha launched by the Congress since 28 April 1952 so as to give the new Government of Dudley Senanayake a chance to formulate its policy on the question of Indian residents. He believed that the leadership of the Congress lacked the necessary moral strength to carry on a satyagraha successfully. His views, in fact, reflected a different policy from that of the Government of India.

of Ceylon on the 12th September also refers to this and further states that you are likely to write a series of articles in the *Mathrubhoomi* on this subject. It is not usual for any person who has held a high post under Government to write about controversial matters after his retirement. Indeed, this is considered rather improper. I hope, therefore, that you will not carry on any kind of controversy in the press or elsewhere on this issue.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To Dudley Senanayake¹

New Delhi
October 13, 1952

My dear Prime Minister,
Thank you for your letter of the 11th October.

I remember receiving a letter from the late Right Honourable D.S. Senanayake² about the relics and reliquaries in the British Museum.³ For my part I would like to accede to the request, in part at least, to meet the wishes of the Government and the people of Ceylon. But you will agree with me that the Buddhists in India as well as others are also interested in this matter. I am enquiring into it and shall write to you again.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

File No K/52/999/41, MEA.

Father of Dudley Senanayake and the first Prime Minister of Sri Lanka.

Some relics of Sariputta and Maha Moggallana, the chief disciples of Lord Buddha, discovered about a hundred years earlier in Sanchi and later taken to the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, were brought back and deposited in Sanchi Vihara on 30 November 1952.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1. Issues of Indo-US Relations¹

I have glanced through Shri B.R. Sen's report.²

2. I think there is often too great a tendency for us to deal directly with the Ambassador of a foreign country in Delhi and not to deal with that Government through our Ambassador there. All our formal communications should always be sent through our Embassy abroad. Of course, we should maintain full contacts with the heads of missions in Delhi wherever necessary. But when we have to send any communication to a foreign government, it should invariably be through our Ambassador, who should always be kept fully informed of any development here.

3. Our Ambassador in Washington should be informed that in regard to the Kashmir question his attitude to the State Department must be absolutely firm. He should make it clear to the US Government that we consider their attitude illogical and wrong and we cannot possibly accept it. If they wish to argue this matter on any plane, we are prepared to do so whether that plane is political, constitutional, legal or cultural. He should further point out that the attitude of the US Government in regard to this matter is more important for the relations of India and America than most other matters.

4. As regards the availability of American capital, Mr Sen takes rather a static view of the future. We are prepared to accept capital from abroad and would gladly, therefore, welcome American capital for the furtherance of our Five-Year Plan. Mr Sen seems to think that the world will still go on as at present even after the rearmament programme of the US has been completed two years from now. He ignores certain political and international factors which have to be kept in view all the time.

1. Note to R.K. Nehru, Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 22 September 1952. JN Collection.

2. In a report for his successor, G.L. Mehta, B.R. Sen, the outgoing Ambassador of India in Washington, had pointed out that there was very little diplomatic work he was called upon to do as most of it was transacted with the American Embassy in New Delhi. He had mentioned about the pro-Pakistan attitude of the US Department of State on the Kashmir question which had reflected itself in the supply of military equipment to Pakistan. Sen was of the view that American capital would show interest in India after the rearmament programme had been completed at the end of 1954-55.

5. Our new Ambassador in Washington will, no doubt, remember that while we are anxious and eager to have American goodwill and friendship, this is not obtained by adopting an over-enthusiastic attitude and functioning as a supplicant for favours to come. The dignity of our country has always to be maintained and people should be made to realize that we do not barter it for any consideration whatever.

2. To G.L. Mehta¹

New Delhi
September 30, 1952

My dear Gaganvihari,

...The question of Kashmir is often raised in America and Americans have a habit of holding us responsible for the deadlock. In this matter there is no need for us to be apologetic and we should always take up a strong line. Most Americans, of course, know very little about the facts and the origin of this dispute. So far as we are concerned, we are completely clear about our position and about the rights and wrongs in this matter and we do not appreciate anyone, not knowing this whole background, offering advice to us or, worse still, criticism. The American attitude in regard to Kashmir has probably come more in the way of Indo-American relations than anything else....

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No S/52/1397/70, MEA. Extracts.

3. To G.L. Mehta¹

New Delhi
October 1st, 1952

My dear Gaganvihari,

I have just seen your letter dated September 22nd addressed to R.K. Nehru,

1. File No 52/184.NGO/52, MEA. Also available in JN Collection.

with which you have sent report of an interview which Bahadur Singh² had with Donald Kennedy³ of the Department of State. Only yesterday I wrote to you what our attitude in regard to Kashmir should be. What Kennedy said confirms me in what I wrote. These references to India's "intransigence" in regard to Kashmir can only mean, so far as I am concerned, stupidity or something worse. In any event, I want it to be made perfectly clear that we are not prepared to tolerate this kind of thing. To us this simply means that the State Department has got a closed mind and is incapable of seeing reason. Further that it presumes too much when it refers to us in this way. They should be made to understand, in the clearest language, that we consider their attitude in this matter completely wrong and unfriendly to India and that this comes more in the way of the development of cordial relations between India and America, that all of us desire, than anything else.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. I.J. Bahadur Singh (1914-1987); First Secretary, later Counsellor, Indian Embassy, Washington, 1951-53; Ambassador to Italy and Malta, 1967-69, and to UAR, 1969-72.
3. D. Donald Kennedy (b. 1900); Foreign Relations Officer, Department of State, 1946-60.

WEST GERMANY

1. Recognition of West Germany¹

Question: Why is it that you have recognized West Germany in preference to East Germany? You have sent an Ambassador² there but you have no contact with East Germany.

Jawaharlal Nehru: No, we have been. Ever since the war ended, that is in 1945-46, we had a representative³ in West Germany who was called the Head of the Indian Military Mission and that was a continuation of the war

1. Remarks at a press conference, New Delhi, 24 July 1952. From PIB report. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference, see, pp. 149, 238-253, 583-584, 617, 637-638, 662-663 and 665-666.
2. S. Dutt was India's Ambassador in Bonn, West Germany, at this time.
3. Khub Chand, ICS.

arrangements. So it came to this that, although he had very little military functions to perform, still the person we sent from here, however civilian he might be, had to transform himself and become a Major-General. When he went there he put on uniform although probably he did not know how to walk in step. He had Major-General's functions there and recently, after the changes in West Germany, he has become our Ambassador there. It is a natural course of events. We have never had dealings with East Germany. The question did not arise.⁴

4. The Government of India had refused to recognize those countries which had been territorially dismembered after the Second World War. It had not recognized North Vietnam and South Vietnam as also North and South Korea. The only exception to this policy was its recognition of the Federal Republic of West Germany in 1949 because of India's position as a partner of the Allied military forces in Germany during and soon after the war and for the sake of her economic interests. India converted her Military Mission into a diplomatic mission and on 15 December 1949, an Indian diplomat presented his credentials in Bonn.

2. Relations with West Germany¹

These notes² are interesting, but there is nothing to be done about the matter. We need not decide as to what we might have to do in a possible future contingency. At present we should avoid doing anything which helps in finalizing the division of Germany.³ Owing to certain historical circumstances and developments, we continue to be in contact with Western Germany after the war. This contact has developed and we have now exchanged diplomatic representatives. We need not go further than this and the question of having a treaty with Western Germany does not arise. Having put an end to the state of war, we have normal relations and there the matter ends. Nothing comes in the way of those relations and the conclusion of a treaty is not at all necessary. There are a large number of countries in the world with whom we have not got treaties and yet we have normal relations with them. Any further positive

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 3 September 1952. JN Collection.
2. Presumably written by the officials in the Ministry of External Affairs following talks with Ernest W. Meyer, the West German Ambassador in New Delhi.
3. India looked forward to the unification of Germany and was, therefore, reluctant to take any step which might retard the process of unification. Recognition of East German Democratic Republic would have implied that India accepted the division of Germany as final.

step taken, as would be the case if we had a treaty with Western Germany, would be going out of our way towards consolidating the present division. We should not do that.

The German Ambassador's talk is interesting. It leaves the impression upon me that he is slightly over-emphasizing something. That does not mean that I do not accept his *bona fides* in this matter.

If we are asked privately what our views are about the German question, we can say that this is a matter for the German people to decide, and as far as we can see, the problem will not end till Germanies are re-united, because that appears to be the wish of the German people as a whole. Our chief interest is in relieving or reducing the tension in Western Europe and we do not wish to be a party to anything which keeps this tension alive. We need not take up any positive attitude as to what should be done. If a specific matter is referred to us, we can give our opinion on that.

TUNISIA

1. Attitude to Tunisian Movement¹

Question: Tunisian leaders saw you yesterday. Have you given assurances that the Government of India would help the Tunisian movement in view of the recent developments?²

1. Remarks at a press conference, New Delhi, 24 July 1952. From PIB report. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference, see pp. 149, 238-253, 583-584, 617, 637-638, 660-661 and 665-666.
2. Since April 1952, the French authorities in Tunisia had not taken any step towards either the restoration of civil liberties or the beginning of negotiations. So following the unprecedented action of the Security Council in refusing even to place the Tunisian question on its agenda, thirteen delegations representing African and Asian countries in the United Nations made a request to the Secretary-General for convening a special session of the General Assembly to consider the question. Although this request was supported by 23 countries, a special session could not be called because the technical majority required under the rules of procedure of the General Assembly was not forthcoming.

Jawaharlal Nehru: The attitude of the Government of India in regard to Tunisia had been publicly stated here and in the United Nations. It was nothing new. All that I said was that we do support the claims of all these colonial territories to freedom and, therefore, our instructions to our representatives in the United Nations or our Heads of Missions in countries concerned are to support those claims.

Q: What is your reaction to the failure of the United Nations to arrange for a special meeting on Tunisia?

JN: I thought I had expressed my views in regard to that very clearly, rather forcibly. We thought that very unfortunate, and in fact the question became less a Tunisian question but a larger question affecting the United Nations themselves, because we thought that if the United Nations could not discuss a matter which a large number of people in Asia, Africa, and some other countries consider it of vital importance, then the United Nations is not functioning as they should. It is a large question affecting the whole future of the United Nations, and we pointed that out to many of the friendly countries concerned, and said that while we attach importance to the Tunisian freedom, this question is really of wider interest and importance.

2. On Struggle in Tunisia¹

This Committee sends its warmest sympathy to the people of Tunisia and of other countries of North Africa in their struggle for national freedom and trusts that they will achieve their objective through peaceful methods and thus help in lessening some of the conflicts of the world and lay firm foundations of their national progress.

1. Resolution on Tunisia drafted by Nehru for the meeting of the All India Congress Committee at Indore, 12 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 13 September 1952.

USSR

1. Trade with Russian Zone in Germany¹

I attach a telegram which you must have seen. I do not know the details of those proposals but I feel that it will be desirable from every point of view to do business with these factories in the Russian Zone. Politically it will be a good thing so that we might not rely too much on some two or three countries in the Western Zone which drive hard bargains with us. To deal with the Russian Zone will open out new possibilities for us and we can then get better bargains everywhere.

2. Apart from this, it appears that the prices quoted are definitely favourable. It should also be remembered that in the Russian Zone we are dealing practically with Governments or with official agencies and therefore we can rely on those Governments to see that the contract is fulfilled. They are anxious to start dealings with India and we should take advantage of this.

3. Naturally each deal should be carefully considered on the merits but generally our attitude should be favourable and we should accept the deal if there is no obvious objection.

4. I should not attach too much importance to what our Ambassador said about the possible reaction of the Austrian Government. I think his fears were exaggerated and in any event we cannot allow ultimately the Austrian Government to put a ban on our dealings with others.

1. Note to the Minister of Railways and Transport, New Delhi, 16 August 1952. JN Collection.

2. Cable to Y.D. Gundevia¹

Your telegram 109 dated 6th September. There is no doubt that so-called United Committee for Relief is Communist organisation which has exploited situation

1. New Delhi, 7 September 1952. JN Collection.

politically.² There are several other relief organizations there totally unconnected with it. Government policy has been not to deal directly with any relief organization. Grants from Prime Minister's Fund given to Chief Minister, Madras, who may use them as he considers proper. Our policy regarding foreign aid in such matters had been clearly stated and followed regardless of source of such aid. We cannot permit foreign governments or organizations to intervene directly in our internal affairs.

Question of visas is secondary.³ We are always prepared to grant visas where necessity arises but not to encourage political agitation here. We might remind you of difficulties of our getting visas for Russia. Even eminent scientist like Doctor Bhatnagar⁴ has not obtained his visa after a month, although Novikov⁵ encouraged him to apply for one. Bhatnagar has now gone to England and USA. If his visa reaches London in time, he may visit Soviet Union. This is for your information.

2. Y.D. Gundevia, India's Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, had written that the Soviet Foreign Office had told him that the United Committee represented different public organizations and the question was between Soviet and Indian public organizations who would straighten the matter out appropriately. Gundevia wrote: "In other words they refuse our request." He told the Soviet Foreign Office that so-called United Committee was composed of opposition groups and encouragement given to them was seriously viewed by India as interference in her internal affairs. If India's request had been granted, the Government of India would have asked for a systematic staggering of deliveries and done advance distribution on their behalf.
3. Gundevia also had told the Soviet Foreign Office that India was refusing visas deliberately to impress that this issue might have been considered if they had been more helpful.
4. S.S. Bhatnagar.
5. K.V. Novikov was the Russian Ambassador in India.

OTHER COUNTRIES

1. Iranian Oil Issue¹

Question: Since you took up a definite stand about Iranian oil which was not pleasant to some countries, what is your reaction to Mr Churchill's statement yesterday in the House of Commons that the Iranian oil is the property of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and will not be allowed to pass the shores of Iran?

1. Remarks at a press conference, New Delhi, 24 July 1952. From the PIB report. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference, see pp. 149, 238-253, 583-584, 617, 637-638, 660-663.

Jawaharlal Nehru: What do you think? That I should regard myself as a sort of Supreme Court or what? A sort of international Court of Justice expressing my opinions, issuing my *obiter dicta*? In regard to the Iranian oil, our approach was that the Iranian Government had a right to nationalize it and it is not for us to say under what terms and conditions and how to do it. If they wanted to nationalize it, it was for them to do so. I believe that was admitted by the UK Government too. It is only with regard to details and other matters that there were conflicts.

2. Bhutan's Relations with India¹

This may be the strictly legal view, but I do not think we should accept it merely as such. We may have no particular objection to Bhutan sending migrants to the USA. But how did this question arise and who asked for it? Did Bhutan take the initiative, or, if the initiative came from the USA, what is the reason for it? I do not like this at all, whoever may have taken the initiative in this matter. We should enquire from the Bhutan Government whether they moved in this matter. If so, we should tell them that in any matter concerning a foreign government we expect them, according to our agreements, to consult us first.²

2. We should also enquire from the USA Government whether they took this action on their own initiative or as a result of an approach from some other country. It is not a question of our objecting to the particular step taken, but of the procedure adopted. Bhutan is a protected State of the Republic of India and their foreign relations are to be conducted through us. If we passively submit to this particular step, others might well follow.

3. Therefore, the action indicated above should be taken in regard to both Bhutan and the USA so that the position might be made clear.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 7 August 1952. JN Collection.

2. The treaty with Bhutan signed on 8 August 1949 gave the Government of India control over the external affairs of Bhutan while leaving internal affairs to the Maharaja and the Government of Bhutan.

3. India's Approach to Austrian Question¹

The Austrian Charge d'Affaires² came to see me this morning. He spoke to me about the difficult position of Austria under some kind of occupation³ and said that under pressure of events they might be forced to raise this matter in the United Nations. They realized that this would not lead to any satisfactory result. He referred to what I had said about this matter some time ago when I had expressed our inability to take the initiative in the matter in spite of our sympathy for Austria.⁴ He wanted to know if it would be possible for us informally to raise this question with the Soviet Government. According to him, there was some indication of possibly a favourable response from the USSR. He thought, therefore, that if our Charge d'Affaires in Moscow or our next Ambassador could raise this question, it might be helpful. At any rate, it would give some indication of what the position was and if there was any hope from the Soviet side.

I told him that it was obvious that the question of Austria was tied up with the larger issues in Europe, more specially with that of Germany. To some extent even the Korean issue affected it. There was, therefore, little hope of any solution of it till there was some improvement in the international situation. So long as there was fear of war in Europe, each major party would like to hold on to what it has got for strategic or other reasons.⁵ Logic and reason or merit would not come into consideration. Even if there was an armistice in Korea, that itself would produce a somewhat favourable atmosphere, though that would not solve any major issue.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 14 August 1952. JN Collection.
2. Kurt H. Enderl.
3. Austria was divided into US, British, French and Soviet zones of military occupation. Although the Austrians were permitted to set up a provisional Government, the exercise of Austrian sovereignty was limited by the four Powers under an agreement of 1946. Negotiations were going on for over six years for an allied agreement for the reestablishment of an independent and democratic Austria.
4. Clemens Wildner, representative of the Austrian Federal Government in India met Nehru on 14 July 1952 and discussed with him the plight of Austria since the Second World War. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, pp. 585-587.
5. Russia had rejected, for strategic reasons, the proposals of the Western Powers for a simplified peace treaty with Austria. Austria almost stood as a wedge between West Germany on the one hand and Italy and Yugoslavia on the other. The maintenance of this vantage point had driven the Soviet Union to delay an agreement on an Austrian treaty. The question had become part of an international tug-of-war in Europe.

He agreed with this, but again stressed the pressure of circumstances in Austria.

I told him that so far as we knew, the UK Government was not in favour of this question being raised in the United Nations in the near future. He said he did not know anything about this.

As far as any approach to the Soviet is concerned, I said that normally we would not do this as we do not interfere with European matters and we would not take any initiative unless there was some definite hope of result. It might be possible, however, quite informally and almost incidentally, to mention this matter at Moscow, provided circumstances appeared favourable. Our Charge d'Affaires could not be asked to do this and, besides circumstances were not favourable now. But when our new Ambassador, Shri K.P.S. Menon, went there and there was some improvement in the situation, he might make some informal reference in the course of talks. This will have to be left to his judgment as to how and when this should be done, if at all.

The Austrian Charge d'Affaires said he appreciated our position and he hoped that it would be possible to make this informal approach. He then wanted to make it clear that this should not be considered as a bar to the matter being raised by Austria in the United Nations. I told him that there was no question of our preventing Austria from taking this step though we felt that it would not yield any results and might even create difficulties and harm the attitude of the various parties concerned. Anyhow, this was for the Austrian Government to decide. Naturally, if this was done, it would become much more difficult for us to raise the question in Moscow.

Before leaving me he again said that he appreciated our position and realized that an approach to the United Nations might well create further difficulties. But sometimes it became difficult not to take this step.

This note may be shown to Shri K.P.S. Menon when he comes here and we can discuss it then.

4. The Indian Representative in Gold Coast¹

Our Commissioner in East Africa, Shri Apa Pant, has recently concluded a tour in West Africa. In the course of this tour, he visited the Gold Coast. This

1. Note to the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet, New Delhi, 20 August 1952. File No A-II/52/1722/31, MEA. Also available in JN Collection.

tour was not only interesting, but very informative and the visit of our Commissioner was greatly welcomed there. He found an abundance of goodwill for India. The people there looked up to India to help them in many ways.

2. The Prime Minister of Gold Coast sent a letter to Shri Pant in which he suggested that the Government of India might appoint a Consul at Accra.

3. This letter from Mr Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Gold Coast, as well as two letters from our Commissioner, are attached for the information of the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet.

4. I should like to say that I entirely agree with the general appraisal² of the situation in West Africa by our Commissioner. Big events are happening in Africa, whether in the South, in the East, or in the West, and the next few years might well see the rapid growth of the importance of Africa in international affairs. Political consciousness is spreading there rapidly. The discipline of the Passive Resistance Movement in South Africa, which has been mainly conducted by Africans, has been remarkable. Africa, therefore, is very much in the picture, and is of particular importance to us. Being somewhat suspicious of Europeans and Americans, Africans look towards India.

5. Our Commissioner in East Africa, Shri Apa Pant, has done very good work in East Africa which is bearing fruit in the good relations that exist between Indians and Africans. But Africa is a vast continent and we can hardly expect a person sitting at Nairobi to deal with that entire situation. The Gold Coast has a peculiar importance as it is one of the self-governing regions in Africa and, to some extent, Africans look to the new Government of Gold Coast for leadership. Therefore, it is important that India should be represented there suitably, and I entirely agree with the proposal made by our Commissioner in regard to this matter. Not only present importance demands this, but the developments which are bound to take place in the near future, necessitate this.

6. The Education Ministry should also give immediate consideration to the possibility of a considerable number of West African students coming to India.

7. We should welcome an official delegation from West Africa to come to India for the study of questions of interest to them.

2. Kenya was a crown colony with a Governor appointed by the British Colonial Secretary. The Governor was advised by an executive council consisting of official and non-official members. The Legislative Council consisted of nominated officials and non-officials and elected members; the Africans were given only a token representation. The population of Kenya consisted approximately of more than five million Africans, one lakh Indians, twenty thousand Europeans and twenty-five thousand Arabs and others. Though constituting a small minority, the Europeans controlled agriculture, trade, industry, and the Government. The Africans demanded self-government, social equality, better social services and more land.

GENERAL

1. The Avoidance of War¹

The All India Congress Committee, while reaffirming the resolution on foreign policy passed at its last meeting held in Calcutta in March 1952,² reiterates its firm conviction that it is essential in the interests of humanity, as well as of individual nations, to avoid war. Whatever results may have been achieved by war in the past, the nature of modern war is such that it cannot solve any problem or advance the national interest of any country as it brings vast destruction and degradation in its train, and it nullifies the very objectives for which it may have been fought. Thus war is no longer an effective instrument of national policy. It is essential, therefore, for national policies to be directed towards the avoidance of war and the adjustment, if a solution is not immediately possible, of such problems as are leading to conflict.

In view of the tremendous pace of modern developments in technology and communications, and the closer contacts which have resulted therefrom, the world is faced with a choice between close international cooperation and interminable and disastrous conflicts, which cannot ultimately advance the cause of any nation. That closer cooperation between the nations of the world cannot take place so long as there is fear of aggression and the suppression of national freedom. Any form of imperialist expansion, or of domination of one nation over another, is thus an enemy of peace and of human progress.

The expenditure of vast sums of money on building up armaments at the expense of economic progress is itself a cause of deterioration leading to discontent and conflict. If the energies of the nations of the world were diverted towards economic betterment, more especially of those countries which need this most, that would be a greater guarantee of peace than any based on armaments.

The Committee appeals to the United Nations Organisation, which was founded for the preservation of peace and the avoidance of war, to devote itself to this vital problem of the age, and find a way out of the deadlocks which continually threaten the very cause for which the United Nations was

1. Resolution on foreign policy drafted by Nehru for the meeting of the All India Congress Committee at Indore, 12 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 13 September 1952. The resolution, moved by Maulana Azad, and seconded by S.K. Patil, was passed on 13 September 1952.
2. The resolution was adopted at the meeting of the AICC in Calcutta on 22 March 1952. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 17, p. 584.

founded. In particular the Committee appeals to those great nations, on whom a special responsibility in regard to world affairs rests today, to meet together with a view to removing the ever present fear and tensions that oppress mankind, and to take some immediate steps towards the solution of the major problems of the day.

The Committee would specially urge that every effort be made to conclude a truce in Korea and thus prepare the way to a peaceful settlement in the Far East.

While approving of the foreign policy pursued by the Government of India, this Committee trusts that India will continue to work for peace and international cooperation and will be ever ready to serve this cause, whatever the changing circumstances might be.

2. India's Status Abroad¹

I emphasize the importance of the foreign policy draft resolution which the Committee is called upon to discuss and adopt. Some people may imagine that the Working Committee is more concerned with external affairs than internal situation. We do owe a duty to ourselves to consider foreign affairs because they are of vital importance to the world and ourselves. Whether in peace or war, we will be involved in the consequences of anything which happens to the world. We cannot remain isolated even though our policy is one of non-alignment, and we are trying to do our utmost to prevent any disastrous development in the world.

A consideration of foreign affairs is necessary not only to the members of the Working Committee or the AICC. It is also a duty of the man in the street to have a broad and proper understanding of the country's policy. We want an intelligent electorate and an intelligent populace to discuss and decide these issues.

Even though the Committee has put forward the resolutions on foreign affairs and South Africa first, what is more important is the economic affairs. The basic problem before the country is that of economic advancement. Unless we face the problem in a satisfactory and adequate measure, we fail. The problem is how to raise the level of the people, to remove the scourge of poverty and unemployment and the frustration that came out of it...

1. Address to the delegates attending the meeting of the All India Congress Committee, Indore, 13 September 1952. From *The Hindu*, 14 September 1952. Extracts.

Democracy does not mean taking blind decisions by a majority. While I agree that the will of the largest number of people must prevail in a democracy, one should not rule out that sometimes democracy takes wrong and foolish decisions. In fact, looking at the world today, the democracies are taking wrong decisions. It is essential for the proper functioning of democracy that it should not only give the right lead from above but also that that right lead must emerge from the people themselves....

With the achievement of independence, India has attained a certain status in world affairs. She has a voice in developments abroad. At times, whether we like it or not, we have to express our views on certain subjects. The strength of our voice, and the effectiveness of the view which we express, will ultimately depend on the inherent strength of the country. No amount of resolutions or speeches can replace that strength.

I do not believe that anybody in the world wants a war, but yet the atmosphere is such and events are moving at such a pace and direction that it looks as though the world is being dragged towards a catastrophe. It is the definite policy of India to avoid war. If there is a war, and whoever may be responsible for it, the result will be misery for the world.

India has no misconception about her own strength. She may not be strong enough in the sense in which the modern world understands it. But yet, there is one thing which is characteristic of India and that is, she never submitted to injustice. Before she achieved freedom, India was weak in a sense but even then, she never bowed to injustice. Threats or allurements could never shake her. India will continue to firmly adhere to her declared policy.

We do not want to take upon ourselves the task of arbitrating between the different nations and settle disputes. If, however, there is any need at any time to express our opinion, we shall do so unhesitatingly.

It is significant that the freedom struggle of India had in a sense started in South Africa where Mahatma Gandhi, who later on gave the weapon of satyagraha to this country to fight against a mighty imperialism, first tested it in that country and made it effective after its use there.

The great question that faces the world today is how the racial problem is to be solved in South Africa, whether through peace or bloodshed. If the people of South Africa decide to use arms, whatever may be their effectiveness, it will bring a catastrophe to the world.

The passive resisters of South Africa have vowed to oppose the unjust laws through methods of non-violence and by these methods, they are increasing their strength. It is possible that the racial question in South Africa may be solved in an atmosphere of peace.

A major aspect of the whole problem is that Africa has awakened. The people of South Africa look for help from other people—help not in terms of money, but of knowledge and understanding....

II. FOREIGN POSSESSIONS IN INDIA

1. Political Repression in French Enclaves¹

Newspapers continue to give information about police and other activities in the French enclaves² in India against those who are in favour of merger with India.³ These people, no doubt, are citizens of French India and, therefore, in a narrow sense, we cannot intervene. But obviously these activities of the French Government affect us directly, and I do not see why we should remain quiescent in regard to them.

2. I do not know if you have received any information on this subject from our representative in Pondicherry.

3. I think we should address the French Government in this matter and tell them that this kind of political repression of people who are in favour of merger and preventing them from expressing their opinion or carrying on their normal activities makes it clear that there can be no free referendum or plebiscite in these areas. We must protest strongly against this and inform them that this repression produces repercussions in India.

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, New Delhi, 2 October 1952. JN Collection.

2. The French settlements in India comprised an area of 203 square miles with a population of 323,295 according to the Census of 1941. The French enclave of Chandernagore in Bengal became a part of the Indian Union after the treaty for its cession was signed in Paris in 1951 by the two Governments. The remaining settlements were: (a) Pondicherry, the capital, together with the adjoining territory; (b) Karaikal and dependent districts; (c) Yanam, with the dependent rural areas; (d) Mahe with the adjoining territory; and (e) a factory in Surat.

3. For example, Bahour, one of the eight divisions of Pondicherry and consisting of 25 villages with 25,000 people, had been in the forefront of the struggle of the people of the French settlement to throw out French rule and be united with India. In the beginning of 1952, Thangavelu Gounder, a municipal councillor of Bahour, presided over a meeting which passed a resolution asking the French to quit their settlements without a referendum. Soon, a reign of terror was let loose in Bahour, forcing many people to flee to Indian territory.

2. No Tolerance of Foreign Footholds in India¹

Question: What is the position in regard to French and Portuguese establishments in India?

Jawaharlal Nehru: The Government of India takes a serious view of the continued oppression of the people and specially of the nationalist elements in the French and Portuguese possessions in India. This oppression, as well as the recent report of some neutral observers, make it perfectly clear that there is no possibility of any fair plebiscite or referendum² in those places. We have agreed to a plebiscite because we wanted the people to decide. But we have seen that the Governments there do not propose to allow fair conditions to prevail. Therefore, a plebiscite can hardly take place.

Normally speaking, one Government does not interfere with the internal steps taken by another in regard to its own nationals. But the position regarding French and Portuguese establishments in India cannot be so regarded. It is inevitable, as we have said before, that these enclaves in the heart of India must become part of the Indian Union. We have patiently waited for settlement by negotiations and we still hope to settle in this way. But it must be clearly understood that we cannot tolerate foreign footholds in India, more especially when there is serious oppression taking place on the citizens who express their sympathies for a merger with India. This very oppression puts an end to the slightest justification, if any, for the continuation of these foreign footholds.

1. Remarks at a press conference, Madras, 4 October 1952. From *The Hindu*, 5 October 1952. Extracts. For other parts of the press conference, see pp. 138-139, 153, 342-343, 412, 431, 510-511, 553-554 and 648-649.
2. In June 1948 an agreement was reached between the Government of India and the French Government under which the French Government had agreed to a referendum being held in the French settlements. On a suggestion of the French Government the International Court of Justice appointed three neutral observers, two European and one Asian, to study conditions in the French settlements in India and report back to the Court on the feasibility of holding a referendum. They arrived in Pondicherry in March 1952 and reported after investigation that conditions did not exist for a fair and free plebiscite in the French settlements.

3. The Situation in French India¹

... 3. The Prime Minister started by asking Shri Sellane Naicker² about the activities of nationalists inside Pondicherry. Shri Sellane Naicker stated that under the present conditions of repression by the French Government and terrorism through goondas, no political activity was possible. For any public assembly, permission of the local Government was necessary, which was invariably refused to the nationalists, whereas even private meetings or social gatherings by them could not be held, as those attending such meetings were immediately subjected to goondaism. Since the Government were directly behind this type of oppression, the nationalists could get no redress from it.

4. Shri Sellane Naicker stated that if the Prime Minister so ordered, they could occupy the outlying French enclaves as there were about 7,000 to 8,000 refugees dispersed all along the frontier and there was in addition the Indian population to help them. The Prime Minister replied that there was little difference between a private invasion from outside and an official invasion and if force had to be used, India could as well send an army. We had to deal with a foreign power which had a certain position in Europe, hence it would at once result in war with France. The Government of India, however, intended to settle the matter by negotiation and was not prepared to enter into an international war to expedite the integration. The Prime Minister added that the position would not be the same if the people inside French territory took any action.

5. Referring to the statement in the Memorandum that the Government of India were preoccupied with the question of Kashmir, hence they were indifferent to the French Indian problem, the Prime Minister stated that this was not so and that there was no connection between the two.

6. The Prime Minister further made it clear that the Government of India were going to deal with the matter through diplomatic channels and that they will not practise any fraud or deception or be party to any form of goondaism. He also added that the Government of India would not give any help, financial or otherwise, to do anything inside Pondicherry. He said that India was henceforward going to take up a bigger and stronger attitude with France but they could not expect any great results, because of various factors, namely, international as well as internal and external affairs of France, came into play.

1. Note, drafted by R.K. Tandon, Consul-General of India in Pondicherry, on the meeting between the French India nationalists and Nehru in Madras on 8 October 1952. File No. E I/52/2635/701, MEA. Extracts.

2. President, Pondicherry Merger Committee.

7. The Prime Minister explained that the policy of India was determined by India's national interests and these interests demanded that Pondicherry must integrate with India. Even if the nationalists inside French India were helpless, merger must take place.

8. He further stated that Pondicherry and the other colonies were in the nature of symbols to France, which was already a disintegrating power. The Government of France was weak and it was not easy to deal with a weak Government.

9. The Prime Minister, in his capacity as Congress President, agreed to advise the President,³ Tamilnad Congress Committee, to take greater interest specially with regard to propaganda and meetings.

10. ...The Prime Minister told him that the situation all over the world was rapidly developing, hence it would not be advisable to take an adventurous step. He suggested that the nationalists should, at first, build up their strength before thinking on those lines.

11. The Prime Minister gave the following advice to the deputationists, who specifically asked him if they should stay *tranquille*:

(a) To give as much publicity and propaganda to the present state of affairs in French India and bring to notice all cases of repression and goondaism. This would help in building up a case against the French Government;

(b) To help the Congress Committees in the border districts to do propaganda; and

(c) To do anything else that was possible inside Pondicherry.

12. The Prime Minister then considered the suggestions made in the memorandum:

(a) As regards the continuance of the Land Customs cordon, he stated that the nationalists had, early this year, recommended a Customs Union agreement with France. The Government of India had already taken up the question with the French Government, but they would now consider the proposal for the continuance of the Land Customs cordon, as, in fact, the present negotiations appeared to be leading in that direction;

(b) With regard to complaints against Customs officials, the Prime Minister stated that Government would be prepared to look into them. He would also consider the proposal for the re-introduction of the permit system;

(c) As regards the reduction of export quotas for the French settlements, the Prime Minister said that, according to his reports, the present quotas were on the low side. The deputationists explained that the real problem arose because of the large-scale smuggling of essential commodities into Pondicherry;

(d) With regard to control over the movement of currency, the Prime Minister stated that the point had already been examined, but it was not considered advisable to take such a step;

(e) As for the request of the deputationists for the grant of monetary aid and other concessions, the Prime Minister made it clear that the Government of India would not give any financial help. The Government of Madras could, however, examine the question of concessions in the matter of appointments, etc.;

(f) As regards increase in the strength of prohibition staff to prevent people going to French Indian territories for purposes of drink, the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister of Madras pointed out that the real solution lay in the re-introduction of the permit system as it was not possible for the prohibition staff to prevent the movement of people.

4. Policy towards Foreign Possessions¹

Recently you may have read in the papers of repeated acts of gangsterism in some of the French settlements in the country. Goondas there are not only harassing the Indian French nationals, that is citizens of Pondicherry, but sometimes show the temerity even to attack Indian nationals. I was told the other day that they attacked a couple of our policemen. This is a strange state of affairs. Everybody knows that Pondicherry and Mahe and one or two other places, as well as Goa in western India, are geographically the inalienable parts of India. Everybody knows, or ought to know, that the British empire in India had ended. It is fantastic for anyone to imagine that bits of the Portuguese or French empire can continue in India.

Again because of our love of peace we have waited patiently for a peaceful solution of this problem. And we did not wish to force ourselves on anyone and would let the people decide by plebiscite. Three years ago there was some kind of an agreement between us and the French Government about some plebiscite or other and preparations were made. That has not taken place yet. Meanwhile, methods of gangsterism have flourished. An atmosphere of goondaism has been created there, and if a person talks about merger with

1. Speech at a public meeting, Madras, 9 October 1952. AIR tapes, NMML. Extracts. For other parts of the speech, see pp. 51-69, 343-345, and 649.

India, goondas are likely to smash his head. It is an extraordinary state of affairs.

The other day some neutral observers came to India and went to Pondicherry. Among other things, they reported that gangster methods were practised in the French Settlements. Why are these methods practised? I can only guess. I take it that these are practised so as to terrify the people of Pondicherry not to vote in favour of merger with India if and when a plebiscite takes place. There may be other reasons too. If gangster methods are being practised in Pondicherry, that can only mean one of two things or both: one is that the Government of the French Settlements connives at them or encourages them, and the other is that it is totally powerless to control them. There can be no third explanation for it. In either event, the situation becomes an intolerable one. If an Indian national is interfered with, we take action, of course. Normally speaking, if a French Indian national, that is, an Indian citizen of Pondicherry, is interfered, because he is a foreign national, we cannot take any action. But when the goonda tactics are employed to crush a movement in favour of merger of these establishments in India, then it is a matter of the most intimate concern to us. After the experience of these two years or so, the obvious thought that comes to one is that these gangster methods are meant to crush or terrify people from voting for India. the obvious consequence of this to my mind is that there is going to be no voting at all.

We shall have voting no more. We shall have to put an end to this business. We have played about with the idea of plebiscite and we have seen how by fraud and deceit this idea has been washed away by the other side. There is then an end of this plebiscite business. India stands in this ground, namely, that Pondicherry and other French Settlements and Goa must inevitably belong to the Union of India. There is going to be no further debate about that issue, I hope. We are not going to discuss that basic issue with anybody any longer. The only point we are going to discuss is the details which follow from acceptance of that issue.

I have spoken seriously because I have strong feelings in the matter. I happen to be the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and so I speak on this matter with your authority and the authority of the Government of India. I repeat that it is India's policy, and it has been so, that there should be nowhere in the territory of India a foreign foothold in India. Therefore, the French establishments become parts of the Union of India....

Nevertheless, I want a peaceful settlement of this question. Anybody with the least knowledge of history and current affairs and also the mind and determination of India must realize, wherever he may be, that there can be only one solution and settlement of this question and no other. It does not matter what difficulties may be put in the way. It has to be solved that way. It however cannot wait too long for that solution.

5. Aide-memoire on French Settlements in India¹

The Embassy of India present their compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have the honour to state as follows:

1. In accordance with an agreement arrived at between the British Government and the representatives of the people of India, the British Power withdrew from India in August 1947. Certain parts of India were partitioned and became Pakistan....The historic process, which had brought about the end of British rule in India, would be completed only when the remaining enclaves, which were under foreign colonial rule, were also integrated with the Union of India.

2. Accordingly, approaches were made to the French Government for a friendly settlement in this matter and the transfer of the French establishments to the Union of India....Conversations took place in Delhi and Paris on this issue and the French Government recognized that the Union of India was justified in asking for a radical change in the existing situation. The nature of this change, however, was not agreed to at the time and various proposals were made. The general principle was agreed that full opportunity should be given to the inhabitants of these Settlements to determine the nature of this change.

3. By a declaration dated the 8th June, 1948, the National Assembly of France decided that the people of the French Settlements in India should determine their future political status by means of "a free and sincere consultation, the particulars of which would be fixed in agreement with the elected Municipal Councils of those Settlements"....

5. On the 19th June, 1949, a referendum was held in the settlement of Chandernagore and there was an overwhelming vote in favour of the transfer of the free town to the Indian Union. A referendum in respect of the remaining four French Settlements which are in South India has not so far been held as no agreement has been reached between the two Governments regarding the modalities of the consultation, and as conditions for a free referendum do not exist in these territories.

6. In their anxiety for an early settlement, the Government of India have felt obliged, on several occasions, to draw the attention of the French Government to the fact that conditions in the French Settlements are becoming more and more unsatisfactory politically. This is borne out by the report of

1. Aide-memoire, undated, which was read out at a meeting of the Cabinet on 17 October 1952. The Indian Ambassador in Paris was asked to present it to the French Government. File No 89/CF/48, Cabinet Secretariat Papers. Extracts.

the three neutral observers who were deputed by the French Government in March 1951 to inquire into the conditions existing in the Settlements. The neutral observers considered it indispensable that "owing to certain defects characterizing political life in the Settlements" certain measures ensuring complete freedom for the electoral body during the electoral period should be adopted.

7. The Government of India regret to note that the French Government have taken no steps to implement the recommendations of the neutral observers. Conditions in the Settlements are steadily deteriorating and lawless elements have been given a free hand to terrorize people who are in favour of merger. Due to the inactivity or open connivance of the local authorities, a situation has arisen in which freedom of speech, press or association has in practice ceased to exist. Numerous incidents have taken place in Indian territory bordering the Settlements and the various representations made in this behalf by the Consul-General of India in Pondicherry and the Embassy of India in Paris have gone unheeded....The existing state of affairs has convinced the Government of India that no useful purpose would be served by proceeding further on the basis of having a referendum in the French Settlements. Conditions suitable for the holding of a free and fair referendum have in fact ceased to exist.

8. In the circumstances, the Embassy of India are constrained to inform the French Government that the Government of India do not consider themselves bound any longer by their previous agreement with the French Government's declaration of the 8th June, 1948....The Government of India accordingly consider that negotiations between the two Governments should take place on the basis of a direct transfer of these areas to India. They have no doubt that the French Government will appreciate that it is not consistent with the status of India as an independent Republic that such foreign enclaves, which are relics of colonial rule, should continue to exist on Indian soil. They are anxious that this question should be settled by agreement in a peaceful manner....

LETTERS TO CHIEF MINISTERS

New Delhi
25 July, 1952

My dear Chief Minister,

I am guilty of delay in sending you this letter. But work has been very heavy indeed and it is sometimes difficult to keep pace with it.

2. One of the subjects that has taken up a great deal of our time is that of Kashmir. There are two separate aspects of this—Dr Graham's enquiries and efforts at mediation and the internal relationship of the Jammu and Kashmir State with the Union of India. So far as the former is concerned. Dr Graham has practically finished his third stage of conversations.² He now proposes that a meeting on ministerial level should take place at Geneva early in August. We have always been willing to cooperate in all talks which might lead to a settlement. Normally, therefore, we would agree to this meeting. But it is exceedingly difficult for a Minister to go to Geneva on the date suggested. We had proposed that the meeting might be held in Delhi, but, as was expected, Pakistan did not approve of this. We are now thinking what reply we should send to Dr Graham.³ It is clear that none of our Ministers can go outside before the present session of Parliament ends. We do not yet know how long it will last. Originally it was fixed to end on the 31st July. Now this has been extended to the 7th August. Probably there will be another extension of some days. Then there is the Independence Day on August 15th. No Minister can possibly leave India before the third week of August. I am not yet sure whether we can send anyone. There are not many people who are fully acquainted with the complicated negotiations in regard to Kashmir which have taken place during the last four and a half years. I cannot go in any event, partly because I just cannot leave India at this stage, partly also because my going to a foreign country has a certain additional significance and might create some complications.

3. The other question that we have been discussing at great length has been the relationship of Kashmir with India. Yesterday I spoke at some length in the House of the People.⁴ Probably you will see a report of my speech. I shall try to send you a copy of it later and I shall not, therefore, repeat what I said then. But I would like you to keep in mind the full facts of this Kashmir

1. File No. 25(6)/52-PMS. The letters in this section have also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 3, pp. 54-134.
2. See *ante*, pp. 227 and 351.
3. See *ante*, pp. 353-354.
4. See *ante*, pp. 219-238.

story and the peculiar position that the State has occupied ever since it acceded to India. Most people are unaware of this or are apt to forget it. They mix up accession with other matters. The accession of Jammu and Kashmir state was complete just as the accession of other Indian states was complete when it first took place. But later the other states accepted a closer integration with the Union. Kashmir did not, and could not, in the circumstances. That does not lessen in any way its accession to India. This matter came up before us when the Constitution of India was being finalized about November 1949. Sardar Patel dealt with it then and he gave a special, though transitional, place to the Jammu and Kashmir state in our Constitution. This was embodied in Article 370 of the Constitution and the President's Order which was issued on January 26th, 1950.⁵ In accordance with this Article and this Order, only certain parts of our Constitution were applied to Kashmir State. That position continued and still continues. It might have continued like this for some more time if the Constituent Assembly of the Jammu and Kashmir State had not been meeting now to finalize their Constitution. Because of this, we had to consider this matter afresh.

4. As a result of our talks and the agreement⁶ arrived at, a number of fresh and important parts of our Constitution will now be applied to the Kashmir State. Even so, the State will be on a somewhat separate footing from that of the other States. This was inevitable not only because of the UN reference, but also because of the other factors.

5. This is the legal approach. But far more important than this is the psychological approach, and this has been recognized right from the beginning. We have stated all along that there is going to be no compulsion of any kind on the people of Kashmir. It is for them to decide. If they wish to leave India, they can do so, however much this may be painful to us. If we adopt any other policy, that will be against our basic principles, our pledges to the people of Kashmir and to the world, and would, in addition, be a justification of the charges that Pakistan has brought against us. Because of this, we have always laid stress on the right of the people of Kashmir to decide their future and the extent to which they will accept the various parts of our Constitution. In other words, while being a constituent unit of India like all others, the measure of State autonomy in their case is somewhat greater for the present than that in other States. It is open to them and to us to vary this in future.

6. In the nature of things, what holds us together is not law or constitution, but the feelings of the people on both sides, as well as their common ideals and objectives. That is the basic bond. Everything that we do should be judged

5. See *ante*, p. 231.

6. See *ante*, pp. 211-217.

from that standpoint. The agitation⁷ in parts of Jammu Province against the present Kashmir Government is, from this point of view, basically misconceived, because it tends to loosen that bond and to make large numbers of people in Kashmir rather apprehensive about their future.

7. The talks we had with Shaikh Abdullah and his colleagues were long and sometimes rather exhausting. But there was no real difficulty about them, as we approached these complicated questions in a friendly and comradely way. Unfortunately, largely because of press propaganda, a mist of doubt and suspicion had arisen in the minds of many people. I am glad that this has been removed and we can continue to work together with full faith in each other. Whatever the importance, political or other, there might be for us (and the importance is very great for both of us) in the Kashmir State being part of the Union of India, that partnership can only subsist in friendship and faith. Only then it has some value. It is on the basis of this that we have proceeded in the past and this has brought rich dividends. It is on this basis also that we propose to go ahead in the future.

8. We have taken many important decisions which, inevitably, will produce their reactions elsewhere, more especially in regard to other so-called B States. The very first question that arises is that of the Head of the State. We have agreed to the Head of the State of Jammu and Kashmir State being chosen by the Constituent Assembly who will recommend a name to the President of the Union. This recommendation and recognition by the President satisfies our Constitution. But behind it lies the fact that the real choice is that of the Constituent Assembly or the State Legislature. That choice can only be made by some form of election. This throws out a new idea for the other B States. I confess that I am not an admirer of that part of our Constitution which has given a life tenure to the Rajpramukhship in these B States.⁸ Many of the arrangements arrived at in those hurried days of accession seem rather out of place now when we think about them more coolly.

9. In Parliament we have had not only a strenuous but sometimes an exciting time. There was the debate on linguistic provinces.⁹ I have often written to you about this subject and in Parliament I repeated our policy. There is absolutely no desire on our part to come in the way of an adjustment or change which is desired by the people. But where desires or interests conflict, it becomes difficult to come to any automatic and theoretical conclusion. We have to act as a responsible Government keeping in view all the factors. Merely to rush in and decide something without carefully weighing all the consequences

7. See *ante*, p. 249.

8. Under Article 366(21) of the Constitution the Rajpramukhs held their posts for life subject to their continuing to enjoy the President's recognition.

9. From 7 to 12 July 1952 in the House of the People. See for Nehru's reply to the debate, *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, pp. 260-272.

and providing for them would be the height of irresponsibility. There can be little doubt that the creation of new provinces would involve, to say the least, major administrative changes and upsets. We shall face them, if necessary, but let us face them after thinking them out and with a measure of general consent among those chiefly concerned. We live in strange times when the thin crust of peace and stability easily cracks. Almost every day some news comes from other countries of internal upsets. A day or two ago, we read about the *coup d'etat* in Egypt.¹⁰ In Iran, conditions are bad.¹¹ In Korea, interminable talks go on while the issue of war and peace hangs in the balance.

10. Another exciting and almost fierce debate was that on the Preventive Detention Bill.¹² In the course of this debate, the House of the People witnessed some scenes which were most regrettable.¹³ What pained me very much was an element of vulgarity that sometimes crept into some Members' speeches, and not only in speeches but in their gestures also. It would be unfortunate indeed if we cannot behave with restraint and dignity in our legislatures.

11. The Preventive Detention Bill has gone into Select Committee and it will, no doubt, take up a good deal of our time later.¹⁴ It is quite possible that this session of Parliament might have to be prolonged because of this as we have to dispose it of during this session. In the course of the debate on this Bill, many charges were brought against Government, chiefly State Governments, in regard to individual cases.¹⁵ It was difficult to deal with all these charges then, though each charge made always deserves an inquiry. Government is not above error, certainly not Government officials. The test is not so much absence of error, but the capacity to correct it and to profit by past mistakes. But the real point at issue in this Bill is not an individual case here and there, but whether this power should be given to our Government. You know that every State Government has demanded this power and if the Central Government did not provide it, there would probably be varying State laws on the same subject. That would be unfortunate. It is far better to have a

10. See *ante*, p. 220.

11. After elections in May 1952, the Prime Minister Mossadeq formally resigned on 5 July 1952; re-nominated by the Majlis, he assumed the premiership on 11 July 1952, but asked for sweeping powers in the administrative and economic fields and insisted on holding the war ministry. On denial of such powers, Mossadeq resigned on 17 July. This led to widespread rioting in his favour. On 22 July 1952, the Majlis having voted his reinstatement, Mossadeq became Prime Minister again.

12. From 18 to 23 July 1952. See for Nehru's speech during the debate, *ante*, pp. 453-466.

13. During the debate on the Bill on 18 July 1952, the Speaker ordered a Communist Member who constantly interrupted him to leave and, on his refusing to do so, ordered him to be taken out by force; thereafter all the Communist Members walked out.

14. See *ante*, pp. 462 and 464.

15. See *ante*, p. 454.

carefully thought out piece of Central legislation which would bring about uniformity in all the States.

12. Apart from this major reason, there is, I think, adequate justification for our having this measure to deal with special cases of anti-social activities. Not many people know that quite a considerable number of black-marketeers have been dealt with under the last Act. There have also been cases of espionage and there have been cases, as in Saurashtra, of a well organized movement, comprising big jagirdars in close alliance with gangs of dacoits.¹⁶ But for the Preventive Act that we have, it would have been very difficult to deal with them.

13. It is supposed by some people that this will be meant chiefly for the Communists.¹⁷ That is not true, though it has been applied a great deal, more especially in Hyderabad and Bengal, against Communists. In Hyderabad, there was something in the nature of open insurrection¹⁸ and I doubt very much if any Government anywhere would have dealt with such insurrectionary activities under the normal civil law. The situation was a very grave one and the gravity can well be realized when we compare it with what has been happening in Malaya. I have no doubt that the Malayan situation is a bigger one and more difficult to handle. Nevertheless, essentially, the two had a great similarity. The special laws and regulations applied in Malaya, without much success thus far, are infinitely harsher than anything that was done in Hyderabad. I think it is true that there were police excesses in Hyderabad and I am distressed about them. But one must remember the terrible excesses on the other side and the difficulties that the police had to experience.

14. We talk of Communists rather vaguely. There are, of course, the orthodox Communists, i.e., members of the Communist Party of India. But, apart from them, there are many other types and varieties of Communists who are a law unto themselves. Many of these latter still continue to declare that they will indulge in violence. In Bengal, every member of the Communist Party has been released. But there are some of this other type of Communists who still continue in detention because even in detention they say that when they come out they will revert to their peculiar type of violence, which has been throwing bombs, killing people and looting.

15. The question before us is whether, having regard to all the circumstances, we should have some such preventive detention law or not. I think that it is necessary. The other question then has to be carefully considered

16. See *ante*, p. 466.

17. A.K. Gopalan suggested this on 21 July and the next day S.P. Mookerjee said that if the Government had any charges to make against the Communist Party, these should be made openly and not by resorting to "star chamber methods."

18. See *ante*, p. 20.

as to what the nature of that law should be and how we can profit by our past experience; we should provide checks and safeguards. Some attempt has been made on the present Bill, which is certainly an improvement on the past.¹⁹ It may be still improved further in the Select Committee.

16. Having said all this, I should like to impress upon you that a law like this must be used with the greatest caution. It is not to be used normally and only in special cases should it be invoked. It is easy enough to put a person in prison and this might well become a habit with some of our district or other officials. We must prevent this happening. I have seen some cases in which it appeared to me to be manifestly wrong to have used this law against some individuals.

17. There has been a good deal of talk about India's efforts to help in bringing about a settlement in Korea. It is true that we have tried hard and we continue to do so despite many disappointments. But it is wrong to call India's role as that of a mediator. We happen to be placed in a special position because we have friendly relations with countries on both sides of the conflict. We can approach them, which others cannot. We have tried to take advantage of this position sometimes interpreting one country's wishes or suggestions to the other. But this has been done quite informally and without commitments. That was the only way to do it. We shall continue to function in this way. I wish that the press would not make a fuss about it, because that itself comes in our way.

18. The situation in Nepal is causing us grave anxiety.²⁰ The nationalist movement there is disintegrating and, as a result, the Government is also disintegrating. For the moment it is difficult to say how a stable Ministry can be established there in the near future. It might well happen that the King decides to function without a Ministry and with the help of advisers only for a while. If so, that will only be a temporary solution. Nepal demonstrates to us that we cannot make progress by pure theory or by wishful thinking. We have to have the material for progress, the human material more than anything else.

19. Assam has again been devastated by floods. That attractive but very unfortunate province has had a succession of calamities year after year. Apart from this it has very special problems and is almost surrounded by international frontiers—Tibet-China, Burma and Pakistan. In addition, it has large tribal areas which contain a great variety of different tribal folk. Some of these tribes are highly advanced in their own way and very attractive; others are exceedingly primitive and indulge in head-hunting. The resources of the State

19. See *ante*, p. 464.

20. See *ante*, pp. 557-558.

are very limited and yet much has to be done. We are sending a team of senior officers to Assam very soon to examine these various problems on the spot and to advise us as to what should be done by the Central Government.²¹

20. On the whole, the food situation throughout the country is fairly satisfactory. The rains have also been good in large parts of the country, though some parts still lack them. The new food policy that has been adopted in many States is producing good results, both practically and psychologically. I was greatly surprised therefore to learn about the food riots in Calcutta.²² I have seldom come across anything with lesser justification behind it. There was no lack of food in Calcutta, either rice or wheat, and the Central Government had fulfilled all its commitments. The Bengal Government had also done its part, the rest had to be done next year. Possibly due to some misunderstanding, but what is much more likely, deliberately, some people organized these riots. It seems to me that they were purely political and had no reference to the food situation. It is sad that some of our countrymen should try to exploit a situation in this way for their group advantage and bring misery to the people.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

21. See *ante*, p. 371.

22. See *ante*, p. 363.

II

New Delhi
2 August, 1952

My dear Chief Minister,

As I write to you, the Preventive Detention Bill is being considered in the House of the People.¹ This Bill has been made the occasion for an organized and combined assault by nearly all the Opposition Members of Parliament against Government. Harrowing stories of the lot of the detenus have been told in the House.² I suppose these discussions will continue as long as the Opposition can possibly carry them on. Parliament will probably have to sit till the middle of the month.³ We hope to pass the third reading of the Bill in

1. The Preventive Detention (Second Amendment) Bill came up for the third reading in the House of the People on 29 July and was debated from 2 to 6 August 1952.

2. See *ante*, pp 453-466.

3. The House of the People was adjourned *sine die* on 12 August 1952.

the House of the People on the evening of the 6th August. It will then go to the Council of States and I cannot say how long that will take.⁴ The House of the People will have to sit on till the Council has finished with the Bill.

2. The amount of time and energy that such legislation takes in the House is enormous. It is right that every Bill, which deals with personal freedom or which affects the people generally, should be carefully considered. But there is undoubtedly a tendency to obstruct and delay, indeed this is openly proclaimed. It is chiefly because of this that we decided to have this Bill for two years and a quarter. Some State Governments wanted it for a longer period. I do not think it would have been right to extend this period.

3. A problem arises as to how to deal with delaying and obstructive tactics in our legislatures. Democratic functioning depends upon a great deal of give-and-take. If this is absent, then all work suffers and indeed democracy comes into disrepute. The British Parliament had first to face these tactics long ago in the days of Parnell⁵ of Ireland. They evolved some procedure to get over that. Later, fresh experience led them to adopt fresh devices. It is possible that we may have to consider some changes in our Rules of Procedure in order to prevent undue delays. For the present, however, we shall carry on as we are.

4. You must have read about our discussions with the Members of the Jammu and Kashmir Government and the agreement on some issues that we reached. There has been a great deal of misunderstanding about the position of Kashmir State in the Indian Union. I tried to clear some of these in the speech I delivered in the House of the People. Separately, I am sending you a printed copy of the speech.⁶ We shall be having debates on Kashmir soon in both the Council of States and the House of the People.⁷

5. The first thing to remember is that Kashmir State has to be treated as a special case for a variety of reasons. If you will refer to Article 370 of our Constitution, you will see the decisions then arrived at by Sardar Patel in consultation with the Kashmir Government. That Article has since governed the situation and any change requires the concurrence of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly. There is also, of course, the reference to the United Nations and we have to keep the assurances we have given to it.⁸

6. The decisions in regard to Kashmir undoubtedly shake up the system of Rajpramukhs and Rulers' privy purses, etc. Having given our word, we have

4. See *ante*, p. 522.

5. Charles Steward Parnell (1846-1891); Irish nationalist; Member of the British House of Commons from 1875 to 1880; adopted obstructive tactics to draw attention to Irish grievances.

6. See *ante*, pp. 453-466.

7. On 4 and 7 August in the House of the People and on 4 and 5 August 1952 in the Council of States.

8. See *ante*, p. 232.

to keep it. But the fact remains that the present arrangements are completely illogical and very difficult to justify. The idea of having Rajpramukhs for life and not only giving them a handsome privy purse and heavy allowances in addition as Rajpramukhs, is something which does not fit in at all with modern ideas. Indeed two or three years' experience has confirmed this opinion.⁹ I have little doubt that this question will be raised more and more by the public and we shall have to face it. The recent dramatic developments in Egypt direct people's thoughts all the more towards the removal of these anomalies.

7. At Dr Graham's invitation, we have decided to participate in interministerial talks about Kashmir in Geneva.¹⁰ Dr Graham wanted us to go there early in August. We pointed out that it was very difficult for any Minister to leave Delhi during the session of Parliament and we suggested that the talks might be held in Delhi. This was not agreed to, probably because Pakistan objected to it. Ultimately, we accepted Geneva as the venue and August 25th has been fixed for the beginning of these talks. Shri N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar has kindly consented to go on our behalf. We have been told that these talks will not last more than seven or eight days.

8. The talks will proceed on the basis of a revised version of Dr Graham's twelve points.¹¹ The revision has been done by Dr Graham himself. We do not entirely agree with it. But as a basis for discussion we have accepted it, having made our own position perfectly clear. These twelve points are confined to the question of demilitarization and to the induction into office of the plebiscite administrator. We have been discussing various versions of these twelve points for a long time past and Dr Graham has come to India twice in this connection. The last set of talks were in New York and did not result in an agreement between India and Pakistan.¹² It is exceedingly unlikely that further talks in Geneva will bridge this gulf.

9. What then? It is evident that Dr Graham wants to demonstrate that he has done his utmost to find some agreement on the lines he has pursued thus

9. See *ante*, pp. 425-425 and 431.

10. From 26 August to 10 September 1952.

11. As Indian and Pakistani representatives had during the talks at New York failed to reach agreement on the quantum of troops to be retained by each side, Graham made fresh proposals in which he suggested retention of 3,000 to 6,000 troops on the Pakistani side and of 12,000 to 18,000 troops on the Indian side in place of the vague principle of "the lowest number of troops proportionate to their strength on 1 January 1949." For the twelve points proposed by Graham on 7 September 1951 and subsequent discussions on them, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 16 Pt. II, pp. 248-252.

12. During discussions in New York from 29 May to 16 July 1952, it was clarified that by "bulk" India meant "majority" of forces, while Pakistan meant "most" of the forces. Again India would not include the State militia in "State armed forces" while Pakistan insisted on its inclusion. India and Pakistan also did not agree to the estimates of their troops as on 1 January 1949.

far. Having failed there, he might feel justified in exploring some other avenue. Indeed he has hinted at this, though nothing is said about these fresh avenues. You may remember that something like this stage was reached when Dixon¹³ came here. Dixon then suggested our exploring new methods of a settlement and, after some discussion, himself made a proposal. In effect this was a partial partition of the State, more or less, based on the present position, and a plebiscite in the Kashmir Valley and one or two other small areas. We did not fancy this, but the attitude that we took up to Dixon was that we were prepared to discuss anything that was put forward. That, of course, did not mean that we accepted any proposal made. Pakistan then practically refused to discuss these matters and so the matter ended there.

10. Dixon, even then, expressed his opinion that a plebiscite all over the State was hardly possible and even if it took place, it might lead to undesirable consequences, such as migrations and upsets. Because of this he came to the conclusion that a plebiscite should as far as possible be avoided or at any rate should be limited to relatively small areas. I was drawing your attention to these old discussions as it is possible that you have forgotten about them. This does not mean that similar proposals are going to be put forward now. In any event, it is hardly possible to discuss any new proposal thoroughly at Geneva because any such proposal would require constant consultation here in Delhi and with the Kashmir Government.

11. It is announced that Sir Zafrullah Khan will represent Pakistan in Geneva. There is at present a widespread agitation going on in Western Pakistan against Sir Zafrullah Khan¹⁴ and the Quadianis or the Ahmadiyas as they are called. Many orthodox Muslims refuse to consider the Quadiani sect as Muslim at all because of certain doctrinal differences. Therefore, they propose that the Quadianis should be called a minority and not Muslims. I am referring to this as it has a bearing on Sir Zafrullah Khan's position in Pakistan and the authority he can exercise in any talks in Geneva. It is clear that he cannot go far beyond his brief. If he attempts to do so, all his opponents in Pakistan, and they are many, will criticize him and attack him. Therefore, I do not expect any marked progress in Geneva on new lines.

12. Some time ago we had decided to send Shri K.M. Panikkar to Cairo as our Ambassador as soon as he left Peking. In Cairo, however, a difficulty arose about the recognition of King Farouk as King of the Sudan also.¹⁵ We were reluctant to take any step which meant our recognition of any status for Sudan. In our view it was for the people of Sudan to decide this and we would like them to decide this in cooperation with the Egyptian Government.

13. Sir Owen Dixon.

14. See *ante*, p. 253.

15. The title was assumed on 15 November 1951.

There was no particular difficulty in our calling King Farouk, King of Sudan, but we wished to avoid any misunderstanding or wrong interpretation of this act. Some two or three weeks ago we addressed the Egyptian Government on the subject of Sudan. In this *aide memoire*, we expressed our satisfaction at the efforts being made by the Egyptian Government to come to a settlement about Sudan in cooperation with the leaders of the Sudanese people. Further we said that we hoped that such a settlement would be reached in conformity with the wishes of the people of Sudan.

13. Ever since this message of ours was sent to Egypt, there have been continuous upsets there, ending in the removal of King Farouk himself. In view of all these developments, we do not wish to delay much longer sending Shri K.M. Panikkar to Cairo. We hope therefore very soon to make a formal approach to the Egyptian Government on this subject.

14. There have been some important diplomatic appointments recently. You know that Shri B.G. Kher is now our High Commissioner in London. Shri G.L. Mehta will be going to Washington, Shri K.P.S. Menon, our Foreign Secretary, to Moscow, and Shri N. Raghavan, to Peking. Dr Abdul Rauf, one of our most senior Ambassadors, is going from Rangoon to Tokyo and Shri Chettur¹⁶, who has been in Tokyo, will go to Rangoon.

15. When we started opening our Missions abroad, there was a tendency to attach more importance to European capitals than to others, especially in Asia. Some places are obviously important from every point of view, such as London, Washington, Moscow and Peking. But there was no particular reason, except old habit, to induce us to consider other European centres as more important than Asian capitals. The old traditions of Europe's leadership continued to prevail and influence us. As a matter of fact, though Europe is undoubtedly still important and will continue to be so, it no longer dominates the international scene. Washington plays very important part indeed and in fact quite a number of countries in Europe and even in Asia look up to Washington for a lead. On the other side, Moscow and Peking have become very important. London, for a variety of reasons, is still a highly important centre of political activity.

16. Reality gradually thrust itself upon us, and in our minds, as in actual fact, some of the countries of Asia became more important from the point of view of our own interests. Apart from the four great powers named above, our first class Embassies are now situated in Pakistan, Cairo, Nepal, Burma and Indonesia. Afghanistan and Ceylon, for different reasons, are also important. Thus our political outlook is governed more and more by geographical reality and does not depend so much on what Washington or London or some other

16. K.K. Chettur (1901-1956); administrator and diplomat; Ambassador to Burma, 1952-54, to Belgium, 1954-56.

distant centre might think. Our immediate neighbours are Pakistan, Nepal, China and Burma. From the point of view of their power and resources, they differ greatly. But from the point of view of India's interests, they are of primary importance in different ways and concern us more than many bigger and otherwise more important countries.

17. This indicates a gradual shift in our international outlook and is also evidence of our developing our own foreign policy and not depending upon other great countries. This seems to me so obvious that I cannot appreciate the question that is being asked us as to whether we are with the American group of powers or with the Soviet group. We are friendly to both, but essentially we function for ourselves and develop closer contacts with our neighbours. It is unfortunate that our relations with Pakistan are not good and are not likely to be very friendly in the near future. But that does not make any radical change in our world outlook.

18. It is true that any world outlook cannot ignore the dominant fact of the tussle and cold war between the American group and the Soviet group, which might lead to a disastrous world conflict. In spite of that, however, gradually new alignments take place outside those dominant spheres. This does not mean, as has sometimes been suggested, that a "third force" or a new power bloc is taking shape. It does mean that gradually, freed from the influence of great powers, some countries in Asia are evolving their own policies and progressively looking more towards each other. In some areas like the Middle East, there is trouble and turmoil and almost a vacuum so far as power is concerned. That vacuum is maintained partly because of nationalist upsurges in those countries and partly because of the rivalries of the great power groups.

19. One of the dominant features of the present day is of course the emergence of China as a great power. This has completely upset the old balance. The last war itself resulted in upsetting this old balance and only two really great powers emerged from it—the USA and the USSR—all other countries were, from this point of view, secondary and, to some extent, dependent. The new China has further upset the old equilibrium, more especially in the Far East and in other parts of Asia. That is a major fact of the present age and not to appreciate or recognize it means shutting our eyes to reality. Because of this refusal to recognize the emergence of this new great power, the United Nations has got into ever-increasing difficulties. It is not a question of liking or disliking the new regime in China. Fortunately for us we took a more realistic view from the beginning and adapted ourselves to it. We did not wholly like some of the consequences of this new development. For us it became a vital matter to consider that we had this new great power as our neighbour with 2,000 miles of frontier between us. There were inherent dangers in that and we had to protect ourselves against them. These dangers were not because China was Communist but rather that a great power had grown and

spread out to our frontiers. Our policy had to be adjusted to this fact. We wanted to be friendly to our neighbour, but, at the same time, we wanted to be firm about our own vital interests. Where these interests were not vital or important or were such that we could not define them, such as in Tibet, we were prepared to adjust ourselves to changes. But in vital matters, there could be no compromise. It is for this reason that I declared in Parliament on several occasions that our frontier with Tibet, known as the McMahon line, was our fixed and definite border and we were not prepared to consider any change in it. I went a little further and declared that our frontier was, roughly speaking, the Himalayas, from our defence point of view. That is to say that we could not tolerate any incursion even into Nepal across the Himalayas.

20. I might add that at no time did I think that there was the slightest reason to expect any aggression on our north-eastern frontier. A little clear thinking will show that it is a frightfully difficult task for any army to cross Tibet and the Himalayas and invade India. Tibet is one of the most difficult and inhospitable of countries. An army may possibly cross it, but the problem of logistics and feeding it becomes increasingly difficult. The climate is itself an enemy of any large-scale movement. Apart from this, there was no particular reason why China should think in terms of aggression in this direction. If world war unfortunately comes, the principal theatres of that war will be elsewhere—in Europe, in the Middle East, and in the Far East. No country is going to be foolish enough to get caught in the icy wilderness of Tibet and thus waste its resources and energy. Nevertheless, we had to be on our guard, not so much for an invasion but for some kind of gradual spreading out or infiltration. We have taken steps accordingly.

21. Our basic policy, however, remains to maintain friendly relations with China, subject always to protecting our interests with firmness. I believe the Chinese Government recognize both aspects of this policy and appreciate it. I think also that there is a definite feeling of friendliness towards India in China. That is due partly to historical reasons, partly to an Asian outlook and partly no doubt to their appraisal of the world situation. We have recently had some talks with the Chinese Government regarding our position in Tibet.¹⁷ With the Chinese overlordship of Tibet, certain consequences flow. We cannot for long

17. Panikkar informed Nehru on 15 June 1952 (see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, p. 474) that Chou En-lai had agreed to a discussion on Tibet but presumed that India had no intention of claiming "special rights arising from the unequal treaties of the past and was prepared to negotiate a new and permanent relationship safeguarding legitimate interests... For their part they were not desirous of abruptly bringing an end to institutions and arrangements which were in existence, like posts and telegraph, trade marks, etc. as such a course would create a vacuum." Chou however insisted on an immediate agreement to replace the Indian trade mission at Lhasa by a Consulate-General and conferment of the same status on the Chinese mission at Bombay.

maintain some garrisons in Tibetan towns, like Gyantse and Yatung.¹⁸ These garrisons were placed there to protect our trade routes, because Tibet was weak and could not give protection. Our representative in Lhasa will in course of time become a Consul-General, as Tibet is no longer an independent country. There will be no difficulty in fixing these and like matters up.

22. But, however much we may think of these neighbourly relations and apprehensions, the fact remains that the world situation is governed by what happens in the unhappy and ruined country of Korea. If some settlement is reached there in the truce talks, there will be a feeling of tremendous relief all over the world. If not, the present tensions will continue and if war spreads, other disasters come in its train. That is why we were anxious to do our little bit in the cause of peace. We have not succeeded thus far and the situation continues to be tense. I cannot say what the future holds. but if an opportunity offers itself to us, we shall take advantage of it again.

23. I am troubled by the news I get of scarcity and famine conditions in some parts of the country. Although the rains have been on the whole good, they have failed in some parts. While in Assam and one or two other places there have been floods, in the eastern districts of Uttar Pradesh, conditions are bad. In parts of Bengal and south of India, they are equally bad. Demands come to us from all over the country for help both in the shape of immediate relief and in the shape of development schemes being taken in hand. Food is on the whole plentiful in the country, but the power to purchase it is, in many areas, very limited. How to get over this difficulty? How to help where help is obviously needed? How to have constructive works which provide purchasing power and at the same time build up for the future? That has become our basic problem. Already we are tied up with tremendous undertakings and are pledged to start others. Even these are beyond our present capacity and resources, but we are prepared to take the risk and go ahead. But this is not enough and the cry comes from so many other parts of India, and reasons are advanced which are good and almost unanswerable. But where are these additional resources to come from suddenly? We cannot, because of sympathy, spread our limited resources and thus fail to achieve anything at all. We have to concentrate on what we can do. But while we do this, so many of our countrymen look on helplessly and ask for aid. It is difficult to say no.

24. Our Planning Commission wrestles with this problem. Government faces it from day to day. In some States a feeling arises that their interests are being ignored or bypassed in favour of others. Each State naturally thinks of itself chiefly and has only vague ideas about the problems and difficulties of

18. Nehru said at a press conference on 21 June 1952 that India when asked would withdraw the garrisons as provided in the treaty with Tibet. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, p. 476.

LETTERS TO CHIEF MINISTERS

other States. I wish that each State would realize that whatever our other failings might be, the Government of India is not partial to any State and that it tries to think of India as a whole. We do not write on a clean slate and we have to take things as they are and build on them. Even the cry for linguistic provinces is probably largely based on the feeling that that particular area is neglected and not given a square deal. There is no way out for us except to pull together and to realize that India has to advance as a whole and not in bits and patches.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

III

Camp: Sonamarg
Kashmir
26 August, 1952

My dear Chief Minister,

I missed writing to you in the middle of this month, although there was much to write about. I am beginning this letter, after nearly a month, from one of the higher valleys of Kashmir.¹ I am at present at Sonamarg at an altitude of over 9,000 feet. This is a lovely spot on the old caravan route from Srinagar to Ladakh and Central Asia. It is only 52 miles from Srinagar. About ten miles from here is the Zojila, the Pass which leads from Kashmir proper to the higher regions of Ladakh, which, in their turn, join up with Tibet on the eastern side and Central Asia on the northern. In the old days big caravans used to travel along this route and go over the high Karakoram Pass leading into Central Asia. Indeed, if you look at the map, you will find that Kashmir itself is almost the heart of Central Asia. The old caravans hardly go now, though sometimes a small one passes through. Big changes have taken place during these years in Central Asia, as well as in Kashmir. A part of this caravan route in the Kashmir State now lies on the other side of the ceasefire line which is controlled by Pakistan.

2. I have come this way, to Sonamarg and beyond, several times previously. The first time was just 36 years ago, in 1916. There was only a bridle path then, and our little party walked and rode on horses from Srinagar onwards. It took us three days to reach Sonamarg and then we climbed up the Zojila and crossed into Ladakh. Travelling slowly in that way, there was much more excitement and adventure and one felt as if the mysteries of the high mountains

1. Nehru visited Kashmir from 21 to 30 August 1952.

were unravelling themselves. As one proceeded along the winding mountain paths, and saw the changing scene gradually, the chinars and poplars and fruit trees of the Valley gave place to walnut trees and pines. As one went up still further, firs appeared and then, higher up still, the birch or the *bhojpatra*, on the bark of which so many manuscripts were written in ancient times. About 10,500 feet even the birch gradually disappeared and there was only the juniper bush. Later, still, in the Ladakh plateau, there was not a tree to be seen, only grass and flowers, and, on either side, small snowfields or glaciers creeping down.

3. Things have changed since then and a fairly good road leads up to Sonamarg and beyond. What had taken me three days of hard riding previously, now took me three hours in a car. It was a comfortable journey in this way, but I missed the excitement of old when we travelled in a more primitive way.

4. On either side of the meadow of Sonamarg, there are high mountains. The rock formations are very peculiar and impressive, and a great glacier lies only two or three miles away. The road leads up through the narrow valley to Baltal and from there straight up a mountain to the Zojila. This reminds me of the magnificent feat of our Army in the winter of 1948. The Pakistani forces at that time occupied the heights of the Zojila and it was very difficult to dislodge them. Our engineers built a jeep road from Baltal right up to the Zojila and in the depth of the winter of 1948-49 some of our tanks went up this road and stormed that stronghold of the enemy. It must be remembered that during those winter months the whole pass and the valleys are covered with heavy snow and the temperature is far below zero. That feat of our Army will be recorded in our military annals and remembered.

5. Before we had captured the Zojila, I paid a visit to Baltal right at the foot of the Pass.² I saw our pickets high up on the mountain peaks at about 14,000 feet. To remain there in that exceedingly inclement weather was itself a feat. To carry on military operations was an additional test of endurance. What surprised and pleased me was that among our troops there were people from Madras, totally unused to the cold and to the high mountains, and yet who were functioning with fortitude and efficiency at this height. When they first came to Kashmir and saw the snow, they were surprised and thought that the soil of that part was white. Yet they soon got used to those regions, and, what is more, prospered and grew healthy, for there is health and strength in the air of these mountains.

6. Few people in India realize the extremely difficult conditions in which our Army and Air Force have functioned in these mountains, where there are numerous valleys and *nullahs* allowing the enemy to creep through unobserved.

2. On 27 June 1948.

Few people realize the high efficiency and discipline which our Armed Forces have shown here. Whenever I come to Kashmir, I like to pay a visit to our detachments, and the more I see them, the more I admire their work, both that of officers and of men. They are a mixed group from all over India, including from Nepal. Kashmir has been a test and trial for us in many ways. But I have no doubt that it has done a great deal of good to our Army which is tougher and more efficient because of these operations and hard conditions of mountain warfare.

7. During the past months much has happened. Parliament was at last adjourned after a very heavy session.³ The House of the People will meet again on the 5th of November and the Council of States towards the end of November. Just before the session ended, the appointment of additional Ministers was announced.⁴ Two Ministers⁵ (formerly called Minister of State), ten Deputy Ministers⁶ and four Parliamentary Secretaries⁷ were appointed. The work of Parliament and Government has grown very heavy and it became essential for Deputy Ministers to be appointed to help in this work and to leave the senior Ministers a little more time to devote to important matters. It is also desirable in the Parliamentary system that we have adopted, to have junior Ministers who can thus get experience and training in administrative work. We have been too apt to rely on some senior and experienced colleagues of ours, whether in the Centre or in the States, and sometimes there is a gap between them and others who have not had the chance of gaining that experience. We should fill that gap and always try to take some new blood in our governments.

8. The Parliamentary Secretaries that we have at the Centre are honorary. They are paid no salary or allowance during the Parliamentary session. They are not supposed to work normally beyond the session. If for any special reason they are asked to do some work during the intervening period between sessions, they can draw a normal daily allowance for those few days. It is desirable to have such honorary Parliamentary Secretaries and to choose bright

3. The session of Parliament lasting 90 days ended on 12 August and during its 67 sittings, considered 34 official and 22 private bills.
4. On 11 August 1952.
5. D.P. Karmarkar was appointed Minister for Commerce and Industry and P.R. Deshmukh, Minister of Food and Agriculture.
6. K.D. Malaviya was appointed Deputy Minister for Natural Resources and Scientific Research, S.S. Majithia for Defence, B.N. Datar for Home Affairs, Abid Ali for Labour, M.C. Shah for Finance, J.K. Bhonsle for Rehabilitation, O.V. Alagesan for Railways and Transport, Maragatham Chandrasekhar for Health, A.K. Chanda for External Affairs and M.V. Krishnappa for Food and Agriculture.
7. Lakshmi N. Menon, Shah Nawaz Khan, J.N. Hazarika and B.R. Bhagat were appointed as Parliamentary Secretaries.

young men or women for the purpose. That gives them some insight and training and it is easier then, at a later stage, to pick our Deputy Ministers and Ministers from among them.

9. In some of the States the practice of having paid Parliamentary Secretaries is followed. I dislike this practice, because there is no point in having a paid Parliamentary Secretary when there is a Deputy Minister. We cannot have too many grades of paid Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries. It is desirable certainly to have Deputy Ministers or Parliamentary Secretaries in the States whenever this is found necessary. But I would like to emphasize that such appointments should be on grounds of necessity only and for merit and not merely to please this group or that.

10. Sitting here at Sonamarg, my mind takes leave of the many day-to-day problems that confront us and I think more of the basic issues that face us in India and the world. Naturally, I think of the Kashmir issue which is again under discussion in Geneva. As you know, Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar has gone there to represent us. I am afraid nothing much can come out of these discussions and I do not attach too much importance to them. We shall continue patiently to discuss these issues as long as is needed. But, in doing so, we are not going to give up any basic principle for which we have stood. Therefore, as far as I can see, the *status quo* will remain.

11. The Kashmir problem would probably have been solved long ago but for its entanglement with wider world issues, and the interest the great powers take in it. They have not helped in its solution. Meanwhile, these larger international issues gradually move towards greater crisis. The recent visit of a high-powered Chinese delegation under the leadership of the Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai,⁸ is itself an event of great significance, both political and, perhaps, military also.⁹ The truce talks at Panmunjon continue without yielding any result and the hope that we nurtured about an early settlement there has faded away. Yet, the mere fact that those talks continue is something to be thankful for, for the alternative is terrible to contemplate.

12. I have often written to you about foreign affairs and our foreign policy. There is far too great a tendency, even among eminent statesmen abroad, to simplify the issues and to talk in terms of some crusade, either for communism or anti-communism. This makes an understanding of the real situation much more difficult. Whatever our views may be about economic problems and

8. The Chinese delegation visited the Soviet Union from 17 August to 29 September 1952. Chou En-lai returned to Beijing on 17 September.

9. During the visit of the Chinese delegation to Moscow, the Soviet Government agreed: (1) to transfer all rights over Chang Chun railway by December 1952; (2) to the joint use of the naval base at Port Arthur till a peace treaty with Japan was signed; and (3) to provide technical help to build Chinese industry.

policies, the first thing to remember is that it is not on account of these ideologies that this world crisis has arisen. Because of various historical reasons, two tremendous world powers dominate the scene today—the USA and the USSR. The other countries are either attached to one or the other in a subordinate capacity or play a rather passive independent role. In effect, each of the two great world powers struggles to obtain a predominant position in the world.

13. What can be the outcome of this historical process that has practically eliminated the other great and small powers? That historical process has been conditioned by many factors, chiefly technological developments. Will this process continue till one great power practically dominates the world? These technological developments in the science of warfare and rapid transport and communications have made it possible for such widespread and distant dominion to be exercised.

14. But before any such development takes place, there is bound to be war, because neither of the two great powers will submit to the other's dominion. We may calculate the relative strength of the two and their allies. In doing so, I think it would be true at this stage to say that the strength of the American group is greater, because they possess the more advanced technological processes and their industrial production is colossal. On the other side also, there is continuous technological progress and they have masses of human beings at their disposal. In any event, it can no longer be said that either side has a preponderating advantage which can result in a smashing and fairly quick victory. Thus, a world war now would not only be a prolonged affair, but would bring mutual destruction on a colossal scale. It would make little difference as to who is the victor and who is vanquished, when the world lies in ruins.

15. It is for this very practical reason, apart from any theoretical or ethical approach, that every effort has to be made to prevent such a war from happening. What is the alternative?—some kind of adjustment between the great blocs of powers. If that adjustment is not possible, then war is inevitable and that means a defeat for modern civilization and the very causes for which people will fight. The great question therefore is whether such an adjustment is possible. Considering the tremendous issues at stake, statesmanship must come to the conclusion that an adjustment must be made. Any other approach leads to disaster.

16. Most statesmen recognize this patent fact, but they often say that they will deal with the other party when they are strong enough to impose their will. That presumes that while one party adds to its strength, the other will remain quiescent. Of course, that is not going to happen. Indeed, it may well be that the other party grows more in strength during the interval and so the relative position either remains the same or worsens.

17. At the end of the last world war it was generally thought that the possession of the atomic bomb by the USA gave them a tremendous advantage over their adversaries. That advantage no longer exists in that measure now, and if there is a war, both sides may well use the atomic bomb. In the same way, it will be difficult for one party to have a major advantage for long and the other will catch up soon enough. Therefore, this talk of dealing with strength has no meaning. It simply leads to a policy of drift while conditions become worse.

18. If some kind of mutual adjustment and the creation of a new balance of power is the only way out, then countries like India can play a role which might help in bringing about that adjustment. We must not exaggerate this and imagine that we can do much. But we should not underrate the possibility either. Because of this, we have tried from time to time to help in bringing about conditions for a settlement in Korea. We have not succeeded. But that is no reason why we should despair or give up, for the consequences of no settlement are terrible to contemplate.

19. Few people realize fully how the old balance of power has been completely shattered. We either create a new balance or go to war. Mere piling up of armaments does not create a balance. It adds to the fear that leads to hatred and utter lack of understanding. It is not enough for us to talk vaguely of peace and put forward high ethical and moral principles. We have to understand the position objectively and practically in all its implications and then come to decisions. None of us, however powerful we may be, can mould the world after our pattern. There are inherent limitations in the power of the greatest country and it is dangerous to overestimate one's own power and to underestimate the power of the adversary. We have to keep this in view ourselves in regard to our limited commitments, whether they are military or financial. It is extraordinary how some people, who should be presumed to be responsible, talk irresponsibly of war, as if war was the solvent of all ills. One of our gravest problems is that of minorities in East Bengal. There is no doubt that the Pakistan Government has, in the past, followed a policy of squeezing out the middle classes especially. The April 1950 Agreement¹⁰ certainly brought about some improvement, but the process continues and there is a great deal of distress. We try to deal with this problem on the diplomatic plane. The only other plane is that of war which, I am convinced, will not solve that problem, whatever else it might do. Yet, leading personalities talk about our adopting methods which can only lead to war.¹¹ I cannot imagine anything

10. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 14 Pt. I, p. 178.

11. S.P. Mookerjee, speaking at Pune on 25 August, asked the Government to follow the advice of Mahatma Gandhi which according to him had been that the life and property of the Hindus in Pakistan should be protected even by using force.

more irresponsible from every point of view and, more especially, that of the minorities concerned. We are accused sometimes of a policy of appeasement and are asked to get tough with Pakistan.¹² The toughness that our accusers exhibit is the use of strong and offensive language. That is not how a civilized nation acts, nor is that the way of statesmanship. A nation conserves its strength and, because of that strength, can sometimes afford to take strong action. Even that action is inevitably limited by the strength and resources of that nation. It does not issue threats and use offensive language.

20. In the world today we live in some kind of a twilight between peace and war. The old balances having been completely upset, no new equilibrium has taken their place. For a long time Europe was the political centre of the world. Then America came into this picture and Europe and North America became two main centres. Now Western Europe has receded into the background and the two principal centres of power are supposed to be Washington and Moscow. At the same time, great changes and revolutions in Asia have taken that vast continent, to a large extent, outside the purview of colonial politics. China has emerged as a great power and, because of its alliance with the Soviet, has added greatly to the weight of Moscow in the world affairs. It must be remembered, however, that China and Russia need not pull together in every matter, because there are bound to be occasional conflicts in their national interests.

21. As the atomic age advances, war ceases to be a means of furthering a foreign policy, because war becomes an instrument of universal destruction. If there can be any justification for war today, it can only be in pure self-defence or self-preservation against aggression. Where there is such an aggression and a challenge to the very existence of a nation, that challenge has to be met. Or else, the nation disintegrates.

22. In this dangerous and threatening state of the world, what are we to do? We cannot play a major part, but we can, perhaps, play some small part in either hastening or averting catastrophe. If we line up with either of the major contestants for world supremacy, we give up such little influence that we might possess in averting catastrophe and in that sense we hasten it. Keeping apart, we, and such other countries as function in the same way, at least keep an area free from the fever of war and can view events with some calmness and objectivity, and occasionally throw our weight on the side of peace. Thus, whether we look at this question from the point of view of narrow national interest or the larger one of world peace, the only policy we can pursue is one of non-alignment with the power blocs and trying to maintain friendly relations with all countries.

12. See *ante*, p. 613.

23. Our defence forces are small in comparison with those of the great powers. But we spend a very large part of our revenue on them. We have tried our utmost to limit this expenditure and, to a small extent, succeeded occasionally. The demand for our development schemes, which ultimately strengthen the nation, is very great. We shall continue to keep a vigilant eye on our defence expenditure. And yet, in the world today we cannot afford to become weak and so we have to spend more on our defence apparatus than we should normally.

24. The Passive Resistance Movement in South Africa is attracting increasing attention.¹³ It is right that it should do so, for it is of the highest significance. It signifies the rebellion of the exploited and oppressed races in Africa against racial domination. It is fortunate that this revolt has taken place on peaceful lines. South Africa, which, under Gandhiji, saw the beginnings of this new form of struggle, is now witnessing a new and vaster application of it. The Indian question in South Africa has been completely overshadowed by this new development, and it is right that it should be so. People of Indian origin in South Africa have joined hands with the Africans in this great struggle and thus far, in spite of the activities of the Malan Government, astonishing self-discipline has been shown by the passive resisters. Everyone in India, and indeed many abroad, will follow this struggle with the greatest sympathy and interest.

25. The Kashmir issue was discussed at length in both Houses of Parliament¹⁴ and the agreement arrived at with the Ministers of the Kashmir Government was approved by Parliament.¹⁵ The Constituent Assembly of the Jammu and Kashmir State also gave its approval to this agreement.¹⁶ Subsequently, the Constituent Assembly came to a decision about their future Head of the State.¹⁷ This was in accordance with the agreement. The resolution of the Constituent Assembly has been forwarded to our Government for necessary action on our part. We are giving consideration to it.

26. There has been a new and unwelcome development in Kashmir. In recent weeks, we relaxed somewhat our vigilance on the ceasefire line, with the result that a large number of people came across from the Pakistan side to

13. The movement had spread to Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Natal.

14. During the discussion on the agreement on 5 August in the Council of States and on 5 and 7 August in the House of the People, while the Congress and the Communist Members welcomed the agreement, the Members of Jan Sangh, Akali Dal, Ram Rajya Parishad and Praja Socialist Party criticized the agreement and demanded "full accession of the State" and no distinction to be made in the institution of Rajpramukhs.

15. The agreement was approved by the Council of States on 5 August and by the House of the People on 7 August 1952.

16. On 19 August 1952.

17. On 21 August, the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly passed a resolution recommending that the Head of the State be elected and called Sadr-i-Riyasat.

our side. Many of these were inoffensive persons, trying to return to their homes. But many were, undoubtedly, sent by Pakistan authorities to create trouble in Kashmir. Indeed, we have received information of special training being given at a number of places in Pakistan in methods of sabotage. Pakistan having failed in other ways has now adopted this new course of action. There were several serious acts of sabotage committed by these persons who had come from Pakistan. Attempts were made to assassinate Shaikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. The persons who were sent over for this purpose from Pakistan were arrested and have confessed. As a result of all this we are again tightening our arrangements on the ceasefire line and practically sealing it. This indicates how much vigilance is necessary on our side.

27. In Nepal the Ministry has fallen and the King¹⁸ has taken direct charge of the administration with the help of advisers.¹⁹ This had become inevitable. It is unfortunate that the democratic processes of Government have failed in Nepal because of the utter lack of a democratic background. For some months past, the Nepal Government was hardly functioning. In the Terai areas, adjoining India, complete lawlessness prevailed. We did not interfere, as we thought that the Nepalese authorities must themselves deal with this situation. We are prepared to help, of course, where such help is needed and asked for.

28. A recent note in a Hindi paper in Allahabad has created a furore.²⁰ This note was a very offensive one against the Prophet Mohammad. The UP Government have rightly taken action on this note. But, meanwhile, Muslim demonstrations took place in many cities and some people even went so far as to suggest a boycott of the Independence Day celebrations on August 15th. This indicates how far we are yet from functioning in a truly non-communal way. I have been distressed greatly by the vulgarity of many references in some newspapers and periodicals. We talk about a secular State, but there are many who function in a bigoted manner if their passions are aroused. Communalism is essentially a primitive and uncivilized type of thought and behaviour, and if we are to advance, we have to get rid of this completely.

29. Although the general food situation shows improvement, in some parts of India, we have had famine or near-famine conditions.²¹ The State Governments are doing their utmost to meet this serious situation.

18. Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah.

19. Following the resignation on 10 August 1952 by M.P. Koirala, the Prime Minister, the King announced on 14 August that he would rule Nepal through his five advisers till an effective and representative Council of Ministers could be set up.

20. See *ante*, p. 6.

21. Reports of prevalence of famine conditions came from eastern Uttar Pradesh, parts of Bihar, Maharashtra, Madras and Saurashtra.

30. I have often written to you about the housing problem and I am glad that a great deal of attention is being paid to this.²² Generally, rather expensive schemes are drawn up in which a good deal of money is spent on erecting solid structures and not much thought is given to the social services which should go with them. I am convinced that the right approach is to arrange for social services such as water supply, sanitation, roads, lighting, drainage, etc., before any building is put up. Indeed, it is better to give the social services without a building than to have a building without those services.

31.²³ I have just returned from Kashmir. During my absence from Delhi, much has happened about which I would have liked to write to you, but I do not want to delay this letter. You will have noticed that, as expected, the talks with Dr Graham in Geneva are not proceeding smoothly. The basic differences between India's attitude and Pakistan's attitude still remain and are likely to remain.

32. This morning in Srinagar I saw a parade of school and college students. This was very interesting and impressive. Great stress is being laid by the Kashmir Government on the physical side of training and the boys and girls appeared to be very smart. Apart from improving their physical condition, this has a powerful psychological effect. What interested me most were the small children from the kindergartens. These range from age three upwards. The Kashmir Government has started these kindergartens not only in the city but even in many villages in the Valley. They are spending very little money on them and all the apparatus required is locally produced. These children were enjoying themselves thoroughly in the parade and in the numerous games which they or their teachers had evolved for them. In addition to these athletic parades, which are held on a fairly big scale every month, there are smaller displays every week. I also witnessed boat races and swimming contests among school and college students. Altogether I was pleased and impressed by this aspect of educational progress in Kashmir.

33. Yesterday morning I made a somewhat unusual flight from Srinagar to the eastern border of Ladakh. The flight itself was very fascinating as we flew over the high mountains and glaciers and snowfields and had a fine view of famous mountain peaks, like Nanga Parbat. But the main interest was in the landing place. This has recently been constructed by our Army with the help of local Ladakhis, at a height of 14,260 feet. This is understood to be the highest airfield in the world. It is situated very near the Tibetan frontier. This was a feat for which both our Army and Air Force can well take credit. It was

22. An All India Housing Conference was held in New Delhi on 25 and 26 August 1952 at which the Government announced an industrial housing scheme costing Rs 9 crores for 1952-53.

23. The last three paragraphs, 31-33, were written on 30 August 1952 from New Delhi.

a peculiar pleasure to me to visit this distant and isolated frontier of India and to meet the local people there. Normally, this place where we landed is a week's march from Leh and Leh itself is two weeks' march from Srinagar. We did the journey from Srinager in less than two hours. That area in Ladakh, where we went to, is fairly rich in copper and sulphur.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

IV

New Delhi
10 September, 1952

My dear Chief Minister,

For a change I am writing to you rather earlier than usual. I am going away tomorrow to Indore for the meetings of the Congress Committees¹ and, as I shall be away for five or six days, I thought of sending you this letter before I left Delhi. During my stay at Indore, I hope to visit some of the Bhil areas and to meet the Bhils there.² As you perhaps know, I am greatly interested in the future of the tribal people. I think that they are a special trust for the nation and we have to pay particular attention to their well-being. That, indeed, was the policy of the national movement during past years, and that is the policy laid down in our Constitution.

2. Tribal people vary very greatly in their development and culture. Some of them are quite primitive; others are fairly advanced. They cannot be treated all in the same way and we have to adapt ourselves to the special conditions prevailing in each area. For any of us to consider that we are superior folk and to look down upon these tribal people is a species of snobbery and is not always justified even in fact.

1. On 13 and 14 September 1952.

2. On 15 September, Nehru addressed a meeting of the Bhils at Māndu. Speech not printed.

3. The King of Nepal recently visited Delhi.³ The object of his visit was to say goodbye to his daughter, who has been ailing and who is going to Switzerland for treatment. But, as he came here, we profited by the occasion and had long talks. Those talks were far more on the personal and friendly level than on the governmental level. It has been our definite policy to keep aloof from interfering in the domestic affairs of Nepal. But, inevitably, help and advice from us have often been sought. We have at present a military mission in Nepal reorganizing the armed forces of the country. We have undertaken to build a cart-road from India to Nepal and we are improving the airfield near Kathmandu. The Nepal Government asked us some months ago to send them a batch of civil officers to help. Their original demand was a very big one and we hesitated to send so many people from outside. The matter was examined more fully and the number has been greatly reduced. Probably, we shall send a few such officers in the near future. This has nothing to do with the new developments in Nepal and the King taking charge of the administration.⁴

4. Nepal is rather a significant example of a country trying to build up a democratic structure without adequate preparation or background for it. After a hundred years of absolute autocracy and authoritarian government, suddenly the people of Nepal sense freedom and the bonds fall away. This heady wine goes to their heads and leads not to a disciplined exercise of that freedom, but to the development of all kinds of disruptive forces and petty groups, each pulling in its own direction. The Nepali Congress was the one major organization and was thus a stabilizing factor. The other stabilizing factor was the King. Unfortunately, the Nepali Congress itself has split up into three or four groups.⁵ It is immaterial which group is the biggest, because this process of splitting up weakens the organization all over the country and permits rather reactionary groups, like the Gurkha League,⁶ to grow in relative importance.

5. The fact is that unity in a country is very much dependent upon certain physical factors, such as communications. Where there is a lack of communications and it takes long to go from one part to another, the governmental apparatus is weak and even organized national movements do not function effectively. Local officers have a large discretion and may behave or misbehave with impunity. Local popular leaders are thrown up and they are not under the discipline of a larger movement. Nepal lacks communications utterly, except for the small valley where Kathmandu is situated. That is the physical weakness of Nepal at present, apart from lack of trained personnel in

3. From 4 to 7 September 1952.

4. See *ante*, p. 569.

5. See *ante*, p. 564.

6. See *ante*, p. 572.

any department of public activity. Then there are different types of people who pull, to some extent, in different directions. There are the Newars, people of the valley; there are the hill people, the Gurkhas; and there are the people of the Terai, adjoining India. These last named, the people of the Terai, are physically and culturally the nearest to India and have been influenced by our national movements to some extent. The Gurkhas have been cut off in the hills; the Newars have played a fairly important part in recent political changes in Nepal, because they happen to be in the capital and round about and are in a position to influence developments more than the other. But if the others wake up, they make a great difference. And this process of waking up has started. Because of this there is a complete lack of balance in Nepal at present. Our attempts in the past year and a half have been to maintain some kind of a balance. But, unfortunately, petty personal rivalries have again upset that balance. It is not because we interfered in Nepal, but because circumstances made it inevitable that the King had to take charge of the administration. There was, for the moment, no group strong enough to do so. Even now the position appears to be that if one group is put in charge of the administration, another equally strong group or groups would probably oppose it and create trouble. In the circumstances, the King had to take charge and since he has done so, there is a measure of quiet in the country and what little has been done already has, on the whole, been appreciated. Of course, there is opposition and criticism.

6. I have mentioned above the importance of communications. The dominant factor of the age today, all over the world, is the tremendous improvement in communications of various kinds. It is this which has made the world much more closely knit together than ever before. It is this which gives far greater facilities for peaceful progress as well as for wholesale destruction. Indeed, the alternative before the world appears to be one or the other, or to put it differently, the development ultimately of some kind of a world order based on free nations cooperating together or world dominion by one mighty power. Of course, there is a third possibility and that is just chaos after tremendous destruction. Indeed, even the attempt to achieve world dominion by any one great power would lead to this destruction and chaos, whatever the ultimate result might be.

7. I remember that when Chiang Kai-shek came to India over ten years ago,⁷ and he looked at the map of India with its lines of communications, he said that he then understood both the strength of the British power in India and the real basis of our non-violent struggle. He was comparing India to China because China was very backward in internal communications and therefore the Central Government could not easily exercise dominion over the

7. He was in India from 9 to 21 February 1942.

distant provinces. A rebellion might occur and there would be no means of putting it down for a long time. Compared to China, India was much more developed in this and some other ways. But, compared to some other countries, India is much less developed. Large areas near our borders are bereft of communications because the British attached little importance to them, except in the North-West Frontier. The result has been that these areas are very backward and the people there suffered greatly. One cannot start the process of development anywhere till one builds roads and other communications which open out that area. This is the first problem⁸ for us in parts of Assam, of Uttar Pradesh, of Himachal Pradesh and East Punjab. Also, of course, in the Jammu and Kashmir State. Similarly, in Nepal, every scheme of development has to be preceded by roads.

8. The development of communications makes it easier to tackle a problem. By itself, it does not solve the problem. The problem essentially remains an economic one, of finding work and employment, of greater production, of greater wealth and greater capacity for capital formation and investment and thus a more rapid pace of development. That pace is unfortunately limited in countries like India because we have little surplus to throw into investment. Nevertheless, we have to increase that pace and find some way to do it. If orthodox methods come in the way, then other methods have to be adopted. The world today witnesses some kind of a race not only between nations, but also between various forces within a nation as well as in the world. The slow of pace lag behind and might go to the wall. The essential unity of the world that has developed, because of the tremendous advancement in communications, brings its dangers also and all these various forces impinge one upon the other all the time.

9. From time to time, we suddenly wake up to some new and unusual occurrence. We saw the disappearance overnight of the King of Egypt at the bidding of the military. That was a military *coup* and it is not quite clear what other forces lay behind it, apart from military dissatisfaction. Since then other important developments have taken place in Egypt. Only a few days ago, Prime Minister Aly Maher and his Ministry resigned, no doubt under pressure, and General Nguib became not only Prime Minister, but also War Minister,

8. For a country with an area of over 1.2 million square miles, India had, in 1952, only 255,460 miles of road of which barely one-third was considered fit for vehicular traffic. The approximate length of the main waterways navigable by steamers and large country boats was 4,871 miles.

Commander-in-Chief and now Military Governor.⁹ That is a fairly comprehensive list of functions and it shows that General Neguib and his group are in a dictatorial position. He has, practically speaking, put an end to all the political parties in Egypt.¹⁰ The only large party, and this is not strictly political though it interferes in politics, is the Muslim Brotherhood.¹¹ A member¹² of this Brotherhood has been taken in the new Cabinet. It thus appears that there is a close relationship between the army group exercising control and the Muslim Brotherhood. Indeed, the programme of social reform, including land reform,¹³ which General Neguib has pushed forward, has practically been taken from the programme of the Muslim Brotherhood.

10. The change that started with the military *coup* has now developed more revolutionary tendencies. It is not yet quite clear which way this movement will go and whether there will be internal conflicts or not. From all accounts, the Wafd Party¹⁴ is still the largest and the most popular and it may not be quite easy to suppress it. It is true that the Wafd became involved in many scandals and stories of corruption. But the party still has a strong national backing.

11. The Muslim Brotherhood is a curious organization started in recent years by a man¹⁵ of great organizational capacity. It was hardly a political

9. On 27 January 1952, Nahas Pasha, gave up premiership and was succeeded by Aly Maher Pasha, an Independent ex-Premier and a personal friend of the King. Aly Maher Pasha also resigned and was succeeded by Hilaili Pasha. After four months, on 28 June, Hilaili Pasha resigned and Hussein Sirry Pasha was appointed Premier. King Farouk abdicated the Egyptian throne on 26 July on General Mohammed Neguib's insistence. Aly Maher returned as Prime Minister, but unhappy over the arrests of prominent leaders by the army on 6-7 September and on the demand by Neguib for immediate action to initiate the land reform programme, he resigned on 7 September 1952.
10. On 9 September, the Egyptian Government asked all political parties to register themselves, purge corrupt elements from their ranks and deposit funds in an established bank within thirty days. This order was issued as the earlier notice of 1 August 1952 directing internal reorganization had not been fully observed.
11. An ultra-conservative religious and political association with a para-military youth organization, founded in Egypt in 1929 and seeking to subordinate the social, political and constitutional life of the nation to Islamic tenets. The party was banned in 1948 as extra-constitutional but was permitted to resume activity in 1951.
12. Sheikh Hassan el-Bakkour became Minister of Religious Foundations (Wakfs).
13. The decree passed on 9 September 1952 placed a ceiling on ownership of land at 200 acres per head and permitted purchase and redistribution of surplus land by the State. Small landholders owning less than 5 acres were compelled to form agricultural co-operatives; and agricultural workers were assured wages regulated by law and given the right to form unions.
14. The Egyptian nationalist political party founded by Saad Zaghlul in 1914 to negotiate Egyptian independence with Britain. The party was at this time led by Mustafa Nahas Pasha.
15. Hassan-al-Banna (1906-1949).

movement and aimed at social reform. It is, in a sense, a movement with religious backing. Its programme of social reform may lead to some form of socialism or it may well develop in an authoritarian way towards some form of fascism.

12. What is happening in Egypt is, of course, important and interesting. But it will have its repercussions in the surrounding countries also and it is a symbol of our changing times. This should be a lesson to us so that we might not grow too static in our outlook and expect that the world or even India will progress in a slow evolutionary way. The progress may be evolutionary in India, but only if it is not slow.

13. I am glad that at this moment we have got our Ambassador, Shri K.M. Panikkar, functioning in Cairo.

14. Next month,¹⁶ the United Nations General Assembly is meeting in New York or nearby and we shall be sending, as usual, our delegation to it. The leader of this delegation will be Vijayalakshmi Pandit who has a great deal of experience of the working of the UN. She has served as Ambassador in Moscow and Washington, the two most important centres in world politics today. Indeed, it may be said that the future of the world depends largely on Washington and Moscow. She has also recently visited China and met the leaders there. She is, therefore, well fitted to understand the international situation and the problems that face us. I did not want to send her as she has been kept abroad for many years, but in view of the importance of this session and the grave problems that are bound to arise there, I decided to invite her to go.

15. There are many subjects in the UN agenda and, as you know, we propose to raise the question of the satyagraha movement in South Africa which is of high importance from the world point of view. But the real problem before the UN is probably not in the agenda at all. That is the problem of war and peace in the world. The future of humanity depends upon the solution of that problem. The present outlook is by no means cheerful or promising and it is only fear of war and its consequences that keep some nations in check. But that fear by itself is not enough and, indeed, leads one to war.

16. Therefore, the question arises how the UN should deal with the basic and vital matter. In effect, it is a question of the two great powers of this world, namely the USA and the USSR, coming to some arrangement or not. Each is afraid of the other and, to use the new phraseology, tries to "contain" the other. This process of containment gradually spreads to all the world. The Soviet Union functions along its frontiers, but these frontiers are far flung from Central Europe to Central Asia and the Pacific Ocean. The USA functions or tries to function on all these border countries of the Soviet Union and of

16. From 14 October 1952.

China and incidentally in other countries also. The question, therefore, is whether in this continuous conflict, spread all over Europe and Asia, there is a possibility of a recognition of each other's position and some kind of a settlement, however temporary, based on that. The attempt of either party to go beyond that position immediately leads to resistance and big scale war. This happened in Korea and the Korean war began in a relatively small way.¹⁷ Behind it, however, was the shadow of that major attempt to contain each other. When the 38th Parallel was crossed by the American or the UN troops going north¹⁸ that brought China into the picture and the scope of the war was widened even though the area remained more or less limited.

17. The military position in Korea, in spite of the terrible bombing that has gone on is one of stalemate, or so it appears. From any reasonable or logical point of view, it seems absurd for such enormous expenditure of life and energy and such vast destruction just to maintain that stalemate, which yields no positive results to either party. Reason would dictate some settlement which would not only be good for the Far East but would immediately affect the tensions in Europe. Briefly put, the two major international problems today are Korea and Germany.

18. I remember being in Geneva in the summer of 1938. While I was there, Mr Chamberlain,¹⁹ the UK Prime Minister, flew over to meet Hitler.²⁰ War was in the air. In France, mobilization had been declared. About that time also the British Navy was mobilized. In Geneva, however, the League of Nations was meeting peacefully discussing every problem but that vital problem of war and peace. The hundreds of international organizations with their headquarters in Geneva were all paralysed. The situation was as unreal as it could well be and the poor League of Nations did not count at all. If the United Nations also behaves in this way and ignores the most vital problems of the world, then inevitably this organization will also become completely unreal and fade away. As a matter of fact, the UN is directly concerned with the Korean war; it is one of the parties to it, although strangely enough, it has little say in the matter except to give its moral backing and to pass occasional resolutions of condemnation.²¹ This is a curious situation when this great organization has no power to control events, but is nevertheless committed to them and is dragged into them. If the UN discusses the Korean war in the

17. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 14 Pt.II, pp. 307-308.

18. See *ante*, p. 588.

19. Neville Chamberlain signed the Munich Agreement with Hitler on 29 September 1938 conceding the demand for immediate German occupation of Sudetenland area of Czechoslovakia.

20. Adolf Hitler.

21. One of the UN resolutions was passed on 1 February 1951, condemning China as an aggressor.

same way as it has done in the past, that is, to pass resolutions of condemnation or embargo,²² then it does not help towards a settlement. That would merely be manoeuvring for position in the war. A heavy responsibility rests with the UN and all countries connected with it not to allow the situation to drift helplessly but to try to come to grips with it and to find some way out.

19. In India there is naturally some kind of a lull in politics since Parliament adjourned. Attention has been diverted to the coming meeting of the All India Congress Committee in Indore and there is much controversy as to the relations of Governments with popular bodies like the Congress.²³ Who is to have the final say or who is generally to control policies? This controversy is rather theoretical and academic. Obviously, if there is a real conflict between a Government representing a certain party and that party organization, both will suffer greatly. We have seen a minor instance of this in Nepal.²⁴ There should be cooperation between the two. There can be no rigid rules about this. On the one hand, a Government is responsible to the Legislature and can only continue to function if it has a certain freedom to do so according to its own judgment. On the other hand, if that party Government becomes isolated from the party and the sanction it derives from that party, then it ceases to have any real authority for long. Thus there must be a common approach in vital problems and at the same time no interference in the normal working of Government.

20. The rains in India are practically over, though it is still not certain what further calamity might come upon us. Sometimes floods come in the second half of September. The rains have not been as generous as we had hoped. In some parts of Madras, notably Rayalaseema and part of Mysore State, they have practically failed again. In some other parts they came too late. On the whole, however, the all-India outlook for the harvest is still fair. There are some parts of the country which have suffered great scarcity and even famine conditions. Among these are some of the eastern districts of Uttar Pradesh, and more especially, Gorakhpur district. This is a heavily populated and a very poor area. Normal conditions are difficult there and the power of resistance of the average person is low. When a blow comes like a drought, the effect is much greater than in areas where people are better off. There is no doubt that large numbers of people there have suffered greatly from undernourishment and even sometimes starvation. There has been an argument as to whether people have died of starvation or not.²⁵ That argument has little

22. The resolution imposing an embargo on China was passed by the United Nations on 18 May 1951.

23. See *ante*, p. 505.

24. See *ante*, pp. 557 and 565.

25. See *ante*, p. 394.

meaning except that conditions have not been so bad as are normally described as famine, which brings about obvious deaths from starvation. But when there is undernourishment for long periods, the power of resistance goes and any additional misfortune snuffs out life. There can be little doubt that many people who even die from fever or some disease, die because of this long background of undernourishment. As a matter of fact, deaths often occur when a person who has suffered undernourishment or partial starvation for long suddenly takes a big and heavy meal. This upsets him completely.

21. Our State Governments do their utmost to meet such a situation and rush foodgrains where there is scarcity. They give out doles and they provide some work. But the situation, nevertheless, distresses one very greatly because it is basically derived from extreme poverty and undernourishment and the loss of the power to resist. We cannot change this by magic, but we must realize that this is a terrible blot on our country and we should not tolerate it willingly for a day. Here again we come up against the basic problem of the pace of development. This is an economic problem and however much we may dislike economics, we cannot ignore realities. But it is something much more than an economic problem; it is a human problem and it is from that human point of view that we must always consider it. Economics are meant for human beings, not human beings for some abstract science which does not satisfy their primary wants.

22. Our Five-Year Plan is being finalized. It has been a unique experience for the draft outline plan to be produced a year ago and for this to be widely discussed all over the country and then for a final plan to emerge. That is democratic way of functioning, and yet I feel that all this discussion has after all been confined to a certain upper strata of our society which reads newspapers. The vast majority of our population know little about this plan. It seems to me essential that the common people should have some knowledge of it, some understanding of its significance, some appreciation of how it affects them. I think that some very simple pamphlets in Hindi and the provincial languages should be prepared and sent to all our village bodies and *gram panchayats* and the like for them to read and discuss it. These pamphlets should deal with the all-India problem as well as the special application of it to that State. There may be three such pamphlets—one dealing with the Five-Year Plan as a whole, the second with community projects, and the third with river valley schemes.

23. There is another approach which is even more important, that is through our schools. These simple pamphlets should be sent to every school and the teachers ought to be asked to read them to their classes, to explain them and even to encourage discussion on them. If we did this, we would give more real education to our children than they get from their textbooks. Maps could be used and the various areas of special development or river valley schemes

or community projects could be pointed out. It should be stated that this is a beginning and we want to extend all this to other parts of India also. I commend this idea not only to the Planning Commission and the Education Ministry but to all State Governments.

24. In a little over four months, we shall have the celebrations of our Republic Day, January 26th. During past years we have had a very effective and impressive parade in Delhi followed by tableaux, which represented a kind of historical pageant of India. These tableaux were organized by school children and were fairly good. Nevertheless, there was much room for improvement. I feel that the celebrations on the 26th January should have certainly the military element but should also have an increasingly civil element in them. We might, for instance, in Delhi, organize something on a more ambitious scale. There would be the usual procession plus perhaps an exhibition plus also folk dances, more especially by tribal people. The conception of this procession and exhibition and everything else should be to demonstrate both the unity and great variety and diversity of India. This can only be done if States participate in these Delhi celebrations and take some responsibility for them. Each State could represent some distinctive feature of its own in the tableau or in the exhibition or both. Thus the procession would be a moving pageant of India in its rich diversity. The arts and crafts of each State could be represented in this way.

25. A part of these demonstrations might be the Grow-More-Food Campaign. Peasants and farmers who have won in the competitions could be invited at State expense to participate in these demonstrations and the tableaux could represent in various ways this idea of an abundance of food growing to feed this hungry land.

26. Then there could be folk dances. I would love to see in our procession people from various parts of India, including our tribal people, the Nagas from the North East, the Bhils from Central India, the Santhals and others showing that they are also full partners in this great enterprise of India going ahead. They could display their dances too, which are so attractive.

27. I have thrown out some ideas about the celebrations on January 26th. All this will require a great deal of organization and full cooperation between the States and the Central Government. There is not much time left and the sooner we begin thinking of this and organizing it, the better. It would be a good thing if we could hold a meeting in Delhi, say in the second week of October, to consider this matter. Each State could send a representative. He need not be a senior officer. It would be better to send a young and enthusiastic person with ideas. At that meeting some general decisions can be taken and we can go ahead preparing accordingly.

28. Some recent incidents regarding the gift of foodgrains, etc., for relief in scarcity areas from the Soviet Union and China have drawn some public

attention.²⁶ A relief committee in Andhra, sponsored and organized by the Communists there, made a direct appeal to certain organizations in China and the Soviet Union for help. In response, these organizations in China donated over rupees four lakhs which were paid over to the Indian Red Cross to begin with, but immediately after the Indian Red Cross was asked to hand this sum over to the Andhra Committee. The Red Cross Committee replied that they would gladly use the money for relief but they could not hand that money over to a private agency. Later, the money was returned to these organizations in China through the Chinese Embassy.

29. The Russian organizations announced that they were sending 10,000 tons of wheat, 5,000 tons of rice, 5,50,000 tons of tinned milk and rupees two and a half lakhs to the Andhra Committee. Our Government informed the Soviet Government that we appreciated this gesture of friendship, but we could not agree to any foreign government or organization dealing directly with private organizations in India for relief. It is clear that if we had permitted this kind of direct contact between organizations in foreign countries and certain groups in India, this would have led to all manner of complications. We are following this rule in regard to all countries, including the USA, from where many gifts have come.

30. The Kashmir talks in Geneva have apparently ended without producing any substantial results.²⁷ We expect Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar back here in another three days. Meanwhile, there has again been some wild talk in Pakistan,²⁸ probably meant to impress world opinion more than anything else.

31. Some recent incidents in Hyderabad have been very distressing. This began by a foolish agitation against non-*mulkis*, that is, against the employment

26. On 5 September 1952, the Government of India clarified that food gifts from abroad should be routed only through Government agencies and the Indian Red Cross Association. "The question of relief is not a party or political question and, therefore, it is Government's desire to keep this apart from and above political controversies."

27. The talks ended inconclusively on 10 September 1952 after a fortnight as Pakistan questioned India's right to ensure the State's security both internally and externally and claimed equal status for the forces on both sides. To this India objected on the ground that maintenance of troops as against civil forces in the area under the unlawful occupation of the rebel forces constituted a violation of India's sovereignty over the area. These differences gave rise to wide divergence between Indian and Pakistani views on the quantum and character of the forces to be left in Kashmir. India also insisted that it would accept appointment of a plebiscite administrator only when she was satisfied that demilitarization as desired by her had taken place.

28. On 31 August, Mian Mumtaz Daultana, Chief Minister of West Punjab, called upon the Pakistan Government to break away from the United Nations because "independence of Pakistan without Kashmir was incomplete." On 4 September, Chowdhury Khaliquzzaman, convenor of the Moslem People's Organization, said that Pakistan preferred to "have Kashmir to plebiscite."

in the State of people from outside the State. The students started it, but soon it went out of their hands and others joined in. Ultimately this grew and assumed big proportions and much damage was done and a number of people were killed by police firing. I do not wish to go into the merits of this at this stage. But this does show how from small beginnings and a little incident, grave developments can take place, if care is not taken. It shows also how there has grown up an atmosphere of violence in our country and how anti-social elements take advantage of this whenever they can. Another most important fact is how some newspapers in India inflame popular passions and behave in a manner which is utterly deplorable. This is not a matter of political difference, but of utter vulgarity and indecency. It is a bad thing for the country if our public taste is lowered in this way by some of our newspapers. A great deal is said about the freedom of the press and when the Government brought some mild legislation about the press recently,²⁹ there was some outcry, and yet here we are having the minds of many people poisoned by these constant outpourings of communal passion, vulgarity and indecency. Some way out will have to be found.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

29. See *ante*, p. 188.

V

New Delhi
2 October, 1952

My dear Chief Minister,

Since I wrote to you last I have spent some days in Madhya Bharat¹ and some days in Hyderabad State.² I went to Indore to attend the meeting of the All India Congress Committee and took advantage of this to pay a visit to some places in Madhya Bharat. This State is full of history, both ancient and medieval. Ujjain³ brings back to mind a period of cultural greatness which shines in our past annals. I went to Mandu also.⁴ I had heard of this for a long time past, but had never visited it. Having seen it, I wondered why it was so

1. From 15 to 17 September 1952.

2. From 24 to 29 September 1952.

3. Nehru visited Ujjain on 16 and 17 September 1952.

4. On 15 September 1952.

little known in India. It is full of history, romance and beauty. Madhya Bharat is the connecting link between North and South India and, as such, it has played an important part in history. It is a rich area and there is great room for development. Even in this rich and fertile land, there were some scarcity areas which had been hit hard by drought. This drought had particularly hit the area where large numbers of adivasis or Bhils lived. I could not go into the heart of this Bhil area, round about Alirajpur, but I met many thousands of them at Mandu itself. I find them a very attractive people and I think more and more how we should consider these and other tribal folk as a trust for the nation requiring every help and care from us.

2. You must have seen the resolutions passed by the AICC at Indore. I should like to draw your particular attention to them, more particularly to the resolutions on Foreign Policy,⁵ South Africa⁶ and Economic Policy.⁷ None of these represents any break from the past. They flow from the policy we have thus far pursued, but, in some measure, they go a little further and are more specific.

3. The death of Kishorelal Mashruwala,⁸ who had been editing the *Harijan*⁹ for the past few years, was a particularly sad event. He was one of the old and sturdy band who represented Gandhiji's ideas in many respects and who spoke and wrote fearlessly from week to week. Such men are the salt of the earth and we require them in India particularly. We talk so much of Gandhiji and yet we drift away, almost unknowingly, from many things that he taught us. In the problems that confront us we miss his wise guidance and burning faith. I write this on the day of his birth anniversary—Gandhi Jayanti. And so, even more than usual, our thoughts go to him and the message he gave us. Conditions change and we have to face new problems from day to day. It is not enough for us to ignore these changing conditions and to apply some remedy, which might not be suitable or appropriate. But certain basic approaches need not necessarily change with the changing times.

4. I spent six very full days in Hyderabad State.¹⁰ For the first time I went into the interior of the State and visited not only some well-known towns but

5. See *ante*, pp. 670-671.

6. See *ante*, pp. 645-646.

7. The resolution called upon the Government to take steps to increase production and reduce disparities, achieve economic growth through structural changes in the economy which would also stimulate capital formation and its investment in development schemes, and create a suitable climate for the growth of industry and trade through the State and cooperative ventures. The resolution also stressed the need for self-sufficiency in food and growth of small scale industry.

8. Associated with Mahatma Gandhi and Editor of *Harijan*, 1948-52.

9. Weekly started by Mahatma Gandhi in 1937.

10. 24 to 29 September 1952.

passed by innumerable villages and saw innumerable people. Vast crowds met me everywhere. Indeed it was surprising how many people came to my meetings or stood by the roadside which they had decorated. It was heartening to see these people and to witness their enthusiasm. And yet whenever this happens, a feeling of sadness comes over me. These people give so much of their faith and affection; how much do we give them in return?

5. Hyderabad, as everyone knows, has very special problems of its own. It was, more perhaps than any State in India, except some in Rajasthan, a feudal State. The police action and after has upset, rightly, this feudal structure; it has also upset the old unstable communal balance. That had to be done. But all this has brought about many unfortunate results also and it takes time to settle down. Before the police action, there was much tyranny on the part of the Razakars. After the police action, in some parts of the State, more especially on the western side, there was brutal retaliation against the Muslims. One evil led to another, but evil does not solve any problem. And now we have to contend against the consequences of both these evils. In Osmanabad, especially, I found many Muslim widows and children, who were in distress. Something had been done for them during the last year or two, but much remained. Apart from the question of giving them relief or some kind of work, there was a social problem, which was even more difficult to tackle. I hope that a better and organized effort to this end will now be made.

6. Hyderabad suffers in some parts from scarcity and drought and generally from the common ill of many parts of India, unemployment. To this has been added special unemployment by changes in the old feudal structure as well as in the Services and the disbandment of the old army. All this was no doubt inevitable, but the problem remains and has to be tackled. The financial resources of the State have been strained to the utmost and there was general complaint there that they had not received a fair deal from the Centre. I am sure that every complaint with any substance in it will be most carefully considered by the Central Government.

7. A few days before my visit to Hyderabad, there had been disturbances¹¹ there which started because of what is called the *mulki* agitation. This was a protest against the employment of people from outside the State. There was a tendency in the years immediately following the police action to bring in large numbers of people from the surrounding State—Madras, Madhya Pradesh and Bombay. Many of these have gone back, but some remain. Some of those who were imported did not function very satisfactorily and many complaints were probably justified. The real reason, however, for this agitation was the prevailing unemployment and the fear that the so-called outsiders will displace people from the State. There was some justification for this feeling, but this

11. See *ante*, p. 13.

whole business of *mulki* and non-*mulki* is, of course, all wrong. Subsequently the agitation went into other hands and there were disturbances for two or three days. By the time I reached Hyderabad, all this was over, but the problem of unemployment continues.

8. Another agitation, though this is more or less confined to certain top people, is against the decision to make the Osmania University a central university.¹² Partly this agitation was due to a misunderstanding and partly, I think, to political reasons, wholly unconnected with educational matters. I am quite convinced that it is desirable for the Osmania University to be a central university. This is good for India as a whole, for the South, but more particularly for Hyderabad State itself. I think the opposition to this is entirely misconceived.

9. Then there is the cry for a division of Hyderabad on a linguistic basis.¹³ For my part, I am entirely opposed to this. If it is accepted, I am sure that it would retard progress in Hyderabad for many long years and would create all manner of problems and upset the balance of South India. All our Five-Year Plans and the like will have to be put on the shelf till some new equilibrium is reached.

10. As I motored long distances across Hyderabad State, I was charmed by the Deccan scenery. In the north of India, we have, generally speaking, flat plains terminating in very high mountains. In the Deccan there is hardly any flat space and the countryside represents a changing and varying aspect, which is very attractive. It was all the more attractive because of the greenery caused by the monsoon rains.

11. I visited the Tungabhadra Project¹⁴ also and was delighted to find how near completion this was. Whenever I see these great engineering works, I feel excited and exhilarated. They are visible symbols of building up the new India and of providing life and sustenance to our people. I wish we had the means and resources to do this on an even larger scale all over India.

12. From this site of the Tungabhadra dam, I journeyed to the ruins of Vijayanagar¹⁵ nearby. It was an all too hurried visit. But even so I was powerfully impressed by the magnitude and magnificence of these relics of the old Vijayanagar Empire. The stone carvings and the friezes were very beautiful.

13. I have now come back to Delhi for just four or five days' stay and am going down South again, this time to Madras city and the Rayalaseema area

12. The proposal was opposed by Congressmen as well as the members of the Opposition and ultimately the Government of India decided not to make Osmania a Central University.

13. See *ante*, p. 409.

14. See *ante*, p. 373.

15. Founded in 1336, it was destroyed in 1565 by the combined armies of Golconda, Bidar, Ahmadnagar and Bijapur.

on the 4th October. Rayalaseema, and the adjoining areas of Mysore and Hyderabad, have been peculiarly unfortunate for several years. The hopes we had nourished that this year at least they might have adequate rain have been falsified and distress continues. My visiting these areas will not bring additional relief to them. But it will bring some satisfaction to me that I have at least gone there and it may be perhaps, that some little part of that satisfaction might come to the people who have suffered so much. It is clear to me that the kind of relief that we organize in these famine and scarcity areas, important and inevitable as it is, is no solution whatever of the problem. We cannot wait for rain year after year or pray for it. We have to devise other methods, if not to produce rain, at least to produce work. The main problem today in considerable parts of India is not lack of the availability of food, but lack of purchasing power. The only solution, therefore, is to increase our production and give more purchasing power to the people. To some extent, of course, we are doing this through our various works and our Five-Year Plan. But probably something more is needed in these particular areas and, as far as I can see, this can only be in the shape of small schemes and cottage industries. We have at present many such scarcity areas, apart from Rayalaseema and neighbourhood. They are the south-eastern districts of Uttar Pradesh, parts of Bihar, where again the Kosi has drowned numerous villages in its floods, some of the Karnataka districts of Bombay State, parts of Madhya Bharat and several other areas.

14. After my return from Madras, I shall spend a few days in Delhi and then pay a visit to the North East Frontier Agency, which comprises some of our important tribal areas, including the Nagas. From there, I shall go to Manipur and Tripura.¹⁶ All these border areas tend to be neglected somewhat and I have long wanted to visit them. This wish of mine is at last likely to be gratified and my discovery of India will thus continue. There can be no end to this discovery in this great country with its fascinating variety.

15. There has been much argument about our handloom industry and various proposals have been put forward to encourage it.¹⁷ Everyone knows that the handloom industry is our biggest cottage industry and employs a very large number of skilled workers. From every point of view it has to be encouraged. For some time past it suffered from lack of yarn. That lack is being gradually removed or lessened. The real difficulty now is due to the lack of purchasing power of the people. There are large stocks of handloom goods and merely to encourage more production without sale will not help. It is necessary, therefore, to encourage sales and we come up there with the fact

16. Nehru visited Assam, NEFA, Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura from 19 to 25 October 1952.

17. See *ante*, p. 151.

that handloom products are somewhat more expensive, even though they might be better in many ways, and thus are more difficult to sell. The Government of India are paying a great deal of attention to this matter and have already taken some steps, which I hope will bear fruit.

16. I have written to you previously about gifts of foodgrains and money from trade unions in Soviet Russia and in China for relief in South India.¹⁸ We would not agree to private organizations accepting these gifts and dealing with them. Subsequently, both the Russian and the Chinese trade union organizations agreed to hand over these gifts to the Indian Red Cross and they were accepted with gratitude. Russian wheat and rice have just arrived in Madras by sea and have been received by the Red Cross representatives. It will be utilized in giving relief in Rayalaseema and in the affected areas of Mysore and Hyderabad. These gifts are substantial, more especially that from Soviet Russia.

17. There has been a certain relaxation of control on cotton cloth.¹⁹ The sugar policy for the next season has also been laid down²⁰ and the price of sugarcane has been reduced. This will bring down the price of sugar also.

18. Our Vice-President, Dr Radhakrishnan, is at present visiting some of the capitals of Europe.²¹ He went to Cairo first and was given a very enthusiastic reception there both by the Government and the people. We have been informed that his visit produced a marked effect. He is now in Rome. This tour of the Vice-President has no special significance in the sense that he is not bearing any message to these capitals, but from another point of view, it is of high significance both by virtue of his high position in India and his great experience and reputation. He is a very fine ambassador of India, carrying India's message and explaining her policy in these different countries.

18. On 20 September 1952, the Government accepted ten thousand tons of wheat, five thousand tons of rice, five lakh tons of condensed milk and a sum of rupees two and a half lakhs from the Central Council of the Soviet Trade Unions, and a gift of Rs 421,940 from five Chinese peoples' organizations for distribution in drought-affected areas in Madras State. The donors agreed to distribution through the Indian Red Cross. Earlier, the Indian Red Cross had also received rupees four lakhs from the Chinese organizations.
19. On 27 September 1952, the Government announced decontrol of price on *dhonis*, *saris* and some other varieties of cloth. The price of yarn was also decontrolled except for the varieties of yarn supplied to handloom industry. The Government, however, decided to continue control on the production of cloth.
20. On 25 September, the Government fixed the minimum price for purchase of sugarcane by the factories but fixed no statutory price for the sale of sugar, *gur* and *khandsari*. Provision was however made that in case the price of sugar rose, the Government would offset it by releasing sugar from its own stock.
21. He visited Cairo, Rome, Geneva, Berlin, Paris and London for a month from 25 September 1952.

19. Our Ambassador in Nepal, Shri C.P.N. Singh has relinquished his post after completing a little more than his full term there. He is being succeeded by Shri B.K. Gokhale, who retired from service recently. The post of our Ambassador in Nepal is a delicate and important one because of our close relations with that country and the new problems that are continually arising there. For the present, there is quiet in that country and the King's administration is apparently welcomed by the people as a whole.

20. There has recently been a merger of the Socialist Party with the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party.²² The new party that has emerged from this is called the Praja Socialist Party. There have been many criticisms of this merger. I think, however, that we should welcome it as it is better to have a small number of well-organized parties than a multitude of groups.

21. In Egypt, it would appear that the revolutionary urge has largely exhausted itself. But perhaps it is premature to form an opinion. A conflict has arisen between the Government and the Wafd Party.²³ As there appear to be inner dissensions within the Wafd Party, probably the Government will have its way.

22. Dr Graham's report to the Security Council about his efforts at mediation in regard to Kashmir has just been published.²⁴ There is nothing very new in it and the position remains more or less where it was. So far as we are concerned, we can accept no major change in the position we have taken up. We have gone as far as we can possibly go.

23. Some recent proposals²⁵ made on behalf of the UN Commanders at Panmunjon offer some hope of a truce in Korea, but it is difficult to be optimistic after the failure of so many efforts.

24. This morning, as usual, many of us visited Rajghat and paid tribute to Gandhiji. It seems long ago since he left us. And yet at other times the feeling of his presence is strong and vivid. Though we may drift away somewhat from our old moorings, something of that gracious memory lingers, something of that inspiration endures, and a sentinel voice sounds in our ears.

22. This was announced on 26 September 1952.

23. In response to Government's call to purge all political parties of corrupt elements, Mustafa Nahas Pasha, leader of the Wafd Party, suspended some members of the party on 12 September and dissolved it on 18 September pending its reorganization as per new rules. However, following the demand for removal of Nahas Pasha by the army leadership which was also supported by the young members of the Wafd Party, Nahas Pasha resigned on 6 October 1952 as the leader of the Party.

24. On 24 September 1952, Graham reported his failure to effect an agreement between India and Pakistan on demilitarization in Kashmir.

25. On 28 September 1952, the UN Command proposed that both sides should agree to bring prisoners to the demilitarized zone for identification, and those resisting repatriation be either sent to the demilitarized zone for further interviews by the representative of the country mutually agreed upon or be set free to go to any place of their choice.

25. After Rajghat, I went to the village of Alipur in Delhi State to participate in the inauguration of community centres scheme. All over India at this time these projects were being started. The beginning is a small one, but there is something really big in the conception behind these community projects. That idea is to change the whole face of rural India and to raise the level of the vast majority of our population. It is a dynamic and revolutionary conception if we could but grasp it and give effect to it through organized and continuous work. Some of us at Alipur made a symbolic gesture of helping in the building of a road. That was a small and insignificant effort, and yet, perhaps, in the wider scheme of things, that manual work had greater significance than much else that I do.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

VI

New Delhi
17 October, 1952

My dear Chief Minister,

I am writing to you again on the eve of my departure from Delhi for a week's tour.¹ I am going to Calcutta tomorrow morning and after a day and night's stay there, I shall proceed to Assam. This visit to Assam is especially meant for the North-Eastern Agency, Manipur and Tripura. I am greatly looking forward to this visit as I am attracted to these frontier regions and the people who live there.

2. I have decided to spend a day in Calcutta on my way to Assam because of the new situation that has arisen in West Bengal owing to a sudden increase in the number of refugees coming from East Pakistan. Apart from the normal causes of this movement, there can be no doubt that the proposal to introduce the passport system² frightened many people and made them think that it might not be possible to cross the frontier later. Because of this there was a rush and a difficult situation was created in Calcutta where these large numbers of

1. Nehru returned to New Delhi on 26 October 1952.

2. The passport system between India and Pakistan came into force on 15 October 1952.

refugees continued to arrive by every train, as well as on foot, across the border. It has not been an easy matter to deal with these refugees. The Central Rehabilitation Minister, Shri A.P. Jain, has also proceeded to Calcutta. At my request the Bihar Government have been good enough to agree to accommodate 15,000 of these refugees. I have made a similar request to the Orissa Government and I hope that they will also agree.

3. I have given you, from time to time, the figures for the movement of Hindus and Muslims between East and West Bengal. Throughout this year up to the end of August 1952, as in the previous two years, there was on the whole a movement of both Hindus and Muslims to East Bengal from West Bengal. That is to say, that, in the balance, more people went to East Bengal than came to West Bengal. There were exceptions to this general trend in the months of June, July, August and September 1951. From October 1951, there was a marked tendency for an excess of Hindus as well as an excess of Muslims to go to East Bengal from West Bengal.

4. In September 1952, however, there was a slight excess of Hindus coming to West Bengal from East Bengal. The figures for the month of September were:

Hindus going to West Bengal	. . .	178,434
Hindus going to East Bengal	. . .	176,471

From the daily figures, it appears that this change-over took place about the 19th September. From that day onwards, there were more Hindus coming from East Bengal to West Bengal. In October, this new trend continued. During the first eight days of October, 76,312 Hindus came to West Bengal and 55,885 Hindus went to East Bengal. Thus, there was an excess of over 20,000 coming to West Bengal. This continued till the 15th October when the passport system was introduced.

5. It is clear that this major movement was due to some panic on account of the passport system. It was also due to the deteriorating economic conditions of Pakistan and to the harassment of the minority community there.

6. You will remember that it was Pakistan that proposed the introduction of the passport system. We resisted this for some time, but on their insistence we agreed. Since then very complicated arrangements have been made and much money has been spent on preparations. The date, 15th October, was finally fixed for the introduction of this system. About a week or so before this date,³ rather suddenly, Pakistan wanted a postponement for a month of this date. The reason they gave was that they had not been supplied with an adequate supply of visa forms or some other papers by us. This was not correct, as we had sent them what they asked for and were prepared to send them more. Normally we would have had no objection to this postponement. But in

3. On 7 October 1952.

view of the abnormal conditions that had arisen in East Bengal and West Bengal and the influx of refugees into Calcutta, any postponement of this date would have aggravated the crisis by continuing a feeling of uncertainty. We were perfectly prepared to scrap the passport system completely. We were not prepared to postpone it for a few weeks. That would have meant another month of trouble and mounting crisis in West Bengal. A final decision had to be made this way or that way. We made this clear to the Pakistan Government.⁴ A day or two before the fixed date, a final appeal was made to me by the Pakistan Prime Minister⁵ for postponement.⁶ I was unable to agree to this,⁷ though we expressed our willingness to relax certain rules for a few days so as to avoid, as far as possible, difficulty and inconvenience.

7. The passport system, therefore, came into force on the 15th October and there has naturally been a considerable reduction in the immediate traffic between West Bengal and East Bengal. In the case of Hindus, who had already come to the border, we are allowing them to come over with the least of formality. Generally speaking, we are not following the rules very strictly for the next week or two.

8. It was curious for Pakistan, after its initial insistence on the passport system, to try to postpone it. Obviously this was due to some kind of pressure on them, the pressure of events. From such information as we have received, it appears that the economic deterioration in East Pakistan is fairly rapid and, unless some marked change takes place, conditions will progressively worsen there. Even the Muslim population there is considerably worried over this. Many Muslims, including the employees of the Pakistan Government, who have special interests or properties in India, were upset by this passport rule and brought considerable pressure to bear upon their Government. I hope that now that we have come to final decisions, the feeling of uncertainty will go and some measure of normality will come in regard to the traffic between East and West Bengal.

9. I have recently visited the Rayalaseema districts in Madras and some parts of Mysore State,⁸ where the rains having failed, scarcity conditions prevailed. I also spent some days in Madras city. This visit of mine to the South after nearly a year gave me a deeper understanding of the South. Madras city grows upon one and the more I go there, the more I like it. But apart from the city, the whole landscape of the South and, more especially the typical Deccan landscape of Rayalaseema, Mysore, and Hyderabad, appeal to me greatly, with its rolling downs and little hills and rock structures standing

4. On 9 October 1952.

5. Khwaja Nazimuddin.

6. On 10 October 1952.

7. This was communicated to the Pakistan Government on 13 October 1952.

8. From 4 to 9 October 1952.

up defiantly in the middle of the plain. The colours of these hills were changing almost from moment to moment and were fascinating to watch. The people, in spite of their distress, were very friendly and attractive.

10. But I did not go there to watch the scenery; I went to see for myself the conditions of distress. These were apparent in the dried up fields and the pinched and famished faces of the people. There had fortunately been some rain just about the time of my visit and this came as a welcome change. But it could make no immediate difference to the distress. The State Governments had done a great deal to help. In Rayalaseema about half a million persons were fed daily at the gruel kitchens. Nearly 75% of these were children and it pained me to see them huddled up together with beggars and the halt and the lame. I suggested to the Madras Government that these children should be separated and fed in schools. Where there were no schools, I suggested that a temporary school should be established. This school need have no building or other equipment—just a teacher for the village, who could be put in charge of some kind of elementary training, including some games, etc., and simple kinds of basic work. That teacher would also give them a free meal daily. I am glad to say that this suggestion has been largely accepted by the Madras Government.

11. I think more and more that if we are to give any widespread training to the millions of our children who have no schools to go to at present, we should adopt some such method and not waste a rupee on buildings. I would, in particular, like this to be done for the little children of kindergarten age.

12. Since I wrote to you last, the community projects have been started all over India. I enclose a sheet which gives you some information about them.⁹ This sheet does not say anything about Jammu and Kashmir State. As a matter of fact, we are having three blocks there also—in Kashmir proper, in Jammu Province and in Ladakh. We have separated these from the others, because we are having some American help for the others. We did not wish any American help to be applied to the Kashmir State for obvious reasons and so we are shouldering that burden separately and by ourselves. These community projects are not just ordinary development centres but have a wider and deeper significance. I believe that they can bring about a revolutionary change in our rural areas if we proceed about them in the right way. It would indeed be a triumph of the first magnitude if in this way, peacefully and without internal conflict, we can spread the gospel of work and, what is more, of self-help and thus help in building up our new India. I am sure you appreciate the full importance of these projects and that your Government will try its utmost to make them a success. That success does not depend on governmental effort alone but much more on the cooperation obtained from the people and a new

9. Not printed.

atmosphere of cooperative and enthusiastic effort that we can produce. I have met many of our project and village officers under training and I have been impressed by them. After all, the success of our scheme largely depends upon these workers.

13. Yesterday and today we have been discussing the draft report of the Planning Commission which contains the Five-Year Plan.¹⁰ The draft itself is rather voluminous and it is not easy to consider such a big report in all its manifold aspects. Naturally we have concentrated on some major points in it. In the draft Plan, we have tried to go as far as we possibly can, without taking undue risks about our economy. We tabulate our resources and try to estimate what they are, using such statistical and other data that we may possess. The human factor, however, is not easy to appraise or tabulate. A people who take up anything with faith and enthusiasm bring an amount of energy which is incalculable. So, much depends upon the way we tackle this great effort. It will depend on the efficiency and deep interest of Governments; it will depend even more on how we can make our people appreciate the fullness and significance of this Plan which is the result of more than two years of hard labour. It is not merely a plan conceived and put out by a few persons who are members of our Planning Commission. It is definitely the result of a joint effort of large numbers of people. The Planning Commission has consulted every prominent group in India and discussed various aspects of the Plan with them. A little over a year ago, they published the draft outline Plan. This attracted a great deal of attention as well as a great deal of criticism. The Commission has taken advantage of this criticism to revise the Plan in many particulars. The Plan is thus truly the result of a democratic approach and widespread discussion and consideration.

14. The Planning Commission are now consulting well-known organizations again. Members of the Congress Working Committee are discussing the Plan with them. Other parties and groups like the Praja Socialist Party will also do so. The advisory bodies of the Planning Commission will then give it consideration. Finally, the draft Plan will be put up before the Cabinet. Perhaps some time towards the end of November it may be published and placed on the table of Parliament for discussion there.

15. It must be remembered that the five years of the Plan really began nearly two years ago and therefore part of the Plan has already been functioning, though not as an integrated whole. Only a little over three years now remain of this five-year period.

16. The Plan, as conceived, is really meant to prepare the ground for more rapid progress during the next stage. It is a preparation for progress,

10. The Planning Commission discussed the revised draft Plan with members of the Congress Working Committee on 16 and 17 October 1952.

though no doubt certain results will be obtained even during this period. We have to lay the strong foundations of future advance. If we are not too anxious to eat our cake today, we shall have much more tomorrow.

17. In a sense, this Plan will be finalized and I hope that all of us in India will endeavour to give effect to it. But there can be no real finality about planning as it depends on developments as they take place and we have to learn from the experience we gather in working it. We shall adhere to the Plan, but we shall not hesitate to add to it or to vary it if circumstances so require. Our resources are limited and do not come anywhere near our wishes in this matter. But it is quite possible that we might be able to add to our resources by means which cannot at present be easily computed. This can be by some other forms of utilization of our manpower, for ultimately labour is capital. Also with a proper drive we might encourage saving in many ways and use this for development purposes. In order to give a further incentive to this saving, we might utilize the money for the development of the particular area concerned. We have, therefore, to look upon development loans and saving schemes, whether of the Centre or of the States, not as something to be carried through by governmental effort alone, but something which requires the fullest measure of public support. Apart from the money and labour thus obtained, we want to give a sense of partnership to millions of people in India—a partnership into this magnificent adventure of building up new India.

18. We have had a notable conference in New Delhi a few days ago—a conference of all the Finance Ministers of the States in India.¹¹ For two full days this conference discussed a number of basic problems. Naturally, in the space of two days, specific decisions could not easily be arrived at about every matter, but a good deal of light was thrown on many subjects and some general conclusions were arrived at.¹² I believe there was a widespread feeling that the conference had done good.

19. There is a feeling among some Part B States that they have not been very fairly treated in the scheme of financial integration.¹³ In the usual course this matter can be revised after five years. But where a case is proved, there is no reason why the matter should not be looked into and, where possible, some variations made in the previous settlement. It is not normally desirable

11. On 14 and 15 October 1952.

12. The Finance Ministers agreed, in principle, to the levy of sales tax, matching their budgetary estimates with the financial outlays for the Five-Year Plan and mutual consultations between the Centre and the States before imposition of any new taxes.

13. On 15 October, in response to the request of the Chief Ministers of Saurashtra and Hyderabad for review of the financial arrangements between the Union and the States in view of their own revenues having gone down after the integration, the President suggested to the Prime Minister to ask the Finance Commission to review the question and, pending such a review, to adhere to the existing arrangements.

to upset settlements as they produce a feeling of uncertainty and it might affect even our planning. But our whole approach is a cooperative one between the Centre and the State Governments and it is always our desire to remove any feeling of unfair treatment. All of us, I hope, are deeply interested, not only in the advancement of the particular part of India that we represent, but of the country as a whole. We have thus to view every problem in this larger context.

20. I have written to you previously on several occasions about the habit of some unworthy newspapers to publish false statements and make scurrilous propaganda. This is often designed to create communal trouble and, indeed, it sometimes succeeds. We have come to the conclusion that we must take legal action wherever there is a *prima facie* case for it. Even if we fail sometimes in that action because of the niceties of the law, we propose to take it. If the law is not adequate, it will have to be changed. This has nothing to do with political opposition, but rather with indecency, vulgarity and something approaching blackmail, in which some periodicals indulge. Recently there have been some extraordinary cases of this kind. A Bombay weekly¹⁴ published a forged letter purporting to have been written by the American Ambassador¹⁵ here. It was published in spite of a warning given previously about this letter. We are taking action in this matter.

21. Another remarkable example of this kind has recently occurred. A periodical¹⁶ published what purported to be a speech by our Commander-in-Chief, General Cariappa.¹⁷ This was an astounding report. On the face of it, it was unbelievable. General Cariappa, when asked, of course, contradicted it. The periodical in question offered to apologize and correct the previous false statement. But in such cases an apology or a correction is not adequate and legal action is being taken.

22. The General Assembly of the United Nations has begun its labours.¹⁸ The first day appears to have been a very tame affair and indeed there were not enough speakers and the meeting had to be adjourned. This is a bad beginning for an important session. The Security Council has also met to hear Dr Graham's report on Kashmir.¹⁹ Very soon, our representative and the representative of Pakistan will make their statements. I do not know what the future course might be and whether any resolution is likely to be put forward by any of the powers. We have asked Vijayalakshmi Pandit to represent us in

14. *Current*.

15. Chester Bowles.

16. *Organiser*, published in Delhi. See *ante*, p. 498.

17. See *ante*, p. 500.

18. The seventh session opened on 14 October 1952 at New York.

19. It met on 11 October 1952 but was adjourned as Pakistan's representative asked for time to prepare a statement on Graham's report.

this matter in the Security Council. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, the cry for war continues.²⁰ Always when the Security Council or the UN representatives are considering this matter, the press and the leaders of Pakistan become belligerent and inform the world that unless their wishes are attended to, there is going to be big trouble. They cry of wolf has grown rather stale, and yet in view of the deterioration in political and economic conditions in Pakistan, there is always danger of some adventurism and we have to be prepared for it.

23. In Iran, negotiations have broken down and have been followed by Dr Mossadeq announcing a break of diplomatic relations with the UK.²¹ This is unfortunate and the consequences are likely to be far-reaching,

24. A short time ago we sent a note²² to the French Government drawing their attention to the state of lawlessness prevailing in some of the French possessions in India and more particularly to the repeated attempts by gangsters to terrorize those who are in favour of merger with India. Such notes had been sent previously also. When I was in Madras, a further and rather flagrant example of gangsterism occurred there and two of our policemen were beaten by some rowdies. There can be no doubt that this kind of thing has had the connivance, if not the active support, of the French authorities. I stated at a public meeting in Madras²³ that we took a very strong view of these developments. It was clear that either the French authorities were conniving at these gangster methods or were incapable of controlling them. To talk of plebiscite in this connection had no meaning and, therefore, so far as we were concerned, we were not interested in a plebiscite. The simple point now for us was that these foreign possessions in India, whether French or Portuguese, should be handed over to India. It is on that basis that we were prepared to discuss matters and details. We are sending a formal note to this effect to the French Government in Paris.

25. We have always made it clear that we do not wish to interfere with the language, laws or customs of these French or Portuguese establishments

20. The *Dawn* wrote editorially on 11 October that "Kashmir is an inalienable part of the very conception of Pakistan and its territory... If the UN is proved wanting in its clear duty...it will have passed its initiative to bloodshed and chaos." On 12 October, Mahmood Hussein, Pakistan's Minister for Kashmir Affairs, declared at Dacca that "in case of the failure of the United Nations to solve the Kashmir problem we will be free to chalk out further course of action."

21. Iran broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom on 16 October after the refusal by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to pay 49 million pounds before negotiations could start for settlement as proposed by Truman and Churchill in their joint note of 30 August.

22. The Indian Government's note of 11 October condemned firing and the use of methods of coercion against Indian nationals in the French settlements and said that no fair referendum could be held under such conditions. See *ante*, pp. 679-680.

23. On 9 October 1952. See *ante*, pp. 677-678.

and that they would enjoy a measure of autonomy. It is only with the consent of the people there that any changes would be introduced.

26. In Egypt new developments have taken place and it is a little difficult to judge of the real position there. One of the Regents was recently dismissed by General Neguib.²⁴ It is not quite clear whether General Neguib is the strong man of Egypt or whether he is rather a popular figurehead with power being exercised by a group of officers. It is clear, however, that it is the army or a group of officers who are dominating the situation. The assurances given previously by the army that they did not wish to interfere with the civil government have proved to be untrue. Probably, General Neguib is more of a figurehead now and others control the Government. The Regent²⁵ who was dismissed was a partisan of the Muslim Brotherhood Organization. This indicates that the army group is not in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood.

27. The army group does not appear to have much political background and the regime exhibits a certain political weakness. In economic matters they have taken steps which have failed to produce results. An attempt was made to control prices through military decrees. This met with no success. The position in Egypt, therefore, is by no means stable.

28. Scarcity conditions prevail not only in Madras and Mysore and parts of Hyderabad, but also in Saurashtra, Karnataka and some areas of Madhya Bharat. There have been welcome rains in many places including the eastern districts of Uttar Pradesh and these have brought much relief. In Assam, however, repeated floods continue bringing disaster and suffering in their train. My programme for Assam and Manipur is likely to be affected greatly by these rains there.

29. I have sometimes received complaints from Christian missions and missionaries, both foreign and Indian, about the differential treatment accorded to them in some States.²⁶ It is said that there is some kind of harassment also occasionally. Some instances of this kind have come to my notice. I hope that your Government will take particular care that there is no such discrimination, much less harassment. I know that there is a hangover still of the old prejudice against Christian missions and missionaries. In the old days, many of them, except in the far South, where they were indigenous, represented the foreign power and sometimes even acted more or less as its agents. I know also that some of them in the north-east encouraged separatist and disruptive movements. That phase is over. If any person, foreign or Indian, behaves in that way still,

24. On 14 October, the Regency Council set up after King Farouk's abdication was suspended and Prince Abdul Moneim was appointed the sole Regent.

25. Rachad Mehanna.

26. On 9 October 1952, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur drew Nehru's attention to complaints of such treatment of Christian missionaries in Bihar and Madhya Pradesh.

certainly we should take suitable action. But we must remember that Christianity is a religion of large numbers of people in India and that it came to the South of India nearly 2,000 years ago. It is as much part of the Indian scene as any other religion. Our policy of religious neutrality and protection of minorities must not be affected or sullied by discriminatory treatment or harassment. While Christian missionaries have sometimes behaved objectionably from the political point of view, they have undoubtedly done great service to India in the social fields and they continue to give that service. In the tribal areas, many of them have often devoted their lives to the tribes there. I wish that there were Indians who were willing to serve the tribal folk in this way. I know that there are some Indians now who are doing this, but I would like more of them to do so. It must be remembered that the Christian community, by and large, is poor and is sometimes socio-economically on the level of the backward or depressed classes.

30. We permit, by our Constitution, not only freedom of conscience and belief but even proselytism. Personally I do not like proselytism and it is rather opposed to the old Indian outlook which is, in this matter, one of live and let live. But I do not wish to come in other people's ways provided they are not objectionable in any other sense. In particular, I would welcome any form of real social service by any one, missionary or not. A question arises, however, how far we should encourage foreigners to come here for purely evangelical work. Often these foreign missionaries raise funds in foreign countries on the plea of converting the savage heathen. I do not want anyone to come here who looks upon me as a savage heathen, not that I mind being called a heathen or a pagan by anybody. But I do not want any foreigners to come who look down upon us or who speak about us in their own countries in terms of contempt. But if any foreigner wants to come here for social service, I would welcome him.

31. An interesting development has recently taken place. The Communist Party of India has proclaimed its willingness to restore the arms it possessed in Telengana.²⁷ I do not suppose that they will restore all the arms they have. Nevertheless, this indicates the pressure of events on the Indian Communist Party. We need not imagine that they have changed their basic creed or that they have given up the way of violence. But it is clear that they feel that the methods of violence are not profitable in India at present. As a matter of fact, it did not matter much whether they gave up their arms or not, because those arms were anyhow more or less useless. Another party, calling itself the Revolutionary Communist Party, which has indulged in brutal crimes in Assam,

27. B. Ramakrishna Rao, Chief Minister of Hyderabad, announced on 8 October 1952 that the Communists in Telengana had agreed to surrender arms unconditionally.

has also announced that it is giving up all kinds of violence and terrorism. Again, this represents the failure of that policy of violence and terrorism and not any change of heart. Anyhow, that declaration is welcome because it indicated their weakness and the public reaction against such methods. In Telengana, the public is definitely reacting against communist methods and a number of Communists there have got into trouble with the villagers.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. To Mridula Sarabhai¹

New Delhi
July 28, 1952

My dear Mridula,

I do not see the point of your seeing the Governor General of Pakistan or the Prime Minister of Pakistan about Badshah Khan's health.² I have in fact communicated with the Prime Minister to enquire about his health.³ We are also trying to get news from Lahore. It is better for us to show some restraint about these matters.

As for Bapu's letters to me, there is no question of their publication either by the Gandhi Smarak Nidhi or anyone else.⁴ If some selected ones are ever published, that will be done under my direct supervision. I do not propose to allow a single letter to be published unless I have passed it.

The Gandhi Smarak Nidhi are merely preparing microfilms of these letters, not for publication, but for record. I have not given them any of my letters yet and indeed I cannot do so till I have myself sorted them out. They are in Allahabad and till I go there and give some time to them, nothing further can be done.

I just do not understand what you mean by presenting the manuscript to Indu. There is no question of presenting it to anybody. I have got it and am keeping it.

You refer to some expert in botany⁵ in the community projects. I have never heard of him and do not know who he is.

Will you please inform Amtus Salam about what I have written to you about Bapu's letters to me?

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Mridula Sarabhai wanted to see Ghulam Mohammad, Governor General of Pakistan, in connection with the deteriorating health of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who was running high temperature and was admitted to a hospital in Lahore. She had enclosed a draft telegram to Ghulam Mohammad and Nazimuddin for Nehru's approval.

3. See *ante*, pp. 598-599.

4. As the Gandhi Smarak Nidhi was collecting Mahatma Gandhi's correspondence, Mridula Sarabhai, on 27 July 1952, requested Nehru for permission and authority to be allowed to collect these letters and to compile them in volumes under the title "Gandhiji's Letters to Nehru". She wished to present these to Indira Gandhi on her birthday on 19 November. She had also written that Amtus Salam was already working on her letters.

5. Mridula Sarabhai had written that the expert, supposedly appointed on Nehru's recommendation, had boasted to his friends that he spent "two hours" with Nehru, which was found to be untrue.

2. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi
July 28, 1952

My dear Jayaprakash,

Thank you for your letter of the 25th July.² I am very happy that you passed through, so successfully, the great ordeal of the fast. You should, of course, take things very easy till you recover fully. I confess that December seems a long way off and I rather doubt if this long stay might not itself become a burden to you. Rest, of course, you should have.

Environment counts for a great deal and I am always a little afraid of anyone staying too long in a hospital or clinic. I have myself stayed for nearly a year in a clinic (not as a patient, but with my wife in Switzerland). I found that life affecting me powerfully, as it was affecting much more the patients themselves. I wonder if you have read a book called the *Mountain* by Thomas Mann.³

Since then I have never advised anyone to stay too long in a clinic. My own inclination would be to go to the mountains and rest there after the preliminary stage of rest is over. I understand that the President has invited you to stay with him in Simla. Simla is, of course, very pleasant in September, but after all it is very official. There is a lovely cottage, 7 or 8 miles from Simla, totally unused except, perhaps, for two or three days in a year. This is at Mashobra and was a kind of week-end retreat of the old Viceroys. It is an ideal place for quiet rest.

But, of course, no place compares with Kashmir purely from the health point of view. The month of October in Kashmir is ideal and braces one up more than anything else. The air is invigorating. It may be that people who are used to the enervating climate of Bombay do not like this kind of nip in the air. For me two days of it is equal to a fortnight's rest elsewhere.

If you care to go to Kashmir, arrangements could be made very easily. A good solution would be for you to stay at Dinshaw Mehta's clinic till the

1. JN Collection.

2. Jayaprakash Narayan had written that he had gone through the fast without much distress and was recovering under Dinshaw Mehta's care in the Nature Cure Centre near Pune, who had advised him to stay there till December to recover completely from his ailments. He also expressed his gratitude to Nehru for settling the postmen strike issue satisfactorily for which he had undertaken the fast.

3. Mann wrote a novel, *The Magic Mountain*, in 1924 which dealt with the mysteries of time, life and death, and "the triumph of disorder in a world founded on order".

middle of September, then go to Kashmir for a month, and then go back to the clinic for a final check-up.⁴

I am feeling terribly tired, both physically and mentally. If at all possible, I shall go to Kashmir for a week about the middle of August. If I do so, I shall not stay anywhere, but trek in the mountains for at least five days.

I am glad you have written to me⁵ about Rao Sahib Patwardhan.⁶ I entirely share your view about him. My recollection is that when I made some suggestions to him sometime back, he was not agreeable to them. I certainly hope that we shall be able to take advantage of his earnestness and ability.

Yours affectionately.

Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Jayaprakash replied that he discussed the matter with Dinshaw who said that Jayaprakash should not think of leaving before completing the full course of treatment and ruled out his departure in September. Jayaprakash wrote that Shimla and Kashmir were very attractive propositions but he was sorry for not being able "to take advantage of either. Poona is quite pleasant in this season, so Poona will have to do for the present." He also wrote that Dinshaw's clinic had more than a boarding house atmosphere and Dinshaw was more like a friend than a doctor.
5. Jayaprakash had written about Rao Sahib Patwardhan (P.H. Patwardhan) who was "a first-rate man—both in ability and character. And no national use is being made of him." Jayaprakash wrote that he was writing to Nehru without the knowledge of either Achyut or P.H. Patwardhan. He also felt that "if his services can be obtained, the country and your Administration would be richer by it."
6. P.H. Patwardhan alias Rao Sahib (1903-1969); leader of Maharashtra Provincial Congress; suffered imprisonment in 1930, 1936, 1939 and 1942. After independence he left politics and joined Vinoba Bhave's Bhoodan movement.

3. To Ella Maillart¹

New Delhi

July 29, 1952

My dear Ella,

I have just received your letter of the 20th July. You say in it that I must not trouble to answer your letters. But then you put me a question in it and so I must answer it.

The story of Badrinath being claimed as Chinese territory is completely without foundation, so far as I know. Nobody in China has claimed it or referred to it. How some newspaper agency started it here or in Europe, I do

1. JN Collection.

not know.² Anyhow, so far as we are concerned, our frontier, wherever it is, is our boundary and no one can come across it without our permission or goodwill. Badrinath is far from the frontier.

I am afraid I am so far from ultimate freedom that even relative freedom seems almost an unrealisable dream.

Do make a colour film of a pilgrim going to Badrinath. I once suggested a film of the Ganga from Gangotri downwards with the background of history. The history of the Ganga would largely be the history of countless generations of the Indian people, their ups and downs, their culture, their philosophy, their empires and their decay.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Ella Maillart replied on 5 August 1952 that *Le Monde* of 26 January 1952 had quoted the China News Agency saying that since the shrine of Badrinath had "Buddhistic origins", the Chinese went there to plant their flag.

4. To A. Soekarno¹

New Delhi
August 1, 1952

My dear Soekarno,

... During the last nine or ten months, I have been terribly overworked. The general elections here meant very hard work and immediately after that came the formation of the new Government and the meeting of Parliament. In our Parliament, we have two Houses and that adds to the work. We have a very vigorous Opposition, among whom are a number of aggressive Communists. The result is that I have not been able to steal even one day from Delhi. I have felt the strain of this very much, and to add to this, I was foolish enough to have a fall the other day. Nothing much happened except that I go about limping. I hope to get over this in a few days' time. But I am looking forward very much to the end of our Parliament session. After that I shall try my best to take a week's rest, probably in Kashmir.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

I get news of you from our Ambassador² from time to time. I am, as you know, deeply interested in developments in Indonesia because I feel that in the context of the world, both our countries will have to pull together.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Bhagwat Dayal.

5. To Shrikrishna Pant¹

New Delhi
August 3, 1952

My dear Pandit Shrikrishnaji,²

Thank you for your letter of the 30th July which I was happy to receive.³

You know how I love the mountains. I am particularly anxious that the people of Kumaon Hills should progress and I shall do my best to that end.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 17(96)/48-PMS.
2. A resident of Nainital.
3. Shrikrishna Pant hoped that Nehru would soon sanction the establishment of a 'model university' in the Kumaon hills on the lines of Hyderabad. He wrote that in his speeches, Nehru was ecstatic in his references to the Himalayas and now the time had come to prove his love for them.

6. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
August 6, 1952

My dear Krishna,

For the first time in many years I have had to retire to bed. Some eight days ago I had a fall and hurt the place just under my knee. The injury was not by

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.

itself serious excepting that a delicate nerve was involved and that rather shook me up. That little injury has taken longer than expected to heal. Naturally our doctor friends have been eager to help me to get well. At their instance, I took an anti-tetanus injection. Also, in spite of my repeated protests, I was made to take some tablets of penicillin. I had never taken penicillin or these new fancy drugs before, nor to my knowledge have I ever taken an anti-tetanus injection.

The result of all this was much more serious than the fall and the injury. For some days I was thoroughly miserable, my body erupting all over, full of rashes and inflammation and itching violently. I began to look like a lobster. It was bad enough on my body. But when it spread all over my face and head, it became almost unbearable. Further injections and tablets of various things. There is no end of this kind of thing. I have now had adrenaline injection and anti-histamine pills. I am better today. During the last few days I have had more drugging than I have had for thirty years or more. The result of this new experience has been to make me more and more disinclined to take any drug at any time. I hope to stick to this resolution in future.

Within a week probably our Parliamentary session will be over. It was my intention to go to Kashmir for a few days' trek in the mountains. But, owing to the injury to my knee, I am afraid trekking is rather out of the question. I shall, however, still try to go there for a few days.

I have seen today a brief note from you with which you enclose a note dated 1st August about an interview you had with Winston Churchill.² In the course of this note, you ask me whether I have written to Churchill. I have not written to him at all. Indeed, I have written to no one in England except for two or three official and semi-official communications to B.G. Kher.

I am dictating this from bed.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. In the course of their talk, Churchill asked Krishna Menon whether he had left the post of High Commissioner "on good terms with Nehru." Krishna Menon replied that he had known Nehru for many years and he and Nehru had a close relationship long before there were any questions of an official relationship. "Our personal relations continued.... I did not feel he agreed with me."

7. To Shiela Grant Duff¹

New Delhi
August 17, 1952

My dear Shiela,²

... I was very happy to have your letter after such a long time.

It is true that I receive a good deal of praise and sometimes this is overdone. But, to balance it, I get much criticism and something worse also. Perhaps that is as well. I suppose it really does not matter much. It is not the praise and blame that make too much difference but rather life itself taken as a whole and this tends to harden and perhaps even, to some extent, to coarsen. There are very very few persons, I suppose, who can keep above and apart from this hardening and coarsening effect of life. No one of course can judge about himself.

You say that your life is a purely private one. Some of us hanker after a private life and wonder if there is much in what is called a public life. Have you written any other books?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Shiela Grant Duff (b. 1913); worked for the Foreign Research and Press Service of the Foreign Office; resigned after the fall of France; wrote *A German Protectorate: The Czechs under Nazi Rule*; edited the Czechoslovak Section of the European Service of the BBC.

8. To S. Radhakrishnan¹

New Delhi
August 31, 1952

My dear Radhakrishnan,

On my return from Kashmir, I find that something in the nature of a sensation has been caused among our foreign correspondents because of a speech you delivered in Bombay on August 27th at a women's meeting.² A report of this came in *The Times of India* of the 28th August. At this meeting you referred to Hitler's *Mein Kampf* where he wrote, "Let the West organize itself and crush Russia." You went on to say, "Today, the West is furiously and fanatically organizing itself to crush Russia. Is it not a triumph of Hitlerism?"

The comparison with Hitler in this connection has stung western countries particularly and we are asked if this means that we have given up our policy of not aligning ourselves with the various power blocs.

I do not know if you have been correctly reported. But in any event I can understand what you meant. That was one side of the picture and you emphasized it. But your words have needlessly led to anger, and have not had the soothing influence that you no doubt intended. Perhaps you could explain and amplify this statement on some future appropriate occasion.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. Replying to the address by the United Women's Organisation Committee representing eighty women's organisations, at the SNDT University, Bombay, on 27 August 1952, Radhakrishnan referred to the two World Wars and said, "though Nazism was defeated in the battlefield, we cannot be sure that the spirit is dead. There are some who complain that what we are doing today is perhaps the greatest triumph for Hitlerism—to organize the West against the menace of what Hitler called Russian barbarism. Even if we defeat our enemies in war, we do not solve our problems. The same problems will repeat themselves after a successful war as before. Why not then face them even now? Defeat of enemies in war does not take us far in the solution of our problems."

3. Meanwhile, Radhakrishnan had sent to Nehru a copy of his speech at the women's conference as recorded by the AIR. Nehru, writing back (not printed) to him on 1 September, said that "there is nothing in it with which I do not agree. But people are over-sensitive nowadays...."

9. Mahatma Gandhi-A Precious Heritage¹

About a year ago, Qudsia Zaidi² asked me to write a foreword to a little book about Gandhiji, which she had written especially for children. I pleaded lack of time and a reluctance to accept this suggestion. She was, however, insistent and did not wish to hurry me at all. It became difficult for me to continue to say no to her, because she had put her heart in the little book she had written. It was something much more than a book to her and the story of Gandhi obviously meant a great deal to her.

For a year her manuscript has been with me, a constant reminder of what I was expected, and yet was so reluctant, to do. At last I took this manuscript with me to Sonamarg in the Upper Sind Valley of Kashmir, and there, in sight of the high mountains and the glaciers, I thought again of the story of Gandhi.

Why was I reluctant to write anything on this subject? I do not quite know myself, but whenever I think of Gandhiji, I have a feeling of inadequacy about myself. Whenever I think of writing about him, the conviction grows that I cannot do any justice to the theme. Those of us, who lived and grew up in the shadow of that personality, had visions of greatness and of many-sided vitality, which cannot easily be expressed to others. It was a personal and a powerful experience which moulded our own lives. How can that personal experience be expressed adequately in writing? And so, whatever one writes about Gandhiji, seems trite, rather insignificant and utterly inadequate.

And yet this generation that had seen him and touched him and knew him somewhat, will pass away, as it is passing already. He will be remembered then by records and writings and by tradition which plays such an important part in the history of a race.

It is four and a half years since he died. He belongs not only to history but to the myth and legend of India, one of the great ones who come from time to time to enlighten us and ennoble us and to fill us with a new vitality.

It is right that our children and our children's children should know something of this story which has a certain epic quality about it, and even though they may miss the living presence, yet they will learn something not only about Gandhiji but about the ancient spirit and eternal message of India, which he represented so magnificently.

I welcome this little book therefore and wish it success.

1. Foreword written to Begum Qudsia Zaidi's book for children, *Gandhi Baba ki Kahani*, 1 September 1952. The book was published by Maktab Jamia, Delhi, on 2 October 1953.
2. (1913-1960); wrote many children's books and translated over twenty Urdu plays; instrumental in starting the Hindustani Theatre in Delhi.

10. To Lord Boyd-Orr¹

New Delhi
September 1, 1952

My dear Lord Boyd-Orr,²

Thank you for your letter of the 11th August.

I find it a little difficult to send you a message. I need hardly say that you have all my sympathy and any person who gives thought to the matter must come to the conclusion that we have to face the alternative of world cooperation or world disaster. What form that world cooperation might take is not quite clear to me and it is difficult to lay down any rigid formula. Ultimately I suppose we will have, if we survive till then, some kind of world government. But I hope that this will not come in the way of national freedom. I say so because we cannot rule out in the world today the domination of one or more groups of powers over the world. Technological improvements have knit the world together and made it possible for a real free world government as well as world dominions.

While I have every sympathy for your objective, I must confess that I do not see how this is to be obtained by merely a theoretical approach which largely ignores the basic conflicts of today. It is by a solution of those conflicts or by at least an adjustment of them, that we clear the way for a larger consideration of the problem.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. President, Parliamentary Group for World Government, House of Commons, London.

11. To C. Rajagopalachari¹

New Delhi
September 2, 1952

My dear Rajaji,

In a letter I wrote to you a day or two ago, I expressed the hope that you would come to Indore. This was more than a hope. I really would like you to come there not only to participate in our meetings but to enable us to meet you. It is a fairly long time since we have met and much has been happening. I do hope, therefore, that you will come. It will be a change for you after the heavy burden you have carried, though I do not promise you much rest. We shall, however, try not to tire you. Apart from the personal point of view, I think it is

1. JN Collection.

necessary that we should gather together from time to time and meet each other.

I am reaching Indore on the 11th evening and expect to remain there till the 15th afternoon.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

12. To Ika Paul-Pont¹

New Delhi
September 2, 1952

My dear Ika,

... I have read both your letters, the one of the 20th July, 1952, and the older one of the 18th October, 1950, which had not reached me at the time. I like your youthful enthusiasm, but the suggestions you make themselves show that you do not quite realize how we function here. I have no doubt that you could make yourself useful wherever you are. But a person must not merely make oneself just a little useful. He or she should play his or her full part. You have received special training and you should utilize that training. You know a good deal about France and some other parts of the world. But you are still ignorant of India and if you wish to serve India, you must get to know her.

I cannot just attach you to my staff merely to be a kind of intermediary between me and foreign visitors. I have plenty of such intermediaries about me, and those whom I have to see I must see myself.

I do not see really how you fit in with the scheme of things in Delhi. The kind of work we lay stress on today is with the common people. The other work, though it has some importance no doubt, is secondary and even for the other work that contact with the people is necessary.

You write that you have been working with the UNICEF children's centre. Why not continue that work, and if it is possible for you to come to India in that capacity, it will give you an opportunity gradually to study conditions here and fit yourself for other kinds of work here. That is all that I can think of for the moment. If any other idea strikes me, I shall let you know.

In your letter of October, 1950, you asked me to send you a photograph. I am sending one.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. A French woman who worked for the UNICEF.

13. To Hare Krushna Mahtab¹

New Delhi
September 16, 1952

My dear Mahtab,²

Your letter of the 10th September. I am afraid I cannot promise to be present at the UN Day meeting because I am not likely to be in Delhi on that day or round about. I expect to go to the tribal areas of Assam about that time.

I am a little apprehensive about the proposal to bring out a monthly magazine called "UN in India." There are quite a number of odd magazines and periodicals coming out in India and hardly any of them is upto the mark. To bring out something which is not really good is not worthwhile and I do not myself see how your magazine is going to be above the average. I see that the magazine is to come out in cooperation with the Ministry of Education. I do not quite know what this means. It should not be an official magazine in any sense, as that would embarrass us because then Government might be committed to the views given expression to in that magazine.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. H.K. Mahtab Papers, NMML.
2. President, Delhi State United Nations Association.

14. Kishorelal Mashruwala¹

I should like to pay my tribute to Kishorelal Bhai.² He was one of the straightest and truest of our old comrades. Whether one agreed with him in any matter or not, it was a comfort to know that he was there, a sentinel watching events and giving his views without fear or favour. His passing away is indeed a great loss both personally and in the national sense.

1. Message of condolence to the Editor, the *Harijan*, Ahmedabad, 19 September 1952. File No. 2(541)/50-PMS.
2. Kishorelal Mashruwala passed away on 9 September 1952.

15. To Jayaprakash Narayan¹

New Delhi
September 23, 1952

My dear Jayaprakash,

As I am leaving Delhi tomorrow for about a week, I am writing to you rather early to send you all my love and good wishes on the occasion of your coming birthday,² when you will complete half a century. I used to think that age quite respectable. But now that I am 62, it appears to me very youthful. Anyhow, may you retain your youth for long.

I shall look forward to meeting you before long.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. On 11 October.

16. To P.H. Patwardhan¹

New Delhi
October 2, 1952

My dear Rao Saheb,

Thank you for your letter of the 25th September. I am glad that you have joined the Press Commission. We attach great importance to this Commission. As constituted, it is a strong one and should produce good results.

None of us really can withdraw into our shells. There is no escape for us and so I am glad that you are going to utilize your abilities in some worthwhile work.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

17. To D.G. Tendulkar¹

New Delhi
October 12, 1952

My dear Tendulkar,
Your letter of October 8th.

I do not think the sentence you have given is quite accurate. It would be correct to say that "Jawaharlal Nehru bent his head down and began to sob like a child."²

Thank you for the fifth volume of *Mahatma*.

You have asked me for authoritative copies of my speeches after Bapu's death. I am sending you separately a copy of the book *Mahatma Gandhi* which contains from page 151 to the end the various speeches etc., that I made after his death. These were corrected by me before publication.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. D.G. Tendulkar Papers, NMML.
2. On the evening of 30 January 1948, Nehru rushed to Birla House on hearing the news that Mahatma Gandhi had been assassinated. Tendulkar has written in his eighth volume of *Mahatma* (p. 348): "Jawaharlal Nehru rushed to the spot. Overwhelmed with grief, he bent his head down and began to sob like a child." This sentence was approved by Nehru.

GLOSSARY

adivasis	aboriginals, tribals
ahimsa	non-violence
anna	one-sixteenth of a rupee (no longer in use)
'Azad Kashmir'	the areas of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan
Bapu	father; Mahatma Gandhi was addressed as Bapu
behn	sister
bhai	brother
bhandar	store
Bharat Mata ki jai	Victory to Mother India
Bhils	a tribe found in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan
bhojpatra	bark of the birch tree used for writing in olden days
charkha	spinning wheel
chinar	tall tree of Kashmir
chhota	small
dal	organization, association
dharmā	duty, religion
dhōtī	a long piece of garment worn by men round the waist and down to the feet
fatwa	a religious edict
firman	ordinance, mandate
goonda	hooligan
gram panchayat	village council
gur	jaggery
gurdwara	Sikh temple
hartal	strike
inam	reward
jagir	tract of land and its revenue given for services rendered
jagirdar	holder of a jagir
Jai Hind	victory to India
janab	a form of respectful address, Sir
jayanti	anniversary
jihad	Islamic concept of war against infidels
ji	affix added to a person's name to denote respect
khadi	cloth woven of handspun yarn
khandsari	unrefined sugar
kutchā roads	unmetalled roads
Lok Sabha	House of the People, Lower House of Parliament
mahasamītee	high level committee

Mahatma Gandhi ki jai	Victory to Mahatma Gandhi
milo	coarse grain
mirasdars	small landlords
mohalla	locality
mulkis/non-mulkis	local residents of Hyderabad as against settlers from outside
nai talim	basic education
nullah	water course, a ravine
panchayati raj	administration by village council
pie	one-twelfth of an anna (no longer in use)
pir	spiritual guide
pucca roads	permanent metalled roads
Rajpramukh	head of a Part B State
Rajya Sabha	Council of States, Upper House of Parliament
sari	an outer garment of Indian women
sarvodaya	movement for people's welfare
seva	social service or welfare
Sher-e-Kashmir	Lion of Kashmir
suba	province
swadeshi	indigenous produce of one's own country
takavi	advance money given to cultivators
talukdar	landowner
talukdari	system of land holding
tehsil	revenue sub-division
ulama	Islamic theologians
vanaspati	hydrogenated edible oil
yuvaraj	crown prince
zamindar	big landowner
zamindari	landowner's estate

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During the period 16 July to 18 October 1952 covered by this volume, Jawaharlal Nehru bestowed substantial attention on the question of Kashmir's position within India in the context of the decision of the Constituent Assembly of the erstwhile Princely State to finalize its Constitution. Nehru clarified that the accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State was "complete in law and in fact Jammu and Kashmir State is a constituent unit (of India) like any other (unit)...." According to the agreement fashioned in dialogue with Shaikh Abdullah and other leaders of Kashmir, a number of important clauses in the Constitution of India would be applied to the State of Kashmir, even though this State was on a somewhat different footing from other States of the Indian Union, in that it was a subject of discussion in the United Nations as a victim of Pakistani aggression. Another concurrent development relating to the Kashmir question was the inconclusive ending of the third and final round of talks held in Geneva by the representatives of India and Pakistan with Dr Frank Graham, the UN Mediator.

The finalisation of the draft first five year plan in this period was another landmark. While Nehru was fully satisfied that the draft plan had been discussed at various levels in a truly democratic manner, he was specially concerned that the intelligentsia and the common folk should be made fully aware of the salient features of the plan. On 2 October, the birthday of Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru also inaugurated the scheme for community development. He believed that the lives of the rural folk would undergo a decisive change for the better as different facets of community development went into operation.

In the sphere of foreign affairs, Nehru believed that the Himalayan State of Nepal should, as a proximate neighbour of India, grow up as a modern and democratic State. He was, moreover, prepared to help Nepal where help was needed and asked for without interfering in the internal affairs of a friendly neighbouring country.

Finally, Nehru was deeply concerned over the prospects of world peace receding due to the deteriorating situation in the Far East, and wondered whether "we should raise this major issue at the UN or encourage others to do so", when the UN itself remained "silent over such a vital matter where a war is being carried on in the name of the UN...."

